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High-impact, low-probability events such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
(CBRN) terrorist attacks have the potential to cause serious disruption to national 
infrastructure organisations in the UK. Although research examining the willingness and ability 
of healthcare workers to report to work during an extreme event has been conducted, little is 
known about levels of willingness and ability for employees of other sectors of national 
infrastructure. 
This thesis presents much needed evidence regarding the likely concerns, behavioural 
responses and information needs of employees of national infrastructure organisations in the 
UK during extreme events, with a focus on CBRN terrorist attacks. An interview study revealed 
that many resilience professionals assumed their staff would be willing to report to work 
during extreme events and had not placed sufficient emphasis on facilitating staff willingness 
to return to work during a crisis. An employee web survey revealed that in the case of some 
CBRN scenarios, less than a quarter of staff reported they would be willing to go to work. A 
series of employee focus groups revealed that staff will face a variety of barriers during a CBRN 
incident and will expect a great deal from their employer, including medical interventions and 
accurate, scientific information. At present, it appears likely that national infrastructure 
organisations’ plans will not meet the expectations of their staff and will fail to address their 
numerous practical, psychological and communication needs in the event of a CBRN terrorist 
attack.  
This research has drawn on theories of risk perception and risk communication, alongside 
theoretical frameworks from health psychology and social psychology, to understand likely 
employee responses to extreme events.  A series of recommendations are suggested for UK 
national infrastructure organisations’ business continuity plans and activities, including 
strategies that could be used to motivate and support staff in their return to work during an 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background and Context 
 
Extreme events such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks or other public health emergencies 
have the potential to cause significant disruption to businesses and, consequently, to national 
infrastructure as a whole. Past natural disasters have caused widespread physical destruction, 
often resulting in severe economic impacts. For example, in the wake of Hurricane Sandy in 
2012, the US Department of Commerce reported that the tropical storm had caused billions of 
dollars of damage.1 It was also estimated in 2013 that the storm would reduce employment by 
11,000 workers in New Jersey and would cost an estimated $41.5bn to repair the damage in 
New York.  Additionally, there have been many examples of business disruption caused by 
terrorist attacks, the largest and most significant being the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks in 
2001. These attacks resulted in widespread destruction of physical infrastructure, destroying 
buildings that housed a number of key international financial institutions.2 The impact of this 
was not only unprecedented in terms of loss of life, but also caused significant disruption to 
the financial markets.  London has also seen its fair share of terrorist incidents with the 
majority of incidents being undertaken by the Irish Republican movement, as well as the more 
recent Islamist-inspired July 7th 2005 bombings. The 7/7 bombings resulted in 52 deaths and 
significant disruption to the transport network; however many businesses were able to resume 
operations within two working days due to the incident only causing localised damage to 
infrastructure.3 In light of these examples it is evident that extreme events can vary greatly in 
terms of their impact upon society, governance and businesses. 
The nature and scale of an incident or terrorist attack can play an important role in the ability 
of organisations to recover from the resulting disruption. Some incidents can be confined in 
respect to the physical scale of the impact, such as the July 7th bombings. Others, such as 
infectious disease outbreaks, can have consequences which are more widespread and longer 
                                                          
1
 United States. Economics and Statistics Administration, ‘Economic Impact of Hurricane Sandy’, October 
2013, http://www.esa.doc.gov/Reports/economic-impact-hurricane-sandy. 
2
 United States. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Summary of “Lessons Learned” from Events 
of September 11 and Implications for Business Continuity’, accessed 13 December 2014, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/lessonslearned.htm. 
3
 United Kingdom. London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ‘The Economic Effects of Terrorism on 




term, impacting the ability of organisations and countries to carry on as normal. This thesis 
draws on evidence from natural disasters and influenza pandemics, whilst focusing on high-
impact, low-probability events such as: catastrophic terrorist attacks; novel, potentially fatal 
infectious disease outbreaks; major accidents which pose public health risks; and large-scale 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) events. Although other types of high-
impact, low-probability events are included in the National Risk Register (NRR), such as cyber-
attacks on infrastructure, volcano eruptions and major transport accidents, it is not feasible or 
appropriate to include all scenarios in this research.4 The majority of this research uses CBRN 
terrorist attacks as a useful case study in order to attempt to understand responses to high-
impact, low-probability events.  
The UK’s counter terrorist strategy (CONTEST) states the need to protect the country from the 
threat of CBRN terrorist attacks, as well as planning for the response and recovery if an attack 
were to occur.5 6 The UK Government considers all terrorist attacks a serious threat to the 
nation due to their capability to cause significant disruption and loss of life. However, in 
contrast to conventional explosive incidents, CBRN incidents can have the added complication 
of a contagious element or contamination, making recovery more challenging.7 CBRN terrorist 
attacks are universally recognised as high-impact, low-likelihood events.8 They are high-impact 
due to their potential to cause widespread disruption and loss of life; however they are also 
considered low-likelihood due to the difficulty terrorists would have acquiring the necessary 
materials and executing a successful attack. Although there have been relatively few examples 
of terrorist groups using CBRN as part of their strategy, the threat of a CBRN attack occurring in 
the UK remains a serious concern. One of the planning assumptions of CONTEST is that 
terrorist groups including Al Qa’ida will continue their long-term aspiration to use CBRN 
materials in a future attack.9 It was previously reported that Al Qa’ida had set up facilities in 
                                                          
4
 United Kingdom. Cabinet Office, ‘National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies’, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-risk-register-for-civil-emergencies-2013-edition. 
5
 United Kingdom. HM Government, ‘CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 




 United Kingdom. HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Chemical, Biological, 






 United Kingdom. Cabinet Office, ‘National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies’. 
9




Afghanistan to conduct research and provide training on the use of CBRN weapons.10 Further, 
it has been suggested that the risk of terrorists acquiring CBRN materials for use in an attack 
has increased in recent years due to:  
 A significant increase in the trafficking of material that could be used in 
radiological/nuclear weapons. 
 The increased availability of relevant technological information on the internet.  
 CBRN materials being used for legitimate purposes (i.e. in nuclear energy). 
 Inadequate security around decommissioned military CBRN material.11   
It is also important to consider the public response to CBRN events in relation to the increased 
threat of CBRN terrorist attacks. The UK Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defence commissioned 
the Blackett review, which was published in 2012, and discussed the best approaches for 
identifying, assessing and managing high-impact, low-probability risks.12 The review stated: 
For many high impact risks we do not understand what the public actually 
expects in a situation, or how tolerant they may be of ‘abnormal’ risks during 
a crisis. Exploration of these issues can be used to help inform how these 
types of risks are communicated to the public.13 
In light of this comment, and the potential for organisations to put less emphasis on planning 
for lower likelihood events, it is vital that research is conducted to understand employee 
responses and expectations during a CBRN terrorist attack. These findings can then be used to 
inform risk communication, specifically the type of information that an organisation would 
need to send to its staff during and after a CBRN incident. The evidence-base regarding the 
business impacts and employee reactions to CBRN events is limited due to the limited number 
of previous CBRN terrorist attacks and the low likelihood of these events occurring.  As a 
result, the discussions presented in this thesis will also draw on more traditional risks (e.g. 
influenza pandemics and natural disasters), in order to ascertain the ways in which businesses 
and their staff currently react to these higher probability incidents. The research will then test 
these current trends, principles and assumptions in respect to the impacts of CBRN events on 
national infrastructure organisations and their staff.  
                                                          
10
 United Kingdom. HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Chemical, 




 United Kingdom. Government Office for Science, ‘Blackett Review of High Impact Low Probability 
Risks’, January 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/high-impact-low-probability-risks-
blackett-review. 
13
 Ibid., 24. 
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CBRN incidents are especially interesting in light of the ability of national infrastructure 
organisations to continue providing basic services. This is because incidents involving CBRN 
hazards can have acute negative health effects, as well as considerable potential for 
widespread psychological and behavioural consequences. For example, the 1995 sarin attacks 
in Tokyo and the anthrax attacks in the United States bring into sharp focus the potentially 
serious effects a CBRN incident can have on both the physical and psychological health of a 
population.14 15 16 These physical and psychological impacts can, in turn, have a disruptive 
effect on worker productivity levels and, consequently, a significant impact on businesses. For 
example, Capitol Hill staff workers experienced concentration difficulties and an inability to 
focus on work as a result of the anthrax attacks in 2001.17 Some mentioned avoidance of 
related information, others said they were in denial or just wanted to forget about the 
incident.  This level of distress is clearly not conducive to business continuity, especially when 
one considers that those employees who experienced distress from the September 11th 
terrorist attacks were more likely to be absent from work in the weeks after the event.18 These 
examples provide evidence of the potential psychological effects that could be caused by a 
CBRN terrorist attack, and the subsequent disruption to organisations. If a CBRN terrorist 
attack were to occur on UK soil, there is a high chance it would cause widespread 
consequences in terms of the psychological health of staff at national infrastructure 
organisations. If key staff at these organisations were unable to function in the aftermath of a 
CBRN incident, it would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the UK to recover and 
return to normal.  
A terrorist incident involving a CBRN hazard has the potential to severely alter the everyday 
functioning of community, government and industry.  As a result organisations must have 
plans, procedures and processes in place in order to minimise the disruption. These activities 
fall under the industrial framework of Business Continuity Management (BCM). BCM is focused 
                                                          
14
 R.M. Bowler, K. Murai, and R.H. True, ‘Update and Long-Term Sequelae of the Sarin Attack in the 
Tokyo, Japan Subway’, Chemical Health and Safety 8, no. 1 (January 2001): 53–55. 
15
 Yuji Nishiwaki et al., ‘Effects of Sarin on the Nervous System in Rescue Team Staff Members and Police 
Officers 3 Years after the Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack.’, Environmental Health Perspectives 109, no. 11 
(November 2001): 1169–73. 
16
 Carol S. North et al., ‘Exposure to Bioterrorism and Mental Health Response among Staff on Capitol 
Hill’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 7, no. 4 (December 2009): 
379–88. 
17
 Carol S. North et al., ‘Capitol Hill Staff Workers’ Experiences of Bioterrorism: Qualititative Findings 
from Focus Groups’, Journal of Traumatic Stress 18, no. 1 (February 2005): 79–88. 
18
 Kristin Byron and Suzanne Peterson, ‘The Impact of a Large‐scale Traumatic Event on Individual and 
Organizational Outcomes: Exploring Employee and Company Reactions to September 11, 2001’, Journal 
of Organizational Behavior 23, no. 8 (November 2002): 906. 
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on planning for the disruption that incidents could potentially cause to the components of the 
organisations that are critical to business operations in order to return to normal functioning in 
a timely manner.19   
The UK Government Business Continuity Management Toolkit recommends organisations 
conduct a business impact analysis (BIA) to establish the critical or essential products and 
services that need to continue to function during a crisis, as well as the resources that are 
required to maintain these, such as: premises; technology; information; supplies and partners; 
and people.20 With regards to ‘people’ the Toolkit suggests finding out the optimum number of 
staff required to carry out critical activities, the minimum staff level needed to provide some 
sort of service and the skills/expertise required. The recommended strategies to combat the 
impacts of staff absenteeism are focused on how to ensure the work continues (through cross-
training of skills, geographical separation of skills and third party support) rather than how to 
increase the ability or willingness of the existing staff to report to work. However, real 
incidents such as the 2001 anthrax incident in the US and hypothetical incident studies such as 
Gershon et al., have demonstrated that not all staff who can report to work necessarily will, 
and if they do, they may not be productive due to the psychological impacts of the incident.21 
22 In light of this, more focus is needed on the potential reasons for staff being absent during 
an incident and on the requirement for organisations to accommodate the practical and 
psychological needs of their staff during high-impact, low-probability events such as CBRN 
terrorist attacks.  
Although organisations can often function in the short-term without their key staff, this is not 
always the case. Staff absenteeism has the potential to severely affect business operations and 
impact on revenue, as illustrated by local manufacturing firms losing an estimated $7.67mn in 
the value of production in the week after the 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear disaster in 
Pennsylvania.23 This loss was caused by a number of factors including interruptions to the 
supply chain and public concerns over contaminated food products. However, one of the key 
                                                          
19
 United Kingdom. HM Government, ‘How Prepared Are You? Business Continuity Management Toolkit 






 North et al., ‘Capitol Hill Workers’ Experiences’. 
22
 Robyn R. M. Gershon et al., ‘Factors Associated with the Ability and Willingness of Essential Workers 
to Report to Duty during a Pandemic’, Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 52, no. 10 
(October 2010): 995–1003. 
23
 Peter S. Houts, Paul D. Cleary, and Teh-Wei Hu, The Three Mile Island Crisis: Psychological, Social, and 
Economic Impacts on the Surrounding Population, University Studies 49 (Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1988), 40. 
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causes of this loss of revenue was a lack of staff due to widespread evacuation. Consequently, 
this example shows that staff absenteeism has the potential to cause a serious financial impact 
on business operations.   
This PhD thesis will examine the consequences of high-impact, low-probability events for 
businesses and for the staff who work in them. Specifically, the author will consider the impact 
of CBRN attacks on national infrastructure businesses in the UK. The thesis focuses on 
employees and the effect their responses to an incident can have on business continuity, 
rather than the recovery of physical assets, IT processes or supply chain issues. However, it is 
acknowledged that the impact on staff and the impact on physical assets and processes are 
often linked. For example, the denial of access to facilities caused by an extreme event can also 
have a psychological effect on employees. After September 11th, it was reported that workers 
appeared to feel a sense of loss for their former offices and also struggled with the crowded 
facilities they were faced with.24 The return to work behaviour of staff after a serious incident 
forms the primary focus of this research. To date, this is an area that organisations and 
industry standards have failed to adequately address. BCM often has well developed strategies 
for the recovery of physical assets and restoring normal processes, as well as for ensuring 
absent staff members’ work is completed by other individuals. However, it fails to take into 
account the importance of addressing staff concerns and facilitating their return to work, 
particularly for incidents that may continue for longer than a week or two.  
  
The willingness and ability of staff to report to work 
National infrastructure organisations must understand the factors informing staff willingness 
and ability to report to work in the event of a serious incident if they intend to engage in an 
effective response.  The failure of key staff to perform their duties could have serious 
consequences for the individual organisations concerned and potentially for the country as a 
whole. Addressing a few key issues would improve national infrastructure organisations’ ability 
to address staff concerns and accommodate their needs, which would help to build a more 
resilient workforce.  These changes can be informed by (i) understanding the behavioural 
assumptions being made about employee response within existing business continuity plans 
and (ii) understanding the distinction between employees’ willingness and ability to work.   
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First, it is possible that organisational business continuity assumptions concerning the numbers 
of staff who would be willing or able to return to work in a timely manner after an incident are 
inaccurate. For example, one study asked healthcare workers about their likely decisions 
during an influenza pandemic; 95% said they would be able to work and 89% said they would 
be willing to work.25 Similarly, in a study of essential workers (including hospital workers, 
police, and public health department workers), although 80% reported they would be able to 
report to work in a pandemic, only 65% said they would be willing to.26 Therefore, it is possible 
that not everybody who could work during a crisis would necessarily want to do so.  
Consequently, a distinction must be made between whether an individual is able to work, and 
whether she or he would be willing to work. The term ‘able’ is understood as meaning 
available to work, as per the definition used by Gershon et al.27 It is also inclusive of an 
individuals’ competency to work, as per the definition of ability used by McCabe et al. who 
refer to ‘actual operational power (ie, skill, know-how) of an individual, organization or 
community to perform a task if the requisite external circumstances require and allow it’.28 
Therefore ability is concerned with whether or not an employee is practically able to work. 
McCabe et al. also define the term willing to work, stating that ‘Willingness refers to the state 
of being inclined or favorably predisposed in mind, individually or collectively, toward specific 
responses’.29  In this case the specific response is the decision to return to work. Therefore, in 
this thesis the term ‘willing’ is understood as ‘would work if practically able’. 
This research will have a greater focus on the willingness of employees to report to work as a 
result of its grounding in psychological theory rather than business or technology-based 
theories. However, the concept of ability to work is not removed from the discussion entirely 
due to the potentially close relationship between the two concepts.  For example, a parent 
whose child has influenza may not be willing to report to work because they want to care for 
the child, and thus because of this they would not perceive themselves as being able to report 
to work. The role this perception of ability plays is an important issue as the measure included 
in this PhD research and most previous research is based on self-reported ability rather than 
actual ability. Therefore the parent in the example above may in reality be able to go to work 
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because they have someone else in their family or friendship group who could care for their 
child; however they may feel they need to care for their child themselves. This may be because 
they believe their child should be their responsibility, or because they feel their family comes 
before their job, or because they think they would worry too much about their child if they left 
them and went to work. Whatever the reason, the parent may perceive themselves as being 
unable to go to work. This example clearly shows the psychological aspect of the concept of 
ability to work and as such justifies why it cannot be removed entirely from the topic.  
Although this research is focused on the decisions of employees to either report to work or to 
stay at home, it is also important to consider the circumstance in which an individual may 
report to work when they are either physically or psychologically unwell. This concept is known 
as ‘presenteeism’ and is considered by some as the opposite of absenteeism, which is where 
individuals take sick leave and stay at home when unwell.30 If individuals feel they cannot or 
should not take sick leave, then in the event of a serious incident or crisis this may lead to staff 
being willing to report to work, but being unable to perform their duties to their usual 
standard. In recent years, researchers have become interested in the incidence of 
presenteeism as well as its impacts on industry, specifically in terms of productivity loss.31  One 
study in this area reported that out of a sample of 3801 employed individuals, over a third said 
that they had gone to work two or more times in the last year even though they felt they 
should have taken sick leave due to the state of their health.32 This concept could be especially 
significant in the event of a major public health incident in which affected employees should 
not attend the workplace due to the increased risk of spreading an infectious disease amongst 
colleagues. Further, by forcing themselves to come to work when they are physically or 
psychologically unwell they could actually lengthen their recovery time, thus increasing the 
negative impacts on the business.  
Figure 1.1 shows the potential behavioural decisions of employees in the aftermath of a 
serious incident, as well as the interplay of ability to work, willingness to work and 
presenteeism (being willing to work but not being able to function once there). 
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Figure 1.1: Interplay between willingness, ability and presenteeism post-incident 
 
It needs to be noted here that the focus of this research is on willingness and ability to report 
to work and that although the concept of presenteeism is not the focus, it is clearly an 
important factor that cannot be ignored. It is therefore recommended that future research 
examines the incidence of presenteeism and the resulting effects on worker productivity in the 
aftermath of extreme events. It would also be interesting to investigate factors that may 
influence presenteeism in the aftermath of an incident, such as perceived or actual 
‘replaceability’, health status, importance of role or other demographic factors.33    
 
The physical and mental health impacts of disaster 
Large-scale incidents such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and infectious disease 
outbreaks can have a significant physical and mental health impact on the affected population. 
Both physical and mental health symptoms could influence whether an employee is able 
and/or willing to report to work. As a result, employers have a role to play in assisting those 
individuals who are experiencing health problems as a result of the incident.  
                                                          
33
 Gunnar Aronsson and Klas Gustafsson, ‘Sickness Presenteeism: Prevalence, Attendance-Pressure 
Factors, and an Outline of a Model for Research’, Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine / 
American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 47, no. 9 (September 2005): 958–66. 
Outcome 
groups 
Decision Event  
All staff involved 
in incident 
Stay at home 
Not able and  
not willing 
Able but not 
willing 
Willing but not 
able 
Go to work 
Willing  but not 
functioning 




Research conducted in the weeks, months and years following terrorist attacks have shown 
that a small percentage of victims will go on to develop a psychological disorder as a result of 
their involvement in the incident. For example Galea et al. surveyed approximately 1000 adults 
living in a specific area of Manhattan five to eight weeks after the September 11th terrorist 
attacks in order to assess the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
depression.34 The findings revealed that 13.6% of the sample reported symptoms meeting the 
diagnostic criteria for either PTSD or depression.  
The psychological impact of the Tokyo subway sarin attacks is more difficult to estimate 
because follow up research is limited; however reports suggest a relatively large proportion of 
victims experienced symptoms of PTSD, anxiety and depression in the months and years 
following the event.35 36 One study conducted face-to-face interviews with a small sample 
(n=34) of victims of the Tokyo attacks and reported evidence of persistent PTSD symptoms five 
years after the attacks; 11 out of the 34 presented with current or lifetime PTSD.37 The authors 
reported that 65.5% of the sample were still experiencing recollections, 48.3% continued to 
avoid places that triggered recollections, 43.3% reported tension and 42.9% reported 
forgetfulness. However, some of these symptoms may have been caused by the acute sarin 
poisoning. In addition, it is important to remember that research of this nature can be 
impacted by a non-response bias if the psychological consequences of the incident affect the 
willingness of victims to volunteer to take part in the study. Nonetheless, the research suggests 
that traumatic incidents such as terrorist attacks, including those involving a hazardous 
element, can cause a range of symptoms that may persist in the long-term, and that these 
symptoms (e.g. recollections, avoidance, anxiety, low mood and forgetfulness) would no doubt 
have an effect on people’s willingness and ability to report to work.  
Further, it is not just individuals diagnosed with psychological disorders whose work will be 
affected. It is possible that post-incident distress could result in individuals experiencing 
symptoms that either prevent them from being able and/or willing to report to work, or as in 
the presenteeism discussion previously, could impair them from being able to do their job 
once they get there. One study of British nationals in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear 
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accident reported that 16% of the sample met the criteria for distress.38 Further, a study of 
Londoners in the weeks following the July 7th terrorist attacks found that 31% of the sample 
reported experiencing substantial stress.39 Lastly, as mentioned previously in this chapter, after 
the 2001 anthrax attacks on Capitol Hill, staff reported experiencing problems such as denial, 
avoidance, concentration difficulties and an inability to focus on work, as well as an 
exacerbation of physical ailments such as headaches and gastrointestinal problems.40 Again, 
these symptoms are clearly not conducive to optimum levels of productivity. In light of this, 
future research should aim to evaluate the influence of post-incident distress symptoms on the 
willingness and ability of employees to report to work, as well as their productivity levels if 
they do.  
When considering both the psychological and physical health impacts of disasters on 
employees, it is important to discuss the capability of organisations to provide their staff with 
access to treatment. In terms of mental health, the strategies most often utilised by high-risk 
organisations to help employees exposed to serious incidents are peer-support programs. 
Peer-support programs make use of members of staff, usually volunteers, who receive training 
by mental health professionals in skills needed to help other members of staff in the aftermath 
of an incident, such as in psychological first aid.41 42 A study using the Delphi method 
recommended that peer-supporters are the initial point of contact for individuals involved in a 
high-risk incident, unless the employee requests otherwise, and that the peer-supporters 
identify individuals who may need further assistance and facilitate the pathways to 
professional help.43 Peer-support programs are often used in high-risk organisations such as 
the military and the police; however it is unclear how prevalent these types of programs are 
within other sectors, such as transport or energy.44 45 In recent years there has been a move 
away from recommending the use of traditional ‘trauma counselling’ or conducting ‘single-
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session psychological debriefing’ with non-selected trauma victims, as it does not have any 
recognised benefit, and could potentially do more harm than good.22 If it were feasible to do 
so, then providing peer-support programs within national infrastructure organisations could be 
a useful alternative to traditional debriefing or trauma counselling, and could become an 
important part of building organisational resilience 
 Many large organisations currently provide an occupational health service and some also offer 
private healthcare to their employees. Occupational health providers have an important role 
to play in the event of a serious incident affecting employee health. However, some reports 
suggest that only a small minority of the UK workforce have access to occupational health 
services or occupational physicians.46 47 For the organisations that do have occupational health 
departments or private healthcare for their employees, they may have the ability to provide 
their staff with access to physical assessments and treatment as well as psychological support 
in the aftermath of an incident. This could be particularly useful due to the fact that GPs and 
other NHS services are often overstretched during normal operations; therefore private 
healthcare services provided by employers have the potential to relieve some of the added 
pressure that would occur in the event of a major public health incident.  
Although healthcare provided by employers should not negatively impact on NHS provided 
care, it clearly has an important role to play. There are previous examples of when the 
relationship between the two has been successful, the most obvious being influenza 
vaccinations. Many occupational health departments have been able to provide their 
employees access to influenza vaccinations. Similarly, some individuals who would be eligible 
for a free influenza vaccination on the NHS choose to pay privately in their local pharmacy, for 
reasons such as accessibility, convenience and preference for the environment.48 This a clear 
example of how private healthcare services can supplement NHS services and contribute to an 
increase in vaccination rates in order to meet WHO targets. However, it is vital that these 
services are designed in collaboration with public health officials to ensure that they adhere to 
current NHS policy and relevant legislation.  
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BCM in national infrastructure organisations: Accommodating the needs of 
staff 
The present study focuses on business continuity in relation to organisations which operate in 
a sector of UK national infrastructure (although many of the key concepts and 
recommendations apply to all organisations). The UK’s national infrastructure consists of the 
essential facilities, networks, systems and sites that are needed to keep the country 
functioning on a day-to-day basis.49 There are nine sectors that make up this national 
infrastructure: communications, emergency services, energy, finance, food, government, 
health, transport and water. The ability of organisations which operate in these sectors of 
national infrastructure to continue to function during an extreme event is vital to keep the 
country running. This PhD research makes use of primary data from employees of all sectors 
and therefore does not limit the discussion to any particular sector. It should be noted that not 
all national infrastructure can be considered ‘critical’; however some essential services and 
physical infrastructure within the sectors are termed ‘critical national infrastructure’ (CNI) if 
their failure could result in severe economic or social consequences or loss of life.50 It is, 
therefore, vital that organisations including elements of CNI continue to function in the event 
of a serious incident. However, past focus has been on the recovery of the physical 
infrastructure and processes of these organisations and less on the likely behavioural 
responses of the staff that work for them.  
The financial services sector is one of the nine sectors that make up UK national infrastructure. 
A case study of the financial services sector is a useful format for illustrating some of the key 
points, challenges and trends taxing business continuity managers today. Many of these trends 
are also reflected across other areas of national infrastructure. The financial sector is made up 
of organisations that provide financial services to retail and commercial customers. Without 
financial services people would not be able to draw money out of an ATM to buy food and 
other necessary supplies. Furthermore, almost all other businesses in the UK are supported by 
financial services, including those that provide essential goods and services such as 
supermarkets and transport providers.51 Therefore, it is vital that financial organisations keep 
functioning in the aftermath of a serious incident. The financial services sector has continued 
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to work to improve its resilience to disruption through research projects and exercising.  For 
example, the Resilience Benchmarking project conducted by the Tripartite Authorities 
(Financial Services Authority, Bank of England and HM Treasury) surveyed approximately 60 
financial firms and financial infrastructure providers in order to review the sector’s resilience 
and produce recommendations for improvement. The 2005 exercise revealed that although 
the tangible infrastructure components of the organisations are relatively well protected, 
there is less clarity regarding the functioning and welfare of staff after an incident.52  
Relevant key findings were as follows:  
 Just over one third of organisations said that their staff would not be affected by travel 
disruption following a major operational disruption. 
 A quarter of respondents’ plans did not take into account where employees live or 
how they get to work. 
 Just over half would expect staff to work from alternative locations for extended 
periods of time but had not consulted with employees on this or investigated whether 
this would work in practice. 
 Twelve firms did not have next-of-kin data. 
 Ten firms had provided business continuity training to less than 5% of their staff. 
 In a follow-up survey in 2008, an improvement was noted with regards to the inclusion of staff 
in crisis management.53 Relevant key findings were as follows:  
 Almost all organisations said that their plans took into account where employees live 
and how they get to work.  
 Only half of all respondents had plans which include provision for staff transportation 
and alternative working arrangements (twice the 2005 level but still low). 
The Resilience Benchmarking exercises have shown that although improvements have been 
made with regards to accommodating the needs of staff in an incident, there is still some way 
to go.  
Similar trends to the ones seen in the financial services sector are also evident in other 
industry sectors. For example, in the Cabinet Office’s summary of the sector resilience plans, a 
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loss of key staff is noted as a potential impact on the resilience of the energy and Government 
sectors.54 However, the summary report includes no mention of the potential impact that a 
longer term loss of non-key staff could have on the sectors. In the transport sector, Boeing 
developed a business continuity model in the wake of 9/11 that aimed to develop plans to 
serve their customers, stakeholders, community and also their own employees.55 On a positive 
note, the organisation provides employee training which includes disaster preparedness 
awareness and it also acknowledges the fact that employees could experience psychological 
symptoms after an incident because of grief. However, the general focus of their model is on 
planning for damage to the physical infrastructure. When staff are included in the planning it 
appears to be only staff with defined roles and responsibilities for business continuity and 
disaster recovery.  
Similar trends were revealed in the Chartered Management Institute’s Business Continuity 
Management Surveys which cover a range of sectors in the UK. The surveys revealed that since 
2007, the ability of organisations to provide remote access to employees who need to work 
from home increased; however the 2010 survey revealed that only 14% of organisations had 
encouraged remote working to help combat swine flu.56 57 58 Furthermore, the 2011 survey 
revealed that only one in three organisations provide BCM training to non-specialist staff and a 
similar result was revealed in the 2007 and 2009 surveys.59 60 61 The evidence would suggest 
that the involvement of staff in BCM did not improve during this time. Possibly as a direct 
result of this, many of the organisations involved in these surveys are also falling short on 
accommodating the needs of their staff in their BCM.   
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As a final example, IBM, a key component organisation of the communications sector, 
produced a guidance document entitled ‘Business continuity: how to increase workforce 
resiliency during disasters’.62 Although the document does acknowledge the need to 
communicate effectively with staff, the need to allow staff to communicate with family 
members and the importance of managing the emotional implications associated with trauma, 
it does not mention the possibility of staff refusing to report to work due to fear or other 
concerns. Further, despite extensive guidance about remote access technology and 
alternative/recovery sites, it does not acknowledge any potential staff issues related to these 
interventions. It should be noted that the IBM document was published as an example of the 
corporate resilience service that the company offers. As such, it is not clear whether the 
organisation actually follows its own recommendations. What is clear, however, is that in all 
these examples the main focus is on staff being unable to report to work as a result of being 
directly impacted by the incident or when transport or childcare is unavailable. The issue of 
staff being unwilling to report to work and discussions about strategies for increasing staff 
willingness to report to work appear to have been overlooked.  
In summary, the outcomes of the two financial services Resilience Benchmarking surveys and 
trends seen across other sectors of national infrastructure have highlighted two key areas of 
interest that will be addressed in this PhD project. First, there appears to be a lack of attention 
to the needs of staff in crisis management and business continuity planning, an issue that will 
be examined further through qualitative interviews. Second, the crisis management and 
business continuity plans of organisations make certain assumptions about their employees’ 
behaviour during a crisis. This research will address whether or not these assumptions are 
accurate through interviews, a survey and focus groups with employees from national 
infrastructure organisations operating in a variety of sectors. The findings of this research will 
be discussed in relation to a number of relevant psychology theories. Following this, 
recommendations for business continuity professionals based on the outcomes of the research 
will be presented.  
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The theories used in the design of this research, as well as in the analysis, have their roots in 
health psychology, social psychology and organisational psychology. These theories have been 
used to explain the phenomenon of staff willingness to report to work during high-impact, low-
probability events.  When studying something as complex as human behaviour, which has such 
a variety of potential influences, it is not just an advantage to draw on a variety of 
psychological theories but a necessity.  
 
Risk Perception 
Employee perceptions of risk are likely to influence their psychological and behavioural 
responses in the aftermath of a serious incident. These perceptions have a role to play in their 
individual decisions whether or not to return to work. The interactions between the risk 
perceptions and behaviour of the public have previously been linked to the ability of 
governments and government agencies to respond to extreme events or disasters; however 
this is also something that could apply to the ability of organisations from other sectors of 
national infrastructure to respond to and recover from these events.63 64 65 To examine these 
issues in more detail it is important to understand how members of the public evaluate the 
risks in the world around them.   
Slovic et al. argue that risk perception is dealt with in three main ways: 1) Risk as feelings – 
using fast, intuitive reactions to danger; 2) Risk as analysis – using logic, reason and scientific 
deliberation for hazard management; and 3) Risk as politics – when our instincts and scientific 
analysis conflict in our minds.66 Members of the public primarily use ‘risk as feelings’ to 
evaluate risks, which leads them to undertake everyday risk analysis automatically and 
instinctively, basing many of their assessments on ‘gut feelings’. The term ‘affect’ is used to 
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refer to the conscious or unconscious feeling of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ associated with a 
stimulus that individuals use in order to make judgements about risk. 67 68 Although people do 
use strong emotions such as fear and anger to make risk perceptions, usually ‘risk as feelings’ 
is reliant on more subtle emotions.69 Risk perceptions using affective responses are more 
efficient because they occur automatically, often without the need for weighing up pros and 
cons or remembering relevant examples.70 71 However, when an individual experiences a new 
risk, for example a CBRN terrorist threat, they have to search through their memory for similar 
risks (e.g. infectious diseases, nuclear power), and make use of the positive or negative feelings 
associated with those more familiar risks.72 Risk perceptions formed as a result of these 
generalisations are likely to be inaccurate.  
An individual’s reliance on positive or negative feelings to perceive risks is known as the ‘affect 
heuristic’. Using an immediately available affective perception of a risk is not always helpful, 
especially if it is based on inaccurate knowledge or generalising from what is deemed similar 
stimuli. Individuals are known to underestimate and overestimate risks, which can have 
consequences as these judgements can affect their behaviour.73 For example, during the 
anthrax attacks that took place in the US in 2001 many people believed that they had been 
exposed to anthrax even when they had not been in contact with the spores. 74 It is possible, 
therefore, that they could have been overestimating the risk to their personal health which 
could be a reason why many unexposed people reported being ‘very upset’ in the immediate 
aftermath.  
A similar over-reaction was evident in the aftermath of the radiological accident in Goiânia, 
Brazil.75 The incident involved a small amount of caesium-137 being stolen from an abandoned 
healthcare facility, which was later shared around the community by people who wanted to 
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show the glowing substance to their family and friends.76 The incident resulted in 4 deaths and 
260 people being contaminated. However, due to the widespread fear caused by radiation it 
also resulted in more than 112,000 people seeking examination and reassurance. Despite the 
fact they had not been exposed to any radiation, members of the public were experiencing 
stress-induced symptoms similar to the symptoms of radiation poisoning.77 This last example 
clearly illustrates the fact that a public over-response to an incident due to misperceptions of 
the risks involved could put a serious and unnecessary strain on healthcare facilities.  
Alternatively, familiarity with a risk can lead to an under reaction which can also impact health 
outcomes.  Take, for example, an outbreak of a novel influenza virus, a scenario in which 
members of the public may recall their past experiences of milder strains of influenza. They 
may also recall that their recovery did not require medication. In the event of a more serious 
strain of the virus, these recollections could result in individuals not taking their symptoms 
seriously enough or not taking the recommended protective actions. 
Due to this potential for individuals to under or overestimate risk, it is important to understand 
how the public estimate the threat a particular risk poses to them. Research in this area has 
discovered a number of qualitative attributes individuals use to assess the potential risks of a 
stimuli or activity. The following factors are deemed important: 
 Is the risk voluntary or involuntary?  
 Are the effects immediate or delayed? 
 Is the risk known or unknown to those exposed? 
 Is it considered controllable or uncontrollable? 
 Is the risk new/unfamiliar or old/familiar? 
 Is the risk chronic or catastrophic? 
 Is it a common risk (one people have learned to live with) or one that causes feelings 
of dread?  
 How serious are the consequences – certain to be fatal or not certain to be fatal?78 
Those risks that are deemed uncontrollable, unfamiliar, catastrophic, cause feelings of dread, 
could be potentially unknown to those exposed and that have serious consequences in terms 
of causing death are the ones that cause the greatest level of concern for individuals. Incidents 
involving a CBRN hazard can score very highly on these qualitative attributes and so are likely 
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to cause high levels of fear if an incident of this type were to occur. This theory is supported by 
findings of prospective scenario studies which have shown that the type of incident has an 
effect on healthcare workers’ willingness to report to work.79 For example, Chaffee concluded 
that healthcare workers might be more willing to report to duty in weather disasters or mass-
casualty incidents than in CBRN incidents.80 Similarly, in a study of frontline health workers, 
78% said they would be willing to report during a weather related event compared to 67% in 
an influenza pandemic and 52% in a bioterrorism event.81 Therefore, there remains a degree of 
uncertainty about the numbers of healthcare workers who would report to work during a 
public health emergency, because the levels of willingness appear to vary greatly by incident 
type. It would seem that there is less willingness to report to work during incidents involving a 
contagious disease or contaminant due to the increased risk the healthcare workers face in 
these situations. The less familiar, more complex incidents (in terms of the hazards involved) 
such as CBRN terrorism are potentially more fear-inducing than natural disasters or 
explosions.82  
Burns and Slovic also compared public risk perception and likely behaviour for a number of 
different threat scenarios and found that:  
i) There was more concern for terrorist attacks than accidents. 
ii) There was more concern for infectious disease than explosions. 
iii) The use of suicide with an expressed motive to spread fear heightens the 
perception of risk.83    
They also reported that risk perception was a good predictor of inclination to avoid public 
places or leave the area until the threat is over. It should be noted, however, that this study 
sampled only students in the US, so whether it can be generalised to the wider public is 
questionable, as is the fact that it took place very close to the anniversary of the September 
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11th attacks – potentially at a time of heightened fears for terrorism. Nonetheless, the findings 
have clear implications for organisations. Those incidents that cause more concern such as 
terrorist attacks, infectious disease outbreaks and suicide attacks are more likely to cause 
people to avoid the affected area or public places in general meaning they may be unwilling to 
leave their homes and report to work. It is vital that business continuity managers are aware of 
the influence that employees’ risk perceptions can have on their behavioural responses during 
serious incidents.  
Business continuity managers may perceive the same incident in a different way to the majority 
of the staff at an organisation. Past research has discussed the idea that whereas the public 
base their risk perceptions on feelings or ‘affect’, experts assess risk in an entirely different 
way. Slovic et al. argue that experts analyse the risks in the world around them using logic, 
reason and scientific deliberation.84 Experts are more likely to calculate the probability of an 
incident occurring and to make use of scientific information about the likely consequences of 
the event prior to making any judgments or behavioural decisions. The public, or in this case 
staff, would be more likely to rely on their gut feelings to make these decisions and are less 
likely to perform a cost-benefit analysis. These findings have clear implications in an 
organisational setting. It is possible that business continuity managers are making assumptions 
about staff behaviour based on their own perceptions of risk. However, due to the varied skills 
and experience of business continuity managers in national infrastructure organisations, it is 
also important to mention that they will not all be ‘experts’ in the scientific nature of the risks 
but they should be considered experts in their organisation’s response and recovery.  
In summary, the risk perceptions of members of the public inform their behavioural responses 
to extreme events.  Similarly, the risk perceptions of employees’ during and in the aftermath of 
a serious incident such as a CBRN terrorist attack are likely to inform their behavioural 
responses and in particular their willingness to report to work. It is therefore vital to 
understand: (i) if risk perceptions can influence the decisions of employees in response to 
extreme events; (ii) how risk perceptions can influence the decisions of employees in response 
to extreme events, and (iii) how an organisation’s risk communication can be informed by risk 
perception theories in order to promote desired behaviours in its staff. This research is the first 
to apply risk perception theory to the topic of willingness to work. It is also the first to examine 
how effective risk communication could be used to increase the likelihood that staff will report 
to work.  
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An aspect of risk perception not evaluated explicitly in the present research is cost-benefit 
analysis. This element of risk perception has been previously applied to public perceptions of 
technological risks, with individuals making quantitative judgements of perceived risk, 
acceptable risk and perceived benefit for a list of activities and technologies (e.g. skiing and 
nuclear power).85 Although the perceived costs and benefits of reporting to work are not 
measured quantitatively in this research, discussions about the concerns and behavioural 
intentions of employees in the focus group study reported in Chapter 5 were designed in a way 
that would facilitate participants to discuss their perceptions of the benefits and risks, the pros 
and cons, of reporting to work. It would be useful for future research to take this one step 
further and ask employees to rate the costs and benefits of reporting to work for a variety of 
scenarios on a numerical scale.  
 
Risk Communication  
Risk communication is widely recognised as an important tool for sharing information and 
informing behaviour. In the case of a serious incident, such as one involving a CBRN hazard, 
effective risk communication has the potential to inform and prepare individuals. This can 
improve the likelihood of individuals taking appropriate protective actions and thus result in 
fewer fatalities.86 Becker has suggested that in an emergency with a CBRNe element, people’s 
behaviour could be influenced if they are given clear, scientifically accurate advice.87 This can 
enable the public to be fully prepared for potential risks so that they can protect themselves 
and their families. 
There are many real world examples of effective risk communication. However, there are also 
examples of when risk communication has not gone to plan and, as a result, has influenced 
behaviour in an unhelpful way. These real world examples highlight the importance of risk 
communication and provide evidence of situations where ineffective risk communication had, 
or could have had, serious consequences. Ineffective risk communication is primarily due to a 
lack of information, inaccurate information being provided, or the public misunderstanding 
that information. For instance, in the case of anthrax incident on Capitol Hill some workers 
thought they had heard media reports containing warnings not to take antibiotics for more 
than a few days because they could become immune to them, which led to some workers only 
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taking the medication for two or three days instead of the two to three months they were 
prescribed for.88  
Similarly, it was reported that after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident the most frequent 
reasons given by residents for why they chose to evacuate the area was that the information 
they were given was confusing; residents were initially advised to evacuate the area, but this 
recommendation was later rescinded.89 The 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attacks were also 
impacted by poor communication. For example, staff at the main receiving hospital were told 
by the Fire Department that the cause of the symptoms they were seeing was acetonitrile, 
when it was in fact sarin.90 Further, the information given to the public was misleading and 
false announcements were given out on the trains, which confused not just the passengers but 
also the responders.91 Finally, miscommunication during the events of September 11th could 
have had very serious consequences for staff involved. An eyewitness described being in the 
South Tower during the incident and being instructed over the tannoy system that there had 
been an isolated fire in the North Tower and they need not evacuate. Fortunately, the 
individual ignored this message and continued to evacuate, a decision that ultimately saved his 
life.92 These examples show the need to provide clear and accurate information to staff, as 
inaccurate information or information that is potentially ambiguous has the potential to cause, 
at best, unhelpful behaviour and at worst, fatalities.   
In contrast, risk communication has also been shown to be helpful in real incidents. It can be 
used during and after an incident so that employees know what to do. For example, during the 
2001 anthrax attacks in the US, the American Airlines’ communications strategy was 
considered a success due to the variety of different communication methods utilised by the 
organisation.93 More than 30 print publications, 20 email publications, 70 different web 
newsletters and 12 managerial phone hotlines were used by airline communicators to reach 
current employees, retirees, airline customers and the financial community. However, it is not 
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just the method of communication that is important; the content of the messages can 
influence the psychological and behavioural responses of individuals during a serious incident.  
Research has used focus groups to examine public reactions and behavioural responses to 
hypothetical CBRN incidents. Some of the most prominent and influential research in this area 
was conducted as part of the two year Pre-Event Message Development Project, which in 
addition to cognitive response interviews, included 79 focus groups with 884 participants.94 95 
The focus groups revealed that in the event of a CBRN terrorist attack, the public respond to:  
i) Clear and accurate information.  
ii) Practical, concrete action steps. 
iii) Consistent, simple messages.96  
Participants also wanted information related to the response, such as whether the incident 
could happen again and how long the emergency would last.97 Similarly, Wray and Jupka 
reported that in the event of a terrorist attack involving plague, the public wanted specific 
information that would allow them to take the necessary actions to protect themselves and 
their families and about how to seek treatment.98 The participants also wanted messages to be 
clear, accurate and presented in plain English. The need for specific information about 
protective actions was also reported by Henderson et al., who also found that in response to a 
hypothetical VX attack the public wanted detailed medical facts about exposure and 
treatment.99 These findings have implications in terms of the content of the messages 
organisations send to their staff during a serious incident. It is probable that similar principles 
apply to industrial/organisational communication during a CBRN event.  
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Pearce et al. have also used focus groups to examine public reactions and information needs 
during a hypothetical incident involving an RED.100 The study examined the public’s existing 
levels of knowledge, risk perception, understanding of existing risk communication and in light 
of this information, their intended behaviour. Based on the findings of these focus groups the 
researchers were able to design new risk communication messages and test these with further 
focus groups. The findings revealed that by providing accurate information, researchers were 
able to improve participants’ understanding of the actual risks to their health. This increased 
level of knowledge resulted in participants being less likely to report that they would attend a 
healthcare/monitoring facility, something that would be unnecessary for those who had not 
been in the affected area. It also led to participants questioning some of the information they 
had seen in a media report because it contradicted the information they had read in the 
official leaflet. This is something that would be extremely useful in a real incident when one 
considers the potentially wide range of different information sources available to the public 
and the so called ‘experts’ who would be giving their opinion in the media. Employers should 
keep in mind that by pointing staff in the direction of the official Government communication, 
their employees will be less likely to be influenced by potentially inaccurate information, such 
as what they may read on social media.  
It is vital that employers provide their staff with accurate information concerning the risks they 
could face by going to work, keeping in mind that without the facts employees could be under 
or overestimating the risks to their health and that of their significant others. In a study of 
student nurses, it was found that the students’ concerns for safety (self and family) were based 
on inaccurate knowledge about some of the agents concerned.101 In fact when asked to 
consider an inhalational anthrax incident, 80% of the student nurses were concerned about 
their own safety and 75% were concerned for their family’s safety, when in reality anthrax is 
non-contagious from human-to-human. Furthermore, with regards to treating victims of a 
chemical incident who had been decontaminated, 54% were concerned for themselves and 
58% were concerned for their families. The student nurses in the study seemed to be unaware 
that there would be little or no risk to themselves or their families when treating a patient who 
had already been decontaminated. However, it must be noted that this study was conducted 
using a relatively small sample of student nurses (n=95) which means that the results must be 
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generalised to the wider nursing population with caution, particularly those with more 
experience and training. Nonetheless, the study shows just how vital accurate information 
would be in the event of a serious but unfamiliar incident such as a CBRN terrorist attack, 
particularly when one considers the potentially low levels of knowledge employees could have 
of the agents involved.  
A final aspect of risk communication that needs to be considered in the present discussion is 
trust. Academics have frequently discussed the role that trust plays in both the acceptability of 
risks and the believability of risk communication.102 103 104 105 106 Both the public and employees 
of an organisation need to trust not only the content of the information but also the provider 
of that information, whether this is an organisation, an individual spokesperson, an 
independent expert or an employee’s own line manager. Pearce et al., in their focus group 
study of public reactions to a radiological exposure device (RED) terrorist incident, found that 
the participants were generally sceptical of the media due to perceived scaremongering in the 
past but were generally trusting of a non-governmental scientist.107 Similarly, Pearce et al., in 
their survey study examining public risk communication following a chemical spill found that 
the extent to which the public trusted the authorities giving the advice directly influenced their 
intention to comply with the recommendation to shelter in place.108 Therefore, if individuals 
do not trust the organisation or person that is presenting the information or advice to them, it 
could mean that they adopt unhelpful behaviours or that they refuse to follow 
recommendations which are designed to protect their health.109 In light of these findings it is 
important to understand how authorities’ inaccurate assumptions about public behaviour 
during emergencies can inform risk communication in an unhelpful way, further fostering 
public feelings of distrust.  
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Governments and organisations often make assumptions about the behaviour of individuals 
during extreme events. Rogers and Pearce suggest that some of the distrust the public have in 
the authorities is possibly a result of information being withheld from the public during past 
incidents.110 This may have occurred because authorities designed their risk communication 
materials based on an assumption that the public would panic if they knew the full extent of 
the situation, an assumption that we now know is largely unfounded. Although ‘panic’ is a 
commonly used term in the media and in the emergency planning world to this day, many 
academics do not agree that the public is prone to panic in emergency situations. 
Consequently many articles have been written and theories proposed that dispute this idea.111 
112 113 A main area of contention is the fact that data collected from survivors of real incidents 
do not support the idea of ‘mass panic’ and there are few examples of antisocial behaviour 
occurring.114 115 In fact, research shows that people are more likely to behave in an altruistic 
manner, even towards strangers, and even in life-threatening situations.116 Despite these 
findings, past academic research has revealed emergency responders frequently hold the 
inaccurate view that the public will panic during an emergency situation and will not follow 
instructions.117 118 These inaccurate assumptions have informed planning in an unhelpful way 
and in an emergency this could result in information being withheld, which could result in a 
less effective response.119 These findings have implications for the ways in which organisations 
communicate with their employees during extreme events. Organisations should not withhold 
information from the public (i.e. their customers) or from their own staff, as this may lead to 
them not being viewed as a trusted source of information in the future.  
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In addition to organisations making assumptions about how the public will behave, it is also 
important to mention that members of the public can also make assumptions about 
emergency response. Research in this area has found evidence that public expectations of 
what should happen during an incident can lead to an under-response on the part of the 
public. For example, Pearce et al. in their study of public responses to a hypothetical RED 
incident found that participants were falsely reassured by the response of the authorities, 
because they believed they would be quarantined or there would be a larger police cordon 
area if there was really a risk of radiation.120 This assumption caused them to believe it was a 
‘scare story’ and because of this most participants said they would not alter their behaviour. 
The implication of these findings in an organisational setting is that employees may make 
assumptions about their employer’s response during an extreme event. If there is a 
discrepancy between what employees expect of their organisation and what their organisation 
actually provides, it may result in employees experiencing negative feelings towards their 
employer. For example, if employees expect there to be masks provided during an infectious 
disease outbreak and the organisation does not provide these, then employees may feel the 
organisation is not taking their safety seriously enough. Employers will therefore need to 
provide accurate, technical information in order to justify why they are providing certain 
interventions, or perhaps more importantly, why they are not.  
To add to this discussion, Drury has suggested that in an emergency, individuals should be 
armed with information to help them survive.121 This idea goes against traditional views that 
people process information less efficiently under stress by proposing that keeping individuals 
informed will actually reduce their stress and allow them to act efficiently. Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that in the event of a CBRN incident there are likely to be low levels of 
knowledge amongst the general public causing an ‘information void’ to occur.122 This is 
something that Barnett et al. believe would do nothing to reduce feelings of dread, and is likely 
to affect an employee’s decision whether or not to report to duty.123 Therefore, it is vital that 
organisations are honest and accurate when providing their staff with information in the event 
of a serious incident, particularly one that is unfamiliar such as a CBRN incident, as it has the 
potential to directly affect rates of staff absenteeism. The present research has examined 
these issues further, specifically the influence of different sources of information on employee 
                                                          
120
 Pearce et al., ‘Communicating with the Public Following Radiological Terrorism’. 
121
 John Drury, ‘Managing Crowds in Emergencies: Psychology for Business Continuity’, Business 
Continuity Journal 3, no. 3 (2009): 14–24. 
122
 Daniel J. Barnett et al., ‘Applying Risk Perception Theory to Public Health Workforce Preparedness 





perceptions and behavioural intentions, as well as getting useful feedback from employees on 
their likely information needs during a CBRN incident. The information employees receive 
during an incident has the potential to influence their behavioural responses. However there 
are also other factors that could influence their willingness to report to work, such as their 
beliefs about the seriousness of the threat they are faced with and the extent to which they 
can do something to protect themselves against that threat.   
 
Extended Parallel Process Model 
The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) is a model which other academic researchers 
have found to be useful in understanding how healthcare providers’ perceptions of threat and 
efficacy may influence their willingness to work during an influenza pandemic.124 125 126 127 The 
model suggests that when individuals perceive a threat they assess the ‘perceived severity’, 
which is their belief about the seriousness of the threat, and the ‘perceived susceptibility’, 
which is their belief about their own chances of experiencing the threat.128 The efficacy part of 
the model is separated into ‘perceived response efficacy’, which is the individual’s belief as to 
whether the response can prevent the threat, and ‘perceived self-efficacy’, which is their belief 
in their own ability to perform the recommended response. The EPPM was originally designed 
as a theory to explain why some fear appeals fail; either when the appeals do not elicit the 
desired health behaviour in the public or the public simply reject the messages. Witte devised 
the EPPM after the previous leading theory, Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), in his 
opinion, failed to sufficiently explain the empirical data and the specific factors leading to the 
message rejection in fear appeals.129 130 The EPPM has been selected for inclusion in the 
present research as an alternative to PMT due to its previous successful application to the 
topic of willingness to work; however it should be noted that the two theories are very similar.  
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Both the EPPM and PMT contain the elements of perceived threat and perceived efficacy; 
however, the EPPM puts more emphasis on the emotional response of fear people experience 
in reaction to a perceived threat. For example, when an individual believes that a threat is 
serious and that they are susceptible to it, their fear will motivate them to take action.131 In 
terms of perceived efficacy, people can become motivated to control the danger that a specific 
threat poses to them or to control their fear about that threat. However, they are only likely to 
take the recommended action if they believe they are able to do so. If they do not believe they 
are able to take the recommended action or the action does not work then Witte and Allen 
suggest that people will be more likely to try to control their fear using unhelpful coping 
strategies such as denial (i.e. a belief that it will not happen to them), defensive avoidance (i.e. 
individuals refuse to think about it because it is too frightening) or reactance (i.e. individuals 
might ignore the official message due to a belief they are being manipulated).132  
Past research examining healthcare workers’ behavioural intentions in the event of an 
influenza pandemic have discovered that the EPPM can be used to assess workers’ willingness 
to respond. Specifically, Barnett et al. in their 2009 study reported that local health 
department employees who perceived the threat of a pandemic to be high (in terms of the 
likelihood of it occurring and its severity) and perceived their efficacy to be high (in terms of 
their ability to perform their duty and the impact they would have on combating the public 
health threat) were 31.7 times more likely to report being willing to respond to an influenza 
pandemic than those with low perceived threat and low perceived efficacy.133 The authors 
note that efficacy is a stronger predictor of willingness than threat, although those individuals 
fitting a high threat/low efficacy profile were still three times more likely to be willing to 
respond than those fitting a low threat/low efficacy profile. Interestingly, a study with hospital 
workers revealed that although those fitting a high threat/high efficacy profile were 
significantly more likely to say they would be willing to report in a pandemic than those fitting 
a low threat/low efficacy profile, the specific ‘threat’ aspect had no significant impact on 
willingness; the high threat/high efficacy EPPM profile was not significantly different from the 
low threat/high efficacy profile in their willingness to respond.134  
                                                          
131
 Kim Witte and Mike Allen, ‘A Meta-Analysis of Fear Appeals: Implications for Effective Public Health 




 Barnett et al., ‘Assessment of Local Public Health Workers’ Willingness to Respond to Pandemic 
Influenza’. 
134




In light of these findings, the research presented in this thesis has examined the willingness of 
employees of all sectors to report to work during a range of different hypothetical scenarios 
using the EPPM threat and efficacy assessment framework. Specifically, it has investigated the 
relative influences of the threat and efficacy variables on willingness, using a modified version 
of the EPPM. To my knowledge this is the first study to apply the EPPM framework to 
employees other than healthcare workers and with additional scenarios to pandemic, such as 
incidents involving CBRN hazards. The EPPM measure has been included in the web survey 
which is reported in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
 
Role Conflict 
Related to the concepts of self-efficacy and response-efficacy are the perceptions an individual 
may hold about their role in the workplace. This could also take the form of a feeling of 
obligation, either to their job or to their family. It has long been recognised in the sociological 
literature the significance of individuals belonging to various social groups: families, friendship 
groups, employment groups, community groups and also society as a whole. One of the first 
and most widely cited articles to examine this multiple-group membership in disaster was 
Killian in 1952.135 Killian suggested that in a disaster individuals experience a ‘role conflict’ 
between the roles they play in these different groups. Killian concluded that the biggest 
conflict is between the family and other groups. The author used the example of a ship 
explosion in Texas City and described how the majority of individuals who experienced a role 
conflict between the family and other groups resolved this in favour of loyalty to their families. 
After conducting interviews with people affected by the Texas City explosion and also people 
affected by tornados in three Oklahoma towns, Killian suggested that: 
Much of the initial confusion, disorder, and seemingly complete 
disorganization reported in the disaster communities was the result of the 
rush of individuals to find and rejoin their families.136 
However, the concept of role conflict in disaster is not fully supported by Quarantelli, who 
found little evidence of its existence in his research.137 In fact in the study of over 150 disaster 
events, which included 6000 interviews, Quarantelli reported that role conflict did not cause a 
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serious loss of manpower.  The author proposed that structural shifts occur in disaster-
impacted communities which reduce the potential role conflicts. A community can be 
described as a group of individuals striving to achieve multiple values. The shifts occur in an 
emergency situation because certain values become more critical, and subsequently the roles 
required to achieve these values become more important.  Quarantelli commented that 
Killian’s article tended to put the primary values that are central to an emergency response 
(e.g. caring for people, providing for their basic needs etc.) in opposition with other types of 
demands on the individual, such as occupational role expectations. Quarantelli notes that these 
values can be achieved in many ways and that some organisations are responsible for 
implementing these values (e.g. emergency relevant organisations). It is important to note that 
Killian focused on disasters for which there was little warning (explosion and tornados), and 
Quarantelli comments that disasters that occur without warning and have a widespread impact 
provide the optimum conditions for role conflict to occur. However, Quarantelli found no 
evidence of role conflict in his own study of these types of disasters. One significant point to 
note here is that Killian discussed the different groups and roles as separate concepts, whereas 
in reality it is likely these overlap considerably. Quarantelli makes two interesting points about 
this: first, that occupational performance is an important part of the role of being a father and 
a husband, and second, that in an emergency situation it is likely that other members of the 
family will take up the role of tending to immediate family and neighbours. However, it must 
be noted that Quarantelli’s article was published over 30 years ago and since then gender roles 
have changed, and as such it is more likely that men and women are equally responsible for 
providing for their families financially, or that either gender could be a single parent, making 
the occupational roles of both genders’ important.  
More recent research into factors affecting the ability and/or willingness of healthcare workers 
to report to duty during an incident have repeatedly reported that fear or concern for family or 
significant others is a frequently cited reason for not being willing to report to work during an 
incident.138 Healthcare workers face an additional source of stress, whereby caring for a 
patient with an infectious disease could potentially put their own health at risk and 
subsequently the health of their family. This stress can be caused by feelings of guilt about 
whether they should be risking their family’s health for the profession.139 Several studies have 
shown that one of the barriers to an individual’s willingness to work is a concern for their 
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families and that a potential facilitating factor to return would be to provide protection or 
treatment to their significant others as well as themselves.140 141 In one study which asked 
hospital staff about their experiences during a fire disaster, participants mentioned negotiating 
with their spouses concerning their decision whether to stay at home or go to work; spouses 
wanted them to stay home for emotional and physical support.142 When asked whether they 
would be prepared to work with victims who could transmit disease, student nurses’ 
responses were influenced by whether their families would receive protection (prophylactic 
antibiotics) or vaccine.143 In fact, 90% of the students said they would not be willing to work 
with contagious clients (where transmission to family was possible) if their family was not 
provided with prophylactic antibiotics. Note that in this study, family was defined as 
‘significant others’, which also included friends and anyone who was highly significant to the 
individual.  
Families are an important influence on the decisions an individual may make during and in the 
aftermath of an incident, and on their willingness to work during this time. This influence 
would most likely be stronger for incidents where there is a threat to the health of significant 
others, such as an infectious disease outbreak or risk of contamination from a noxious agent. 
However, it must be noted that not all studies have found a difference in willingness to work 
between those who have children and those who do not have children.144 Although previous 
academic studies have examined the influence of families and significant others on the 
willingness of employees to report to work in for various hypothetical extreme events, this 
study will be the first to discuss these influences in relation to Role Conflict Theory.  
Accounts of real incidents can also provide examples of family having an influence on return to 
work behaviour. For example, after the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear disaster in 1979 – the 
worst nuclear incident the United States had ever experienced – it was reported that role 
conflict was a source of tension for nuclear workers.145 The TMI incident caused a large 
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number of residents to evacuate the area.146 According to one estimate, 66% of those 
households within five miles of TMI had at least one person evacuate (although this only 
accounts to 1% of the total area population).147 Although most of the evacuees reported 
staying with family and friends, they were often located far away, with over half reporting 
having travelled over 90 miles.148 This is significant because mass-evacuation has the potential 
to cause substantial business disruption, especially when, due to their roles, staff are unable to 
complete their work remotely (e.g. bus drivers and bank cashiers). When residents who 
evacuated the TMI area were asked why they did so, the main reasons given were because 
they felt there was a danger and to protect their children.149 Having young children in the 
house was one of the strongest predictors of evacuation. One study reported that vast 
majority of TMI nuclear workers indicated that during the incident they felt they needed to be 
in two places at once – at work and at home. However, this conflict was resolved in favour of 
work, with high proportions of TMI nuclear workers not evacuating because they felt they ‘had 
to work’. After the anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001, families often added to 
employees’ distress, requiring information and reassurance. For example, one mother of a 
worker made the worker promise never to go back into the building they worked in ever 
again.150 
 As most of the past studies included in the present thesis have found families to be an 
influence on willingness to work, they provide some support for Killian’s original theory of role 
conflict; although as previously discussed, the roles are not as separate as his article 
suggests.151 The recent research differs from the findings of Quarantelli potentially because the 
disasters he included did not involve an infectious agent or any CBRN element; therefore 
continuing to work in the disasters he studied would have been unlikely to put a worker’s 
family at further risk.152 The idea of role conflict has also been discussed away from the disaster 
literature and focuses on the idea that parents who care for children and who also work can 
experience role conflict in everyday life, whereby the two roles are perceived as somewhat 
incompatible. Research has shown this conflict to be a source of stress for many professionals, 
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having an effect on both psychological and physical health.153 154 155 This is important because 
even if the role conflict does not affect an individual enough to cause them to stay away from 
work, the fact that it can cause psychological and physical symptoms means it cannot be 
ignored; experiencing these symptoms can have a negative effect on an individual’s 
productivity levels at work. The issue of the influence on family and loved ones on return to 
work behaviour needs further clarification and the present thesis will examine the effect of 
these significant others on predicted willingness to work after an incident through its primary 
data collection.  
As well as significant others having an effect on workers’ willingness to report to work, they 
can also have a significant effect on their ability to go to work. Several studies report the 
availability of childcare as a potential barrier to employees returning to work after an 
incident.156 157 158 159 160 In the event of a large scale incident it is likely that some school 
closures would occur. In some cases this might happen because the school is in a directly 
affected area, damaged by the incident, or in the instance of a pandemic, it could be closed as 
part of a country’s mitigation strategy. One estimate states that in the UK about 16% of the 
workforce is likely to be the primary caregiver for their children (who still live at home); the 
cost of school closures as a result of work absenteeism could potentially be as high as £0.2bn 
to £1.2bn per week.161 However, it is noted in the same article that it may be possible for 
individuals to arrange informal care for their children, or to work from home; but for how long 
these alternative arrangements could last is unclear. Furthermore, this estimate is based on 
solely the primary caregiver staying at home for practical reasons, and does not take into 
account the additional caregivers missing work because of concerns for the safety of their 
children, such as the fear of passing on an infection. 
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Further, in a study examining the return to work behaviour of staff in a local government 
organisation after a hypothetical earthquake, the researchers noted that having dependent 
children had less of an effect than predicted.162 However, those with children in their 
household scored significantly higher on the item ‘I would be more useful at home than at 
work after an earthquake’ than those with no children. It is unclear, however, why there was a 
difference; for example whether the parents agreed with the statement solely because of 
practicalities or whether other influences and emotions had a part to play.  
 
Professional Obligations  
During or after an incident that involves contagion or contamination, employees may have to 
put their lives at risk (or at least perceive themselves as doing so) to carry on working as 
normal. Adding another layer of complexity to personal risk assessment is the ethical or moral 
dilemma they may face: carry on working to for the sake of their organisation and colleagues 
or stop working to protect their health. Research in this area has mainly focused on the ethical 
dilemma healthcare providers face when deciding whether to put their own personal health at 
risk by reporting to duty and treating infected patients.163 There exists a moral debate about 
the level of risk an individual should or would tolerate when they have an obligation or duty of 
care.  Discussions in this area have taken place around Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) and pandemic influenza.164 165 166 In the case of SARS, the illness was very serious, even 
in healthy young adults, and posed a genuine risk to the health of medical professionals 
treating infected patients.167 Many healthcare workers were labelled as ‘heroes’ by the media 
for risking their own health to treat sick patients.168 However, one must consider whether such 
acts are indeed heroism or simply fulfilment of a professional obligation. Some would argue 
that the specialist knowledge and ability of physicians means they have an obligation to help 
                                                          
162
 K. Smith and D. Walton, ‘Returning to Work after the Big One: Predicting Staff Priorities in a Dual Role 
Agency’, International Journal of Emergency Management 6, no. 2 (2009): 169. 
163
 Abigail Zuger and Steven H. Miles, ‘Physicians, AIDS, and Occupational Risk’, JAMA: The Journal of the 
American Medical Association 258, no. 14 (October 1987): 1924. 
164
 Lynette Reid, ‘Diminishing Returns? Risk and the Duty to Care in the SARS Epidemic’, Bioethics 19, no. 
4 (August 2005): 348–61. 
165
 Kelly A. Shaw et al., ‘The GP’s Response to Pandemic Influenza: A Qualitative Study’, Family Practice 
23, no. 3 (June 2006): 267–72. 
166
 Carly Ruderman et al., ‘On Pandemics and the Duty to Care: Whose Duty? Who Cares?’, BMC Medical 
Ethics 7 (April 2006): 5. 
167
 Monica Avendano, Peter Derkach, and Susan Swan, ‘Clinical Course and Management of SARS in 
Health Care Workers in Toronto: A Case Series’, CMAJ: Canadian Medical Association Journal 168, no. 13 
(June 2003): 1649. 
168
 Dena Hsin-Chen Hsin and Darryl R. J. Macer, ‘Heroes of SARS: Professional Roles and Ethics of Health 
Care Workers’, Journal of Infection 49, no. 3 (October 2004): 210. 
 48 
 
when faced with a critical human need, even if personal risk is involved, and certain codes and 
principles of ethics have been published to address this issue in the medical profession.169 
However, codes and principles notwithstanding, it is still possible for a healthcare worker to 
refuse to report for duty, potentially believing that they may be putting their career on the line 
by doing so. During the SARS outbreak, there were examples of staff refusing to treat infected 
patients.170 Singer at al. discuss the moral quandary of healthcare workers during the SARS 
outbreak, who 
….were forced to weigh serious and imminent health risks to themselves 
and their families against their duty to care for the sick. This duty is mainly 
determined by professional ethics. By analogy, firefighters do not have the 
freedom to choose whether to face a particularly bad fire and police 
officers do not get to select which dark alleys they walk down.171 
Further, in a study of healthcare workers in Singapore, it was reported that although the 
majority perceived a great personal risk of falling ill with SARS, they also accepted the risk as 
part of their job.172 In the case of pandemic influenza, similar moral decisions are likely to have 
been made in GP surgeries and hospitals across the world. A prospective qualitative study of 
GPs in 2006 revealed a strong conviction that the abandonment of their responsibilities during 
a pandemic would be unethical and that taking care of their patients is what they signed up to 
do.173 In a study examining willingness to work during an influenza pandemic, it was found that 
64% of physicians disagreed with the statement ‘It would be ethical for HCP [healthcare 
professionals] to abandon their workplace during a pandemic in order to protect themselves 
and their families’, which compared to just 30% of administrators who disagreed with the 
same statement.174 Similar results were reported by Seale et al. who found that 
ancillary/support staff were significantly more likely to be unsure of their intentions regarding 
reporting to work during a pandemic when compared to medical/nursing staff.175 Therefore, 
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the willingness of staff to put their personal safety at risk by working may vary by occupation 
or role. It is also unclear whether the sense of duty and consideration of professional ethics 
applies only to emergency/healthcare workers, or if employees of other organisations would 
also be confronted with a similar ethical dilemma when deciding whether or not to report to 
work. DiGiovanni et al. is the only study known at the present time to have directly compared 
healthcare/emergency workers and another working population, which, in addition to 
emergency responders, also included a group of local media workers, a group of spouses of 
responders and a group of residents in a prospective study of community reactions to 
bioterrorism.176 It was found that: responders (95%) were the most likely to stay at work when 
compared to media (71%) and residents (65%); media workers and spouses showed the 
highest levels of fear; and media workers showed the lowest levels of understanding of 
medical issues surrounding the outbreak. However, it is unclear from the research whether it 
was the responders’ sense of professional obligation that led to them being the most willing to 
remain working or whether it was their increased levels of knowledge.  
Consequently, there is a need to examine this issue further, and this thesis will examine 
whether employees of national infrastructure organisations feel a sense of duty to continue to 
work in order keep their organisation running during a crisis. In addition to the possibility of 
employees’ willingness to report to work being influenced by their role or profession, it is also 
possible that their behavioural responses are affected by organisational factors, such as how 
strongly they identify with their organisation or how satisfied they are with their job. Both of 
these factors will be discussed in turn.   
 
Organisational Identification  
The tendency for individuals to identify with an organisation and for this identification to 
influence their perceptions and behaviour is a phenomenon that has been studied by 
psychologists for many years.177 178 179 180 181 182 The roots of this phenomenon can be found in 
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the social identity approach of social psychology.183 Social Identity Theory (SIT) proposes that 
as well as personal identities, individuals also possess social identities based on them being a 
member of a group or multiple groups.184 When applied to organisations it explains how 
people define themselves in terms of their membership in a specific organisation, such as their 
employer - a construct known as ‘organisational identification’.185 186  
Organisational identification as a concept has been reported to be distinct to the related 
concepts of organisational commitment and job satisfaction.187 188 Ashforth and Mael 
reformulated the concept of organisational identification using social identity theory and 
defined it as the experience of perceived oneness with a group.189 Mael and Ashfroth later 
discussed a feature of organisational identification as ‘the experience of the organisation’s 
successes and failures as one’s own’ and as such, the concept’s relevance for the present topic 
becomes clear.190 After an incident, the recovery of a business has the potential to be a success 
or a failure. If employees feel these successes and failures so personally, are they more likely 
to behave in a way that fosters business continuity? Mael and Ashforth examined 
organisational identification in alumni of a college and found that it was associated with: 
making financial contributions, willingness to advise others to attend and participation in 
functions.191 However, the authors state that organisational identification is not necessarily the 
same as professional/employment identification, which is the extent to which an individual 
defines him/herself in terms of the work (e.g. ‘I am a bus driver’, rather than ‘I am a TFL 
employee’). The research presented in this thesis focuses on organisational identification 
rather than professional identification because in order to increase the likelihood of recruiting 
sufficient numbers of participants, employees with diverse job roles were included. Further 
research is needed to explore the influence of professional and employment identification. 
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Furthermore, past studies have examined the links between organisational identification and 
specific work related behaviours such as job satisfaction, motivation and wellbeing. 192  One 
study of new US Army recruits reported a link between organisational identification and 
military attrition and another study of physicians discovered that strength of organisational 
identification was positively associated with voluntary cooperation at work.193 194 Therefore, 
although past research has linked organisational identification to positive workplace 
behaviours, this is the first study to my knowledge to examine an association between 
organisational identification and the willingness of employees to report to work in the event of 
a serious incident, something that has been tested in the web survey of this PhD research. 
 
Job Satisfaction 
In addition to organisational identification, a further concept drawn from organisational 
psychology which could help inform this discussion is ‘job satisfaction’. Academics have 
discussed a variety of precursors to an individual being satisfied with their job such as job 
complexity, work stressors, social and organisational support and person environment fit (the 
compatibility between an employee and their work environment).195 Job satisfaction as an 
attitude has been linked to a range of different work related behaviours and psychological 
variables in the academic literature for several decades.196 Some variables job satisfaction has 
been linked to in the past are: openness to change (restructuring); organisational citizenship 
behaviour; life satisfaction; and turnover, as well as others.197 198 199 200 
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Of interest to the present study is the association between job satisfaction and absenteeism 
and return to work decisions after illness or injury.  Although it might seem logical that those 
employees who are satisfied with their jobs would return to work quickly and those who are 
dissatisfied might not be in any rush to go back, the past research examining this association 
has revealed mixed results. A study by Froom et al. found that low job satisfaction strongly 
predicted a delay in employees returning to work after gallbladder removal surgery.201 
Similarly, low levels of job satisfaction have been found to be a risk factor for the length of 
sickness absence caused by low back pain in a study by Hoogendoom et al.202 However, it 
should be noted that the study did not take into account the absence policies of different 
companies or the different company cultures related to sickness absence, which also could 
have played a role. 
By contrast, other researchers have not found any evidence of a relationship between job 
satisfaction and returning to work after illness or injury. For example, Krause et al. found that 
job satisfaction had no association with the time it took employees to return to work after 
compensated disabling low back pain.203 Scott and Taylor conducted a meta-analysis on the 
relationship between job satisfaction and absenteeism and concluded that differences in the 
method and analysis used in past studies, such as the use of different measures and sampling 
errors, could explain the inconsistencies in the findings.204 Although research has failed to 
prove the existence of consistent relationship between job satisfaction and returning to work 
after illness or injury, there is still the potential for job satisfaction to be linked to willingness to 
report to work during a serious incident. A possible explanation for why the two relationships 
might be different is that returning to work after recovering from illness or injury is something 
that employees would perceive as being expected of them, and thus job satisfaction may not 
strongly influence this decision. However, during a serious incident such as a CBRN terrorist 
attack, returning to work is something that employees may not consider would be expected of 
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them due to a perception that they might be putting their health at risk by coming into the 
office, and, as such, job satisfaction could potentially influence this perceived ‘voluntary’ 
behaviour.  
In a similar way, research has found job satisfaction to be a stronger predictor of 
organisational citizenship behaviour (individual contributions in the workplace that go beyond 
what is required by an individual’s role or by what is contractually rewarded) than it is of ‘in-
role performance’.205 When one considers the voluntary aspect of willingness to work during 
an extreme event, the potential for it to be associated with job satisfaction becomes clear.  
The research presented in this thesis is, to my knowledge, the first of its kind to apply the 
concept of job satisfaction to the willingness of employees to report to work during a serious 
incident and, as such, a measure of job satisfaction is included as a predictor variable in the 
employee web survey reported in Chapter 4.  
Summary 
 
There is a lack of understanding of the role that various individual psychosocial factors and 
organisational responses play in determining the short and long-term effects of high-impact, 
low-probability events such as CBRN terrorist attacks on business continuity and organisational 
resilience. Past academic research and evidence from real incidents has found that the public 
response to CBRN events has the potential to significantly impact upon response and 
recovery.206 207 208 However, many of the trends to come out of the research with the public 
have never been tested in an organisational setting. This gap in the research needs to be 
addressed as the staff response to a CBRN event has the potential to severely impair an 
organisation’s ability to recover and return to normal functioning. Specifically, it is likely that 
employee levels of knowledge, concerns, perceptions of risk and the resulting behavioural 
changes associated with CBRN incidents may influence whether or not they report to work. 
There are also other potential psychological influences that may affect their decision, such as 
their perceptions of their personal and professional obligations, which will need to be 
addressed. Past academic research with healthcare workers suggests that not all staff who are 
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able to report to work during a CBRN incident will necessarily be willing to do so.209 
Consequently, if the employees of national infrastructure organisations do not report to work 
in the event of a serious incident such as a CBRN attack and do not return in the days, weeks or 
months following the incident, this would severely impact the response and recovery of the 
whole country.  
In light of this potential problem, the research presented in this thesis will focus on 
understanding employers’ (business continuity decision-makers) and employees’ assumptions, 
knowledge and behavioural intentions following extreme events such as CBRN incidents. It will 
also investigate the practical and communication interventions used by organisations and how 
these may impact on individual responses to these events. A variety of psychological theories 
will be used to examine these issues in more detail. A number of these theories have not 
previously been applied to this topic.  
Research Aims 
 
Overarching research aims  
Using a mixed-methods approach, this PhD research has been designed to identify the 
assumptions that business continuity managers and business continuity plans make about 
employees’ likely behaviour during and in the aftermath of a serious incident, including those 
involving CBRN hazards. It will also identify examples of good practice within the participating 
organisations. The research will focus on factors affecting employees’ likely ability and 
willingness to continue to work during/after an incident, with the main focus being on their 
willingness to work. The research will also examine the barriers and facilitators (both physical 
and psychological) that could influence employees’ decisions about whether or not to report 
to work, along with their information needs and expectations of their employers’ response 
during the incident. Finally, this research will investigate what factors predict an individual’s 
willingness to report to work during a hypothetical extreme event.  
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Research aims by data collection method 
 
Study 1: Semi-structured interviews with business continuity and resilience professionals 
with a current or former role at a national infrastructure organisation (Chapter 3) 
The aims of the study were to ascertain: 
1. What business continuity managers and resilience professionals believe are the best 
ways to plan for disruption. 
2. How business continuity managers and resilience professionals perceive the likely 
behaviour of employees during extreme events, particularly CBRN incidents. 
3. How business continuity managers and resilience professionals plan to address the 
barriers and facilitators to employees’ willingness and ability to work in the event of a 
serious incident. 
4. What assumptions business continuity managers and resilience professionals are 
making based on their experience of past incidents or individual beliefs.  
 
Study 2: Web survey with employees from any industry or sector (Chapter 4) 
The aims of the study were to ascertain: 
1. What factors (demographic, psychological and job-related) might influence employees’ 
willingness to go to work in the event of a serious incident. 
2. If the perceived willingness and ability of employees to go to work varies by incident 
type. 
3. What barriers and motivating factors play a role in the decisions of employees to 
return to work in the event of a serious incident. 
 
Study 3: Scenario-based employee focus groups within national infrastructure organisations 
(Chapter 5)  
The aims of the study were to ascertain: 
1. If employees will go to work in the event of a pneumonic plague outbreak. 
2. How the level of information employees are given about a pneumonic plague outbreak 
influences their general thoughts and feelings about the event. 
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3. What barriers might employees face when deciding whether or not to return to work 
in the event of a pneumonic plague outbreak. 
4. What factors might motivate employees to return to work in the event of pneumonic 
plague outbreak. 
5. What information employees will want to know in the event of a pneumonic plague 
outbreak. 
6. What the preferred information sources are for employees during a pneumonic plague 
outbreak. 
7. What makes employees believe an organisation when they tell them it is safe to go 
back to work in the event of a pneumonic plague outbreak.  
8. If staff reactions to a pneumonic plague outbreak vary by sector. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 presents the findings of a systematic literature review of peer-reviewed research 
examining the behavioural intentions of employees during hypothetical incidents; specifically 
their willingness to work and also findings related to their ability to work and potential barriers 
and motivating factors (facilitators). The majority of the 65 research articles that met the 
inclusion criteria were survey studies assessing the willingness and ability of healthcare 
workers to report to work during hypothetical serious incidents, and in half of the studies the 
incident of choice was an influenza outbreak or pandemic. This systematic literature review 
revealed that a range of factors could potentially influence an employee’s decision about 
whether or not to work during an extreme event. Several gaps in the research literature were 
identified, including: (i) the need to apply the concept of willingness to work to sectors of 
national infrastructure other than health; (ii) the need to apply academic theory to the 
concept; and (iii) the need to compare the likely behaviour of staff of national infrastructure 
organisations to the assumptions of the decision-makers, the business continuity managers. 
The outcomes of the literature review presented in Chapter 2 were used to inform the 
development of the studies presented in the subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 3 reveals the findings of a series of semi-structured interviews with business 
continuity, crisis management or resilience decision-makers from national infrastructure 
organisations. An analysis of 21 interview transcripts revealed that business continuity 
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planning within the UK national infrastructure is based on many behavioural assumptions and 
grounded in little or no academic research regarding the likely reactions of employees during a 
high-impact, low-probability event. Very few organisations involved in the research had 
actually asked staff about their likely concerns or issues they may face in the event of an 
incident that causes significant disruption. Furthermore, many assumptions surrounding likely 
staff behaviour seemed to be based on conventional wisdom and experiences of staff 
reporting to work during incidents that were not CBRN. There were also potentially dangerous 
assumptions made by some interviewees that their staff would return to work in any situation, 
something that could put businesses at serious risk in a time when they need to be working on 
recovery. The study revealed the importance of finding out about the likely behaviour of staff 
during serious incidents as well as any expectations they might have of their employers’ 
response.  
Chapter 4 presents the findings from a web survey examining the factors that predict the 
willingness of employees to report to work in the event of a range of hypothetical serious 
incidents, including some involving a CBRN hazard. The results revealed that not all staff may 
be willing to report to work during a serious incident, with willingness rates being particularly 
low for incidents with a CBRN element. It also revealed a range of different factors that 
predicted the willingness of employees to report to work during a serious incident and 
provided support for a modified version of the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM). 
Overall, the survey study has shown that organisations should plan for significant rates of 
absenteeism during serious incidents because of employees not being willing to go to work 
rather than simply not being able. 
The analysis of a series of scenario-based employee focus groups is presented in Chapter 5. 
These groups were made up of employees without any business continuity responsibilities and 
took place within national infrastructure organisations in the following sectors: energy, 
financial services, Government and health. The hypothetical scenario used in the focus groups 
was a deliberate release of pneumonic plague at a mainline train station in central London. The 
results of the study revealed that employees are likely to be concerned about the risk to their 
health by going to work in the event of an infectious disease outbreak, particularly one that 
has the potential to be fatal, and that this concern could result in them refusing to report to 
work. The study also found that in the event of an extreme event employees would expect a 
great deal from their employer in terms of communication and practical interventions.  
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The final chapter (Chapter 6) presents an overview of the thesis, including the unique 
contributions the findings of this research have provided to the understanding of likely 
employee responses to extreme events. The empirical findings from all the studies have been 
synthesised in order to form the overall research conclusions. These conclusions take the form 
of a series of practical recommendations for organisations. These recommendations have been 
informed by the findings of the primary data collection (Chapters 3-5), the systematic review 
of previous peer-reviewed literature (Chapter 2) and grounded in the relevant academic 
theories presented in Chapter 1. Each recommendation is discussed alongside links to the 
supporting evidence and theoretical frameworks. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the strengths and limitations of the research presented in this thesis and a number of 
suggestions for future research studies.  
Research Ethics 
 
Throughout the research process there were a number of ethical issues that needed 
consideration. The data collection activities were approved by the KCL War Studies Group 
Research Ethics Panel (REP(WSG)/11/12-28) and the relevant data storage policies adhered to.  
Due to the sensitive nature of some of the topics in this research it was important to design 
and conduct the study in a way that reduced the likelihood participants would experience any 
distress or anxiety. The author first spoke to the PhD supervisors who have conducted a great 
deal of research of this type with members of the public, to see if they had encountered any 
ethical issues that were above and beyond the usual issues that arise. The author also 
contacted an academic at the KCL Institute of Psychiatry familiar with this type of work for 
advice. The risk of causing distress was deemed low due to the fact that even for people who 
have directly witnessed traumatic events, little negative impact has been caused by 
participating in research that asks about those events. For example, one study of 5,774 
members of the public in the US found that less than 1% were emotionally upset after taking 
part in a survey regarding their experiences of the September 11th terrorist attacks.210  
The interviews were conducted with people who deal with these issues on a daily basis and so 
were less likely than members of the public to experience distress discussing them. The 
interview participants were asked about their previous experience of incidents, but not pushed 
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for answers. Participants in the focus groups were discussing a hypothetical incident and were 
not asked about any past experiences. In both the interviews and the focus groups, if it 
appeared the participants were uncomfortable discussing any particular topic then the 
researcher moved on to another topic. In the focus groups, although every participant was 
given the chance to speak, no individual participants were pressed for a response if it 
appeared they did not wish to answer. At the beginning of the focus groups the moderator 
reassured participants that although the incident they would be discussing was very serious in 
nature, it was hypothetical and extremely unlikely to happen. They were also reassured that 
although the moderator was from a Government department, the moderator had no 
information that this scenario was of particular interest to the Government or any more likely 
to happen than any other serious incident. Alongside the more serious scenarios used in the 
survey, such as the CBRN terrorist incidents, the list of potential scenarios also included less 
fear-inducing incidents such as snow and flooding. As per the KCL ethical procedure, the 
contact details of both the researcher and the supervisor were provided to all participants to 
use if they felt the study had harmed them in any way or if they wanted more information. It 
should be noted that no participants reported any concerns, withdrew due to distress or 
experienced any visible signs of anxiety during the research.  
As with all research with human participants, gaining informed consent was a required 
component of the data collection process. Participants of the interview and focus group 
studies were asked to sign a consent form which stated that they voluntarily agreed to take 
part in the study, after having been provided all the information about what was involved. This 
information was provided to participants via an information sheets in the interview and focus 
group studies. All participants were told at the beginning of the studies that they did not have 
to take part if they did not want to and that they did not have to sign the consent form after 
reading the information sheet. After signing the consent form participants were reminded they 
could leave the room at any time and their data would be removed from the study. Due to the 
nature of the study and the location of the data collection it was also important to inform the 
volunteers that participation would not affect their employment in any way and that their 
employers would not be shown their responses. For the survey study, informed consent was 
gained via the first screen of the web survey which asked participants to select an option 
which stated that they agreed to take part in the study, after reading a series of ethical 
statements. Participants were free to end the survey at any time and their data were not 
included in the analysis.  
Due to the fact that focus group participants were recruited through gatekeepers, it was 
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important that participants did not feel they were obligated to take part and that they were 
not coerced into volunteering. All gatekeepers were briefed on the importance of this and 
were required to send out an email that had been pre-approved by the ethics committee. No 
line managers were present in the focus groups and as mentioned above participants were 
reminded they were free to leave at any time without it affecting their employment.  
It was also important that the research process maintained confidentiality and anonymity. 
Interview and focus group participants were made aware that although their participation was 
audio-recorded, once transcribed the original recording would be destroyed and any quotes 
would not be associated with them individually. All participants were referred to by a number 
and all company details and identifiable information removed. Any quotes used in the write up 
were attributed to an anonymous employee of a general sector (e.g. energy sector). Survey 






















Business Continuity Management (BCM) is concerned with planning for the disruption that 
incidents could potentially cause to business operations, with the aim of returning to normal 
functioning as quickly as possible.211 However, assumptions are made by planners about the 
ways in which individual employees responsible for operating the key business systems and 
processes will respond during extreme events. Assumptions about staff responses to extreme 
events can be challenged or reinforced by examples of real incidents. After the Three Mile 
Island (TMI) nuclear disaster in 1979, it was reported that a large number of residents 
evacuated the area.212 Manufacturing firms in the area lost an estimated $7.67 million in the 
value of production as a result of this evacuation, caused in part by loss of staff.213 This 
example demonstrates the impact that staff absenteeism could have on the business 
operations of national infrastructure organisations.  
As well as causing serious consequences for the individual organisations, the failure of staff to 
perform their duties could also have significant impacts for the UK as a whole. For example, if 
the staff of a power plant did not report to work, essential services such as hospitals might 
experience a loss of power. Furthermore, if supermarket workers did not report to work, the 
country could begin to experience problems with food supply. In light of this, it is important for 
organisations to consider employees’ willingness and ability to go to work during extreme 
events in their business continuity planning. An organisation can only recover from disruption 
if its staff are working; therefore an important component of an organisation’s resilience is the 
willingness and ability of staff to return to work. The concepts of being able to go to work and 
perform one’s duties and being willing to do so are potentially two very different things, and 
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were explored in detail in Chapter 1. The focus of this research is on staff willingness and 
intention to report to work; however factors related to ability are also included due to the 
potential relationship between the two concepts.  
Research has shown that there could be both internal and external influences on an 
employee’s decision whether or not to report to work in a serious incident. However, data is 
limited on the specific reasons for absenteeism in real incidents and only a small number of 
academic studies have examined this issue. Recognition of the combined internal and external 
influences on an employee’s decision to report to work during an extreme event can be found 
across a number of countries. For example, Koh et al. noted that during the SARS outbreak in 
Singapore in 2003, healthcare workers experienced a great deal of anxiety, work stress and 
social stigmatism but often felt that a risk of falling ill with SARS was part of their job.214 
Furthermore, a study by Tzeng found that a significant predictor of Taiwanese nurses fulfilling 
their professional care obligation in a SARS outbreak was their level of agreement with SARS 
infection control measures.215   
Similarly, in the US, first responders who assisted with the response on 9/11 reported difficulty 
finding a balance between protecting their own personal safety and honouring the duty of care 
they had for the victims.216 Finally, Davidson et al. examined employees’ decisions about 
reporting to work during the San Diego wild fires of 2003.217 The researchers reported a 10.6% 
no show rate at the hospital on the first day of the fire. This decision was driven by employees’ 
first inclination to assess their physical safety and wellbeing and that of their family and then 
their pets. Participants discussed feeling torn between wanting to care for their significant 
others and going to work to support their colleagues. A desire to help those affected by the 
fires followed once personal, family and pet safety were established. A focus group study 
examining nurses’ needs and concerns following Hurricane Floyd in Florida noted that local 
news reported that a number of employees failed to show up to work for hurricane duty (as 
per hospital policy) and subsequently had their employment terminated for ‘job 
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abandonment’.218 It should be noted here that the authors did not provide a citation for the 
news reports, so these cannot be verified. Nonetheless, this example and the previous 
examples provide evidence from real world events of staff absenteeism and of the potential 
influences that could affect employees’ decisions about reporting to work.  
Due to the limited past research on real incidents, particularly those involving a CBRN hazard, a 
systematic literature review was conducted. The aim of the review was to collate and 
summarise the literature examining the behavioural intentions of employees during 
hypothetical incidents. More specifically, it aimed to review studies examining the willingness 
and ability of staff to report to work and the potential barriers and motivating factors 
(facilitators) influencing their decisions. Although some examples of staff absenteeism 
resulting from real incidents have been reported previously, the peer-reviewed academic 
research examining absenteeism rates after real incidents is limited. Few organisations have 
released information on their absenteeism rates, and when they have, the specific reasons for 
the individuals being absent (i.e. whether they are unwilling or unable to work) are not often 
evident.  Therefore, it was decided to only include hypothetical incident studies in the review 
in order to examine the potential reasons for staff being absent in more detail. In addition, the 
hypothetical incident studies are more likely to include high-impact, low-likelihood incidents 
such as CBRN terrorist attacks, for which there have not been many real examples. 
Systematic literature reviews are a useful and relatively unbiased method for integrating large 
amounts of existing information on a chosen topic, summarising the evidence and 
subsequently using this to draw conclusions or make recommendations.219 220 The outcomes of 
this review informed the data collection activities presented in Chapters 3-5 of this thesis, 
including the predictor variables selected for use in the web survey (Chapter 4). Studies 
included in the literature review have also been used to provide supporting evidence for the 
recommendations presented in Chapter 6.  
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The methodology for integrative review was similar to the method used by Chaffee:221 
1. Research design: Both quantitative and qualitative designs were included. 
2. Study sample:  Employees of any organisation in any sector. 
3. Outcome measure: Willingness to work, or intention to report to work, in a disaster, 
extreme event or public health emergency. Studies examining potential absenteeism 
or workplace abandonment were also included if considered relevant to willingness to 
work. Only hypothetical incidents were included.  
4. Research methodologies: Reports of published quantitative and qualitative studies 
were included in this review.  
5. Language of studies: English only. 
6. Time period: From inception to August 2012 
7. Dates of review: January to August 2012.  
8. Type of research report: Peer-reviewed research articles and peer-reviewed research 
abstracts. Unpublished reports (e.g. government reports, conference proceedings and 
dissertations) were not included. 
 
Search strategy 
A method as described by Chaffee was adapted for the search strategy:222 
1. Electronic database searching:  ISI Web of Knowledge; PsycINFO; Medline; and Embase 
were all searched for relevant studies. Search terms were: “willingness”, “work”, 
“willingness disaster”, “willingness to report”, “reporting to work”, “willingness 
research”, “absenteeism”, “employee responses”, “staff behaviour”, “public health 
emergencies”. Terms were combined with “willingness”, “pandemic”, “disaster”, 
“terrorism” and “CBRN”. 
2. Ancestry searching: The reference list of each publication was examined for other 
relevant studies.  
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3. Internet searching: An internet search engine (Google/Google Scholar) was used to 
ensure no further articles had been missed in the electronic database search. The 
same search terms were used. 
4. Networking: Individuals with a known interest in the topic were contacted to ask if 
they were aware of any other relevant studies.  
 
Screening process 
Article titles were reviewed for potential relevance, followed by the abstracts. Full articles 
were then obtained for those studies meeting the inclusion criteria. If the full version of the 
article could not be obtained after requesting a copy from the King’s College London and 
Public Health England libraries and after emailing the authors, it was only included if useful and 




The systematic literature review revealed two previous literature reviews on the topic of the 
willingness of healthcare workers to work during hypothetical serious incidents. The first 
review by Smith in 2007 reviewed studies examining the willingness of emergency healthcare 
workers to work during major emergencies and disasters and a second review by Chaffee 
published in 2009 focused on the willingness of healthcare personnel to work in a disaster.223 
224 The existence of two previous systematic literature reviews was not deemed to negate the 
need for the present review due to the previous reviews solely focusing on healthcare 
workers. Furthermore, additional studies were known to exist that were not included in the 
previous reviews. Smith’s review only examined 8 relevant studies and Chaffee identified 27 
studies (including two that were not peer-reviewed) that met the inclusion criteria. For the 
present review, 65 peer-reviewed research articles met the inclusion criteria and were 
included in the final review, from approximately 1500 titles and abstracts that were examined. 
Out of these 65, there were three studies for which the authors had published two separate 
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papers on the results. These papers were included in the review as the results presented in 
each paper were different.  
 
Data collection method 
61 studies out of the 65 included in the final review used a survey as the primary data 
collection method, three included interviews and/or focus groups and one study used both 
focus groups and a survey. The key concept of ‘willingness’ to work was measured in a variety 
of ways, with the most frequent being to ask respondents if they would be willing  to report to 
work or remain at work for one or more hypothetical scenarios. In some cases, the studies 
differentiated between being willing to report to work ‘if required’ and being willing to report 
to work ‘if asked but not required’.225 226 227 228 There were also several other variations on 
willingness to work. For example, respondents were asked if they would be willing to work in 
these circumstances: when the job required face-to-face contact with a potential infectious 
patient; when transmission to their family was possible; and if they had not had a vaccine.229 
230 231 A table of the key willingness findings from each study included in the final review is 
presented in Appendix A.  
 
Study samples 
The sample sizes ranged from the smallest samples of 58 for a qualitative study and 64 for a 
quantitative study to the largest sample of 6428 for a quantitative study.232 233 234 The vast 
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majority of studies (62 out of 65) had a sample made up of employees working in the health 
sector. Only three studies contained participant groups who did not work in the health sector: 
DiGiovanni et al., in addition to medical first responders, also studied their spouses/partners, a 
group of journalists and a group of community residents; Gershon et al., in addition to 
healthcare workers, also included police department personnel, fire department personnel 
and correctional facility officers; and Smith and Walton’s study used staff in a local 
government organisation.235 236 237  
 
Content of studies 
Half of all the studies included in the review examined the willingness of employees to report 
to work during an influenza/pandemic event. Table 2.1 presents the hypothetical scenarios 
used in the 65 studies included in the final review.  
Table 2.1 Breakdown of literature review studies by hypothetical scenario 
Hypothetical scenario No. of studies 
Influenza/pandemic 32 
Multiple incidents 13 
Bioterrorism 9 
Radiological incident 2 
Disaster (manmade/natural) 2 
SARS 2 
Serious infectious disease 1 
Infectious disease outbreak/public health emergency 1 
Smallpox 1 




A complete table containing the methodological details and the key willingness to work 
findings of all 65 peer-reviewed studies can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Use of a theoretical framework 
In total, seven studies described the use of an established theoretical framework. Firstly, 
Balicer et al. applied the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) to the topic of the 
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willingness of hospital employees to report to work during an influenza pandemic or a 
radiological terrorist incident.238 239 Two further studies also applied the EPPM to healthcare 
workers’ willingness to report to work.240 241 A second theory to be used by Kim et al. and Ko et 
al. in their studies of nurses’ intentions to care for SARS patients was the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour.242 243 Finally, Smith and Walton applied Social Network Analysis to their study of the 
return to work decisions of staff of a local government organisation in the event of an 
earthquake.244  
Davidson et al. discussed the tension employees felt as a result of their obligations to family, 
community and organisation but did not apply a theoretical framework such as role conflict 
theory to their findings.245 246 They also discussed the perceived importance of the employees’ 
roles but failed to apply theories such as Protection Motivation Theory or EPPM to these 
findings (see Chapter 1 for more information about these theories).247 248  
Therefore, the majority of studies included in this literature review did not apply a theoretical 
framework to their research, although others made use of the conceptual frameworks 
developed in previous willingness to work research. Chaffee reported a similar finding in her 
review and also noted that using theory to guide research is part of the scientific process.249 In 
light of this finding, there is a need for more research to be conducted which applies 
established theoretical frameworks to the topic of the willingness of employees to report to 
work during extreme events.  
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Key findings of literature review: willingness to work 
The willingness of employees to report to work during a serious incident varied greatly across 
all the studies and was dependent on the specific scenario details the participants were given. 
The willingness rates ranged from 98% of emergency department personnel reporting they 
would be being willing to work additional hours for victims of an airplane crash, to just 4% of 
paramedics who said they ‘probably’ would remain on duty, and none ‘definitely’ would 
remain on duty to treat/care for patients with smallpox if they did not have any protective 
gear and a vaccine was not available.250 251  
In general, the research on willingness to report to work has shown that not everyone who is 
‘able’  to work, would necessarily be ‘willing’, and the ability and willingness rates found in the 
reviewed studies often differed. For example, Gershon et al.’s study revealed that although 
80% of essential workers would be able to work during a serious pandemic event, only 65% 
would be willing to do so.252 In contrast, Katz et al. reported that although 73.8% of dentists in 
their sample were willing to provide assistance to the state of Hawaii’s bioterrorism response, 
only 9.2% indicated they were able to respond effectively to a bioterrorism attack.253 
The review of the literature revealed a number of factors that could potentially affect an 
individual’s willingness to report to work in the event of a serious incident. Table 2.2 presents a 
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Fear/concern for self 
Fear/concern for others 
Personal obligations  
Job role  
Perception of importance of role/self-efficacy 
Professional obligations and duty of care 
Employer provisions 
Perceptions of employer 
Ability to get to work and perform duties  




A number of studies reported a gender difference in willingness to work, most frequently 
finding that females were less likely than males to report to work or risk their life for a patient 
in the event of a serious incident.254 255 256 257 258 259 For example, a survey study of healthcare 
workers in Georgia found that females were more likely to report being unwilling to report to 
work than males in the event of an avian flu pandemic (25.6% of females to 8.7% of males).260 
However, it should be noted that there were only 46 male healthcare workers included in the 
sample, compared to 242 females. A similar finding was reported by Damery et al., who found 
that female healthcare workers in the UK were significantly less likely to report being willing to 
work during an influenza pandemic than males; however again the sample comprised more  
female respondents than male (704 females to 323 males).261  
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Another demographic factor found to have an association with willingness to work was the age 
of the employee; however this review revealed mixed findings concerning this variable. Bar-
Dayan et al. found that younger employees (those between 18 and 24) were significantly less 
likely to report being willing to risk their life for a patient during an A/H1N1 pandemic than 
employees in the older age groups.262 Similarly, Basta et al. found that public health 
department employees aged 35 or older, compared with those under 24, were significantly 
more likely to report a willingness to respond to an influenza pandemic, and a study by 
Ogedegbe et al. reported that being in an older age group was a significant predictor of 
willingness to work in a disaster.263 264 In contrast, Mackler, Wilkinson and Cinti reported that 
being a younger paramedic was associated with a greater likelihood of remaining on duty 
during a smallpox event; however, it should be noted that the study had a small sample of 
95.265 Not all studies examining the association between age and willingness reported a 
significant finding. For example, Burke et al. concluded that the age of paediatric healthcare 
employees had no association with willingness to report to a disaster and Considine and 
Mitchell found no significant correlations between nurses’ willingness to participate in CBR 
incidents and age.266 267  
Lastly, a small numbers of studies have found an association with willingness to work and 
education. Bar-Dayan et al. reported that healthcare workers’ willingness to risk one’s life for a 
patient was significantly lower in those with a non-academic education.268 Considine and 
Mitchell found a positive association having a postgraduate qualification in emergency nursing 
and willingness to work during a CBR incident, but it should be noted that the study had a 
small sample of just 64 emergency department nurses.269 However, in Burke et al.’s study of 
paediatric healthcare employees, education had no association with willingness to work in a 
disaster.270  
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Adams and Berry found that healthcare personnel in the US were most willing to report to 
work in the event of an explosion (93.0%) or a winter weather event (92.8%) and least willing 
to report to work during a SARS outbreak (74.6%) or a radiological event (69.1%).271 Similarly, 
Qureshi et al. reported that healthcare workers in the US were most willing to report to work 
for a mass casualty incident (86%), an environmental disaster (84%) or a snow storm (80%) and 
least likely to report to work for a chemical event (68%), a smallpox epidemic (61%), a 
radiological event (57%) or an outbreak of SARS (47%).272 In a study by Hope et al., 78% of 
front line health staff in Australia reported being willing to work in a weather related event 
compared to 67% in an influenza pandemic and 52% in a bioterrorism event.273 Willingness 
rates also varied by incident in a study by DiMaggio et al., with US emergency medical 
technicians reporting high levels of willingness to report to work in the event of explosions 
(87.7%), a landfill fire (87/1%) or a snowstorm (84.1%), and slightly lower numbers willing to 
work in the event of a chemical attack (74.3%), a dirty bomb (73.6%) or smallpox incident 
(64.8%).274 Lastly, Smith et al. found that the willingness of paramedics decreased for 
situations that were non-conventional and less visible and the longer a disaster situation lasted 
for the more the perception of risk increased and willingness decreased.275  
 
Fear/concern for self: 
The review revealed eight quantitative studies and two qualitative studies that found that a 
fear or concern for one’s own health or safety was a predictor of the willingness of employees 
to work for a range of scenarios. Adams and Berry reported that commonly expressed barriers 
to reporting to work were concern for self and the effect of the disaster on self.276 In a study by 
Garrett, Park and Redlener, 18% of hospital workers selected ‘personal safety concern’ as the 
single most significant barrier to reporting to work.277 Gershon et al. reported that the most 
common barrier to US home healthcare workers’ willingness to work was fear for self and 
                                                          
271
 Lavonne M. Adams and Devon Berry, ‘Who Will Show up? Estimating Ability and Willingness of 
Essential Hospital Personnel to Report to Work in Response to a Disaster’, Online Journal of Issues in 
Nursing 17, no. 2 (March 2012). 
272
 Gershon et al., ‘Factors Associated with the Ability and Willingness of Essential Workers’. 
273
 Hope et al., ‘Willingness of Frontline Health Care Workers to Work During a Public Health 
Emergency’. 
274
 Charles DiMaggio et al., ‘The Willingness of U.S. Emergency Medical Technicians to Respond to 
Terrorist Incidents’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 3, no. 4 
(December 2005): 331–37. 
275
 Smith et al., ‘Paramedics’ Perceptions of Risk and Willingness to Work during Disasters’. 
276
 Adams and Berry, ‘Who Will Show Up?’. 
277
 Garrett, Park, and Redlener, ‘Mitigating Absenteeism in Hospital Workers during a Pandemic’. 
 73 
 
family’s safety.278 For two avian influenza/pandemic scenarios used in a study by Martinese et 
al., 70-80% of hospital staff in Australia selected the main reasons for not working as concerns 
for their own health and concerns for their family’s health.279 Similarly, Qureshi et al. found 
that the most frequently cited barriers for healthcare workers reporting during catastrophic 
disasters were personal health concerns and fear and concern for family and self.280 Stergachis 
et al. reported that one of the most frequently reported barriers to the willingness of 
healthcare workers to report to work in the event of an earthquake or an influenza pandemic 
was a fear or concern for themselves, and in the case of the influenza pandemic, ‘personal 
health problems’ was also a frequently cited barrier.281 Veeneema et al. found that perception 
of personal safety was the main determinant of nurses’ willingness to respond to a radiological 
emergency.282 A study by Wong et al. found that 29.2% of community nurses in Hong Kong 
reported that fear of being infected was a reason for being unwilling to care for patients during 
an H1N1 influenza pandemic.283   
The two qualitative studies revealed similar findings: an interview study by Shaw et al. 
revealed that 55 out of 60 GPs would stop working in an influenza pandemic if personal 
protective equipment (PPE) was unavailable due to concerns for their own welfare; and in a 
qualitative study of paramedics in Australia, Smith et al. reported that concerns about threats 
to their health and wellbeing were frequently mentioned during discussions about working in a 
disaster.284 285   
 
Fear/concern for others: 
The review revealed a number of quantitative studies and qualitative studies that found that a 
fear or concern for their significant others’ health or safety was a predictor of employees’ 
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willingness to work during a serious incident. As previously mentioned, studies by Gershon et 
al., Martinese et al. and Qureshi et al. found that a common barrier to reporting to work was 
fear or concern for their own health and their family’s health.286 287 288 Similarly, Adams and 
Berry found that a commonly expressed barrier to reporting to work was concern for others 
and the effect of the disaster on others, and in a study by Stergachis et al. one of the most 
frequently cited barriers to healthcare workers reporting to work during an influenza 
pandemic or an earthquake was fear or concern for their family.289 290 Further, Garrett, Park 
and Redlener reported that ‘concern for safety of family’ was the single most significant barrier 
to reporting to work in an influenza pandemic for 25% of hospital workers.291 Shaw et al. 
reported that 55 out of 60 GPs said that they would stop working if PPE were unavailable due 
to concerns for the welfare of their dependents if they were to die.292 A key finding of Young 
and Persell was that 90% of a sample of 95 nursing students in the US said they were not 
willing to work with contagious clients if transmission to their family was a possibility and 
there was no prophylactic help available to their family; however, it should be noted that this 
study had a small sample.293 Lastly, Smith et al. reported that the way paramedics perceived 
risk was directly influenced by the potential for the incident to impact on their families, and 
they frequently mentioned concerns about the potential threat to the health and wellbeing of 
their families.294  
Research has also shown that an employee’s family can be an influence in ways other than the 
employee simply being concerned for their health or wellbeing. A key finding of Kim et al.’s 
study of nurses in Korea was that a significant predictor of intention to care for SARS patients 
was ‘subjective norm’, which was a measure of perceived approval or disapproval of significant 
others.295 Tippett et al. reported that in the event of an influenza pandemic those prehospital 
medical care providers who perceived that their relationship partners were ‘concerned’ were 
less willing to work themselves.296 Social stigmatism has also been shown to play a role, with 
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Wong et al. reporting that healthcare workers and primary care physicians in Singapore would 
be concerned that people would avoid their families and themselves in an avian influenza 
pandemic.297 298 In a study by DiGiovanni et al., first responders and their partners were asked 
whether or not it was important to reach agreement as a couple on whether they would work; 
26% of responders said that reaching agreement was essential compared to 53% of spouses 
who said concurrence was essential.299 Finally, Wong et al., in 2010, surveyed community 
nurses in Hong Kong and found that those nurses who were unwilling or unsure about caring 
for a suspected H1N1 case generally reported a higher level of psychological stress, which 
included being concerned about their family catching the virus because of their job.300   
 
Personal obligations: 
A number of studies have found that childcare responsibilities were a frequently cited 
perceived barrier to reporting to work during an incident.301 302 303 304 305 306 307 Similarly, Cone 
and Cummings found that in the event of a disaster, childcare was one of the most frequently 
selected support needs for hospital employees in the US.308 In Ives et al.’s study a barrier to 
willingness to work in an influenza pandemic for healthcare workers in the US was ‘prioritising 
the wellbeing of family members’, and Damery et al. reported that females were less likely 
than males to work if children were ill, most likely due to the need to care for them; which 
could go some way to explaining the gender difference found in other research.309 310 
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An association between having children or childcare responsibilities and willingness to work 
has been reported by a number of academic studies. For example: a key finding by Damery et 
al. was that those healthcare workers with caring responsibilities were significantly less likely 
to work during a pandemic than those without; Grimes and Mendias reported that being less 
likely to respond was associated with having dependent children; Mackler et al. found that 
having no children under the age of 18 was associated with a greater likelihood of remaining 
on duty (however it should be noted that this study had a small sample); Adams and Berry 
reported that a greater proportion of healthcare personnel with no responsibility for children 
were able and willing to report to work for multiple scenarios; Qureshi et al.’s findings showed 
that having childcare obligations was a correlate of healthcare workers being less willing to 
work in a number of catastrophic events; and lastly, Shapira et al. found that parents of 
children over the age of 14 years old were most willing to report to work in an unconventional 
missile attack in Israel.311 312 313 314 315 316  
However, other research has not found evidence of this association between having 
dependent children and intentions to report to work. Considine and Mitchell did not find a 
significant correlation between having carer responsibilities for children and willingness to 
participate in a CBR incident.317 Research by both Irvin et al. and Syrett et al. found that being 
married or having children had no effect on willingness.318 319 Finally, Smith and Walton 
concluded that having dependents had less effect on attitudes to returning to work after an 
earthquake than they had expected.320  
It is not just childcare obligations that have been linked to reporting to work, research has also 
shown an association between willingness to work and having eldercare responsibilities.321 322 
Adams and Berry reported that a commonly expressed barrier to reporting to work was 
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responsibility for a spouse with healthcare needs/disability.323 Furthermore, Cone and 
Cummings reported that ‘pet care’ was one of the most frequently selected support needs for 
hospital employees in the US during a disaster.324 
 
Job role: 
Balicer et al. compared the willingness to work of individuals in different job roles in their 
study of US local public health workers in 2006, and found that the likelihood of reporting to 
work was significantly higher for clinical staff compared to technical and support staff.325 This 
finding, that clinical staff were more likely to report being willing to work than non-clinical staff 
has been supported by Bar-Dayan et al., and Basta, Edwards and Schulte.326 327 Furthermore, 
Crane et al. reported that pharmacists were the least likely to respond in all bioterrorism 
scenarios included in the study, compared to physicians and nurses.328 The reasons for this 
were not fully established from the findings; however the researchers did note that 
pharmacists displayed major shortcomings in a number of clinical competencies associated 
with bioterrorism events. Similarly, Seale et al. discovered that non clinical staff were 
significantly more likely to be unsure of their intention with regards to reporting to work 
during an influenza pandemic in Australia.329  
Further support for the idea that different job roles can influence willingness comes from 
Burke et al. who found that physicians were more likely to respond to a disaster than nurses 
and Irvin et al. who reported that doctors were more likely to be willing to work during an 
avian influenza pandemic than nurses or clerical/other associates.330 331 Damery et al., in their 
study of healthcare workers in UK concluded that when there was a personal infection risk 
during an influenza pandemic, doctors and GPs were most likely to continue to work despite 
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the risk compared to other healthcare workers such as ancillary workers and managers.332 
Similarly, one of the findings of Qureshi et al.’s research was that compared with physicians 
and emergency medical technicians, administrators, nurses, clinical support staff and all other 
job categories were less likely to report being willing  to work.333 Ehrenstein et al. also reported 
a difference between physicians and administrators in the percentage who disagreed that it 
would be professionally acceptable for healthcare professionals to abandon their workplace 
during a pandemic to protect themselves and their families; 65% of physicians disagreed 
compared to 32% of administrators.334 
A small number of studies have compared different job roles that also included groups who 
were not healthcare workers. DiGiovanni et al. found that after a Rift Valley Fever virus 
outbreak was identified and recognised as bioterrorism, 95% of medical first responders said 
they would continue to work, compared to 71% of media workers and 65% of residents (made 
up of other community residents).335 Gershon et al. discovered differences in the percentage 
of employees willing to report to work in a serious pandemic event between groups of 
essential workers; 74.1% of health employees, 78.3% of police employees, 69.9% of fire 
employees, 68.1% of emergency medical services personnel, 56.8% of hospital workers and 
56.4% of correctional facility officers were willing to work.336  
However, in contrast to the aforementioned research, Adams and Berry found that a greater 
proportion of those healthcare personnel with a non-clinical position would be willing to 
report to work during a chemical terrorism event and a smallpox outbreak compared to those 
who held a clinical position.337 Other research has found no influence of job role on willingness 
to work: Daugherty et al. found no differences in the likelihood of healthcare workers 
reporting to work based on job title and Hope et al. found that the willingness of front line 
health staff to work did not differ by clinical status or job classification.338 339 With regards to 
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doctors and nurses, Katz et al. found that the percentage willing to work in a bioterrorist attack 
was the same for both groups (74%).340 
 
Perceptions of importance of role/self-efficacy:  
In their 2010 study, Balicer et al. concluded that the most influential factor associated with 
willingness to work for local public health workers during an influenza pandemic was the 
perception of the importance of one’s role in the agency’s overall response.341 In their 2011 
article, Balicer et al. reported that a significant predictor of willingness to respond to a 
radiological event was the perceived impact of one’s response.342 Similarly, Goodhue et al. 
reported that the most significant factor predicting the willingness of paediatric nurse 
practitioners to respond was having a specified role in the workplace disaster plan.343 Smith 
and Walton, in their social network analysis research of local government staff in New Zealand 
found that the strongest influence on attitudes to returning to work after an earthquake was 
overall responsibility in the organisation; and staff who were not perceived to be as important 
were more likely to show a preference towards their responsibilities at home, or to feel they 
should stay away because they would be in the way if they went to work.344 Ives et al. found 
that lack of information about what is expected of healthcare workers during an influenza 
pandemic was considered a barrier to their willingness to work.345 Lastly, a key finding of Ko et 
al. in their survey of nurses in China was that self-efficacy (a measure of confidence in their 
ability to care for SARS patients) was a predictor of intention to care for SARS patients.346 
 
Professional obligations and duty of care: 
A number of studies have examined the influence of professional obligation and duty of care 
on healthcare workers’ willingness to respond to serious incidents. For example, Alexander 
and Wynia reported that 40% of their sample of physicians in the US said they would be willing 
to put themselves at risk of contracting a deadly illness to save others’ lives; however, this 
reduced to 33% who said they would care for infected smallpox patients even if 
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unvaccinated.347 Damery et al. also examined this issue and found that those healthcare 
workers in their UK sample who agreed that all healthcare workers have a duty to work were 
significantly more likely to say that they would report to work during an influenza pandemic 
than those who disagreed.348 Furthermore, those who agreed that doctors and nurses have a 
duty to the sick were over four times more likely to work than those who disagreed, and lastly, 
those who agreed that their main responsibility was to themselves and their family were less 
likely to report that they would work than those who disagreed. Similarly, a study by Gullion 
showed that the willingness of school nurses in the US to care for patients during a 
bioterrorism incident (an outbreak of an unknown but potentially deadly illness) was positively 
correlated with their agreement that nurses have an obligation to care for a patient, even if 
doing so may put their life at risk.349 
Further support was provided by DiMaggio et al., who surveyed emergency medical 
technicians in the US regarding their likely reasons for reporting to work during a terrorist 
incident.350 They reported that 83.3% of respondents selected ‘sense of responsibility’ as a 
potential reason for not reporting and 69.9% selected ‘code of ethics’ as a reason. Similarly, 
Seale et al. reported that 74% of their sample of healthcare workers in China accepted the risk 
of getting pandemic influenza as part of their job, and another study found that 72.7% of a 
sample of nurses in Hong Kong accepted a personal risk of catching avian influenza in the 
course of their work.351 Research from Singapore found that the majority of healthcare 
workers accepted the risk to their health from their occupation and falling ill with avian 
influenza.352 353 Lastly, Shabanowitz and Reardon found that 60.7% of healthcare workers in 
their US sample disagreed that it was ethical to abandon their workplace during a pandemic in 
order to protect themselves and their family; however, 64.5% agreed that they should be 
allowed to decide whether they report to work in a pandemic.354  
                                                          
347
 G. Caleb Alexander and Matthew K. Wynia, ‘Ready and Willing? Physicians’ Sense of Preparedness for 
Bioterrorism’, Health Affairs (Millwood) 22, no. 5 (September 2003): 189–97. 
348
 S. Damery et al., ‘Healthcare Workers’ Perceptions of the Duty to Work during an Influenza 
Pandemic’, Journal of Medical Ethics 36, no. 1 (January 2010): 12–18. 
349
 Jessica Smartt Gullion, ‘School Nurses as Volunteers in a Bioterrorism Event’, Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 2 (July 2004): 112–17. 
350
 DiMaggio et al., ‘The Willingness of U.S. Emergency Medical Technicians’. 
351
 D. K. P. Tam, S. Lee, and S. S. Lee, ‘Impact of SARS on Avian Influenza Preparedness in Healthcare 
Workers’, Infection 35, no. 5 (October 2007): 320–25. 
352
 Wong et al., ‘Concerns, Perceived Impact and Preparedness in an Avian Influenza Pandemic’. 
353
 Wong et al., ‘A Cross-Sectional Study of Primary-Care Physicians in Singapore on Their Concerns and 
Preparedness for an Avian Influenza Outbreak’. 
354
 Robert B. Shabanowitz and Judith E. Reardon, ‘Avian Flu Pandemic – Flight of the Healthcare 
Worker?’, HEC Forum 21, no. 4 (December 2009): 365–85. 
 81 
 
Three qualitative studies have also reported findings related to healthcare workers’ 
professional obligations. First, in a 2006 qualitative study in Australia, the GPs in the sample 
said they would continue to work during a pandemic and that declining to work would be 
unethical.355 From this finding the researchers concluded that the GPs had a strong personal 
work ethic and had a sense of responsibility for the welfare of their patients. Second, a 
qualitative study of UK healthcare workers concluded that healthcare workers were motivated 
by a sense of obligation to work in an influenza pandemic, which the researchers described as 
‘a professional ethic’, ‘a duty to help’ and ‘a work ethic and confederate loyalty’.356 Last, an 
interview and focus group study of paramedics in Australia found that when discussing their 
willingness to work during a serious incident, they spoke about their desire to fulfil their 
professional responsibilities.357  
Other researchers have queried this association between professional ethics and willingness to 
work. Findings from academic studies have shown that it is not always as simple as a 
healthcare professional having a professional obligation or perception of a duty of care to their 
patients; there are other factors which could have a role to play. For example, Crane et al. 
found that although the majority of healthcare providers in their US sample were willing to 
respond to both a high risk event and a low risk event within their local community (81.7% and 
82.8% respectively), the willingness reduced for events that were regional, and reduced 
further for events statewide, and further still for events nationwide.358 Research has also 
shown that home healthcare workers were less willing to take care of new patients than they 
were to take care of their current patients in an influenza pandemic.359   
 
Employer provisions: 
Many of the studies included in the present review examined the effect of employer provisions 
on willingness to report to work, particularly provisions in the form of medical treatment. Ko et 
al. reported that one factor predicting nurses’ intention to care for SARS patients was 
‘receiving resources from the hospital’.360 A number of studies found that being provided with 
vaccination, medication and/or protective equipment was associated with increased 
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willingness to work.361 362 363 364 365 In one study this was defined as ‘preferential access to 
antiviral medication’, which when offered resulted in an increase in willingness to work scores, 
and in another study being offered the treatment on site was important; being offered the 
treatment at a remote site reduced the willingness rate by nearly half.366 367 Other studies 
defined vaccination, medication and/or protective equipment as frequently selected 
facilitators to reporting to work.368 369  
Some studies have reported that intention to work rates were lower for scenarios where 
vaccination, treatment or protective equipment either did not exist or was not made available 
to employees.370 371 372 DiGiovanni et al.’s findings revealed that certain groups of employees 
may expect their employer to provide them with access to treatment, with 77% of media 
workers in the sample stating that if their work put them at risk they would expect their 
employers to provide protective measures and also necessary medication/treatment.373 
Furthermore, research has shown that providing vaccination, medication or protective 
equipment for an employee’s family is also something that could increase their willingness to 
work.374 375 376 377 378 379 In a qualitative study of GPs in Australia, it was stated that if public 
health authorities recommended them to take prophylactic antivirals then most GPs would 
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also want them for their families.380 In addition, two studies reported that providing 
accommodation for employees and/or their families or having a safe place to bring children 
could encourage them to report to work.381 382 Shabanowitz and Reardon questioned the 
influence of employer provisions on willingness to work and reported that 21% of their sample 
of healthcare workers in the US said they would not volunteer to work during an avian 
influenza pandemic, even if they were provided with the following: PPE and training; 
specialised infectious disease training; life/disability insurance coverage for family; additional 
support for personal/family needs; priority medical treatment and vaccination if available; and 
hazard pay.383  
The review has revealed mixed results with regards to the influence of additional financial 
incentives on the likelihood of staff reporting to work during a serious incident. Gershon et al. 
reported that being paid more money and being paid to stay home if sick were both 
considered facilitating factors in an influenza pandemic.384 Masterson et al. reported that 
increased pay, increased compensation time and disability coverage were the most influential 
incentives for employees considering whether to respond in a serious incident; however, the 
incentives had less influence during biological incidents than during a conventional or 
radiological incident.385 Burke et al. reported that those paediatric healthcare employees who 
said they needed compensation were less willing to respond to a disaster than those who said 
they might not or did not need it.386 Other research findings have suggested that financial 
incentives may not be enough to encourage employees who are unsure about their intentions 
to come back to work. For example, Irvin et al. found that for 19% who answered ‘maybe’ to 
whether they would be willing to work if avian flu patients were being treated at the hospital, 
financial incentives (even triple pay) would not make a difference to their willingness.387 
Similarly, a study by Martin reported that offering double or triple pay did not significantly 
affect nurses’ willingness to respond to an influenza pandemic.388  
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Perceptions of employer: 
Irvin et al. reported that for those healthcare workers unsure about their intentions to report 
to work in an avian influenza pandemic, the most important facilitating factor was their 
confidence that the hospital could protect them.389 Bar-Dayan et al. discovered that healthcare 
workers’ willingness to risk one’s life for a patient during an A/H1N1 pandemic in Israel was 
significantly lower for those with less trust in workplace preparedness and in the effectiveness 
of safety measures.390 DiGiovanni et al. in their study of a hypothetical Rift Valley Fever Virus 
outbreak reported that in all groups (medical first responders,  their spouses, media workers 
and other community residents), most participants would continue to work provided their 
work sites were adequately protected.391 Similarly, Gershon et al.’s study revealed that having 
two or more workplace pandemic preparedness elements was significantly associated with 
willingness to work.392 These preparedness elements included: respirator training; respirator 
fit-testing; pandemic influenza training; and the workplace having established pandemic plans. 
A further study by Gershon et al. reported that a frequently selected facilitator for willingness 
to work was being confident a mask would protect them in an influenza pandemic.393  
Although no studies have examined the influence of organisational identification on 
willingness to work (as discussed in Chapter 1), Gershon et al. reported that a measure of 
organisational trust/shared values was associated with essential workers’ willingness to work 
in a serious pandemic event.394 Similarly, a qualitative study by Ives et al. found that healthcare 
workers were motivated by a sense of ‘confederate loyalty’, and that barriers to willingness to 
report to work included a lack of trust in, and goodwill towards, the NHS and a feeling that 
employers do not take the needs of staff seriously.395 Lastly, Tippett et al., in their study of 
emergency prehospital medical care providers in Australia, reported that increased willingness 
to work was associated with high confidence in employer.396  
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Ability to get to work and perform duties: 
This review has been focused on staff willingness to report to work; however, it is also 
important to consider their ability to report to work. Research has found an association 
between the two concepts. For example, Balicer et al.’s 2010 study found that perceived ability 
to perform one’s duties was a significant predictor of hospital employees’ willingness to work 
in an influenza pandemic.397 Similarly, Balicer et al.’s 2011 study revealed that perceived ability 
to perform one’s duties and perceived confidence about getting to work safely were both 
significant predictors of hospital employees’ willingness to work during a radiological event.398 
An association between perceived ability to perform one’s duties and willingness was also 
discovered by Goodhue et al. who surveyed paediatric nurse practitioners in the US and found 
that those who felt ‘definitely prepared’ for a disaster in general were more likely to be willing 
to respond than those who did not feel prepared.399  
A number of studies have also found that transportation problems are a frequently selected 
barrier to employees’ ability to report to work during a serious incident.400 401 402 403 In addition, 
Burke et al. reported that employees who said they needed transportation in the event of a 
disaster were less willing to respond than those who did not or might not need it.404   
 
Knowledge and information: 
Several studies in this review have examined the association between actual or perceived 
knowledge related to an incident and willingness to work, as well as looking at the different 
types of information available. Balicer et al. showed that a significant predictor of willingness 
was level of perceived knowledge of pandemic events.405 Martin’s 2011 study stated that 
although 90.1% of the sample of nurses were willing to work during an influenza pandemic, 
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fewer (83%) felt knowledgeable enough to safely care for pandemic flu patients.406 Similarly, 
another study found that only 18.9% of senior medical students considered themselves to be 
sufficiently educated regarding H5N1, which may go some way to explaining why fewer 
students were willing to treat children (41.1%) than pandemic patients overall (82.3%).407 In 
Bar-Dayan et al.’s 2010 study of healthcare workers in Israel, 84% who had read a scientific 
article about A/H1N1 influenza were willing to risk their lives for a patient, compared to 73% 
who had not.408 They also found that healthcare workers’ willingness was not related to 
obtaining information from lay information sources such as television, newspapers or the 
internet.  
Similarly, a study by Basta, Edwards and Schulte found that public health department 
employees who had read either the state or country pandemic influenza plan were 
significantly more likely to report a willingness to respond during an influenza pandemic when 
face-to-face duties were required.409 However, Daugherty et al. concluded that healthcare 
workers’ confidence in their knowledge of how to protect themselves during an influenza 
pandemic had no effect on their likelihood of reporting to work.410  
In a study by Veenema et al., baseline knowledge and clinical competence were both positively 
associated with the willingness of nurses In Taiwan to respond to a radiological emergency.411 
Furthermore, Bar-Dayan in their 2011 study, reported that willingness to risk one’s life for a 
patient with A/H1N1 was lower for those with less knowledge about safety measures.412 
DiGiovanni et al. found that most respondents would continue to work in a Rift Valley Fever 
Virus outbreak provided they received information about medical issues, particularly 
transmission and prevention.413 Conversely, Ives et al., in their qualitative study found that a 
barrier to reporting to work in an influenza pandemic was a lack of information about the 
risks.414   
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The importance of providing accurate information to staff during an incident was shown in a 
study of student nurses by Young and Persell, where it was found that the students’ concerns 
for safety (self and family) were based on inaccurate knowledge about some of the agents 
concerned.415 In fact when asked about anthrax (inhalation), 80% were concerned about their 
own safety and 75% were concerned for their family’s safety, when in reality anthrax is non-
contagious from human-to-human. Further, with regards to treating victims of a chemical 
incident who had been decontaminated, 54% were concerned for themselves and 58% were 
concerned for their families; the student nurses in the study seemed to be unaware that there 
would be little or no risk to themselves or their families when treating a patient who had 
already been decontaminated. It must be noted that this study was conducted using a 
relatively small sample of student nurses and the results may not generalise to the wider 
nursing population, particularly those with more experience and training.  
 
Training: 
Gershon et al. tested the effect of pandemic preparedness training on willingness to work; the 
training involved an educational intervention and a skill-based drill with respiratory protective 
equipment (RPE).416 The researchers reported that willingness to work increased from 63% 
before the training to 66% after the training and that the training was effective at increasing 
pandemic knowledge and behavioural intentions (use of RPE and vaccination). A further study 
by Gershon et al. found that pandemic influenza training was significantly associated with 
essential workers’ willingness to work during a serious pandemic event.417 Goodhue et al. 
reported that disaster training was a significant predictor of paediatric nurse practitioners’ 
willingness to work in a disaster.418 Wong et al. discovered that 74.5% of their sample of 
community nurses in Hong Kong wanted more training and professional educating regarding 
how to deal with H1N1 influenza.419 
Perceived adequate education and training has been associated with increased willingness to 
work during an influenza pandemic in a study by Tippett et al.420 However, Considine and 
                                                          
415
 Young and Persell, ‘Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear Terrorism Readiness’. 
416
 Robyn R.M. Gershon et al., ‘Evaluation of a Pandemic Preparedness Training Intervention for 
Emergency Medical Services Personnel’, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 24, no. 6 (November 2009): 
508–11. 
417
 Gershon et al., ‘Factors Associated with the Ability and Willingness of Essential Workers’. 
418
 Goodhue et al., ‘Willingness to Respond in a Disaster’. 
419
 Wong et al., ‘Will the Community Nurse Continue to Function during H1N1 Influenza Pandemic’. 
420




Mitchell only found a weak positive correlation between training adequacy and willingness to 
participate in a chemical incident; and this did not apply to biological or radiological 
incidents.421 It should be noted that Considine and Mitchell’s study had a small sample for 
quantitative research of 64 emergency department nurses.  
Discussion 
 
The systematic literature review revealed that a range of factors could potentially influence an 
employee’s decision whether or not to work in the event of a serious incident or disaster. 
These include: 
 Incident type 
 Fear/concern for self 
 Fear/concern for others 
 Personal obligations 
 Job role 
 Perception of importance of role/self-efficacy 
 Professional obligations and duty of care 
 Employer provisions 
 Perceptions of employer 
 Ability to get to work and perform duties 
 Knowledge and information 
 Training 
The first influential factor to be discussed is the type of incident or hypothetical scenario. The 
type of incident had an effect on the willingness of employees (particularly healthcare 
workers) to report to work. Those incidents considered unconventional or unfamiliar, and 
particularly those with a perceived risk of contagion or contamination, are likely to cause more 
concern than more conventional incidents such as mass casualty or weather related incidents. 
This is most likely because these types of incidents cause a higher level of fear or concern with 
regards to personal health or safety or that of significant others. The concern that employees 
feel for themselves and their families has been shown to be a strong influence on their 
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willingness to work, particularly in the case of an infectious disease where there is an 
associated fear of catching it at work and then going home and passing it on.  
The implications of these findings for organisations are that they may experience higher levels 
of staff absenteeism for CBRN incidents and infectious disease outbreaks than for conventional 
incidents or those without a contagious element or contamination. This is a conclusion 
supported by the risk perception literature which has found that risks that are deemed 
uncontrollable, unfamiliar, catastrophic, cause feelings of dread, potentially unknown to those 
exposed and have serious consequences in terms of causing death are the ones that cause the 
greatest level of concern for individuals.422 CBRN incidents and infectious disease outbreaks 
would score highly on many of these qualitative attributes. In light of this, organisations should 
focus their planning on the types of incidents that are likely to result in the greatest rates of 
staff absenteeism, such as CBRN terrorist attacks and potentially fatal infectious disease 
outbreaks. They could do this by using these types of scenarios in their simulations/exercises. 
These recommendations are discussed further in Chapter 6.  
The responsibilities employees have to care for others are a potential influence on their 
willingness and ability to go to work during a serious incident, particularly children; however it 
is unclear whether simply having children has an effect on its own without knowing if the 
parent has sole responsibility for childcare in the household. A number of studies included in 
the review reported that females were less likely to report to work in a serious incident than 
males; however, the reasons for this need further examination. One study reported that 
females were less likely than males to report to work if children were ill, which is something 
that could go some way to explain the gender difference; however, it needs to be supported 
by future research findings.423 These findings are not surprising when role conflict theory is 
applied to them. Role conflict theory suggests that in a disaster individuals experience a ‘role 
conflict’ between the roles they play in different groups, such as their family group and other 
groups (i.e. their employment group).424 Killian used the example of a ship explosion in Texas 
City and described how the majority of individuals who experienced a role conflict between 
the family and other groups resolved this in favour of loyalty to their families. Therefore, it 
would be wise for organisations to consider the potential strong influence an employee’s 
family could have on their decisions concerning whether or not to report to work during an 
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extreme event. Organisations should also focus on strategies that consider the needs of the 
significant others of their staff, such as the provision of childcare. 
A further influence on employees’ willingness to work is their job role.  The review revealed 
that clinical workers were more willing than non-clinical workers to report to work during an 
extreme event and, similarly, physicians were more willing than nurses. However, it is unclear 
whether this is simply because clinical workers and physicians have more skills or knowledge 
related to the response. Alternatively it could be their confidence in their skills and knowledge 
that is more important. One study to report contradictory findings was that of Adams and 
Berry, who found that a greater proportion of non-clinical personnel than clinical personnel 
were able and willing to report to work during a chemical terrorism event or smallpox 
epidemic.425 The researchers offer a potential explanation for this, which is that non-clinical 
essential personnel may have fewer people per department and so are more critical to the 
response. They also suggest that it is possible non-clinical personnel are socialised to anticipate 
their ‘essentialness’ to a greater extent than clinical staff who know they are more easily 
replaced due to their numbers. Furthermore, the researchers also discuss the possibility that 
clinical staff could be influenced by their increased risk of exposure to patients with infectious 
disease or chemical contamination. However, these questions need to be explored further due 
to this result differing from the findings of other studies. It is also difficult to generalise any of 
the findings related to the influence of clinical job roles to other occupational groups given the 
unique role that healthcare workers would play in the response to an extreme event.  
Overall, this review has found that the majority of studies examining the differences between 
job roles have reported that clinical workers and first responders are more likely to report to 
work than non-clinical workers and other job roles. Evidence suggests that professional 
obligation or duty of care could potentially be the mediating factor in the willingness of 
healthcare workers to report to work during a public health emergency. However, it is unclear 
from the limited research with non-healthcare workers whether individuals in other 
occupations would also experience the same professional obligation or duty to return to work. 
It is possible that employees’ motivations to report to work might be different depending on 
whether their role is directly related to the incident response (such as emergency responders 
and physicians) or whether their role is not directly related to the incident response but they 
would still be affected in some way by the incident or the recovery (such as financial services 
or energy sector employees). This potential relationship between job roles, centrality with 
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regards to the incident response and motivations to report to work is not something that has 
been examined in the studies included in this review, and as such is a subject that should be 
the focus of future research. When focusing on healthcare workers and their willingness to 
report to work in the future, it would be interesting to look at whether there are differences in 
those who provide care for specific groups such as older adults or young children, or whether 
there are variations in behavioural intentions between physicians with different specialisms.  
The review has shown that perceived importance of their role and self-efficacy could have an 
influence on an employee’s decision to report to work during a serious incident, but again in 
the context of healthcare workers responding.426 427 These results can provide support for the 
EPPM, a threat and efficacy based model.428 The efficacy part of the model, which is of interest 
here, is separated into ‘perceived response efficacy’ which is the individual’s belief as to 
whether the response can prevent the threat, and ‘perceived self-efficacy’ which is their belief 
in their own ability to perform the recommended response. The research identified in this 
review supports the influence that self-efficacy can play on behavioural responses, in this case 
the willingness of staff to report to work. In light of this it is recommended that organisations 
focus on increasing employees’ perceptions of self-efficacy. They should do this by 
communicating to staff the importance of their role in an emergency, as well as how they as 
individuals can contribute to both the response and the recovery of the organisation.  
Employer provisions particularly in the form of medication, vaccinations or personal protective 
equipment could encourage employees to return to work during a serious incident. The review 
also revealed that providing these interventions to the families of the employees as well as the 
employee themselves is also a motivating factor. However, there will be some employees for 
whom nothing will persuade them to come to work, particularly during an infectious disease 
outbreak. Furthermore, mixed findings on the usefulness of companies offering financial 
incentives to encourage employees to come to work have been highlighted by this review. The 
implications of these findings for employers are that the interventions with the best chance of 
encouraging staff to return to the workplace are the ones that protect their health or increase 
the perception that their health is being protected. It is therefore recommended that 
organisations include strategies to provide medical incentives to the employees and to their 
families where possible. However, it is vital that these interventions are designed to sit 
alongside current NHS policies and adhere to the relevant legislation, and, most importantly, 
                                                          
426
 Balicer et al., ‘Characterizing Hospital Workers’ Willingness to Respond to a Radiological Event’. 
427
 Ko et al., ‘Applying Theory of Planned Behavior’. 
428
 Witte, ‘Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals’. 
 92 
 
are part of a coordinated response between medical providers. It is also suggested that 
employers make personal protective equipment and hygiene-based interventions (such as 
hand gels) conspicuous in the workplace.  
With regard to employee perceptions of their employer, a number of studies in this review 
have shown this to be an influence on willingness to work. Perceptions of workplace safety are 
something that has been linked to willingness to respond, as is being confident in, or trusting, 
an employer. The finding by Gershon et al. that organisational trust/shared values is associated 
with willingness to work is something that warrants further investigation, particularly as it 
relates to the theory of organisational identification.429 430 Organisational Identification is a 
construct with its roots in Social Identity Theory and can be described as the extent to which 
an individual identifies with their organisation, particularly with the organisation’s values, 
norms and goals.431 432 Consequently, it is possible that those individuals with higher levels of 
organisational identification, who have shared values and who experience the successes and 
failures of the organisation as their own, will be willing to report to work during an extreme 
event.433  
The findings concerning the influence that knowledge and training has on employees’ 
willingness to work in a serious incident are mixed, particularly when separating out the 
influences of actual knowledge versus perceived knowledge. One potential association that 
warrants further investigation was Bar-Dayan et al.’s finding that reading a scientific article 
about A/H1N1 influenza had a stronger relationship to healthcare workers’ willingness to work 
than when lay sources of information were used.434 Therefore, it is potentially the quality and 
the source of the information they receive that is important, rather than simply having any 
information about the potential risk. However, it is possible that there are confounding 
variables that the researchers did not control for that could be a predictor of whether 
someone reads a scientific article, such as their personality type, risk perception, professional 
development goals or general interest in learning about A/H1N1.  
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The risk communication literature also supports the suggestion that people should be provided 
with accurate, scientific information during a public health emergency. For example, Pearce et 
al. used focus groups to examine public reactions and information needs during a hypothetical 
incident involving an RED.435 The findings revealed that by providing accurate information, 
researchers were able to improve participants’ understanding of the actual risks to their 
health. This meant they were able to take appropriate actions during the scenario and not 
attend healthcare facilities unnecessarily. It is vital that employers provide their staff with 
accurate information concerning the risks they could face by going to work, keeping in mind 
that without the facts, employees could be under or overestimating the risks to their health 
and that of their significant others. 
With regards to training, the results are again somewhat mixed; however, a small number of 
studies found training or perceived adequate training was linked to willingness and that 
employees wanted more training. Gershon et al. provided the only study in which a specific 
intervention was tested and discovered that pandemic preparedness training led to a 
significant increase in willingness to work, and that the training increased levels of 
knowledge.436 However, it should be noted that the study used a small sample of 129 
emergency medical services personnel and that the post-test was conducted immediately after 
the training, so it is unclear if the change in behavioural intentions and knowledge levels would 
persist long-term. It has been suggested that an ‘information void’ could occur during a CBRN 
incident due to potentially low levels of knowledge amongst members of the public.437 Barnett 
et al. suggest that this would be likely to affect an employee’s decision whether or not to 
report to duty.438 The risk perception literature has discussed the idea that unfamiliar risks are 
likely to cause greater levels of concern in the public than those risks they are faced with 
regularly.439 Therefore, providing training to employees about CBRN incidents could potentially 
increase their familiarity with the risks, thus reducing their level of concern and enabling them 
to select the most appropriate actions.  
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Limitations of current research  
As with all research involving hypothetical scenarios, a limitation of this type of research is that 
it raises the question of whether self-reported behavioural intentions transfer into actual 
behaviour. There is also the question of whether there is evidence of heroic reporting due to 
the professional obligations or duty of care ethics healthcare workers must abide by and 
whether reading a scenario on paper provides enough realism for an individual to judge their 
willingness. There is some evidence of these issues in the study of Alexander and Wynia who 
reported that 40% of their sample of physicians said they would be willing to put themselves at 
risk of contracting a deadly illness to save others’ lives; however, when given a specific 
scenario this percentage reduced and only 33% said they would care for infected smallpox 
patients if they themselves had not received a vaccine.440 Therefore, it is possible that generic 
questions about professional obligations elicit a more positive response in terms of willingness 
than when individuals are presented with a more specific scenario and that giving more 
information helps the individual to imagine the scenario and to conduct a personal risk 
assessment. Therefore, for the present research it will be important to provide details about 
the specific scenario and name the agents involved, for example ‘pneumonic plague outbreak’ 
rather than simply ‘bioterrorist incident’. This approach was used when developing the 
scenario for use in the focus group study (Chapter 5).  
Some of the survey studies included in this review had particularly small samples (n<100) and 
so it is difficult to generalise their findings to a larger population. Furthermore, many of the 
studies used web surveys, requiring respondents to be connected to the internet. In addition, 
the majority of the studies in the review did not apply any established theoretical frameworks 
to the research. A number of psychological theories and models that could be used to 
understand the drivers underlying employees’ decisions to return to work were presented in 
Chapter 1, and have been considered again here.  These theoretical frameworks could help 
guide researchers to understand the factors that mediate employee decisions and inform the 
development of effective interventions. 
A further limitation of the research included in the present review is that the vast majority of 
studies included samples who were just healthcare workers. It is therefore difficult to 
generalise these findings to other employment groups, particularly due to the nature of the 
role healthcare workers would have in extreme events. In addition, as mentioned by Adams 
and Berry in relation to their own study, despite the surveys being anonymous, participants 
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may have not wanted to answer honestly if they were not willing to work in case their 
employer were to find out.441  
 
Limitations of systematic literature review 
Despite extensive database and ancestry searching it is possible that studies may have been 
missed; however, due to the increase in studies included in this review compared to the two 
previous systematic literature reviews conducted by Chaffee and Smith, it is not likely that 
many have been missed. Due to time constraints the systematic literature search ended in 
August 2012 and it is quite likely that more studies or reviews have been published on this 
topic since that time (see Chapter 6). It should also be noted that due to the nature of the 
topic it is possible that relevant data has been collected and published in industry publications, 
which are not peer-reviewed or accessible via the databases used for this literature search, 
and so could not be included in the present systematic review.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
As discussed by Chaffee at the end of her systematic literature review into the willingness of 
healthcare personnel to work in a disaster, the findings of the hypothetical incident studies 
included in this review should be considered in relation to studies that examine how 
employees have behaved in actual disasters.442 These findings will also be used in conjunction 
with the findings from the original research presented in this thesis in order to formulate a 
series of evidence-based recommendations for organisations. These recommendations can 
then be used to build a resilient workforce and help to prevent high levels of staff absenteeism 
in the event of disaster.  
The vast majority of research in this area has focused solely on healthcare workers. It is vital 
the concept of willingness to work is applied to other sectors of national infrastructure, as 
understanding the likely behaviour of employees is something that would be invaluable to all 
organisations faced with disruption. Future research should involve groups of employees from 
a range of organisations and sectors to investigate if these individuals experience the same 
influences on their decisions about reporting to work as healthcare workers, or whether there 
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are different factors involved.  The present review also revealed a limited number of studies 
which were based on theoretical frameworks. Future research should consider applying other 
theories to the topic, such as risk perception theory, organisational identification, job 
satisfaction and role conflict theory (see Chapter 1).  
The majority of research in this area has looked at the likely behaviour of employees, but has 
not compared this with the assumptions of the employers/decision-makers. One report which 
goes some way to doing this entitled, ‘Preventing Absenteeism and Promoting Resilience 
Among Health Care Workers in Biological Emergencies’ was discovered during the present 
review but not included as it was not peer-reviewed.443 The report was prepared for the US 
Department of Energy and contains a brief review of past survey data, as well as including 
some primary data consisting of 28 interviews with a range of individuals such as civilian and 
military physicians involved in emergency response planning, nurse managers, state public 
health officials and others. Although a useful report, this type of research needs to be 
conducted with key decision-makers in organisations in sectors other than health. Finally, 
more qualitative research needs to be carried out in this topic area, examined alongside the 
quantitative data in order to provide a deeper understanding of the underlying drivers of 
employees’ decision-making in the event of a serious incident such as a CBRN terrorist attack.   
The findings from this systematic literature review were used to inform the interview guide 
used in the interview study (Chapter 3). The themes revealed through this review process 
formed the basis of some of the questions and prompts used in the semi-structured interviews 
with resilience professionals, in order to examine if they had considered these potential 
influences on their employees’ decisions. Similarly, the predictor variables found in the 
reviewed studies were included in the web survey of this research (Chapter 4) to investigate if 
they also applied to employees who work in sectors other than the health sector. 
Furthermore, the findings from this review informed the decision to select a deliberate 
infectious disease release as the focus group scenario (Chapter 5). Finally, the results of many 
of the studies reviewed in this chapter have been used to provide further support for the 
organisational recommendations that are presented in Chapter 6.  
 
 
                                                          
443
 A.M. Lesperance and J.S. Miller, ‘Preventing Absenteeism and Promoting Resilience Among Health 




Chapter 3: Interview Study 
Introduction 
 
When organisations create their business continuity plans, they must make assumptions 
regarding the numbers of staff who are likely to be at work during a major incident. One of the 
key aims of the research presented in this thesis was to examine likely staff behaviour in 
extreme events from the employer’s viewpoint. This, in turn, was expected to shed light on the 
assumptions that national infrastructure employers are making about the behaviour of their 
staff within their business continuity plans.  
Past research has revealed a number of inaccurate and contradictory assumptions that are 
held by emergency responders about how the public will respond to emergency situations; for 
example, that they will panic and will not follow instructions.444 445 These assumptions have 
implications for emergency planning and have the potential to hinder emergency response.446 
It is possible that equally unrealistic assumptions may be held by resilience professionals about 
the likely behaviour of staff in national infrastructure organisations. This study will use 
interviews with business continuity managers and other resilience professionals at national 
infrastructure organisations to ascertain whether or not similar assumptions about human 
behaviour are present.  
Chapters 1 and 2 argued that, with the exception of the previously mentioned US Department 
of Energy report into decision-maker perceptions of the issues surrounding healthcare staff 
absenteeism in biological emergencies, there are very few examples of peer-reviewed 
qualitative research studies in the area of staff willingness to work during extreme events.447  
Despite the fact that the US Department of Energy report is not peer-reviewed, it is the most 
relevant research to the present interview study to have been conducted to date, containing 
some useful findings; and, as such, is cited a number of times in the present chapter. In light of 
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the sampling limitations of the aforementioned US report, the present study is the first of its 
kind to interview decision-makers in all sectors of national infrastructure about their 
assumptions of the likely behaviour of their staff in extreme events, such as those associated 
with a CBRN hazard.  
The present study consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews (n=21) conducted with 
individuals who have current or former responsibilities for the business continuity, crisis 
management or overall resilience of national infrastructure organisations in the UK. The 
purpose of the interviews was to examine the interviewees’ opinions and experiences related 
to their employees’ willingness and ability to work during an extreme event. An interview 
study was considered the most suitable method because a significant level of detail was 
needed on the specific and unique experiences of each interviewee with regards to the 
organisation they work for or previous incidents they had been involved in.  
The aims of this study were to ascertain: 
1. What business continuity managers and resilience professionals believe are the best 
ways to plan for disruption. 
2. How business continuity managers and resilience professionals perceive the likely 
behaviour of employees during an extreme event, particularly CBRN incidents. 
3. How business continuity managers and resilience professionals plan to address the 
barriers and facilitators to employees’ willingness and ability to work in the event of a 
serious incident. 
4. What assumptions business continuity managers and resilience professionals are 
making based on their experience of past incidents or individual beliefs.  
This approach of comparing the assumptions of decision-makers at organisations in a variety of 
sectors of national infrastructure to the self-reported likely behavioural responses of 
employees is novel, and, as such, has the potential to provide a unique contribution, not just 








Design and procedure 
21 semi-structured interviews were conducted between August 2012 and July 2013. The 
majority of interviews took place at the participants’ places of work, one took place at King’s 
College London and two interviews were conducted as telephone interviews. Participants were 
recruited either through contacts of the organisation funding this research, the PhD advisory 
board or as a result of networking. Each participant was contacted by email to ask if they were 
interested in taking part and provided with the study information sheet, after which a 
convenient meeting time and place were arranged. The interviews lasted between 30 and 90 
minutes and all were audio-recorded. Participants signed a consent form to acknowledge that 
they understood they could withdraw from the study at any time and that their contribution 




All 21 interviewees had responsibilities (or former responsibilities) for business continuity, 
crisis management or resilience at a national infrastructure organisation in the UK. Job titles of 
the interviewees included:  ‘Head of Business Continuity’, ‘Emergency Planning Manager’, 
‘Business Continuity Manager’ and ‘Head of Business Continuity and Crisis Management’ 
amongst others. Sectors included in the study were: finance, energy, water, food, transport, 
communications, health, emergency services and local and central Government. 20 out of the 
21 participants were male, 19 were based in England, 1 in Scotland and 1 in Wales. The 
participants’ ages ranged from 28 to 64. Several of the participants had experience working in 
more than one sector of national infrastructure.   
 
Interview schedule 
The interview schedule was designed to cover a number of topics related to the perceived 
ability and willingness of the staff of the participant’s organisation to report to work in the 
event of a serious incident. The first topic included questions designed to explore the 
interviewees’ role in the business continuity planning of their organisation and the types of 
incidents included in their plans. Then interviewees were presented with a set of questions 
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specifically related to planning for CBRN incidents and were asked to describe any incidents 
they had been involved in that could inform future planning for these, e.g. accidental chemical 
incidents or infectious disease outbreaks/pandemics. The purpose of these questions was to 
ascertain the particular approach to BCM used by the organisations and their reasons for 
focusing on some scenarios over others. 
The interviewees were also asked to think about the likely behaviour of the staff at their 
organisation during serious incidents as well as any barriers the employees might face, and any 
strategies the organisation had in place to encourage their staff back to work. These questions 
were designed in order to find out if the interviewees were making assumptions about the 
likely behavioural responses of their staff and the importance they placed on helping their staff 
get back to work. Another topic covered was the internal communications between the 
organisation and their staff during an incident, including their use of social media. This topic 
was included in order to ascertain if organisations were basing their communication strategy 
on assumptions or evidence about effective risk communication. Topics were not always 
covered in the same order nor did they have the same weighting within the interviews due to 
variations in experience. The interviews were semi-structured (meaning the interview schedule 
was only loosely followed) and participants were allowed to discuss issues related to their own 
particular background. The full interview schedule is presented in Appendix B.  
 
Analysis 
All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and subsequently analysed using thematic 
analysis, a flexible research tool which can be used to provide a rich, detailed account of the 
data.448 Through thematic analysis researchers are able to identify and report patterns in the 
data, also known as ‘themes’.  The first stage of the analysis involved reading and re-reading of 
the interview transcripts. Following this, the transcripts were coded, a process where 
important moments or patterns in the data are recognised and categorised. For this analysis all 
coding was conducted manually by highlighting text and writing notes in the margins of the 
printed transcripts. The final stage of the analysis involved collating the codes and considering 
how these could be combined to form over-arching themes and sub-themes.449  
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The analysis of the interview transcripts revealed five over-arching themes and each of these 
had several sub-themes, all of which are described in this section. The themes and sub-themes 
are presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Themes and sub-themes arising from semi-structured interviews with resilience 
professionals (n=21) 
Themes Sub-Themes 
1) Business Continuity 
Management (BCM) approach 
1.1 Planning preferences 
1.2 Staff awareness/involvement in BC 
planning/exercises 
1.3 The importance of being part of national 
infrastructure 
2) Perceptions of likely employee 
responses during an incident 
2.1 It does not matter why staff are not available 
2.2 Consideration of the issue of staff willingness 
2.3 Assuming staff will come to work 
2.4 Consideration that staff will not come to work 
2.5 Different staff will have different reactions 
2.6 Experience of issues with staff willingness 
3) The barriers staff might face 
when considering reporting to 
work  
3.1 Fear or concern for self 
3.2 Fear or concern for others 




4) Facilitating factors or 
organisational interventions to 
encourage staff to return to 
work 
4.1 Flexible working arrangements and technology 
4.2 Medical treatment 
4.3 Social/psychological interventions 
4.4 Other organisational interventions 
5) Information and communication 5.1 Methods of communicating with staff during a 
serious incident 
5.2 What information staff would want to know in the 
event of a serious incident 
5.3 Challenges of communicating with staff during an 
incident 
5.4 Preferred communicators 
 
Theme 1: Business Continuity Management (BCM) approach  
 
1.1 Planning preferences: 
A minority of interviewees suggested that their organisations planned for incidents on the 
basis of past experience. This was either past experiences of the organisation responding to 
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incidents, individual managers’ experiences of being involved in incidents or simply witnessing 
incidents that affected similar organisations. Five interviewees mentioned that they had 
focused on bad weather in their exercises as this has been the main source of disruption for 
them in recent years. One interviewee described the industry as ‘event driven’, meaning 
organisations are more likely to plan for incidents that have occurred in the past, and another 
discussed how affected organisations can be when a similar organisation experiences an 
incident:  
I’ve seen that certainly in organisations where an organisation will get very 
worried about a certain risk because somebody next door had the same risk 
manifest itself, and they look like us, and they feel like us, and that could 
happen to me, therefore my perception of that risk changes and I’m going to 
do something about it. [Interviewee 1] 
There was also a suggestion that the incidents experienced or witnessed by management in 
the past, or the ones they are most worried about happening in the future, influences the 
incidents that organisations plan for. For example one business continuity manager said: 
.…we hold an annual exercise for the executive and the last three of them 
have been around nuclear events, because our Chief Executive, that’s the 
thing that keeps him awake at night most. [Interviewee 6]  
None of the organisations involved in the interview study had been involved in a large-scale 
CBRN incident in the past. However, a minority mentioned the Fukushima response and the 
Litvinenko polonium-210 poisoning. Others drew comparisons from their involvement in small 
scale hazmat incidents and the influenza pandemics of recent years. Opinions regarding the 
need to plan for CBRN incidents were mixed among the interviewees. A minority of 
interviewees said their organisations had planned for CBRN incidents, either in the form of 
scenario plans or in exercises. One local government business continuity manager described 
the importance of planning for CBRN: 
For us it’s a key piece of work. What better way to bring the country 
down…We know it features highly around the National Risk Register, and 
London will always be under threat. [Interviewee 7] 
Other interviewees said that they did not focus on planning for CBRN incidents because it was 
too far down the risk register or because a large scale CBRN incident had not happened before 
in the UK. However, one interviewee acknowledged that if a CBRN incident were to occur in 
the UK it would change people’s perceptions in terms of planning. Two interviewees said that 
they needed to do more CBRN planning in the future. Others argued that CBRN incidents are 
very serious and very frightening, which keeps people from planning for them:  
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Some things that people are preparing for they don’t want to think about. So 
some of CBR could be quite contained, but people don’t want to think about it. 
[Interviewee 18] 
Another interviewee also acknowledged the fear that surrounds CBRN incidents with long-
term consequences: 
....there are things that are almost beyond comprehension, so people...they 
are so severe, so unpleasant, that people do not want to think about it. 
[Interviewee 4] 
A number of organisations who said they had planned for CBRN incidents had often only 
considered the incidents that would directly affect their organisation, for example a deliberate 
attack on their transport infrastructure, or contamination of their water supply or an incident 
that directly affected their organisation’s building. They were often only thinking about these 
incidents in terms of denial of access events. One interviewee said the organisation they 
worked for did not plan for CBRN because of the assumption that it would be so serious it 
would mean simply no access to the workplace. Many had not considered more widespread 
CBRN incidents such as deliberate infectious disease releases and said they would use their 
influenza pandemic plan in the case of a more widespread bioterrorism incident. There was 
also a related assumption that a CBRN incident would only affect operational staff and not 
office staff. One interviewee admitted to not considering the type of CBRN incident that could 
potentially go on for a long period of time or where the effects are not known immediately: 
.…I haven’t perhaps considered something that could, say like an aerosol, 
spread some bacteria or something, and you don’t know because you might 
think it’s somebody who is slightly disturbed spraying some deodorant or 
hairspray around. But what you don’t know is that it actually contains 
something harmful. And you might not know until days or weeks later after 
the incubation period. [Interviewee 15]  
The majority of resilience professionals interviewed expressed a preference for impact-based 
planning, where the emphasis of the planning is on the effect of the incident on certain 
aspects of business rather than the cause (e.g. loss of access to buildings/IT/staff etc.). This can 
be contrasted with scenario planning, in which plans are developed around specific scenarios 
(e.g. fire, power outage). This preference was especially evident for organisations in the 
private sector, although not exclusively. There was a general consensus amongst those 
interviewees who expressed a preference for impact-based planning that organisations should 
plan for the effect rather than the cause of disruption. One business continuity manager from 
a financial organisation, when asked if  they plan for what has caused the disruption answered: 
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No. Don’t care. It doesn’t interest us. It doesn’t matter. It’s the impact of what 
happens that matters. [Interviewee 2]  
In spite of this, the majority of organisations had a pandemic plan and used scenarios in 
exercises and for incident response plans.  
 
1.2 Staff awareness/involvement in BC planning/exercises: 
The majority of interviewees said they did not include all levels of staff in exercises and that 
they mostly exercise at a managerial level. The reasons given for this were that there was a 
concern that some people could take the exercises as real or leak things to the outside world, 
that resources did not allow it and that it was difficult to exercise everyone because of critical 
workers’ shift patterns: 
We can’t bring everyone in on the exercises because we are quite tight on 
resources; we know on a day-to-day basis how many people we need, and we 
don’t have much slack in the system. [Interviewee 9] 
One business continuity manager mentioned that they would like to exercise everyone if they 
could. However, in contrast, another said that there were too many people in the organisation 
and that the people need to be removed from the planning. Just two of the interviewees 
mentioned holding staff awareness events (a seminar and a discussion group) related to 
business continuity. One interviewee discussed the idea that they needed to involve staff 
more: 
We’re looking to involve our staff more in the plans and the processes we’ve 
got. Because we’ve been very good at doing the work, but we’ve been very 
poor at sharing that information with anybody. [Interviewee 9] 
Some organisations had included all levels of staff in exercises, one exercised 50% of the 
organisations’ staff (although this was a very small organisation) and one mentioned an aim to 
include every member of staff in at least one exercise. This latter idea had come from the 
interviewee’s experience during 9/11 in which they learnt that all staff needed to know what 
the response plan was to make them feel comfortable that someone was dealing with the 
crisis: 
I believe so much in the importance of exercising that I exercise everybody in 
the organisation, from the tea lady in Hong Kong up to the CEO. I give 




This interviewee also spoke of including all levels of staff in exercises and described a past 
white powder exercise which staff found very useful; some did not know what to do in the 
specific emergency situation beforehand, so the exercise increased their levels of knowledge. 
One business continuity manager said that they like to bring the human element into 
exercises; for example they sometimes include a member of staff dying in the exercise so that 
there are then issues related to family, next of kin and concerned colleagues that need to be 
discussed. The same interviewee also mentioned the inclusion of staff concerns about job 
security and getting the exercise participants to consider how they would deal with that issue. 
Only three interviewees stated that they had actually asked staff about the potential concerns 
and issues they might have during an incident and one of these ran employee awareness 
seminars during which staff were asked to imagine a terrorist incident and then were asked 
about their immediate concerns. One interviewee explained: 
We’ve had one or two exercises and discussions in teams where I’ve gone 
round to teams to talk to them about the things they might have to do, and 
you pick up comments where some people say ‘well in a situation like that my 
family would come first and I would be at home’. [Interviewee 1] 
A number of organisations acknowledged that they did not bring staff concerns (e.g. 
experiences of fear or practical issues) into their planning processes or their exercises nor did 
they include staff in the exercises. One interviewee explained that this is difficult to do in large 
organisations: 
We don’t go down to the staff level…It’s difficult with [identifiable number] 
thousand people, and they will all have an individual view, so at some point 
you’ve got to write, I know it sounds callous, but you’ve got to write some of 
that off, and just protect them using the best advice you have. [Interviewee 2] 
One resilience professional working for an organisation in the transport sector mentioned that 
rather than being involved in hypothetical incidents in exercises, the staff had experience of 
being involved in real incidents.  
 
1.3 The importance of being part of national infrastructure: 
The fact that the organisations operate within sectors of national infrastructure and the issues 
related to this status were brought up by a number of interviewees. One interviewee 




[We try] to continue to provide support to the customers who need it. Because 
they do need it. Because other [services] can fail during these types of 
incidents, and we can’t because we are their last piece of the jigsaw I suppose. 
[Interviewee 13] 
A second interviewee suggested that for national infrastructure organisations there is a lot of 
pressure to restore services as soon as possible: 
.…we’re always aware that as soon as possible you need to make sure that 
services are restored or, if at all possible, never ceased. [Interviewee 10] 
Another mentioned how there would be serious implications if some services did not continue: 
….if that service was impacted it could be a life or death situation for the 
person at the other end, so that’s a high priority service. [Interviewee 11] 
 A related topic was concern that many of the interviewees’ organisations were reliant on 
other areas of national infrastructure and that some of these suppliers were sole suppliers, for 
example their telecommunications network. Only one interviewee mentioned communicating 
to staff that they were working on critical national infrastructure, although this was limited to 
their operational staff: 
Yeah I’m always telling the ten guys at the [named site] that we are critical 
national infrastructure etc. etc., but not telling people in procurement and IT the 
same.… [Interviewee 17]  
 
Summary of Theme 1: Business Continuity Management (BCM) Approach: 
 Business continuity planning is often event-driven rather than evidence-driven. 
 Organisations often prefer to plan for impacts rather than specific scenarios. 
 Resilience professionals have different opinions regarding whether or not to plan for 
CBRN incidents; and if they did, less focus was on incidents with potentially long-term 
consequences.  
 In general interviewees acknowledged the importance of including staff in BCM 
awareness activities; however the extent to which this happens in practice is 
somewhat limited. 
 Staff concerns are not often included in exercises.  
 Being part of national infrastructure was considered an important issue but few 
resilience professionals communicated to employees that they were part of national 
infrastructure organisations and why it was important for the country that the 
organisation continued to function.  
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Theme 2: Perceptions of likely employee responses during an incident 
 
2.1 It does not matter why staff are not available:  
In BCM, one of the impacts considered in impact based planning is loss of staff or staff 
absence, for example as this interviewee described in relation to a CBRN incident: 
And it might be that some staff are unavailable for an indeterminate length of 
time…So the approach is where else can staff work from, and those that can’t, 
ensure that you have succession planning cross-training in place so that other 
staff can back-fill on any critical priorities that those staff who have been 
directly impacted are not able to perform. [Interviewee 15] 
When asked if they had considered staff willingness to return to work, the majority of 
interviewees discussed this idea that they had planned for loss of staff in terms of how to get 
the absent individuals’ work done by others, or how the non-critical work could be put to one 
side until they come back to work. There was a general assumption among the interviewees 
who mentioned this approach that the impact would be short-term and staff would come back 
to work eventually, or that the impact was localised and so more staff could be found from 
somewhere else, as this interviewee explained: 
Only the highest priority activities and functions will be carrying on, but the 
rest will just be by the wayside until they can be picked up again when more 
staff and resources can be pulled in. [Interviewee 11]  
It is possible for some staff to be able to transfer into other roles, and cross-training was 
mentioned a few times; although it was acknowledged that although this is easy with lower 
skilled roles, it is not always possible with highly skilled roles: 
Through to the other end of the spectrum, where there are a very small 
number of people who can do [that job]. You know things like foreign 
exchange traders on a trading floor, and those kinds of things, it’s very, very 
specific and takes a long time to learn to do properly. [Interviewee 5] 
There were also a minority of interviewees who felt quite strongly that it did not matter why 
staff were not available because the impact will always be the same, for example: 
....it really doesn’t matter if you are unavailable because you can’t come to 
work or you won’t come to work; you’re not at work, therefore you’re not 





2.2 Consideration of the issue of staff willingness: 
When discussing the issues surrounding staff and extreme events, although the interviewees 
often mentioned potential problems with employees’ ability to report to work, very few 
interviewees brought up the topic of employees not being willing to report to work (unless 
prompted by the interviewer). This suggests that it is not a front of mind concern for business 
continuity managers or is simply an issue they have not previously considered. One 
interviewee acknowledged that this issue was not a priority for business continuity managers:  
.…one of the things that has always struck me as getting parked in the too 
difficult box [is] the emotional and behavioural response of the people. 
[Interviewee 16].  
The same interviewee brought up the issue of business continuity managers of national 
infrastructure organisations (e.g. central government) making ‘dangerous’ assumptions about 
willingness:  
.…we make behavioural assumptions because we need people to 
communicate, drive things, move things etc.  [Interviewee 16]  
However, about half the resilience professionals interviewed said they had thought about a 
situation where staff do not want to come back to work due to fear or other barriers, when 
specifically asked. Two said they had considered a situation where the fear of catching an 
infectious disease could affect willingness to report to work and another interviewee discussed 
staff not returning to work due to fear of radiation. Two interviewees admitted that it would 
be worth considering issues surrounding staff willingness. Nearly half of the resilience 
professionals interviewed said they had thought about how staff might react during an 
incident and what their concerns might be but had never actually asked their staff:  
No, I haven’t really considered it. It’s something that I’ll perhaps take away 
after this interview. [Interviewee 17]  
A very small minority of interviewees spoke about which types of incidents they thought staff 
would be most concerned about, although one suggested it could be incidents involving 
biological agents whilst admitting that she/he had not thought about it before. Another said 
that it would be useful to know this information:  
I’ve not done any research or asked anybody would they come to work in this 
scenario versus would they come to work in this scenario. It would be 
interesting to find out what the answer would be, that would be useful to 
know what the common picture is. [Interviewee 9] 
 109 
 
As with the issue of willingness in general, not many interviewees mentioned interventions 
they could use to facilitate willingness, and some said they had never considered this. A few 
indicated that it did not matter why the staff were not at work, and one interviewee discussed 
why it was not up to the organisation to facilitate their staff’s return to work: 
.…to what extent we should be helping people who are not making a huge 
effort themselves because they see this as your responsibility, and to what 
extent should we be, you know, rewarding those who made that massive 
effort to get themselves in. And at the end of the day we need you to do the 
job and we have a relationship where you turn up and we pay you, that’s kind 
of the way it works. [Interviewee 1] 
 
2.3 Assuming staff will come to work:  
Half of the resilience professionals interviewed made at least one assumption about their staff 
being willing to come to work during a serious incident. One of the most common reasons 
given was employees having a level of personal resilience. It was mentioned that London has a 
‘Blitz spirit’ and that people do not want to admit defeat. Phrases such as ‘Dunkirk spirit’, 
‘gung-ho attitude’, ‘human nature’ and ‘team spirit’ were mentioned. In fact one business 
continuity manager even acknowledged that they rely on human nature and the human spirit 
when they plan. Three interviewees gave examples of when staff had volunteered in past 
incidents. A small minority acknowledged the idea that this may not apply to CBRN incidents, 
where going to work could put their lives and the lives of their families at risk. Some of the 
interviewees spoke about how their employees would come to work because of their 
commitment to the organisation. One even said that they were unable to think of a situation 
where staff would not be willing to come in, but acknowledged that there was no evidential 
basis to this: 
That’s nothing grounded in a lot of research or anything, it’s a gut reaction 
that people will respond. It’s certainly one of the areas that we will look at in 
the future. [Interviewee 20] 
 A small minority recognised the fact there could also be other influences on the decisions of 
the staff at their organisations:  
.…there’s a high degree of professionalism and commitment. So that would 
make people want to come back to work, they would feel a duty to do that. 
But it’s whether that is overpowered by their own fear, influence of trade 




During the interviews some of the resilience professionals considered the potential factors 
that could influence an employee’s decision to go to work or not. One of the influences 
considered was an individual’s role within the organisation. There was a perception that 
frontline/operational/critical staff would be more likely to continue to work during an incident. 
Related to that was the assumption that technical specialists would be more willing to work 
because they have pride in their work and that people who work on call anyway would expect 
to work beyond what they are normally expected to do. Another view was that employees of 
financial organisations whose day-to-day work is tied to the fortunes of the organisation and 
also to their bonuses, would be more willing to work, whereas employees who know they 
would get the same amount of pay whether they stay at work or go home would most likely go 
home rather than put themselves at risk: 
.…they know that if they are not there making money and their bonus, the 
incentive being money there, Gordon Gekko never went away, they will keep 
trading while the Wharf burns. [Interviewee 4] 
Furthermore, there was a suggestion by resilience professionals at three organisations that 
staff need to know the importance of their role in an incident; some people only want to help 
if they think that what they are doing is useful. They suggested that everyone needs to feel 
part of the response. One interviewee described the aftermath of 7/7 and how staff who 
volunteered sometimes felt that their contribution was not valuable because their roles were 
poorly defined. The same interviewee wondered if willingness to work might be related to how 
people think the organisation is treating them in general, and thus if morale is related to 
willingness.  
Some resilience professionals believed that specific aspects of their organisation meant that 
employees would be more willing to go to work than employees at other organisations. One 
interviewee commented that it was due to the size of the organisation that employees would 
be willing to go to work:  
I think the advantage to being small is that if something happens, most people 
realise it’s in their ability to carry on working. [Interviewee 20] 
Another influence discussed was organisational culture. Two interviewees believed that staff 
at their organisation were loyal and would be willing to work during serious incidents because 
they identify with the shared values of the organisations, and they are bought into the 
organisational culture. As one interviewee explained: 
I think there is a desire to pull together and work in the best interests of the 
company, and I put that down to a specific cultural change…for the vast 
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majority that mind-set is there and is there for anything, regardless of what 
the circumstances might be. [Interviewee 19] 
One interviewee from a transport organisation had a strong belief that their organisation’s 
staff were more resilient than other organisation’s staff because of their experience of 
responding to incidents in the past: 
The personal resilience of our workforce is a bit higher because of what they’ve 
been exposed to, there’s a little bit of a head start there. [Interviewee 12] 
The same interviewee also assumed that staff would go back to work as soon as they started 
to see others going back to work and so would be influenced by colleagues: 
People tend to think, ok if he’s going to work, she’s going to work, I’ll be part 
of that, rather than sit at home on my own and do something different. So I 
think there’s some peer pressure...not so much pressure but it’s an influence 
of the wider community. [Interviewee 12] 
Some business continuity managers believed that the business continuity team and those at 
the top of the organisation should come to work to set an example to the rest. Two 
interviewees said that they themselves would come to work whatever the incident, because 
that was their jobs and another with a military background described a mentality in soldiers 
whereby they put themselves at risk in order to provide for their family: 
They see it as, ‘whatever happens to me, as long as I can provide for them in 
the future’. [Interviewee 4] 
The same interviewee also described their own level of personal resilience and how they were 
unsympathetic about people not coming to work because of stress.  
Approximately half of the interviewees used previous examples of staff willingness to work to 
explain their opinions that staff would respond in future incidents. 7/7 was used as an example 
a few times where people went back to work the next day. Hurricane Sandy, the Buncefield 
incident and an employee who rowed to work after the Tewkesbury flooding were also 
mentioned. However, as previously noted, none of these incidents were CBRN incidents. Only 
one interviewee acknowledged that people’s reactions to CBRN incidents could be different to 
non-CBRN incidents.  
 
2.4 Consideration that staff will not come to work: 
In contrast to the interviewees who were convinced their employees would come to work 
regardless of the situation, there were those who acknowledged that they might not. One 
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resilience professional mentioned that although people might want to help initially, people 
have a breaking point where they will say ‘no I can’t do that anymore’. One resilience 
professional from a transport organisation fully appreciated that it would be a major challenge 
getting people back to work and another admitted not knowing what people would do, but 
that it was possible people might not come to work. As one interviewee questioned: 
How would people respond to an instruction to go to a particular place if they 
were not sure about their own personal circumstances? [Interviewee 16] 
A few interviewees mentioned that people could have a conflict between going to work and 
looking after their families. Two resilience professionals from local government mentioned 
how they rely on staff to come forward and volunteer in an incident, but acknowledged that 
they do not have to; you cannot force someone to volunteer if they want to check on their 
family. One of these interviewees wondered if you should ask staff to consider this possible 
dilemma before they sign up to become volunteers. The same interviewee recognised the fact 
that managers may have a different view of their operational staff’s willingness in the face of a 
perceived risk than the operational staff themselves. Similarly, another interviewee said that 
what an employer would expect staff to do may be different from what they will be able to do 
or what they will want to do.  
Two of the interviewees questioned the assumption in planning that everyone will be available 
during an incident and that everyone will come to work, for example:  
You shouldn’t assume that everyone will be available. With pandemic you 
have to plan that you might have casualties and not everyone will be there. I 
saw a fantastic plan, not our organisation; nowhere in there were they 
assuming that any of their employees will be affected. [Interviewee 18] 
Interviewees also discussed that the intent to help out during incidents can be different to 
what a person really would do. One interviewee had an example of a friend who had a role to 
play in the Cold War:   
.…and what this guy said to me, he said ‘yeah I went along with it, went on all 
the courses, signed all the forms but I was never going to do it. Someone gives 
me the call, I’m going home’. [Interviewee 16] 
One resilience professional commented that the plan should not even assume the business 
continuity or resilience manager is going to be there. This particular interviewee was working 
during an earthquake and suddenly found that his only concern was to drive to the school and 
see how his son was. Work was no longer a priority, family was: 
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The very first thing we had in mind was how are my kids, where are they? 
That was another big lesson…Suddenly even for me the plan was secondary. 
My only concern was to drive there and see how my boy was. [Interviewee 18]  
Another business continuity manager who had previously volunteered to help at 7/7 was not 
certain that they would do it again due to the stress it caused them. One of the resilience 
professionals also questioned the assumption that technical staff would come to work 
regardless of the situation: 
I think there’s a feeling that the mentality in the business is such that they are 
used to being in emergency teams, that they understand the materials they 
are dealing with... I think there’s a feeling that whatever happened people 
would be prepared to do whatever. It is an assumption and it’s one I always 
challenge. [Interviewee 6] 
There was also an acknowledgement that the ‘in-it-together’ spirit that is often mentioned 
would only last a short period of time as people are running on adrenaline. There could 
potentially be longer term psychological consequences that could affect staff, particularly if 
colleagues have been injured or killed. 
 
2.5 Different staff will have different reactions: 
Nearly a third of the interviewees discussed the idea that people will react very differently in 
extreme situations; some employees will make more effort than others, some people will want 
normality and will want to come back to work, but some will not: 
There are different mentalities. There will be some people who will not want 
to come back and we accept that. There will be some people who will go into 
a flat spin panic about the whole thing. There are some who, because that’s 
where their stress ball is and their screens are set up the way they want, will 
come back and trade from Canary Wharf regardless. [Interviewee 4] 
One interviewee used the example of the recent pandemic to explain the idea that staff can 
react very differently to the same incident or the same experiences:  
And swine flu was an interesting one, but what we saw with swine flu was 
people being very, very passionate about protection and some of the 
measures, and others being terribly laissez-faire about it. [Interviewee 14] 
There was a feeling that these different reactions to incidents would have to be managed on 
an individual basis, as one interview explains: 
You can’t apply a blanket policy. Obviously some people will choose to come 
to work and some won’t and that’s down to the individuals, to be managed on 
a case by case basis. [Interviewee 9]  
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The same interviewee also brought up the idea that although some people might react in a 
positive and committed way in the immediate aftermath of an incident, due to the 
psychological effect and pressure of the event they may not be able to continue in the longer 
term: 
We have good commitment to [non-operational staff being deployed to 
operational areas] and quite a good buy in. However, that’s only going to last 
a short period of time and then also recognising the fact that the experience 
that those people have been through, they may be fine to get through on 
adrenaline and sheer determination for a day or two but then it sinks in and 
then there’s the longer term consequences and impacts of that depending on 
what has happened. [Interviewee 9]  
The idea of risk was brought up by two of the resilience professionals, with one commenting 
that risk perception is not always rational or logical and it is not just about calculating the 
numbers. Another interviewee mentioned the idea that some people want to help in risky 
situations and may even enjoy it, but some do not (including the interviewee themselves). 
Even the ones who want to help and say they are fine; there is always the concern that they 
are hiding how it is affecting them, as the interviewee explains: 
.…we had a core group who were literally waiting to be deployed. I have my 
own thoughts about the psychology of some of these individuals and I was 
concerned even for those that showed this hardy approach. I still worried 
about them, were they hiding their thoughts, was it going to explode at any 
time? [Interviewee 7]  
One interviewee discussed how people can behave selfishly and it is not always because of 
fear, but because the situation is not a normal one and so people think the normal rules do not 
apply. 
 
2.6 Experience of issues with staff willingness: 
A quarter of interviewees had experience of someone not coming into work because of fear or 
concern for their safety. One interviewee mentioned an employee who was ‘traumatised’ after 
an incident and would not go back to work: 
But as a result of [the London bombings] we did actually lose one of our staff 
who was very traumatised by what they saw at that particular incident…and it 
was clear that they were never going to come back to the [organisation] in 
any shape or form. [Interviewee 7] 
 Another described the reaction of a staff member who found out a team member had flu and 
refused to go in: 
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.…in the one branch that it happened first, in a 5 person branch, one person 
refused point blank to come back in at all, until such time as they were told 
that it wasn’t the flu. Other than that they weren’t coming in. [Interviewee 1] 
Another spoke about 7/7 and how they had experienced people not wanting to help out, and 
another had a whole team refuse to do their job because it required them to drive in the snow, 
even though their job was critical: 
Another team of people with a different activity but still critically to do with 
the safety of vulnerable people said, ‘no, sorry, we really don’t feel confident 
about driving’, and their service had to get other people to fill in for them 
because they couldn’t actually persuade their staff to drive. [Interviewee 14]  
One resilience professional from a transport organisation said they had experienced a very 
small minority of people say they were not coming into work, and this was blamed on ‘media 
scaremongering’ and had also had other staff members asking questions and needing to be 
reassured: 
Of course we had a minority of staff ringing up and saying ‘I’m not coming to 
work’. Well why? It was just the Sun saying this. It was probably only two people 
who rang up and said ‘I’m not happy’, others asked their managers questions at 
work and were reassured. [Interviewee 12] 
 
Summary of Theme 2: Perceptions of likely employee responses during an incident: 
 Some national infrastructure organisations have planned for staff absenteeism as a 
potential impact of an incident, but did not believe it was important to understand 
why staff were absent.  
 The issue of staff willingness to work in the event of different types of incidents did not 
appear to be a front of mind concern for many of the interviewees involved in this 
study. 
 Beliefs about staff reporting to work during an extreme event such as CBRN incidents 
were based on conventional wisdom or staff reporting to work in non-CBRN incidents. 
 Some interviewees were aware that not all of their staff would report to work during a 
CBRN type incident.  
 Others were aware that different members of staff might react differently to the same 
incident. 
 Nearly a quarter of the resilience professionals interviewed for this study had 
experienced a staff member not coming to work because of fear or because of the 
long-term psychological effects of an incident.  
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Theme 3: The barriers staff may face when considering returning to work  
 
3.1 Fear or concern for self: 
A minority of interviewees recognised that in the event of a high-impact, low-probability 
incident, particularly an infectious disease outbreak or CBRN terrorist attack, staff may be 
reluctant or refuse to come to work due to a fear for their own personal health/safety. For 
example: 
And I think a good example of this is pandemic. If you’re running a big 
operation you might want to ask your people to help you, but then you might 
also say that all your people might stay at home because they are concerned 
about being contaminated, and that’s a very fair assumption. [Interviewee 
18] 
One interviewee acknowledged that staff could potentially stay away due to fear of radiation, 
but was unsure how this could be dealt with:  
Because it’s radiological, that’s automatically scary. And that’s an issue where 
I don’t think any organisation, even ourselves, has really got around that 
question of if you have a widespread absence from work due to a fear factor 
that you can’t really deal with logically. [Interviewee 1] 
Related to this was the idea that staff may be concerned that other colleagues may come to 
work with symptoms. Using the example of flu, one interviewee acknowledged this could be a 
problem:  
….if they see a lot of people going down with flu, they may not want to come 
in because they’re vulnerable or they see that they could get it. One of the 
problems that we do get is people actually coming into work when they’ve got 
flu or ailments that can be transmitted. If you’re ill you shouldn’t come into 
work, it’s as simple as that. [Interviewee 13] 
One interviewee described the recent swine flu pandemic as the only example of a situation 
when there was any hint of non-willingness due to health concerns, but that this was dealt 
with swiftly and effectively with the right channels of communication and the right expertise. 
 
3.2 Fear or concern for others: 
As well as fearing for their own safety, staff may feel that coming to work could potentially put 
their families’ lives at risk. This idea was mentioned by two of the interviewees. Similarly, one 
interviewee mentioned the potential for people to not want to be at work because they are 
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concerned for their significant others and this was something the interviewee had learned 
from discussions with staff members: 
We’ve had one or two exercises and discussions in teams where I’ve gone 
round to teams to talk to them about the things they might have to do, and 
you pick up comments where some people say ‘well in a situation like that my 
family would come first and I would be at home’. [Interviewee 14] 
Another spoke about the dilemma between continuing to work in an emergency and the need 
to find out if their family is safe. This dilemma was discussed in the context of the Fukushima 
nuclear incident: 
….just put yourself in the place of a guy working in the nuclear power station 
at Fukushima…he doesn’t know if his family’s alive or dead, he’s on top of a 
reactor that’s going critical…it’s the perfect storm in terms of how do you 
respond to that, as human beings how do you respond to that? [Interviewee 
6] 
The interviewee acknowledged the fact that the workers did continue to work and there were 
examples of tremendous self-sacrifice during and in the aftermath of the incident, but 
questioned whether that would happen in the UK. A related issue to this is the idea that 
employees may have to deal with the concerns of their friends and families who might not 
want them to go to work, as mentioned by one interviewee. Pandemic planning in recent years 
led to one interviewee realising that there are critical dependencies with regards to staff, in 
terms of their families being affected, or worrying about their families being affected.  
A minority of interviewees brought up the potential conflict staff may face when thinking 
about whether their first priority was to their families or their job. As one interviewee put it:  
It’s human psychology, some people will want to get involved, some people 
won’t. They just see the job as a job, come in and go home. Some people are 
going to think ‘no, I’ll look after myself and my family’. [Interviewee 11] 
Similarly one business continuity manager recognised that the priorities for individuals and 
businesses may be different during emergency situations.  
 
3.3 The need to care for others: 
The need to care for significant others was frequently mentioned in the interviews as a barrier 
to the ability of staff to report to work. This was often mentioned in relation to family 
members being ill or schools being closed due to the incident. One interviewee discussed the 
need to care for others:  
 118 
 
.…you could perhaps have similar domestic impacts e.g. nursing family at 
home. If schools are shut the kids may not be down with the flu but they are 
not going to school; who is going to look after them? What about your other 
dependents who you may need to look after? You might feel well enough 
yourself to come to work but you have other responsibilities. [Interviewee 21] 
One resilience professional also recognised the significance of schools for UK national 
infrastructure and that childcare was part of the organisation’s supply chain: 
.…as soon as teachers can’t teach, well the schools are closed, so therefore 
people have got to look after their kids, and so people don’t go to work and 
the economy grinds to a halt because you don’t have a school. [Interviewee 4]  
However, only one interviewee said that their organisation could provide childcare during an 
incident but that this was in fact part of their normal day-to-day provision: 
Yes, so we have places at the nurseries around the area, which are not just for 
incidents. So if your school is closed for whatever reason you can put your 
child into some of the nurseries. [Interviewee 2]  
One further interviewee said they had thought about the potential to provide this service in 
the future. A minority mentioned that it would be up to the manager’s discretion in individual 
cases as to whether an employee could work from home to look after children or if they would 
have to take a day’s leave. Two interviewees said that childcare was not the organisation’s 
responsibility and so people would have to make their own arrangements; some could 
hopefully rely on other family members to help. For example: 
The policy is that it is people’s responsibility to come to work…Different people 




A few interviewees mentioned that transport disruption could be a potential barrier for 
employees trying to get to work. However, only two interviewees (and one was from a 
transport organisation) mentioned the potential concern for their health that staff might have 
when commuting and how this may affect their willingness to go to work. A resilience 
professional from a local government organisation highlighted the issue: 
.…if something did happen and you didn’t want to use public transport 
because it’s disrupted so you can’t, or because it’s exposing you to risks you’re 
not comfortable taking then you would be able to continue your key function 
from a different location. [Interviewee 8] 
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Another example related to transport and the issue of willingness to go to work was brought 
up by another interviewee who discussed the dilemma an employee might have during a fuel 
crisis when they have limited fuel supply, something which could also happen during a major 
incident:  
So the question of ‘can I go to work?’ remains, but it’s affected by the other 
impacts and the question of ‘should I be using my fuel for this or should I be 
making sure that I can access this, that and the other; are my children home 
from school and [can I] get them where they need to go, what about other 
dependent relatives?’ [Interviewee 21] 
This example, although not directly related to an extreme event, highlights the potential 
dilemma an employee might have with regards to going to work or using his/her resources to 
support significant others. 
 
3.5 Role: 
A flexible working environment, with staff working from home, was mentioned by a number of 
interviewees. However, it was recognised that not all roles are suited to working from home, 
such as pilots and cabin crew. One interviewee said that the organisation may have to accept 
that some staff will be at home and not working because their roles do not allow it:  
You might have to send your lower level staff home, those that are less critical 
to the immediate delivery, so it might be perhaps that you would ask your 
admin staff for example to not come into work, and if they can’t work from 
home then you could probably tolerate that. [Interviewee 15]  
However, an issue was raised by a resilience professional from a transport organisation with 
regards to the message that a decision of that sort might send to staff:  
I think you have to be careful with this, because if you say to the desk bound 
people like me that you can work from home during this, it sends the wrong 
message to the operational staff. [Interviewee 12] 
This presents a challenge for organisations in these situations and the interviewee discussed 
the possibility that operational staff could feel as though their safety is being taken less 
seriously than the desk-based staff who are working from home.  
There was also a suggestion by one interviewee that staff who are not at the forefront of 
making the organisation money, the back office workers, would be more likely to go home in 





Although there were many remote access technology options offered by the organisations 
involved in the research, there were also a few beliefs related to these. Firstly, there was an 
assumption among some interviewees that everyone has a laptop or computer at home that 
they could use, and no consideration that there may be couples who both need to work from 
home but only have one device: 
.…there’s an assumption that these days people have the technology. At least 
they have a home PC, which means they can get their emails via web access. 
[Interviewee 15] 
Secondly, a number of interviewees were assuming that staff members who were given 
remote access tokens and/or laptops took these home every night, and, therefore, if an 
incident happened over the weekend or during the night that people would have everything 
they needed to be able to work from home the next day. Although some interviewees said 
they specifically instructed staff to take their remote access technology home, some said they 
did not tell staff anything: 
.…some people leave their laptops at home and use a desktop computer at 
work. I take mine home with me just because I do, but I’ve never been told you 
have to take it home. Likewise I’ve never been told don’t leave it at home. So it 
would be entirely dependent on the situation and who had what at the time 
really. [Interviewee 9] 
There were interviewees who acknowledged that this was a dangerous assumption to make as 
they were unaware how many employees took their laptops home each day or how many kept 
their remote access tokens at home. One interviewee recognised that in an incident requiring 
an evacuation, staff would have to leave their laptops and maybe even their phones in the 
office, and potentially might not be able to go back in to get them meaning they would be 
unable to work from home: 
....staff can [work from home] via laptops, but it depends whether you’ve 
taken your laptop home with you. If you can’t get into your building then you 
wouldn’t be able to pick up your laptop. [Interviewee 21] 
Another interviewee also commented:  
It’s interesting when you ask people ‘where’s your laptop?’, and we can’t 
mandate that people take their laptop when there’s a fire evacuation.” 
[Interviewee 13] 
Even if the employees have all the equipment they need at home, it was also recognised that 
the servers would need to be able to cope with the increased traffic, and that some staff save 
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their work on their personal drives (meaning it is not easy for other staff to continue their 
work in their absence) or on the hard drive of their laptop (that they may have left in the 
office).  
 
Summary of Theme 3: The barriers staff might face when reporting to work in the event of a 
serious incident: 
 Few resilience professionals acknowledged that staff may not be willing to report to 
work during an extreme event such as a CBRN incident due to a fear for their personal 
health or safety. 
 Although some interviewees did mention that staff may want to care for their 
significant others during an incident, only a small minority acknowledged the fact that 
staff may be unwilling to go to work due to a perceived risk to their families’ health as 
a result of going to work. 
 A number of interviewees noted the potential need for parents to care for children 
when they are ill or because the schools were closed; however there were different 
views about whether their organisation had a responsibility to help provide this 
support.  
 Transport problems were mentioned most frequently in reference to employees being 
unable to get to work during a serious incident, but there were fewer 
acknowledgements that public transport in particular could be a barrier to the 
willingness of employees to report to work. 
 The option of working from home was frequently mentioned by employees, but it was 
also recognised that not all roles could do this.  
 Remote access technology is often provided by organisations. Some interviewees 
believed that staff take this technology home every evening and others said they did 







Theme 4: Facilitating factors or organisational interventions to encourage staff 
to return to work 
 
4.1 Flexible working arrangements and technology: 
The majority of organisations offered flexible working arrangements, particularly the ability for 
people to be able to work from home. Some organisations said working from home was 
allowed when necessary, because of an incident, transport problems or bad weather for 
example: 
 [Our flexible working policy] allows us to say to people ‘well if the transport 
infrastructure is disrupted or if London is difficult to get to for whatever 
reason, be it that you have someone at home that you need to look after, or 
you yourself are not well enough to travel, or you don’t want to put yourself in 
a position where you could be exposed to something on public transport’.... 
[Interviewee 8] 
A minority of organisations said working from home would be allowed when staff needed to 
look after their children. For example, one interviewee said: 
For those [children of staff] who are above nursery age, we would, we have 
allowed staff to work from home and supervise children. [Interviewee 2] 
In addition, one business continuity manager suggested that working from home was allowed 
when it was easier for people, for example because of appointments or needing to pick 
children up from school. Finally, two interviewees mentioned that people could work from 
home if they were worried about the risk of exposing themselves or if they needed to care for 
a sick family member. For example, one interviewee noted: 
But if something did happen and you didn’t want to use public transport 
because it’s disrupted so you can’t or because it’s exposing you to risks you’re 
not comfortable taking then you would be able to continue your key function 
from a different location, mainly from home, but also other offices. 
[Interviewee 8]  
One resilience professional said that line managers should look into each individual situation, 
for example if staff needed to care for family. However, another two interviewees 
acknowledged the fact that different managers think differently regarding working from home 
during periods of disruption and also set different examples. Many interviewees also brought 
up the fact that they had alternative locations or back-up offices at which key staff could work 
if necessary. For example, one interviewee said: 
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So the critical people would decant to their fallback sites, assuming they could 
get out of here. [Interviewee 3] 
However, the same interviewee did also mention that the organisation’s fallback site was 
within a few miles of the main site.  
Only one interviewee mentioned having considered strategies to provide staff with remote 
access IT equipment such as laptops if they had left them in the office during an incident; spare 
laptops being kept at alternative sites and the use of disk mirroring to ensure the laptop data is 
stored separately from the original technology.  
 
4.3 Medical Treatment: 
A quarter of organisations had considered a situation where they could provide prophylaxis to 
their staff in an infectious disease outbreak. Four interviewees said their organisations had 
either bought or thought about buying prophylaxis in a previous incident. However, issues 
were raised surrounding the ethics and practicalities of an employer providing medical 
treatment to its employees. As one interviewee speaking about their former employer 
explained: 
So they had essentially purchased, direct from the drug manufacturer, the 
right to a certain amount of Tamiflu, which could then be prescribed by 
medical practitioners. That Tamiflu was all held by those drug companies for 
the four, five or six years before it would be past its use-by-date and then it 
would be disposed of. Guess what? It all got disposed of. Across all the banks. 
[Interviewee 5]  
One interviewee discussed potential problems with deciding which staff to provide prophylaxis 
to if the medication was in short supply. The interviewee questioned whether it should just be 
provided to critical staff, and if so, how would the rest of the staff feel about that decision? 
Another admitted that they had not really thought about how to prescribe it or the liability 
implications involved in doing so: 
I guess it would have been quite strange; how do you encourage your staff to 
take it and what sort of liability risk do you take if your staff took antibiotics 
prescribed by [their employer]…I don’t quite know how that will work. 
[Interviewee 10] 
One interviewee described purchasing iodine for staff in Japan during the Fukushima disaster 
based on the advice of an independent expert: 
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We also went out and bought all of the recommended items that [name of 
independent expert] had asked us to buy iodine tablets and stuff like that. So 
we got all of those shipped in. [Interviewee 2] 
Two organisations specifically mentioned offering flu vaccinations to its staff in recent years. 
One business continuity manager said that organisations sometimes need to be seen to be 
doing something in these situations, because staff have heard/seen what competitors are 
providing or because media coverage is saying what organisations should be doing. It was also 
noted that staff may be annoyed if they see differing responses at similar organisations, even if 
the government advice on providing prophylaxis for all new cases has changed and they are no 
longer advised to do this. Another issue was brought up by another interviewee who 
mentioned the challenge faced when an organisation has contractors, and whether or not they 
should also provide interventions for the contractors as well as their own employees. 
 
4.3 Social/psychological interventions: 
Five organisations reported having experience of using psychological interventions following 
an incident, usually in the form of trauma counselling. One interviewee discussed how this was 
provided to all staff who were involved in a past hoax anthrax incident: 
Counselling was provided to the people who were exposed throughout the 
period, saying it probably isn’t anything because we do get these all the time, 
but we need to make sure.… [Interviewee 5] 
A minority of interviewees acknowledged the fact that a traumatic incident could have long-
term consequences and that staff members could experience symptoms months or years after 
the event. A few other organisations said that they had the option to use trauma counselling in 
the future, and one interviewee specifically said this could be used for people who were 
frightened about going to work. They also said that the trauma counselling would usually be 
provided by a third party healthcare provider: 
It’s a third party company that we use. If we had an incident, say for 7/7, what 
we did after 7/7 was to…we notified the company and said ‘can you ramp up 
your staff because we suspect we’re going to get more calls’, plus we brought 
some of their counsellors into the building. [Interviewee 2] 
Another interviewee implied that these arrangements were not already in place and that 
they would be decided on in the aftermath of the incident: 
.…we need to think about whether we engage a firm to come and do post-
trauma counselling and get all those arrangements in place. [Interviewee 6] 
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One business continuity manager believed very strongly that organisations that are not 
healthcare providers should not themselves provide healthcare services. Two interviewees 
discussed the use of pre-incident psychological assessments to assess the suitability of those 
who could potentially be called on for a role in the incident response, and one of those 
described an example of a past situation whereby a staff member psychologically affected by 
an incident had not received adequate support initially, but that they did in the end: 
I’m not sure to this day whether they got the support that they deserved, 
possibly because I think they may have tried to hide some of those issues 
initially…And they did then get the full support of the occupational health, 
they got the full support of the organisation, and they were eventually retired 
on an appropriate pension. [Interviewee 7] 
It is unclear from the above example what psychological support the employee was provided 
by their occupational health department as this was a confidential case.   
 
4.4 Other organisational interventions: 
Some other organisational interventions brought up in the interviews were related to hygiene, 
such as desk cleaning when an employee had been experiencing symptoms, hand gels in 
communal areas and at building entrances, and advice on effective hand-washing in the toilets. 
Again, it was mentioned that organisations have to be seen to be doing something because 
staff may have seen other organisations doing certain things or have heard things in the 
media: 
Um there was a lot of feeling that we should be doing more cleaning on the 
grounds that a lot of media coverage at the time was you touch something 
that somebody else has touched then that’s what causes the problem…And 
then there’s the challenge that some of our competitors gave out hygiene 
packs to staff, hand cleaners and stuff like that and in some cases put them on 
desks around, [employees ask] ‘they’ve got that so why haven’t I got that?’ 
[Interviewee 1] 
One interviewee considered the idea of quarantining sick staff, making them stay away from 
the office. Another interviewee said they had discussed the idea of compensation for 
employees who were prepared to put themselves at additional risk by working during an 
incident. Another suggested that organisations should ‘wave a perk in front of them and they’ll 
come in’ and another from a local government organisation spoke about one of the boroughs 
in which they have rotas for people being ready and available to be called out to an incident, 
and staff get paid to be on this rota.  
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A minority of interviewees discussed the potential or their organisation to be able to provide 
transport options to employees who could not get to work. One interviewee mentioned a 
contract with a coach company and another said they could organise taxis during an incident: 
The demands for taxis might be very high but we’ve got a contract with 
someone who’s designed to do that. We can also call on bus operators to give 
us capacity in buses and coaches. [Interviewee 12] 
Sometimes this transport assistance could be provided for all staff, but usually just for critical 
workers. Two organisations would issue advice about how to get to work, e.g. advising people 
to walk or cycle to lower their risk, or to car-share when public transport was unavailable. 
However, as with the provision of childcare, a minority of interviewees did not see the 
provision of transport as something that was the organisation’s responsibility. 
If employees were unable to get home then three interviewees also mentioned that they could 
potentially offer accommodation, sometimes in the office and sometimes at local hotels: 
Hotels round here get filled up, but for our crisis team we would block book 
hotel rooms, so people essential to the response would be able to get in. 
[Interviewee 9] 
Two interviewees also described providing assistance with money and clothes if needed, and 
organising locksmiths to help people get into their houses if they had to evacuate from the 
office without their house keys. However, one business continuity manager for a public sector 
organisation brought up the issue of the costs and who would be prepared to cover them for 
these situations, an issue that needed to be resolved.  
 
Summary of Theme 4: Facilitating factors or organisational interventions to encourage staff 
to return to work: 
 Flexible working arrangements for situations where the usual place of work was 
inaccessible were frequently mentioned, usually working from home or fall-back sites. 
 Several of the organisations involved in the research mentioned providing medical 
treatment to employees; however there were practical and ethical issues raised by the 
interviewees.  
 Some organisations would provide psychological interventions to employees in the 
aftermath of an extreme event and this was usually in the form of trauma counselling 




 Some organisations were able to provide transport, accommodation and childcare. 
Other interventions mentioned were visible cleaning interventions and financial 
compensation. There were differing opinions on how much an employer should be 
helping its employees return to work. 
 
Theme 5: Information and communication 
 
5.1 Methods of communicating with staff during a serious incident: 
A wide range of communication methods were mentioned for contacting staff during an 
incident and overall the communication strategies of the organisations involved in the study 
were comprehensive and well-tested.  The most frequently mentioned communication 
method was a call cascade or ‘phone tree’, as one interviewee described the process for a 
situation where an organisation needed to contact staff at home: 
For the majority of staff it’s almost a cascade ring-round. So the manager will 
ring team leaders, team leaders will ring their guys, and it works out well. 
[Interviewee 17] 
The next most frequently mentioned communication methods were an automated phone 
service or staff hotline and a mass email. However, one resilience professional was concerned 
that although lots of people have BlackBerry devices, not everyone does so you should not 
assume emails will get through to everyone. A number of organisations said they would put 
information for staff on their intranet site and a few spoke about methods whereby staff could 
register their safety on an automated system or would be instructed to report in by phone, for 
example: 
We can also put through the [name of system], which is our external 
notification system, with both the push system we have, but also a pull 
system. So we can ask people to register their safety. We don’t have to push 
that out, they can auto register it quickly. [Interviewee 2] 
One interviewee raised a concern that staff might not remember they needed to ring the staff 
hotline or that they might not know where to find the number, as they explained:  
There is a staff hotline, but nobody phones the staff hotline. And even people, 
when you say about the staff hotline, they go ‘well where do I find the 
number?’, ‘It’s on the back of your pass’. People don’t you know, because they 




One interviewee also expressed an opinion that automated communication methods should 
not be used instead of actually speaking to staff; it is important for managers to take 
responsibility and thus be accountable for making sure staff are safe and looking after their 
welfare: 
.…we would do a manual call cascade, because our belief was that if you 
removed the ownership and accountability from line managers, for contacting 
their people and making sure that A they are alright and B they know what to 
do. [Interviewee 19]  
One resilience professional said that the organisation would provide a briefing pack for staff 
and that they would also use texting to send out information. Two organisations mentioned 
verbally briefing staff or providing a question and answer session, and had done this in the 
past for incidents.  
 
5.2 What information staff would want to know in the event of a serious incident: 
The importance of giving staff information during an incident was mentioned by the majority 
of interviewees, with one saying that giving staff as much information as possible is important 
so that they feel empowered, making them less hesitant and more willing. However, only two 
organisations mentioned any sort of evidence on which to base their approach. One 
interviewee said that their organisation’s communication strategies are informed by the 
results of their own internal data, specifically related to the method of communication, the 
likely staff perceptions of the information and believability: 
It’s getting people to see [the public communication], and then depending on 
the subject it’s getting people to believe it as well. It’s based totally on 
research because [the comms team] have their own dedicated research 
officer. [Interviewee 11] 
However, no other organisations involved in the research mentioned any use of data collection 
activities in relation to their communication strategy. One other interviewee mentioned 
discussing risk communication issues with university academics; however, it was unclear if any 
policies had been developed based on this discussion: 
I think we had the discussion [about staff concerns during a CBRN incident] 
when we visited [a university] recently. It’s a challenging one, because it links 
into other work that we have done around welfare and around warning and 
informing. [Interviewee 7] 
The interview analysis revealed that a number of resilience professionals had thought about 
the use of pre-event messaging with staff. A few interviewees discussed the usefulness of 
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informing staff about the organisation’s business continuity arrangements, but one 
interviewee said that it was difficult to do because there is a need to emphasise its importance 
without scaring people: 
….so it’s how do we continue to raise awareness [of BCM] and how do we 
keep it at the forefront of people’s minds without scaring them really, 
emphasise its importance and what it means to them and why it’s important 
to them and so on and so forth. [Interviewee 6]  
Another interviewee  suggested that staff being aware of the planning means they would be 
more willing to go along with what they are being asked to do when the time comes. However, 
this did not appear to have any evidential basis. In the event of a serious incident, some 
interviewees discussed the importance of telling staff that the organisation is responding and 
what the strategy for this is. One resilience professional described doing that in a past incident 
and how it is also a regular part of their communication strategy: 
[During a flu pandemic] internally we told employees what we had in place, 
we assured them that we had plans in place. Every winter for example we 
encourage people who are maybe members of vulnerable groups to have 
their flu injections. We remind people to check their cars to make sure 
they’ve got all the stuff they need for the winter. [Interviewee 6] 
Similarly, another interviewee also said that the initial communication after an incident would 
be about the organisation’s response and another said that the communication would be 
about what the problem was and the response that was being undertaken.  
With regards to the type of information staff would want to receive, many interviewees said 
staff would want scientific or technical information which the organisation would look to get 
from external experts. One interviewee from a health organisation was the only one who 
specifically mentioned the health content of the information, saying that this would need to 
include symptoms to look out for, mitigation and protective measures and what to do with 
regards to treatment. However, this interviewee did also point out that this was more their 
incident response communication than their business continuity communication. One 
interviewee from a transport organisation said they were starting to think more about staff 
communications in an incident and expectations of staff during a CBRN incident specifically:  
As a wider piece we’re looking at staff information and engagement across all 
the contingency continuity plans, the major events we could have and making 
sure that our staff know what’s expected of them and what to do, and that’s 
every member of staff. [Interviewee 9] 
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Similarly, when talking about the organisation’s expectations of staff reporting to work, one 
interviewee from a financial organisation said: 
So I think as long as you’re clear, as long as the organisation’s clear about 
what the expectation is and what the requirement is then that works. 
[Interviewee 1] 
One business continuity manager from a transport organisation noted that staff would want 
specific reasons and evidence if their organisation was telling them it was safe to come to 
work, because they may need these to convince their concerned friends and family.  
The need to provide reassurance in communications was mentioned by the majority of 
interviewees and a number said they had had to reassure staff in the past of safety issues. A 
few mentioned using statistics and scientific information to reassure staff and there was an 
assumption with one interviewee that if you give this to staff in a CBRN incident that people 
will go to work:  
And my view would be, and I’m not a scientific expert, that those who are 
expert in their field, both with monitoring for chemicals or radiological, 
nuclear type contamination, they would provide the assurance that there’s no 
risk associated with whatever, and that the science would back that up. And I 
think on that basis, why would staff then refuse to go to a particular location 
to work? [Interviewee 15]  
One business continuity manager suggested that if you give people the facts about the CBRN 
incident it will make it less frightening. When talking about people being afraid of cyanide the 
interviewee said: 
And the potential for cyanide attacks, and that’s genuinely horrible, and you 
read the first bit and it says death within 5 to 15 minutes, but then you read 
on and you find out you’ve actually got to get it in this level of concentration 
for it to kill you…as long as you receive medical treatment within a reasonable 
timeframe you’re probably going to be alright. [Interviewee 4] 
Another interviewee said that it is the unknown that is the most frightening; people assume 
the worst. If you give people the correct information it can mitigate against this.  
One business continuity manager admitted having not thought about the need to reassure 
staff as the organisation has never needed to do that in the past. Of the organisations who had 
needed to reassure staff in a past incident, in addition to using communication, a couple of 
interviewees said they did this by physically sending the managers and sometimes the CEO out 
to workplaces to show employees that the management themselves believed it is safe enough 
to be there in person.  
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5.3 Challenges of communicating with staff during a serious incident: 
Resilience professionals foresee a number of challenges in communicating with staff in the 
event of a serious incident. One interviewee spoke about the need for communication to take 
into account, for example, the employees, the families, the next-of-kin (if there have been 
casualties), the issues related to colleagues being impacted and job security concerns. Another 
of the challenges some resilience professionals said they would face during an infectious 
disease incident is how much they should tell staff about their colleagues being affected. They 
wondered if they should tell all staff if there had been a confirmed case in the organisation or a 
suspected case, or if they should only tell staff who work in the immediate vicinity of the 
affected individual. A minority also queried what would happen with regards to differing 
policies for contractors, as one interviewee discussed: 
.…again through the grapevine somebody else in the building discovers, and 
they work for a different company but they are working for us, discovers that 
there has been a case in the building and they haven’t been told, then that 
creates a problem because in their company their policy is that everybody in 
the building is told. [Interviewee 1]  
There was also a concern that employers cannot ask their employees what is wrong with them 
if they are absent, so unless they choose to disclose this information, you may not know about 
all the confirmed cases. 
One interviewee wondered how much they should tell staff about the incident because if they 
told them too much it would scare them. Another challenge suggested by one interviewee was 
how to explain technical aspects so that people understand them, and they spoke about the 
organisation’s experience of this issue: 
And I think due to Fukushima we’ve got to the stage of saying you know, the 
amount of radiation experienced there is the same as the pilot would 
experience on a long haul flight...You have to get some context that ordinary 
people can understand and visualise. [Interviewee 6]   
With regards to CBRN, one interviewee was concerned that they were either ‘dumbing down’ 
the information or raising the profile too much because they did not understand it themselves. 
Similarly a resilience professional from a local government organisation admitted that even 
business continuity managers do not fully understand CBRN, which can be a problem when 
communicating risks. Another interviewee suggested that managers would need to fully 
understand the science so that they can communicate it to staff and answer any questions 
they may have. With regards to pre-event messaging for CBRN, a few interviewees described 
the need to strike a balance; staff (particularly operational staff) need to know what to do in a 
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CBRN incident in terms of the response, but they should not be told about CBRN risks every 
day:  
We have to strike a balance, we can’t remind them about it every day or every 
week because then they would come to work alarmed. We want them to 
come to work alert and equipped to deal with it, but to keep it in balance. 
[Interviewee 12] 
One interviewee suggested that it is important to keep it proportionate to the likelihood of the 
event happening and another believed that organisations should not highlight the risks too 
much so that staff are always thinking about them.  
During an incident there is a pressure to provide accurate information to staff in a timely 
manner. This was considered by some interviewees to be a challenge because they themselves 
may not have all the information they need at that time and could therefore be making 
decisions based on insufficient information. A few interviewees described how their initial 
messages would not contain much actual event-specific information, but would simply say that 
there had been an incident and that the response had been ‘stood up’. Similarly, one 
interviewee said that it was important to get a holding statement out very quickly to say what 
was happened and that the organisation is finding out more information so to expect further 
updates.   
There was also an awareness that organisations need to be honest. Organisations cannot tell 
people they will not catch an infectious disease if they come into work, because they cannot 
possibly guarantee that; all they can say is that they are putting interventions in place to try 
and protect them. Some other interviewees also acknowledged the need to be honest with 
staff, particularly with regards to the risks they may face by coming to work to support the 
response; if there is a risk it should be articulated appropriately. There is also a need to be 
honest so as not to lose the trust of their employees and it was also noted by one interviewee 
that they cannot hide anything from the staff because of the staff unions: 
And I think I would say that we try to be very open and transparent with our 
staff. We operate in quite a unionised environment, so we can’t be anything 
but that, because if we try to keep things, we would lose the trust of our staff 
pretty quickly. [Interviewee 10]  
 Again, the challenge of needing to reassure staff quickly when you do not have all the facts 
was brought up. One interviewee had considered the fact that in an incident where there are 
closures, staff may be very concerned about their jobs and will need reassurance, but again, 
there is a limit to how much you can say.  It was also mentioned by a few interviewees that 
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media scaremongering could influence staff perceptions of an incident and this can then 
influence organisational interventions: 
….there was a lot of feeling that we should do more cleaning on the grounds 
that a lot of the media coverage at the time was [about] how you touch 
something that somebody else has touched and that’s what causes the 
problem. [Interviewee 1]  
One interviewee was concerned that if people are told not to travel unless they need to, 
people will read ‘don’t come to work’, as they are looking for any excuse. Another interviewee 
was concerned that if there was no organisation-wide message then different managers could 
give out different messages. Similarly, one interviewee said it was important to make sure the 
information given to staff was coordinated across all parts of the organisation so that all staff 
receive the same information; this would need to filter down from the top or be sent as a 
company-wide email. The issue of being a public-facing organisation was also brought up and 
there was a perceived need to give staff the same information as they were giving the public. 
For example, there might be an problem if an organisation is telling the public not to travel 
unless necessary, but they are telling their own staff it is safe to go to work, or vice versa. 
 
5.4 Preferred communicators: 
Another topic of discussion during the interviews was centred on who would communicate 
with staff during an incident. Interviewees made a number of suggestions concerning who staff 
would want to hear from and also who staff would and would not trust. The suggestions were 
either specific people/roles at the organisation or whole organisations (e.g. central 
government). Consistent with previous themes, when prompted interviewees did not appear 
to be basing these suggestions on previous research. 
The issue of employees not trusting the organisation’s advice or the government’s advice was 
brought up by a small number of resilience professionals. When talking about a radiological 
incident and safe levels of radiation, one business continuity manager said:  
.…you can’t say, you know, the experts have said it’s safe up to this point, 
because people don’t believe that it’s safe, therefore they’re not coming in. 
That’s an issue I don’t think anybody’s got their head round. [Interviewee 1] 
A business continuity manager from an energy organisation acknowledged that people need to 
trust the information givers and questioned whether people trust the organisation they work 
for. There were various opinions among the interviewees on this topic:  One interviewee 
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believed that academics are more credible sources of information to staff than an employee of 
the organisation: 
.…because they were a professor from X university then they were a more 
credible advocate than [a named staff member] from the organisation or 
whoever it might be. Because they are seen to have less of a vested interest or 
[seen to be] more independent anyway. People would trust academics more 
than they would trust a company. [Interviewee 6]  
Another said that medical professionals were more trusted than the organisation. One 
interviewee felt that the CEO would be the most trusted and that people do not trust ministers 
or politicians. Another suggested that trade unions might be trusted more than the 
organisation to give staff information during an incident so they could put out a joint 
statement with them. One resilience professional admitted not knowing if staff would want to 
hear from local government (their employer) or central government. Another said that the 
CEO or person at the top of an organisation is not always the right person to be giving out the 
messages (if public speaking is involved), they also need to be a good public speaker and not 
someone who stumbles over their words. Finally, one interviewee said that different people 
will trust different sources: 
I think they’d want to hear from a range of people, because different people 
will trust different things. Some people will be relatively trusting of a senior 
manager, some people will look to the establishment, so a politician, some 
people will be looking for a more scientific approach because they will want to 
read it, understand it, Google it. [Interviewee 12]  
One of the interviewees said that it was important to understand what would make people 
believe that the information they are being given about the risk is true. In some interviews the 
organisations’ CEO/MD was mentioned as being the person who would front the campaign, 
whereas other interviewees mentioned that they would use scientists and academics or the 
company medical advisor/officer. There was a feeling that titles are important e.g. Chief 
Medical Officer and one interviewee mentioned the conventional wisdom on which they based 
their views on the subject: 
The conventional wisdom that we will always come back to is that people in 
uniform are trusted more than people not in uniform. And I think the 
conventional wisdom, and I say conventional wisdom because I don’t know 
the basis on which that sits, is that that would be much more readily accepted 
at face value than if a shifty character like me wearing a suit popped up in 
front of the camera. [Interviewee 16] 
Another interviewee said that the best way to send out scientific information (if you are not a 
scientific/health organisation yourself) is to use the information from Public Health England 
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with their branding on it (or the equivalent) but to send it out with a cover letter from the 
organisation.  
 
Summary of Theme 5: Information and communication  
 Communication methods for use during an incident were comprehensive; however 
there were differing opinions about which methods would prove the most effective in 
getting a message to staff.  
 Communicating with employees in the event of a serious incident was seen as 
important; however, there was little discussion about the specific type of information 
employees would want to receive and the majority did not base their communication 
strategy on any evidence or research.  
 A number of challenges were acknowledged in communicating with staff during a 
serious incident; for example, when not all the information is known at the time of the 
communication.  
 Interviewees made assumptions about who the best person to communicate with staff 
would be and who staff would trust the most; often based on conventional wisdom 
rather than evidence or research. 
Discussion 
 
Analysis of 21 interviews has revealed that business continuity and resilience professionals 
have a wide range of opinions and beliefs related to likely staff behaviour during an extreme 
event (particularly those with a CBRN element). These behavioural assumptions were often 
based on conventional wisdom or generalised from dissimilar previous incidents rather than 
academic research or information/data from real-world events. Half of the resilience 
professionals made at least one assumption about their staff being willing to come to work 
during a serious incident; because of personal resilience, Blitz spirit , Dunkirk spirit, gung-ho 
attitude, human nature or team spirit. These assumptions were usually based on past 
experience of staff coming to work in non-CBRN incidents such as after the London bombings 
on July 7th 2005.  
Overall, the issue of staff being unwilling to report to work during a CBRN incident was not 
something that had been considered by many organisations, and for the interviewees who did 
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discuss this, it was unclear whether they were simply considering this issue at the time of the 
interview after being prompted to think about it. The fact that half of the resilience 
professionals had a positive view about the behaviour of staff, that they would be willing to 
come to work because of Blitz spirit for example, could be viewed in contrast with the existing 
literature which has revealed responders often have a negative view of public behaviour, 
believing that the public would panic during an emergency.450 However, the present study did 
reveal that a significant number of resilience professionals held a more negative view that was 
more akin to the views of responders, believing staff would experience fear and could be 
‘traumatised’ as a result of the incident. With regards to the ‘Blitz spirit’ assumption, there is 
evidence that the shared fate caused by major incidents can lead to sense of collective unity.451 
However, whether this would apply to CBRN incidents and whether this directly affects an 
individual’s willingness to report to work once the initial danger has passed, is something that 
requires further investigation.  
There were differing views on whether organisations should plan for CBRN incidents, related 
to the perceived likelihood of this type of incident occurring and the perceived severity of the 
consequences if one did occur. Some organisations acknowledged that they did not include 
CBRN incidents very often in their exercises or planning. This is an important finding as 
previous research has revealed that absenteeism rates are likely to be higher for CBRN type 
incidents than for other incidents.452 453 Furthermore, risk perception research has found that 
less familiar, more complex incidents such as CBRN incidents are potentially more fear-
inducing than natural disasters or explosions.454 455 However, rather than utilising evidence 
from academic literature, the types of incidents organisations plan for are influenced by other 
factors, such as their own risk register, the culture they operate in, the incidents they have 
experienced in the past and the ones their management team are worried about. It is vitally 
important that organisations plan for incidents that involve a CBRN hazard due to the potential 
decrease in staff willingness that could occur in this type of event.  
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The interview study presented in this chapter has revealed that the majority of national 
infrastructure organisations do not appear to exercise all levels of staff, either because of the 
size of the organisation, resources, shift patterns or security issues. Very few interviewees 
recognised the importance of these activities; an outcome that is unique to this study. Only a 
minority of organisations said they had exercised all levels of staff or wanted to include more 
staff in exercises in the future. Very few interviewees acknowledged the importance of staff 
being aware of the business continuity arrangements of the organisation. In contrast, 
Lesperance and Miller found that several public health and hospital officials believed that 
training employees on how their hospital would function during a disaster was important, and 
as such the authors recommend that healthcare organisations should ensure that all 
employees understand how different aspects of the business continuity plan affect them.456 It 
is interesting that only a minority of interviewees in the present study mentioned sharing the 
organisation’s business continuity arrangements with staff, perhaps undervaluing the 
importance of doing this. In a study by Basta, Edwards and Schulte, it was found that public 
health department employees who had read either the state or county pandemic influenza 
plan were significantly more likely to report a willingness to respond during an influenza 
pandemic when face-to-face duties were required.457 Therefore organisations should consider 
sharing more of their planning with staff, perhaps as part of their regular training schedule, so 
that staff understand their role in the organisation’s response if an incident were to occur.  
The systematic literature review in Chapter 2 revealed numerous potential barriers and 
facilitators that could influence employees in their decisions about whether or not to go to 
work during the event of a serious incident.458 459 The present study also found that most 
organisations represented in the interviews did not bring likely staff behaviour or concerns 
into their exercises. Although some said they did include staff responses, only a minority said 
they had actually asked staff what their concerns would be during an incident and the rest 
appeared to be making assumptions about any barriers staff may face. It is vital that employers 
make an effort to find out what concerns their staff might have and develop strategies that 
aim to alleviate some of these concerns. It is also important to take into account potential staff 
concerns when creating business continuity plans or designing risk communication, and 
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including staff of different levels of an organisation in exercises could be a useful way of doing 
this.  
A lack of staff willingness to work during high-impact, low-probability events did not appear to 
be a front of mind concern for resilience professionals, a finding that is unique to the present 
research. The idea of facilitating employees’ return to work was not mentioned by many 
organisations, unless specifically related to transport. This is an issue that needs more 
consideration by organisations, not simply to discuss situations where staff may be unwilling to 
go to work, but also to prepare strategies that could assist employees in overcoming potential 
barriers or motivate employees to return to work. A minority of interviewees mentioned 
strategies to assist staff during an incident, such as providing help with transport if the 
transport network went down or providing accommodation if they were unable to get home. 
However, the focus was on helping people’s ability rather than addressing any willingness 
concerns. For example, the provision of accommodation was suggested for situations when 
staff could not get home, not for when staff would rather stay in a hotel than go home, either 
because they do not want to travel any further than necessary or they do not want to put their 
families’ health at risk. It has previously been suggested that providing temporary 
accommodation (such as a bed at the hospital or a designated hotel) for employees actively 
taking care of SARS patients might have helped alleviate their concerns about transmitting the 
disease to their families.460  
The idea of staff not being willing to return to work because of fear for their personal health or 
safety was mentioned by a few interviewees, particularly in relation to an infectious disease 
outbreak during which employees could be concerned that their colleagues were contagious. A 
few interviewees mentioned the concerns employees may have for their families or significant 
others and acknowledged that this may stop people reporting to work. Previous research has 
provided support for this view. For example, Gershon et al. reported that the most common 
barrier to US home healthcare workers’ willingness to work was fear for self and family’s 
safety.461 Furthermore, in a study by Lesperance and Miller several interviewees revealed that 
the risk of infecting their children was a major concern of healthcare workers during SARS.462 In 
light of these findings, this study is the first to reveal that resilience professionals in several 
sectors of national infrastructure are aware that staff may not be willing to return to work 
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because of fear for their personal health or safety. However, fewer interviewees 
acknowledged that employees might be concerned that their decision to go to work during an 
infectious disease outbreak could put their family at risk if they catch something and then pass 
it on. Therefore, as previously mentioned, providing accommodation to staff during an incident 
may be a way of encouraging them to come to work.  
The need for individuals to care for others during an incident was considered by a few 
interviewees; however there was a difference of opinion with regards whose responsibility it 
would be, the organisation’s or the individual’s. Previous academic research with healthcare 
workers has revealed that the need to care for others is a frequently selected barrier to 
healthcare workers’ willingness to report to work during a serious incident. For example, 
Qureshi et al.’s findings showed that having childcare obligations was correlated with 
healthcare workers being less willing to work in a number of catastrophic events.463 However, 
it is unclear if this may also be related to the feelings of guilt a parent may have leaving their 
child to go to work during a serious incident and the potential ‘role conflict’ the parent may 
feel in this situation. Killian’s theory of role conflict suggests that people may feel a conflict 
when they are members of different groups, and that the biggest conflict is between the family 
and other groups (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of this theory).464  
The suggestion of a conflict between an individual’s role at work and their role in their family 
was brought up by a small number of interviewees, including one who had experienced this 
conflict himself during a real incident. This is the first research study to find evidence that 
resilience professionals may be aware of the potential for staff (other than healthcare workers) 
to experience role conflict during serious incidents; however many either did not see this as a 
potential issue related to staff absenteeism or thought it was one they could not do anything 
about. The fact that some resilience professionals did not appear to consider employees’ 
childcare as their responsibility and some did not wish to help staff with this problem, is an 
issue that needs revisiting in light of this study and the previous academic research. Allowing 
staff to work from home when they have a sick family member to look after or a child who 
cannot go to school because the schools are closed is something that could benefit not only 
the individual employee but also the organisation as a whole; an employee who is sitting at 
their desk worrying about his/her family is unlikely to be a productive member of the 
workforce.  
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Although many organisations recognised the fact that transport could be a barrier in people’s 
ability to get to work and had thought about offering assistance in these circumstances, only a 
minority of interviewees mentioned that individuals might not be willing to use public 
transport even if it was functioning normally. This is important as an infectious disease 
outbreak could cause employees to become concerned about the threat of infection by 
travelling on public transport, an issue that is explored further in the findings of the focus 
group study in Chapter 5.  
Some interviewees recognised that not all roles are suited to working from home and also that 
a person’s role might affect their ability and willingness to come to work in an extreme event. 
However, the majority of interviewees did not mention the importance of staff being aware of 
the role they would have in their organisations’ response to an incident. Similarly, only one 
interviewee said they told employees they were working on critical national infrastructure. 
Academic research in this area has revealed that perceived importance of role is a significant 
predictor of the willingness of healthcare workers to report to work during a serious incident. 
For example, Balicer et al. in their 2010 study concluded that the most influential factor 
associated with willingness to work for local public health workers during an influenza 
pandemic was the perception of the importance of one’s role in the agency’s overall 
response.465 Similarly, Goodhue et al. reported that the most significant factor predicting the 
willingness of paediatric nurse practitioners to respond was having a specified role in the 
workplace disaster plan.466 Therefore, it is recommended that organisations take steps to 
ensure all employees are aware of the importance of their role in their organisation’s overall 
response and recovery in the aftermath of an extreme event.  
The present study revealed that a number of assumptions are being made by organisations 
with regards to the use of technology during a period of disruption. For example, when 
discussing remote access technology, it was assumed by many interviewees that staff take 
their laptops and remote access tokens home at the end of every day; and only a small number 
of interviewees considered a situation where they had not taken these home or had been 
forced to leave them at work due to an evacuation. Furthermore, few interviewees said that 
their organisations communicated to staff the importance of taking remote access technology 
home at the end of each day. These are issues not raised in the previous research with 
healthcare workers, most likely due to the fact that the majority of healthcare workers would 
be needed to report to their normal place of work during a serious incident and not to work 
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from home, and as such is a unique contribution to the academic literature. This issue is 
potentially more important for other sectors of national infrastructure such as finance or 
communications, where certain roles could potentially be continued from home if employees 
have the necessary equipment. Several interviewees mentioned having alternative sites or 
back- up offices that staff could use if their normal location was not accessible.  However, it is 
important to note that no interviewees mentioned that staff may not be willing to travel to 
another location, due to issues such as the distance to the alternative site or the perceived risk 
of travelling a longer distance on public transport to get there. This issue of remote working is 
revisited in the employee data collection reported in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The analysis of the interviews revealed that there were differing opinions on whether to 
provide employees with medical treatment and the capability to do this varied from 
organisation to organisation, most likely to do with the costs and moral concerns. Some 
organisations had previously purchased medical supplies such as Tamiflu and had not actually 
distributed this amongst staff, with the exception of the flu vaccination. The results of the 
systematic literature review in Chapter 2 revealed the provision of medical treatment to 
healthcare workers and their families as something that could increase their willingness to 
report to work during a serious incident. For example, Syrett et al. reported that healthcare 
workers were most likely to respond in the event of an infectious disease outbreak when an 
effective treatment was offered on site to both the employees themselves and their 
families.467 The fact that the resilience professionals in the present study did not mention any 
plans to provide medical treatment to employees’ families potentially shows a gap in 
knowledge regarding the effect this provision could have on staff willingness to report to work. 
In light of this, it is recommended that business continuity managers and emergency planners 
are trained on the importance of providing medication to the families of essential workers 
specifically; and the business continuity managers and emergency planners should look to 
include this intervention in their plans for scenarios in which it is feasible and advisable to 
provide medication. 
Although many organisations mentioned the ability to provide psychological interventions in 
the aftermath of an incident, there was no discussion about the relative merits of different 
types of interventions (with no mention of any social interventions). Most said they would be 
advised by a third party organisation (usually their private healthcare provider) which type of 
psychological intervention to use, which was usually a form of ‘trauma counselling’. The vast 
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majority of business resilience professionals did not seem to have considered the use of 
psychological or social interventions with regards to facilitating willingness to return to work. 
In recent years, academics have advised that rolling out blanket ‘trauma counselling’ or 
conducting ‘single-session psychological debriefing’ with non-selected trauma victims does not 
have any recognised benefit, and could potentially do more harm than good.22 Providing these 
kinds of psychological interventions could make individuals believe they should be 
experiencing psychological symptoms or force them to re-live an incident unnecessarily. 
Rather than pathologising their feelings as symptoms of a potential psychological disorder, it is 
important staff understand that it is normal to feel stressed or anxious in the aftermath of a 
serious incident and at what point they should consider seeking further help. It is 
recommended that employers focus on providing practical support to employees, as well as 
facilitating the social cohesion that occurs naturally after events of this type. More discussion 
around this issue is presented in Chapter 6. 
Giving staff information during an incident was mentioned as important by all of the 
interviewees, particularly the need for frequent accurate updates that provided reassurances 
about safety. This is similar to the Lesperance and Miller study, which reported that the 
interviewees stressed the importance of providing frequent, accurate and honest information 
to healthcare workers during a biological event.468 Furthermore, the authors suggest that 
providing consistent and compassionate communication to employees, alongside giving 
employees the opportunity to provide feedback will help the leadership maintain the trust of 
their workforce. The importance of providing accurate information to staff during an incident 
was shown in a study of student nurses by Young and Persell, where it was found that the 
students’ concerns for safety (self and family) were based on inaccurate knowledge about 
some of the agents concerned.469  
Using effective risk communication during an extreme event has the potential to increase 
compliance and influence desired behaviours in the public.470 For example, in a study by 
Rogers, Amlôt and Rubin, it was reported that providing appropriate messages to the public 
about radiological dispersal devices increased the credibility of official advice and increased 
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levels of intended compliance.471 In the case of a serious incident, such as one involving a CBRN 
hazard, effective risk communication from an employer has the potential to inform and 
prepare its staff, which in an emergency could mean people know what to do to protect 
themselves and thus result in fewer fatalities.472 It also has the potential to promote desired 
behaviours such as employees being willing to report to work. Adding to the discussion, Becker 
has suggested that during a CBRN incident people’s behaviour could be influenced if they are 
given clear, scientifically accurate advice.473 Therefore, the findings of the present study 
support the previously held view that accurate, scientific information should be provided to 
the public and to staff during an extreme event in order to increase compliance with 
recommended actions and promote desired behavioural responses, such as staff being willing 
to report to work.  
Communicating with staff during an incident was perceived to be a challenge by many 
interviewees. For example, there was concern over how much staff should be told, because 
they need the information but they do not need to be frightened; especially during a CBRN 
type event. The interviewees also mentioned that there would be a pressure to provide staff 
with full information and reassure staff before all the specific details are known; reassurance 
was mentioned by several resilience professionals. Interestingly, Rogers, Amlôt and Rubin, in a 
study examining the impact of communication materials on public responses to a radiological 
dispersal device attack (RDD), found that information that simply provides reassurance may 
not be enough to improve compliance with preferred behaviours.474 The authors suggest that 
the information should aim to increase knowledge, reduce anxiety, manage expectations, build 
trust, and create familiarity with emergency response procedures. Similarly, Rogers and Pearce 
noted another potential problem with ineffective risk communication, in that it could lead to 
under-response.475 This could be a problem in an infectious disease outbreak if employees do 
not trust the information they are being provided with about the threat of infection; they may 
choose not to comply with the health recommendations and could report to work whilst 
contagious, thus making the situation a lot worse for the organisation.  
Pearce et al., in their study of public responses to a hypothetical radiological incident found 
that because participants believed they would have been quarantined if there was really a risk 
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of radiation, they were falsely reassured about the severity of the situation.476 This assumption 
caused them to believe it was a ‘scare story’ and most said they would not alter their 
behaviour. Therefore it is vital employees are provided with accurate information about the 
true seriousness of the situation, and not simply reassured, as this could result in unhelpful 
behaviour or non-compliance with recommended actions.  
Who would communicate with staff during an incident varied by organisation and opinions of 
who staff would trust the most to provide them with reassurance regarding coming to work, 
varied by interviewee. The majority of interviewees did not base their opinions of who people 
would trust on any research and usually based these on conventional wisdom or personal 
beliefs. Research examining public reactions to a terrorist attack involving botulinum toxin 
found that health or emergency response experts, national leaders and familiar news reporters 
were considered credible spokespersons during the incident, and that local politicians and 
elected officials were not specifically mentioned.477 Wray et al. in their US study found that the 
public had more confidence in local than federal authorities when being given information 
regarding an emerging health threat; and that they were more likely to trust first responders 
than politicians.478 Another study found that when faced with conflicting expert opinions 
regarding quarantine during the SARS outbreak in Toronto, physicians were more likely to 
believe the person they knew better and trusted more.479 This last finding provides support for 
the use of the company Chief Medical Officer to deliver the health messages, as mentioned by 
a few interviewees in the present study.  
There were differing opinions regarding the use of social media during an incident. Some 
organisations said they already used this communication tool and some said they do not, and 
would not in the future for various reasons. There was often a distrust of the information on 
social media and various assumptions about how staff would make use of social media during 
an incident. Interestingly, a previous academic study has shown that the public were more 
likely to share information they read on an online newspaper than on social media, due to 
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newspapers being perceived as more credible sources of information.480 In the present study 
only one organisation mentioned recommending the use of social media during an incident to 
their staff and advising them on the best ways to use it. Many interviewees had negative views 
of social media during an incident because of how quickly rumours can spread and the 
difficulty of controlling or managing it. It is important that organisations learn how to make use 
of social media, due to the significant numbers of people who now use social media and the 
fact it is so readily accessible on mobile phones. This study has been the first of its kind to 
examine business continuity managers’ perceptions about the use of social media during an 
incident and more specifically how employees would be likely to behave on social media. 
However, further research is needed to examine the effect social media has on public or 
employee reactions to serious incidents such as CBRN terrorist attacks.  
 
Methodological limitations  
One limitation of the present study and of qualitative research in general is the relatively small 
sample size. However, in the context of the present study, even the opinions of one individual 
BCM manager can be considered extremely important when that individual is responsible for 
making decisions that will affect thousands of employees. Even though the results cannot 
necessarily be generalised to all organisations in the same sector, they are still important as a 
number of these large organisations (e.g. energy providers or transport organisations) would 
have a significant role to play in keeping the UK running in the event of a serious incident.  
Another limitation of the present study was that the sample was an opportunistic sample and 
a number of participants were recruited through networking contacts. It is possible that a 
certain type of professional, perhaps those who are interested in improving the discipline 
through research or those who are more helpful in nature, would want to be part of a research 
study. It is therefore possible that the views and experiences of these 21 interviewees are not 
representative of the general population of business continuity and resilience professionals. 
Further, there was only one female present in the sample; however this might also be due to 
an unequal gender distribution in business continuity manager roles.   
The semi-structured interviews allowed the participants to discuss their individual past 
experiences; however it is impossible to verify the accuracy of some these reports. It is also 
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unclear whether certain aspects were being underplayed or overemphasised by the 
interviewees due to them wanting to be perceived to be doing the right thing and considering 
the needs of their staff. Similarly it was not evident whether interviewees had thought about 
the issues related to staff willingness prior to the interview or whether they were thinking 
about these things for the first time during the interview. If the latter is true then potentially 
the results of the present study have overestimated the extent to which business continuity 
managers and resilience professionals have planned for their staff being unwilling to work.  
Conclusions 
 
The present study has been the first of its kind to conduct semi-structured interviews with 
business continuity managers and resilience professionals from national infrastructure 
organisations in the UK to examine expectations and planning for how staff will behave in the 
aftermath of a serious incident, particularly one with a CBRN hazard.  
Overall, the findings have revealed that business continuity planning within the UK national 
infrastructure is based on many behavioural assumptions and grounded in little or no 
academic research regarding the likely reactions of employees in the event of a high-impact, 
low-probability event. Very few organisations have actually asked staff about their likely 
concerns or the issues they may face in the event of an incident that causes significant 
disruption. Many assumptions surrounding likely staff behaviour seemed to be based on 
conventional wisdom, such as ‘people like normality’ and experiences of staff reporting to 
work during incidents that were not CBRN. There were also dangerous assumptions by some 
interviewees that their staff would return to work in any situation that may not be borne out 
in reality; something that has the potential to put businesses at serious risk in a time when 
they need to recover.  
In summary, the present study has provided a unique addition to the pre-existing research in 
this area and its findings have been used alongside the systematic literature review (Chapter 2) 
to inform the next phase of data collection, the employee web survey (Chapter 4). The web 
survey and the employee focus groups (Chapters 4 and 5) were used to test some of the 
behavioural assumptions highlighted in this interview study regarding staff willingness to work 
and the potential barriers and facilitators that could be influencing their decisions. Some 
suggestions for future research based on the findings of this interview study are presented in 
Chapter 6.  
 147 
 
Chapter 4: Survey Study 
Introduction 
 
In the event of incidents that cause serious disruption, organisations need their staff to report 
to work to facilitate business recovery and return to normal functioning. However, it is unclear 
to what extent employees from all sectors of national infrastructure would be willing to do this 
when one considers the practical and psychological barriers they could face. This chapter 
presents the findings of a web survey study examining the factors that predict the willingness 
of employees to report to work for a range of hypothetical serious incidents, including CBRN 
terrorist attacks. The aims of the study were to ascertain: 
1. What factors (demographic, psychological and job-related) might influence employees’ 
willingness to go to work in the event of a serious incident. 
2. If the perceived willingness and ability of employees to go to work varies by incident 
type. 
3. What barriers and motivating factors play a role in the decisions of employees in the 
event of a serious incident. 
The findings from the literature review and qualitative interviews aided the design of the 
survey. Specifically, the predictor variables included, for example:  
 Organisational identification 
 Job satisfaction 
 Importance of returning to work during an incident 
 Importance of organisation continuing to function 
 Perceptions of health and safety  
 Risk perception (likelihood and severity) 
 Having a business continuity role 
 Working climate 




Some of these measures have been used in previous research examining the willingness of 
employees to go to work during extreme events. Others are applied to the topic of extreme 
events for the first time but have previously been used in organisational psychology research, 
(e.g. studies of return to work behaviour after sickness/injury or work commitment). See 
Chapter 1 for the theoretical justification for including these variables in the present research.  
Web surveys have already been widely used to examine the willingness of healthcare workers 
to report to work in the event of a serious incident, or most frequently, during a pandemic.481 
482 483 484 Web-based surveys are particularly useful because, conducted correctly, they can be 
anonymously completed and allow employees to be honest about their likely behaviour in an 
emergency. Furthermore, research has found web surveys to be of equal quality to more 
traditional pen-and-paper methods.485 In light of this, a web survey was deemed the best way 
of meeting the objectives of the study.  
Method 
 
Survey design and procedure 
Prior to the study commencing ethical approval was granted from the KCL War Studies Group 
Research Ethics Panel (REP(WSG)/11/12-28). The survey was hosted on Select Survey and was 
live from 02/05/13 to 26/07/13.486 Prior to the survey going live, the survey was piloted 
amongst individuals in the author’s network and feedback was received. The survey was 
piloted to ensure questions were clear to respondents and changes were made based on the 
feedback. The feedback confirmed that in general respondents understood what was meant by 
the ten different scenarios and if they were unsure about a term they used an internet search 
engine to find a definition. An email was sent containing a link to the survey and participants 
were encouraged to forward the email on to others. The rationale for the use of the snowball 
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technique to recruit was that it was a convenient way of reaching individuals that the author 
would not usually have access to. It was hoped that individuals would forward the survey link 
on to colleagues and others in their networks who were also employed at that time. This was 
also a method of sampling that did not cost anything to use and was not as labour-intensive as 
some other sampling methods such as quota sampling. It has been suggested that snowball 
sampling is not only a useful way to gain access to hard to reach populations, but may also 
allow individuals be more open with their responses, due to the fact they have received the 
survey from someone they know and/or trust.487 488 The survey took approximately 15 to 25 
minutes to complete and participants were informed that their responses were completely 
confidential and their identities would remain anonymous. They were also informed that they 
should only fill in the survey if they wanted to, were free to withdraw at any time and that 
their participation would not affect any aspect of their employment. All items on the survey 
required a response in order for the participant to proceed to the next page.  
 
Participants 
Survey respondents were required to be over the age of 18 and currently employed in the UK 
at the time of filling in the survey. They could be employed by any type of organisation in any 
sector. Recruitment took place via emails sent out from gatekeepers at organisations involved 
in the PhD advisory board and through contacts of the supervisory team and the funding 
organisation Deloitte. Survey respondents were encouraged to forward the email on to anyone 
else who might be willing to fill it in. The survey link and description were also placed in the 
Business Continuity Institute (BCI) newsletter and leaflets were handed out at a KCL War 
Studies end-of-project workshop attended by a large number of resilience professionals. 
 
Survey content 
Behavioural outcome variable: 
Participants were asked to indicate their willingness to report to work in the event of a list of 
10 serious incidents. Willingness to report to work was described as whether they voluntarily 
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intended to report to work (as opposed to being physically able to get to work which was a 
separate variable). They could respond ‘Willing’, ‘Not Willing’ or ‘Not Sure’, as per the primary 
outcome variable used by Qureshi et al., in their study of the correlates of the ability and 
willingness of healthcare workers to report to duty during catastrophic disasters.489 
The list of hypothetical incidents were as follows: 
1) Bomb/explosive incident 
2) Chemical warfare agent release 
3) Accidental chemical spill or leak 
4) New strain of pandemic flu 
5) Deliberate release of the smallpox virus 
6) Dirty bomb 
7) Severe flooding 
8) Deliberate release of pneumonic plague 
9) Severe snow 
10) Nuclear incident 
 
The incidents were selected to include a variety of qualitative attributes from risk perception 
theory such as the risk being controllable or uncontrollable; familiar or unfamiliar; chronic or 
catastrophic; serious consequences or not serious consequences; and whether it is a common 
risk or one people have great dread of.490 For example, severe snow is likely to be perceived as 
more familiar with less serious consequences than a dirty bomb, and a deliberate release of 
smallpox is likely to be perceived as more uncontrollable than a conventional bomb/explosive 
incident. Therefore it is expected that responses will differ for some incidents compared to 
others due to these qualitative attributes. The final choice of scenarios was informed by a 
wealth of past research examining public responses to CBRN terrorist attacks and other large 
public health emergencies.491 492 493 494 495 496 497 
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A range of predictor variables were included in the survey which fall under a number of 
thematic subheadings. The predictor variables included in the survey are described here with 
further explanation where necessary. A full list of survey items can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Organisational Identification: 
The measure of organisational identification used in the survey was a modified version of the 
model used by Mael and Ashforth in their study of alumni at an all-male college in the US.498 
The alumni study was the first time the researchers had operationalised organisational 
identification, although it had been considered a concept important to organisations for many 
years.499 500 The measure of organisational identification used by Mael and Ashforth was found 
to be associated with other organisational variables such as: satisfaction with the college; 
sentimentality towards the college; tenure; ranking of financial contributions to the college; 
and the willingness to advise others to attend.501 When the researchers applied the same 
model to a sample of army recruits, the reported coefficient alpha was 0.74, and they note 
that it was ≥ 0.8 in previous samples.502 This indicates the model is reliable and as such was 
selected for inclusion in this study. As with Mael and Ashforth’s model, this survey included six 
items all using a 5-point Likert scale. However, instead of the ‘name of school’ or ‘this school’ 
the present survey referred to ‘the organisation I work for’ or ‘this organisation’, which made it 
more relevant for employees of other organisations. The six items of the model were: ‘When 
someone criticises the organisation I work for, it feels like a personal insult’; ‘I am very 
interested in what others think about the organisation I work for’; ‘When I talk about the 
organisation I work for, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’’; ‘This organisation’s successes are 
my successes’; ‘When someone praises the organisation I work for, it feels like a personal 
compliment’; and ‘If a story in the media criticised the organisation I work for, I would feel 
embarrassed’. A mean score for the 6 items was calculated for each participant.  
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A measure of job satisfaction was created from a job satisfaction subscale of the Michigan 
Organizational Assessment Questionnaire (MOAQ).503 The MOAQ was originally designed for 
use as an alternative to the Job Diagnostic Survey and includes subscales from the Job 
Characteristics Model.504 505 The full MOAQ scale includes variables related to job 
characteristics, feelings of responsibility and motivation; however it is only the job satisfaction 
subscale which has been included in this survey.506 Bowling and Hammond’s meta-analysis 
revealed the subscale to be a reliable and construct-valid measure of job satisfaction.507 Due to 
these results, the measure was selected for inclusion in this survey. The variable included in 
this study consisted of the mean of two of the subscale items: ‘All in all I am satisfied with my 
job’ and ‘In general, I don’t like my job’. The decision was taken not to include the third item 
‘In general, I like working here’ because the use of the term ‘here’ could relate to the home 
environment, especially considering the fact that more employees work from home now than 
they did in the 1970s when the scale was developed. To avoid any ambiguity with this 
statement it was removed.  Participants were required to indicate their level of agreement to 
the two statements on 7-point Likert scales.  
 
Roles and responsibilities: 
Perceived importance of role was measured using participants’ responses to the statement: ‘If 
I can continue to work in the event of a serious incident it will make a big difference to the 
organisation I work for’. Participants were required to indicate their level of agreement on a 9-
point Likert scale. Similarly, participants were asked to identify their level of agreement with 
the following statement: ‘If my organisation can continue to function in the event of a serious 
incident it will make a big difference to keeping the country running’. This latter statement was 
designed to measure the extent to which participants believed their organisation played an 
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Health and safety: 
The following statements were used with 9-point Likert scales in order to find out employees’ 
perceptions of their organisation’s focus on health and safety: ‘The health and safety of staff is 
a high priority with management where I work’ and ‘I believe management where I work 
would put the continuation of business above my personal safety in the event of a serious 
incident’. The first statement is sourced from a workplace safety climate scale used in Gershon 
et al.’s study of the willingness of essential workers to report to duty during a pandemic.508 The 
second item is a novel item created for the present study.  
 
Threat perception: 
There were three items related to threat perception included in the survey. They all consisted 
of a question with a 9-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Extremely likely’ to ‘Extremely unlikely’. 
The three items measured participants’ perceptions of: the likelihood of the incident occurring 
in an area close to their place of work; the likelihood of the incident (if it did occur) causing 
severe public health consequences; and the likelihood of the incident (if it did occur) putting 
the participant’s own health at risk. Participants were required to complete these scales for all 
ten of the hypothetical scenarios.  
 
Other organisational factors:  
A variety of other organisational factors were measured in the survey, including: 
 Length of time working for organisation (in years). 
 Number of direct reports (staff who report directly to them). 
 Having a current or former business continuity role.  
 Previous business continuity or crisis management training. 
 Ability to work from home. 
 Job security. 
 Ease of finding a new job. 
 Supervisor or manager considering views. 
 Being involved in conflicts at work. 
 Feeling uneasy about going to work. 
 Awareness of workplace bullying. 
                                                          
508
 Gershon et al., ‘Factors Associated with the Ability and Willingness of Essential Workers’. 
 154 
 
The last four items in this list relate to a model of working climate used in a study by Holmgren 
et al.; however for the purposes of this study the measures were analysed separately.509 This 
decision was made due to the possibility of the items being related separately to the primary 
outcome variable. 
 
Ability to go to work:  
Participants were asked to indicate their ability to report to work (described as their ability to 
get to work and perform their duties) for each of the 10 incidents. They could select ‘Able’, 
‘Not Able’ or Not Sure’ for each incident separately. As with the primary outcome variable of 
willingness to report to work, the ability measure was sourced from Qureshi et al.’s study of 
the correlates of the ability and willingness of healthcare workers to report to duty during 
catastrophic disasters.510 
 
A modified version of the Extended Parallel Process Model: 
The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) was originally designed as a theory to explain 
why some fear appeals fail; either when the appeals do not elicit the desired health behaviour 
in the public or the public simply reject the messages.511 More recently it has been used to 
predict the willingness of local public health workers to report to work during a pandemic.512  
Specifically it has examined how the workers’ perceptions of threat and efficacy may influence 
their willingness to work during an influenza pandemic. The present survey included a 
modified version of the EPPM used by Barnett et al.513 For this adapted model the ‘threat’ 
variable was determined as the sum of the participant’s perceived likelihood of the incident 
occurring near their place of work and the perceived likelihood of the incident causing severe 
public health consequences. The ‘efficacy’ variable was a sum of the participant’s belief that 
reporting to work in the event of a serious incident would make a big difference to the 
organisation they work for and the belief that if their organisation can continue to function it 
will make a big difference to keeping the country running. 
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It was decided to modify the ‘efficacy’ variable to exclude the variable used by Barnett et al. of 
participants’ confidence that employees can respond effectively to the threat. This decision 
was taken in order to make the variable more applicable to the present study sample; the 
previous research applying the EPPM to willingness to work used this measure with healthcare 
workers, who by reporting to work would have to respond to the threat. For the present 
survey, it is likely that a large percentage of employees from other sectors would not have to 
directly respond to the threat when reporting to work. Therefore, an item related to the 
perceived importance of the employee’s organisation continuing to function was included in 
the ‘efficacy’ variable. This decision was made because odds ratios revealed the measure to be 
significantly associated with willingness to report to work in a number of scenarios, and it was 
more relevant to the present study sample.  The threat variables were incident-specific 
whereas efficacy variables were not.  
Individual influences: 
Two variables were included in the survey that related to an individual’s personality – 
sensation seeking and resilience. The first, sensation seeking, is a personality trait that has 
been linked to risky health behaviours. Stephenson et al. evaluated a short 2-item measure 
and a 4-item measure and found that they both performed well in comparison to the 
established measures of sensation seeking containing more items, and that the brief measures 
also had very good internal consistency.514 The 2-item measure was selected for use in this 
survey and consisted of two statements alongside a 5-point Likert scale:  ‘How often do you do 
dangerous things for fun?’ and ‘How often do you do exciting things, even if they are 
dangerous?’ A mean score for the two items was calculated for each participant. The individual 
resilience of the participants was measured using an abbreviated version of the Connor-
Davidson Resilience Scale. The scale was originally formulated due to its relevance to 
treatment outcomes in mental health conditions.515 Whereas the original scale consists of 25 
items, the abbreviated scale has only two items and was found to have good test-retest 
reliability as well as convergent and divergent validity.516 A 5-point Likert scale was used to 
measure agreement to the following statements: ‘I am able to adapt to change’ and ‘I tend to 
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bounce back after illness or hardship’.517 A mean score for the two items was calculated for 
each participant.  
 
Other Survey Items: 
The survey also included a small number of questions which were not used as predictor 
variables but used to gain a greater level of understanding of the topic. 
 
Barriers and Facilitators: 
Two multiple response questions asked participants to select any of the following factors that 
could 1) prevent them from reporting to their usual place of work in the event of a serious 
incident and 2) motivate them to report to their usual place of work in the event of a serious 
incident. Table 4.1 presents the barriers and facilitators included in the survey.  
 





If I had a lack of knowledge about 
the specific incident 
Fear for my own health or safety 
Fear for my significant others’ 
health or safety 
Stress/anxiety 
I don’t care about my job that 
much 
I volunteer for another 
organisation 
Not sure 
Other (open response) 
Because it is my duty to report to work 
Because my colleagues would report to work, therefore 
so should I 
Because my colleagues might not report to work, 
therefore I should 
Because I get paid to go to work 
Because I would want to carry on as normal 
Because I would want to be around colleagues for 
support 
Because I would be concerned about losing my job if I 
didn’t report to work 
If I was provided with an extra financial incentive 
If I felt I had enough knowledge about the incident 
If my organisation kept me up to date with frequent 
communication 
Not sure 
Other (open response) 
 
Other job-related questions: 
The survey also contained questions related to: sector; organisation size and workplace type; 
commuting; BCM training; being informed about business continuity plans; perceptions of how 





much their employer has considered their willingness to report to work during an incident; 
disability; pregnancy; and questions related to equipment needed to work from home. Some 
of these were initially considered as predictor variables but due to the variability in responses 
between the categories, these were considered unsuitable for analysis using odds ratios or 
they were considered too similar to other variables and were removed to simplify the analysis. 
Some were included in the survey with the sole purpose of presenting the findings as 
descriptive statistics.  
 
Demographics: 
Participants were requested to provide information about: gender, age, if they had children, 
education, the location of their work and their salary. Participants were also asked to rate their 
health between ‘Excellent’, ‘Very Good’, ‘Good’, ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’.  
 
Analysis 
Survey data was analysed using IBM SPSS 21.518 All incomplete surveys were removed from the 
analysis, including surveys where the respondents answered that they were not presently 
employed in the UK. Due to the key outcome measure being a willingness to report to work, 
those who indicated that they had worked from home every day in the last 12 months were 
also removed from the analysis. Free text and ‘other’ responses were recoded into relevant 
categories where possible and coded as ‘missing data’ if recoding was not possible. Reverse-
coded items were recoded accordingly.  
Prior to calculating odds ratios, multiple cross-tabulations were produced of all categorical 
independent variables to check that no more than 20% of the expected frequencies were less 
than 5 and that none of the combinations were empty. Some variables were recoded to ensure 
they could still be used in the analysis or to simplify the final analysis.  Full details of how the 
survey items will recoded can be found in Appendix C.  
The multi-item predictor scales were tested for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha. Data for all 
demographic and predictor variables were tested for normality and showed that data for all 
variables did not have a normal distribution; therefore Mann-Whitney U tests were used to 
examine any associations between willingness to work during each incident and all the 
continuous predictor variables.  
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Chi-square tests for independence were used to test the association between the demographic 
predictor variables and outcome variable (willingness to work for each incident). Univariate 
odds ratios were then calculated for any variables found to have a significant association with 
willingness to work (for each incident). Binary logistic regressions were then used to calculate 
the odds ratios between the predictor variables and willingness to work for each incident in 
turn. These regressions controlled for the effects of any demographic variables found to have a 
significant univariate association with willingness to work (for each incident). Odds ratios were 
calculated separately for each variable.  
Results 
 
Sample size and demographics 
When the survey closed on the 26/07/13 and incomplete surveys were removed, a total of 321 
complete surveys were included in the data set. The completion rate of the survey sample was 
77%. It should be noted that this percentage only takes into account those individuals who 
clicked on the survey link and went on to complete the survey, the software is not able to 
calculate the number of people who received the email but did not click on the survey link. 
Nine of the 321 complete surveys were subsequently removed due to the respondents 
indicating they worked from home every day for the last 12 months and as such were not 
useful for the outcome variable ‘Willingness to report to work’, leaving a final sample size of 
312. Out of these 312, 156 (50%) were male, and all participants were aged between 19 and 
69. 51.6% were 34 or younger with the mean age for the sample being 37.4 (SD = 11.24). The 
sample was slightly skewed towards people who had received a high level of education, with 
38.7% reporting having a Masters/PhD or equivalent. With regards to location of their 
workplace, 46.8% worked in London and 53.2% worked outside of London and salary was fairly 
evenly distributed between the three groups with 32.6% earning up to £30k, 37.2% earning 
between £30-£50k and 30.2% earning £50k or more. For a full breakdown of demographic data 






Table 4.2 Full breakdown of participant demographics (n=312) 
Demographic Variable Number of participants/total sample (%) 
Gender:  
Male 156/312 (50) 
Female 156/312 (50) 
Age:  
18-24 23/312 (7.4) 
25-34 138/312 (44.2) 
35-44 60/312 (19.2) 
45-54 56/312 (17.9) 
55+ 35/312 (11.2) 
Children under 18:  
Yes 86/312 (27.6) 
No 226/312 (72.4) 
Education:  
GSCE/A Level or equivalent (NVQ1-3) 56/305 (18.4) 
Bachelor degree or equivalent (NVQ4) 131/305 (43.0) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118/305 (38.7) 
Health:  
Excellent 79/312 (25.3) 
Very good 144/312 (46.2) 
Good 74/312 (23.7) 
Fair 14/312 (4.5) 
Poor 1/312 (0.3) 
Work location:  
London 146/312 (46.8) 
Not London 166/312 (53.2) 
Salary:  
Up to £30k 98/301 (32.6) 
More than £30k less than £50k 112/301 (37.2) 
£50k or more 91/301 (30.2) 
 
To assess whether the sample is demographically representative it must be compared to the 
demographic breakdown of the target population, those individuals in the UK labour force in 
employment. To do this, data from the 2013 UK Labour Force Survey and the 2011 census 
were examined. It should be noted however that the 2011 census only included data from 
England and Wales.  
In the 2013 UK Labour Force Survey (Apr-June) it was reported that 67% of women were in 
work, compared to 76% of men.519 Therefore, in the present study sample males are 
underrepresented. The percentage of present survey respondents aged 35 or over was 48%. 
From the 2013 UK Labour Force Survey (Feb-Apr) it can be calculated that 61% of employed 
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individuals over 16 were aged 35 over.520  Therefore, the older age groups are 
underrepresented in the present study sample.  
The percentage of the UK working population with dependent children is more difficult to 
estimate as the UK Labour Force Survey uses ‘households’ and ‘families’ in their data analysis, 
as opposed to individuals with children. In the 2011 census, dependent children families 
accounted for 43% of all families. However, this is not a calculation of the number of currently 
employed individuals who have dependent children, which is likely to be lower. Although this 
is more difficult to calculate as not all dependent children live with both their parents, we 
know that 64% parents of dependent children were in employment at the time of the 
census.521 522  
Data from the 2011 census revealed that 49% of those with no qualifications (aged 25-64) 
were in employment at the time of the census.523 In the present sample, no individuals 
reported having no qualifications, clearly showing this sector of the UK labour force has been 
excluded from the sample.  
In summary, after comparing the present sample to the demographic breakdown of the UK 
labour force it appears that the present sample is not representative. However, it should also 
be noted that is not possible for the categories from the Labour Force Survey and UK Census to 
be directly compared to the categories in the present study, due to differences in definitions 
and inclusion criteria.  
 
Behavioural outcome variable 
Survey results revealed that the number of participants who reported being willing to go to 
work varied by incident type. The highest rates of willingness were for severe snow (88.5%) 
and severe flooding (82.7%) and the lowest rates of willingness were for a chemical warfare 
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agent release (22.4%) and a dirty bomb (22.1%). Figure 4.1 presents the percentages of 
participants willing to go to work for each scenario.  











Associations between demographic variables and behavioural outcome 
variable  
Significant associations were found between some demographic variables and the behavioural 
outcome variable of willingness to work for specific incidents: 
 Gender was significantly associated with willingness to go to work in the event of 
severe snow, with males more likely to report being willing to go to work than females 
(odds ratio [OR] 2.92, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.36-6.29). 
 Age was significantly associated with willingness to go to work in the event of a 
bomb/explosive device, with participants in the 18-24 age less likely to report being 
willing to go to work than those over the age of 55 (OR 0.20,95% CI 0.06-0.63). 
 Work location was significantly associated with willingness to go to work in the event 
of a new strain of pandemic flu, a dirty bomb and a nuclear incident. Those working in 
London were less likely to report being willing to go to work than those working 
outside London for a new strain of pandemic (OR 0.63, 95% CI 0.40-0.98), a dirty bomb 
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These significant associations were controlled for when calculating odds ratios for the 
predictor variables using binary logistic regressions. The full set of results can be found in 
Appendix D.  
 
Associations between predictor variables and behavioural outcome variable  
Prior to calculating adjusted odds ratios, the reliability of the predictor scales used in the 
survey was measured using Cronbach’s alpha tests. The results were all above 0.7 indicating 
that all scales were reliable.  
Binary logistic regressions were used to calculate odds ratios in order to assess the association 
between each predictor variable and the behavioural outcome variable of ‘willingness to go to 
work’, for all 10 scenarios, adjusted for gender, age or location where appropriate. Table 4.3 
presents the frequencies and odds ratios (with 95% confidence intervals) of the variables 
found to be significant predictors of willingness to work for the majority of incidents (6 
incidents or more out of 10). Table 4.4 presents the frequencies and odds ratios (with 95% 
confidence intervals) of the variables found to be significant predictors of willingness to work 
for between 3 and 5 incidents. Odds ratios are adjusted for demographic variables where 
necessary. Significant associations are shown in bold and underlined. Variables found to be 
significant predictors for 2 incidents or less were not considered reliable predictors and as such 
are not included in the following tables. The full set of results can be found in Appendix D.  
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Table 4.3 Significant predictors of willingness to work for the majority of incidents (6 incidents or more out of 10) 
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Table 4.4 Significant predictors of willingness to work for 3 to 5 incidents out of 10 
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Summary of predictors of willingness to work 
For the majority of incidents (6 incidents or more out of 10), employees were more likely to be 
willing to report to work if they: 
 Had a business continuity role (current or former). 
 Had previous business continuity or crisis management training. 
 Believed they would be able to get to work and perform their duties. 
 Had higher levels of organisational identification. 
 Had higher levels of job satisfaction. 
 Believed that continuing to work in the event of a serious incident would make a big 
difference to the organisation they work for. 
 Believed their organisation continuing to function in the event of a serious incident 
would make a big difference to keeping the country running. 
 Believed that the health and safety of staff was a high priority with management 
where they work. 
 Perceived that severe public health consequences were unlikely. 
For between 3 and 5 incidents out of 10*, employees were more likely to be willing to report 
to work if they:  
 Did not work in London. 
 Perceived themselves to be more resilient. 
 Perceived that their own health being put at risk was unlikely. 
 Had been working for the organisation for a longer period of time.  
*Although age showed up as a predictor of willingness in 3 scenarios it was not considered a 
reliable predictor due to inconsistent results. For example, for the bomb/explosion scenario, 
participants in the 18-24 age group were less willing than those in the over 55 age group, 
whereas for the accidental chemical scenario the 35-44 age group were less willing than the 
over 55 age group. For the pandemic flu scenario it was the 25-34 age group who were 
significantly less willing than the over 55 age group. In contrast, the other categorical variables 
listed above were considered reliable predictors of willingness to work because they had 
consistent results with regards to which categories were significantly different to the reference 




A modified version of the Extended Parallel Process Model 
Binary logistic regressions were used to calculate odds ratios in order to examine the 
association between the modified version of the Extended Parallel Process Model and the 
behavioural outcome variable of ‘willingness to go to work’, for all 10 scenarios; adjusted for 
gender, age or location where appropriate.  
The results showed that the High Threat Low Efficacy (HTLE) group was significantly less likely 
to report being willing to go to work than the High Threat High Efficacy (HTHE) group for the 
majority of incidents (8 out of 10).  In addition, the Low Threat Low Efficacy (LTLE) group was 
significantly less likely to report being willing to go to work than the High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHE) group for the majority of incidents (6 out of 10). The Low Threat High Efficacy (LTHE) 
group was significantly less likely to report being willing to go to work than the High Threat 
High Efficacy (HTHE) group for 2 out of the 10 incidents. There were no significant differences 
between any of groups for the severe flooding or severe snow scenarios.  
 
Other survey items and analysis 
Ability vs. willingness: 
As with willingness, perceived ability to go to work in the event of a serious incident varied by 
scenario.  Participants perceived themselves as most able to go to work in the event of a new 
strain of pandemic flu (62.8%) and an accidental chemical spill or leak (50%). Participants 
perceived themselves as least able to go to work in the event of a dirty bomb (26.9%) and a 
nuclear incident (26.3%). As shown in Figure 4.2 the greatest variance between ability and 
willingness rates were evident for severe flooding (37.2% and 82.7% respectively) and severe 









Figure 4.2 Percentage of participants able to go to work for each incident compared to 
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Barriers and facilitators: 
Analysis of perceived barriers to reporting to work during a serious incident revealed that the 
most frequently selected barriers were: ‘Transport problems’ (76.7%); ‘Fear for my own health 
or safety’ (69.2%); ‘Fear for my significant others’ health or safety’ (47.5%;) and ‘Lack of 
knowledge about the specific incident’ (40%). ‘Childcare responsibilities’ was selected as a 
potential barrier by 26.6% of participants and stress/anxiety was considered a potential barrier 
by 23.3%. 5.6% of participants selected ‘I don’t care about my job that much’ as a reason for 
not reporting to work.  
Analysis of perceived facilitators or motivating factors for reporting to work during a serious 
incident revealed that factors such as: being kept up to date with frequent communication 
from their organisation (65.5%); having enough knowledge about the incident (63.2%); a sense 
of duty (53.7%); and a desire to carry on as normal (48.5%) were some of the most frequently 
selected facilitators. 12.7% of participants reported that an extra financial incentive would be 
something that might motivate them to report to work in the event of a serious incident.  See 





Table 4.5 Percentage of participants selecting each potential barrier  
Barriers N Response percentage 
Transport problems 234 76.7 
Fear for my own health or safety 211 69.2 
Fear for my significant others’ health or 
safety 
145 47.5 
Lack of knowledge about the specific incident 122 40.0 
Childcare responsibilities 81 26.6 
Stress/anxiety 71 23.3 
Eldercare responsibilities 47 15.4 
I don’t care about my job that much 17 5.6 
Not sure 3 1.0 
I volunteer for another organisation 3 1.0 
 
Table 4.6 Percentage of participants selecting each potential motivating factor (facilitator)  
Facilitators N Response percentage 
If my organisation kept me up to date with 
frequent communication 
201 65.5 
If I felt I had enough knowledge about the 
incident 
194 63.2 
It is my duty to report to work 165 53.7 
I would want to carry on as normal 149 48.5 
I get paid to go to work 114 37.1 
My colleagues would report to work, 
therefore so should I 
99 32.2 
I would want to be around colleagues for 
support 
70 22.8 
My colleagues might not report to work, 
therefore I should 
57 18.6 
I would be concerned about losing my job if I 
didn’t report to work 
48 15.6 
If I was provided with an extra financial 
incentive 
39 12.7 
Not sure 4 1.3 
 
Working from home: 
Results relating to participants’ ability to work from home revealed that the majority (91.7%) 
reported being willing to work from home if their normal workplace was inaccessible during a 
serious incident; 7.3% of respondents answered ‘N/A’ indicating that their job was not 
something they could do from home. Respondents were also asked questions about the 
equipment they would need to be able to work from home during a serious incident and 62.2% 
reported that it would have been necessary for them to have brought some equipment home 
with them the previous day. Despite this, 31.1% said that they did not take the necessary 
equipment home with them at the end of each day. See Figures 4.3-4.5 for the full breakdown 
of these survey items. 
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Figure 4.4 Percentage of employees who would have needed to have taken remote access 
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A web survey of 312 employees who currently work in the UK was conducted in order to 
examine the factors that predict the willingness of employees to report to work in the event of 
a range of hypothetical serious incidents, including some involving a CBRN hazard.  The results 
of this survey have shown that not all staff may be willing to report to work during a serious 
incident, with willingness rates being particularly low for incidents involving a CBRN hazard. 
This finding is supported by related academic research. For example, Chaffee concluded that 
healthcare workers might be more willing to report to work in weather disasters or mass-
casualty incidents than in CBRN-type incidents.524 Similarly, in a study of frontline health 
workers, 78% said they would be willing to report during a weather related event, compared 
to 67% in an influenza pandemic and 52% in a bioterrorism event.525 The findings of these 
studies and of the survey presented in this chapter provide support for risk perception theory 
that less familiar, more complex incidents (in terms of the hazards involved) such as CBRN 
terrorism are potentially more fear-inducing than natural disasters or explosions.526 In light of 
these findings, employers need to be aware of the potential differences in rates of 
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absenteeism for different types of incidents. More specifically, that the more fear-inducing 
incidents such as CBRN events could result in employees being less willing to come to work. 
Organisations may need to focus more of their planning around the education and reassurance 
that may be needed for staff during CBRN incidents. 
The findings revealed that rates of ability to go to work differed from willingness to go to work. 
This was not an unexpected finding as a previous research has also found a difference. For 
example, in a study of essential workers, it was reported that although 80% said they would be 
able to report to work in a pandemic, only 65% said they would be willing to do so, as a result 
of a variety of individual and organisational influences.527 Therefore organisations need to be 
aware that not all employees who are able to report to work will necessarily be willing to do 
so. 
From a theoretical point of view, the fact that perceived ability to go to work was found to be a 
predictor of willingness to go to work could be interpreted in a number of ways. Firstly, it is 
possible that the concepts are closely related in people’s minds and survey respondents were 
not necessarily differentiating between them. They may be thinking that even if they were 
physically able to get to work they may not be psychologically able to perform their duties if 
they are not willing to be there. Secondly, it could be that for incidents considered more 
serious (the ones that people would be less willing to go to work for) participants may be 
assuming that either the transport network would be temporarily shut down or that their 
employer had made a decision to close their workplace. Lastly, it is possible that there is 
another influence on people’s perceived ability to get to work not measured in this survey, for 
example that those who are more willing to go to work might be more likely to try to find 
alternative modes of transport in order to get to work or be more psychologically able to 
perform their duties once they are there, and vice versa. Further research is needed in order to 
clarify these issues.  
The measure of organisational identification used in the survey showed an association to 
willingness to go to work in the majority of scenarios; the more an employee identified with 
their organisation the more likely they were to report being willing to go to work. To my 
knowledge this study is the first to examine the association between organisational 
identification and willingness to go to work during serious incidents. Previous research has 
looked at the links between organisational identification and other organisational factors such 
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as job satisfaction, motivation, and wellbeing.528 One study of new US Army recruits reported a 
link between organisational identification and military attrition and another study of 
physicians discovered that strength of organisational identification was positively associated 
with voluntary cooperation at work.529 530 The present study provides more support to the 
theory that organisational identification is linked to positive workplace behaviours and as such 
is something that should be promoted and embedded into an organisation’s culture. Some 
ideas for how companies can increase levels of organisational identification amongst their 
employees (e.g. through leadership and corporate language) are discussed in Chapter 6.  
The findings of the survey study revealed an association between job satisfaction and 
willingness to go to work in the majority of scenarios. The more satisfied an employee was 
with their job the more likely they were to report being willing to go to work. This is the first 
time that an association between willingness to go to work during serious incidents and job 
satisfaction has been explored. Although the present results indicate that job satisfaction is a 
predictor of willingness to work, there has been some debate in the academic literature 
whether commitment to a company develops from job satisfaction or alternatively whether 
commitment to a company causes an individual to feel more positive and satisfied towards it, 
meaning they are less likely to want to leave (see Tett and Meyer for a discussion of the 
debate).531 The mechanisms involved in the association between job satisfaction and 
willingness to go to work during a serious incident warrant further investigation; however for 
the purpose of the present study it can simply be interpreted that those employees who are 
more satisfied with their jobs are more likely to report being willing to go to work during a 
serious incident. Organisations may be aware that satisfied employees might be more 
productive employees, but they may not have considered the influence job satisfaction could 
have on employees’ willingness to report to work during extreme events.  
The findings of this study have shown that an individual’s role, or perception of their role, has 
a significant influence on their willingness to report to work in the event of a number of 
serious incidents. More specifically, those individuals who perceived that going to work during 
a serious incident would make a big difference to the organisation they worked for were 
significantly more likely to report being willing to go to work. Similarly, those who perceived 
that their organisation continuing to function in a serious incident would make a big difference 
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to keeping the country running were significantly more likely to report being willing to go to 
work. This is a perception that could apply to employees who work for national infrastructure 
organisations. Past research has examined the sense of duty healthcare workers may feel 
when deciding whether or not to report to work during an infectious disease outbreak.532 533 
One study found that responders were more likely to say they would stay at work during a 
bioterrorist incident than media workers and other residents.534 Although the current web 
survey was unable to ascertain enough detail about the actual roles and duties of all 
participants, it did identify an association between perceived importance of role and perceived 
importance of the organisation’s role and willingness to work for the majority of incidents.  
In addition, a study by Smith and Walton revealed that staff who were not (or at least did not 
feel they were) as important were more likely to show a preference towards home 
responsibilities, or to feel they would be in the way if they came to work and so it would be 
better if they were to stay away.535 The implication of these findings for organisations is that 
those employees who do not think they can do anything useful in the event of serious incident, 
or do not see the wider picture in terms of their organisation’s role in keeping the country 
running, will be less likely to report to work. It is therefore vital that organisations 
communicate to employees the importance of their individual roles during an emergency, both 
in terms of the recovery of the business and the country as a whole. Future research should 
investigate the influence that specific job roles might have on the willingness of employees (in 
all sectors) to report to work during serious incidents.  
The results of the study also revealed that having a BCM or crisis management role (or a 
former role) was associated with willingness to go to work for the majority of incidents. Also, 
having received some business continuity or crisis management training was significantly 
associated with willingness to work for the majority of incidents. One potential reason for this 
association could be that by receiving training about business continuity individuals become 
more aware of the role staff play in business continuity. Alternatively, it could be that receiving 
training about the types of incidents that cause serious disruption to a business leads to 
employees feeling more confident in their ability to report to work, which in turn leads to 
them being more willing to report to work. Research suggests that training and preparedness 
activities have the ability to influence perceived self-efficacy in responding to a CBRN incident. 
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In a study of Australian paramedics it was found that those who had completed recent training 
perceived themselves as more competent to respond to a CBRNe incident than those without 
recent training; and training was a stronger predictor of perceived response readiness than 
experience of responding to a CBRNe incident.536 In light of these findings, organisations could 
involve staff in their business continuity planning, something which could not only increase the 
knowledge of employees so that they know what they should do in an extreme event, but also 
increase their confidence in their ability to respond effectively to the situation. However, more 
research is needed to examine, in detail, the potential reasons why BCM training is associated 
with willingness to work; particularly with staff for whom responding to an incident is not part 
of their normal role. It is also important to compare different types of BCM activities, such as 
staff awareness through communications, staff discussion groups/seminars, exercises and 
different types of training (classroom vs. e-learning) and to consider the costs and benefits of 
each.  
Another significant predictor of willingness to go to work during a serious incident was the 
perception that the health and safety of staff is a priority with management. Similarly, a study 
by Gershon et al. discovered that provision of respiratory protective equipment and a high 
level of trust in their employer were associated with essential workers’ willingness to work 
during a pandemic.537 It has been suggested by Barnett et al. that an organisation should 
provide assurances to employees of the measures they would take in an incident to protect 
their personal safety and thus make the employees more confident that the organisation 
would be able to control the situation.538 The authors also suggest that it could be useful for 
organisations to make their health and safety interventions more conspicuous to employees, 
as discussions involving risk perception theories suggest that a lack of confidence in workplace 
safety could lead to increased feelings of dread for employees in the event of an incident.  
Furthermore, informing employees where they should go to access updates and information in 
a crisis may increase their sense of control, which may in turn have an effect on their risk 
perception and level of concern.539 One study found that individuals who were confident in 
their employer’s ability to respond appropriately were not only more likely to be willing to 
work in the first place, but were also more likely to be willing to change roles during a 
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pandemic.540 This is important because during and in the aftermath of an incident a flexible 
and adaptive workforce is essential to facilitate a timely return to normal functioning. The 
results of the present study support the finding that confidence in an organisation’s approach 
to health and safety is associated to willingness to work, and this association also applies in 
incidents other than a pandemic. Due to these findings, organisations should maintain a focus 
on the health and safety of their employees and also communicate this focus to the employees 
themselves.  
The present study has provided some support for the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), 
a model that incorporates an individual’s perception of threat and efficacy.541 This is the first 
time an academic study has applied the EPPM to the willingness of employees other than 
healthcare workers to report to work during serious incidents. However, as noted, this was a 
modified version of the EPPM to make it more applicable to the present study population; the 
efficacy variable was related to the perceived importance of role and organisation. The 
primary purpose of the EPPM is to provide a framework for effective risk communication.542 It 
was originally designed to explain the successes and failures of fear appeals, however more 
recently it has been applied to other topics such as the effectiveness of workplace safety 
messages.543 The model has also usefully been applied to the topic of staff willingness to work, 
with a focus on healthcare workers.544 The EPPM explains behavioural responses using just two 
main constructs, threat and efficacy and can be considered a parsimonious model.545 The 
present analysis measured these concepts and, as such, threat is discussed in relation to being 
‘concerned’ and efficacy is related to feeling ‘important’. The results revealed that those 
employees who fitted a ‘concerned and important’ profile were more likely to report being 
willing to work than those who were ‘concerned and not important’ and those who were ‘not-
concerned and not-important’.  However, the analysis also revealed that those who fitted a 
‘concerned and important’ profile were more willing to report to work than those who were 
‘not-concerned and important’ in only two out of the ten incidents. Therefore, these results 
have shown that for the present study sample, perceived efficacy in terms of perceived 
                                                          
540
 Tippett et al., ‘Anticipated Behaviors of Emergency Prehospital Medical Care Providers during an 
Influenza Pandemic’. 
541
 Witte, ‘Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals’. 
542
 Erin K. Maloney, Maria K. Lapinski, and Kim Witte, ‘Fear Appeals and Persuasion: A Review and 
Update of the Extended Parallel Process Model’, Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5, no. 4 (1 
April 2011): 206–19. 
543
 Michael Basil et al., ‘Applying the Extended Parallel Process Model to Workplace Safety Messages’, 
Health Communication 28, no. 1 (2013): 29–39. 
544
 Barnett et al., ‘Assessment of Local Public Health Workers’ Willingness to Respond to Pandemic 
Influenza’. 
545
 Maloney, Lapinski, and Witte, ‘Fear Appeals and Persuasion’. 
 176 
 
importance of role/organisation has a stronger association with willingness to work than 
perceived threat. A possible explanation for this is that being willing to work was not 
significantly associated with a low perceived likelihood of the event occurring.  
The difference between threat and efficacy is similar to a finding reported by Barnett et al. 
who discovered that out of perceived threat and perceived efficacy, perceived efficacy was the 
more influential component in determining public health workers’ willingness to work in a 
pandemic.546 Barnett et al. concluded that those employees who fit a ‘concerned and 
confident’ profile are most likely to be willing to report to work during a pandemic, a concept 
which is partially supported by the present findings. Therefore it is recommended that 
organisations should focus their messaging on increasing perceptions of efficacy before 
attempting to change employees’ perceptions of the threat. Organisations could focus on 
strengthening employees’ confidence in their ability to do something to help by reporting to 
work and communicating the importance of the recovery of their organisation.  
For 3 incidents out of 10, employees were more likely to be willing to report to work if they did 
not work in London. The reasons for this difference are not clear from the data; however a 
possible explanation might lie in the fact that the majority of those who work in London use 
public transport to get to work. For those incidents with an element of contagion or 
contamination it is likely that coming into contact with other commuters could be a potential 
source of fear for many individuals. The focus group study addresses this issue in Chapter 5. It 
is important to note, however, that this could be a result of living in a city and may not be 
unique to London. More research is needed to ascertain if living in a city or urban area has an 
effect on willingness to work in certain scenarios, and whether the use of public transport is 
the reason for this effect.  
Similarly, for a minority of incidents those individuals who perceived themselves as more 
resilient were more likely to be willing to go to work. It is logical that those who are more 
confident in their own ability to bounce back and recover from negative situations would be 
more willing to put themselves at risk by going to work; however, as this was only a significant 
association for three incidents (pandemic flu, flooding and snow) it is not considered a reliable 
predictor for serious incidents in general. It is interesting to note however that perceived 
personal resilience only has an association with willingness to go to work for incidents with 
which the participants were likely to be more familiar with or have experienced before. As 
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these two factors, work location and resilience, were significant predictors of willingness to 
work in only 3 out of the 10 scenarios it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions. 
However, they are potential influences that could be considered in further research, 
particularly research examining why they might be predictors of willingness to work in some 
scenarios and not others. 
The findings suggested a possible association between age and willingness to work. The oldest 
age group in the sample was significantly more likely to report being willing to work than a 
younger age group for 3 out of the 10 incidents. As with work location and resilience, it is 
difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from this, especially as it was not always the same 
younger age categories involved. However, the systematic literature review reported in 
Chapter 2 revealed that similar associations have previously been found by academics. For 
example, Bar-Dayan et al. found that younger employees (those between 18 and 24), were 
significantly less likely to report being willing to risk their life for a patient during an A/H1N1 
pandemic than employees in the older age groups.547 Similarly, a study by Ogedegbe et al. 
reported that being in an older age group was a significant predictor of willingness to work in a 
disaster. 548 However, other researchers have disagreed that age is associated with willingness. 
For example, Burke et al. concluded that age of paediatric healthcare employees had no 
association with willingness to report to a disaster and Considine and Mitchell found no 
significant correlations between nurses’ willingness to participate in CBR incidents and age.549 
550 In light of the findings of this research and previous studies it is recommended that the 
association between age and the willingness of staff to go to work is a feature of research in 
the future. If an association between age and willingness to work exists, then organisations 
could be made aware of the age groups less likely to report to work, which could inform the 
development of targeted communication and interventions.   
The length of time an individual had been working for their present organisation was 
significantly associated with the likelihood of them being willing to go to work for 4 out of the 
10 incidents. Specifically, the greater number of years they had been working for the 
organisation the more likely they were to say they would be willing to go to work during the 
incident. Interestingly the 4 incidents this association was present for were all CBRN incidents 
(chemical warfare agent, smallpox, dirty bomb and pneumonic plague) and the association for 
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willingness to go to work in a nuclear incident and length of time working for an organisation 
was also approaching significance. Therefore it seems that those who have been working for 
an organisation for longer will be more likely to go to work during a CBRN incident. The 
reasons for this cannot be interpreted from the data and it is possible that some other factors 
not measured by the present study are mediating this association. However, it is still an 
interesting finding and one that warrants further investigation from research in the future.  
An unexpected finding of the present study was that there was no gender difference in 
willingness to work for the majority of incidents. This is an unexpected finding as risk 
perception research has generally shown that females perceive hazards as more severe than 
males.551 Qureshi found that being female lowered the likelihood of being willing to report to 
work during a catastrophic disaster for most types of events. However, it is unclear from the 
article what the authors’ definition of ‘most’ types of events is. In the present study, the only 
gender difference observed was during a severe snow incident, where females were less likely 
to report being willing to go to work.  There is a potential explanation for this gender 
difference in the academic literature, with some researchers reporting a gender difference in 
driving perceptions and behaviour during bad weather. For example, one study reported that 
females were more likely to acquire information about the weather forecast before a trip and 
another study found that women expressed less comfort than men for driving in bad 
weather.552 553 However, it is not clear from the present survey what the cause of this gender 
difference is and as such it requires further research to examine this issue in greater detail. The 
idea that females might be more concerned about driving in bad weather is something that 
organisations could keep in mind however, and could provide guidance about driving in bad 
weather to all employees. 
For the present study, having children did not have a significant association with willingness to 
work; however, this is not an unexpected finding as Smith and Walton also found that having 
dependent children had less of an influence on attitudes to returning to work after an 
earthquake than the researchers expected.554 It should be noted that the findings from this 
web survey must be used with caution due to the small percentage of respondents who 
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reported having dependent children (28%). This may also explain why only 26.6% of 
respondents reported childcare as a potential barrier to reporting to work. Furthermore, the 
current survey was not able to examine the influence of having children on willingness to work 
in detail, as other factors such as the age and health of the children, as well as the specific 
childcare arrangements of the family would have to be taken into account. Future research 
should examine these issues in more detail with a larger sample. Despite these sample 
limitations, it is clear that having children who are ill or whose schools are closed will cause 
some parents problems. Past research has shown childcare issues to be a frequently reported 
barrier to healthcare workers reporting to work during a serious incident.555 556 557 In light of 
this it is recommended that organisations consider parental obligations in their business 
continuity planning, either in terms of the provision of childcare or more flexible working from 
home arrangements.  
The specific barriers and facilitators reported by participants in the present study support the 
findings of previous academic studies that have examined these factors. The most frequently 
cited barrier from the present study was transport problems. In previous research with 
healthcare workers transportation problems was a frequently cited barrier to reporting to 
work during a public health emergency; and was selected more frequently for an earthquake 
scenario than an influenza pandemic scenario.558 Fear for self and fear for significant others’ 
health or safety were found to be the next two frequently cited barriers to reporting to work 
during a serious incident. This finding is supported by a study by Qureshi et al. who reported 
that the most frequently cited barriers to healthcare workers reporting to work during 
catastrophic disasters were fear and concern for family and self.559 The finding that concern for 
significant others’ health or safety is a potential barrier to staff reporting to work provides 
some support for Killian’s theory of ‘role conflict’.560 Killian suggests that during a disaster, 
individuals would be faced with a conflict between their role in their family and their role in an 
organisation. Killian noted that in a disaster situation this conflict could be resolved in favour 
of loyalty to the family. Therefore, it is recommended that organisations take time to 
understand the concerns and practical barriers that staff may face in the event of a serious 
incident, as these concerns could prevent staff from reporting to work. A possible method for 
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doing this is to involve staff in planning and particularly in exercises, giving them a chance to 
voice their concerns and their specific needs during different scenarios.  
For facilitators, or the factors that might motivate employees to report to work, the most 
frequently selected factors were receiving frequent communication from their organisation 
and having enough knowledge about the incident. Academic researchers have suggested that 
keeping individuals informed during emergencies reduces their stress and allows them to act 
efficiently.561 Due to lack of knowledge there is also potential for an ‘information void’ to occur 
during a CBRN incident or other uncommon event such as an outbreak of a novel virus, which 
could increase feelings of dread.562 In a study of student nurses it was found that their 
concerns for safety were based on inaccurate knowledge; for example that they could pass 
anthrax onto their families after treating patients who had contracted inhalation anthrax.563 
Furthermore, a study of public health workers in the US found that those who had read the 
pandemic influenza plan were more likely to report a willingness to work during a pandemic.564 
The present study provides support for these findings and shows the importance of 
communication and information during extreme events and the potential impact it could have 
on employees’ decisions about whether or not to report to work. 
An unexpected finding with regards to facilitators was that only 12.7% of participants reported 
that an extra financial incentive might motivate them to report to work in the event of a 
serious incident. It is possible that this figure is low because of the serious nature of many of 
the incidents used in the survey; it is possible that other factors become more important than 
money when there is a perceived threat to the health of an individual or his/her family. As with 
the potential barriers employees might face, organisations need to take the time to find out 
the potential factors that might motivate their staff to return to work during a serious incident 
and include these in their planning.  
The survey results revealed a very high level of willingness among participants for working 
from home if their normal workplace was inaccessible during a serious incident. However, a 
potential problem with accessibility was revealed. Although the majority of employees said 
they would have needed to have taken some remote access equipment home with them at the 
end of the day in order to work from home, over a third admitted that they did not take this 
home with them each day. This is potentially a very serious problem if organisations are 
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assuming that providing the necessary remote access equipment to employees is sufficient to 
ensure they can work from home. Therefore, organisations need to encourage their staff to 
take home their remote access equipment at the end of each day, and not to assume that 
simply providing the equipment is enough. This issue is explored further in Chapter 5. 
 
Methodological limitations  
The main limitations of the present survey study relate to the sampling method employed – 
snowball sampling (also known as chain-referral sampling). This method was selected due the 
fact it was convenient, it did not cost anything and was not as labour-intensive as some other 
methods (e.g. quota sampling). However, snowball sampling as a data collection method has a 
number of shortcomings that need to be addressed here. Firstly, snowball sampling frequently 
results in a sample that is not random and is often not representative of the target population. 
Using this technique can result in large sections of the target population being omitted from 
the sample. Secondly, using snowball sampling means it is impossible to calculate the true 
response rate of the survey, due to the fact that it is impossible to know who has received the 
survey link but has decided not to click on it. All that can be calculated is the completion rate, 
which is the percentage of individuals who clicked on the survey link and went on to complete 
the survey. Although the results of this method can be useful, it is important to note that they 
should not be generalised to the whole population. It is often better to view results of this type 
as a ‘proof of concept’ and something that can be confirmed or challenged using a larger and 
more representative sample when time and funds allow.  
Another of the potential limitations of the current study is due the fact it is a web survey it is 
only filled in by those individuals with an internet connection. Although this is less of a 
problem now than it would have been five years ago, with more and more people connecting 
through smart phones and tablets, it is still possible that the sample was not representative of 
the working population. However, unlike other types of research, the sample included only 
those individuals who were currently employed, so children and the elderly (those least likely 
to have internet connections) were excluded anyway. The sample was also shown to be 
skewed in favour of those who work in London and some other regions were 
underrepresented. Due to the snowball sampling technique employed, it is not possible to 
assess the impact of a non-response bias on the results as the survey software cannot 
calculate numbers of individuals who received the email but chose not to click on the survey 
link. This is a problem with this type of research and something that could be improved if a 
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telephone survey method was used rather than a web survey, or if the email was only sent to 
pre-selected individuals. However, reassurance is provided by the fact that the results of this 
survey follow similar trends to those reported in previous surveys, for the measures previously 
studied.   
A further limitation of the sample is that it is possible certain personality types were more 
likely to fill in the survey resulting in a further non-response bias. Firstly, it could be that those 
who are naturally more anxious by nature might not have wanted to fill in a survey about 
incidents that are so fear-inducing. This may mean that willingness rates have been 
underestimated. Secondly, it is possible that people who are generally more helpful in other 
aspects of their lives were more likely to complete the survey. It is possible these more helpful 
people would be more willing to help during emergencies and therefore the willingness rates 
could have been overestimated. Another potential sample bias could have occurred due to the 
fact that the survey was less likely to be completed by employees with operational or business 
critical roles and those who do not use a computer at work. However, as the survey was also 
sent out through both personal and professional networks, including business continuity 
professionals, this helped to mitigate this potential problem.  
Due to the anonymous nature of the data collection and the difficulty in creating a closed 
survey item that asked about all potential occupations and organisations, it was not possible to 
ascertain what type of organisation the respondents worked for, or their specific job role. This 
is a potential limitation of the study as it is possible individuals who work for different types of 
organisations, and in different roles, will have different motivations for reporting to work 
during extreme events. This also meant that it was not possible to solely collect data from 
those who work in national infrastructure organisations and as such the results should be 
generalised across sectors with caution.  
A final limitation of the present survey can be found in the scenarios used to assess individuals’ 
willingness and ability to report to work. Although these were piloted within the author’s 
networks, it is possible that respondents’ perceptions of the scenarios may have differed, 
which makes it difficult to perform a reliable comparison between individuals. It is possible 
that the incidents, for example a nuclear incident or dirty bomb, are perceived differently by 




Future research could improve the present study by using a demographically and 
geographically representative sample, as well as a sample that is representative of all UK 
national infrastructure sectors and roles. It should aim to include participants who do not 
regularly use the internet, as this is a section of the UK workforce that may have been missed 
by this survey. Quotas for use in representative sampling could be informed by using the UK 
Labour Force Survey. This would ensure the correct percentages of males and females, age 
groups, part-time and full-time employees and the various salary brackets (as well as other 
factors) are included in the sample. It would also be useful to understand the demographics of 
those individuals who choose not to fill in a survey of this sort; something which is not possible 
using snowballing or opportunistic sampling for an online survey. A population survey is likely 
to be both costly and time-consuming, therefore another option would be to survey a sample 
of employees from within a specific organisation and directly compare these results to a 
matched sample from another organisation; this could either be within the same sector or 
across different sectors. With regards to the survey content, an improvement could be made 
to the scenarios used; more description about the individual scenarios (e.g. how many cases of 
plague, how many casualties from the explosive device etc.) would be helpful to people when 
deciding whether or not they would report to work.  
Conclusions 
 
This study has been the first of its kind to examine a number of unique predictors of 
willingness to work for a range of different scenarios, using a sample which is not solely 
employees of the health sector or essential workers. Measures from organisational psychology 
such as organisational identification and job satisfaction have been applied to the topic for the 
first time and the Extended Parallel Process Model has also been used to examine the 
willingness to work of non-healthcare workers for scenarios other than pandemic. Overall, it 
has been shown that organisations should plan for significant rates of absenteeism during 
serious incidents because of employees not being willing to go to work rather than simply not 
being able. It has also shown that organisations should expect their staff to be less willing to 
work in CBRN incidents than less serious or more familiar incidents such as snow and flooding 
or a bomb/explosive incident. The survey has also highlighted the importance of organisational 
communication and the findings have been used to suggest ways in which communication can 
be used to facilitate employees’ willingness to work during serious incidents.  
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These survey results, along with the results of the interview study have been used to inform 
the next phase of data collection, the employee focus groups. A pneumonic plague release 
scenario was selected due to the low rates of willingness for that scenario identified in this 
study. Only participants who do not have a business continuity role were recruited to the focus 
groups due to the finding that rates of willingness differ significantly between the two groups 
and, as such, business continuity employees could have influenced other employees during the 
discussions with their responses and potentially increased levels of knowledge. Due to the 
finding that not all individuals take their remote access equipment home with them at the end 
of each day, this was included in the focus group discussion guide. The potential concerns 
about using public transport during an infectious disease outbreak were also examined, as the 
survey did not explore this topic. Chapter 5 describes this scenario-based focus group study. 
Some suggestions for further research based on the findings of this survey study are suggested 

















Chapter 5: Focus Group Study 
Introduction 
 
The overarching aim of this project was to examine the likely behaviour of staff during and in 
the aftermath of a high-impact, low-probability event, such as one that involves a CBRN 
hazard. As revealed in Chapter 3, the majority of national infrastructure organisations involved 
in the research do not involve staff in exercises nor do they ask staff about their potential 
concerns or information needs in the event of a catastrophic event such as a CBRN incident. 
Instead, they make a variety of largely unsupported assumptions about the willingness of their 
staff to report to work. In addition, results of the web survey reported in Chapter 4 revealed 
that a high percentage of employees may be unwilling to report to work in the event of an 
incident that involves a CBRN hazard. This chapter reports the results of a focus group study 
designed to further explore and develop these findings. The focus groups were made up of 
employees of national infrastructure organisations and examined their likely concerns, 
behavioural intentions, information needs and expectations of their employer in the event of a 
hypothetical CBRN incident.  
Focus groups are a useful way to examine the effect of the provision of information on 
people’s behavioural intentions and have been widely used in past research examining risk 
communication.565 566 567 568 569 570 Using focus groups in the development of risk communication 
can result in more effective communication because it enables communicators to listen to 
consumers of the risk messages.571 This study made use of different modes of communication 
(a television news report, a news website article and social media) and assessed employees’ 
reactions to these mock injects.  
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One advantage of using focus groups as a data collection method with the public is that they 
encourage those people who would find a one-on-one interview intimidating to take part, so 
that all types of personality are included in the research.572 It is also not just the responses the 
participants give to the moderator’s questions that are important, but the exchange between 
the research participants. Due to the fact that participants provide an audience for each other 
and can provide opinions and contrasting views, participant interaction results in a greater 
variety of discussion than would be evident in one-on-one interviews.573 Group discussions 
allow participants to explore their own views and opinions, using anecdotes and arguments, 
thus helping the researcher to understand more about what participants know or have 
experienced than would be possible through other methods of data collection.574  
Past research has used focus groups to examine public reactions, responses and information 
needs in the event of various hypothetical CBRN incidents. For example, Pearce et al. 
conducted focus groups in Britain and Germany to examine the behavioural intentions and 
information needs of the public in the aftermath of the hypothetical discovery of a radiological 
exposure device (RED).575 Similarly, Rogers, Amlôt and Rubin used focus groups to assess the 
impact of communication materials on public responses to a hypothetical RDD incident.576  
Other studies have used focus groups to examine public reactions to hypothetical CBRN 
scenarios such as attacks involving plague, VX and botulinum toxin.577 578 579 
Therefore, although there have been a number of focus group studies examining general 
public responses and reactions to CBRN incidents, there has been much less focus on employee 
responses to such events.  A few studies have used focus groups to investigate employee 
responses to incidents such as anthrax, Rift Valley Fever Virus and natural disasters; however 
these have not specifically looked at willingness to report to work, which is one of the key 
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areas of interest of the present research.580 581 582 The systematic literature review (Chapter 2) 
revealed that only two previous academic studies used focus groups to assess employees’ 
willingness to work during a hypothetical serious incident.583 584 Consequently, due to this gap 
in the literature, this study used focus groups to examine the behavioural intentions 
(specifically willingness to work) and information needs of employees of different national 
infrastructure sectors to a hypothetical deliberate pneumonic plague release. Furthermore, 
this study is the first to include employees of national infrastructure sectors other than health. 
The aims of this focus group study were to ascertain: 
1. If employees will go to work in the event of a pneumonic plague outbreak. 
2. How the level of information employees are given about a pneumonic plague outbreak 
influences their general thoughts and feelings about the event. 
3. What barriers might employees face when deciding whether or not to return to work 
in the event of a pneumonic plague outbreak. 
4. What factors might motivate employees to return to work in the event of pneumonic 
plague outbreak. 
5. What information employees will want to know in the event of a pneumonic plague 
outbreak. 
6. What the preferred information sources are for employees during a pneumonic plague 
outbreak. 
7. What makes employees believe an organisation when they tell them it is safe to go 
back to work in the event of a pneumonic plague outbreak.  
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Design and procedure 
In total eight focus groups (n=53) were conducted during November and December 2013. All 
focus groups took place at the participants’ places of work, with two groups taking place 
outside of London and the rest conducted in London. Participants were recruited through 
gatekeepers at the organisations they worked for. The gatekeepers were either contacts of the 
funding organisation, the PhD advisory board or the supervisory team. Each participant was 
contacted by email to ask if they were interested in taking part and provided with the study 
information sheet, after which a meeting time and place were arranged. The focus groups 
lasted between one and a half and two hours and were audio-recorded. Participants signed a 
consent form to acknowledge that they understood they could withdraw from the study at any 
time and that their contribution would be anonymous. The study was approved by the KCL 
War Studies Group Research Ethics Panel (REP(WSG)/11/12-28). 
The method was adapted from a method previously used by Rogers et al., in which members 
of the public were presented with a series of media injects containing information about a 
CBRN incident.585 They were then asked to write down their first thoughts prior to discussions. 
Following this they were prompted to discuss their reactions and concerns, expectations of the 
authorities, behavioural intentions, information needs and preferred information sources with 
the other participants in the group. This method has been successfully applied to other 
studies, including the work of Pearce et al.586 
To help participants visualise the scenario and to add a sense of reality to the focus groups, 
participants were presented with three injects. The first, a five minute video of a televised 
news broadcast was used to set the scene on the day the terrorist device was discovered. The 
second, a news website article was used to give more specific information about the incident 
and about pneumonic plague on day 5 of the scenario.  Lastly, a social media page containing a 
series of posts from other users about the incident on day 16 of the scenario was used to 
gauge participants’ feelings about the use of social media during an incident.  
After being presented with each inject participants were asked to make some notes about 
their ‘first thoughts’ on a piece of paper before the group discussions began: ‘What you might 
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be thinking’, ‘What you might be feeling’, and ‘Anything you might do’. These notes were used 
to capture the initial thoughts of participants, prior to discussion with other participants. This 
form of data capture enables the researchers to ascertain the extent to which discussion 
changes initial responses and gives a voice to participants who might be less forthcoming in 
group discussions. Following the written notes, the moderator prompted a group discussion 
using the pre-prepared semi-structured discussion guide, but also allowed participants to 
discuss topics not included in the guide. The discussion guide is presented in Appendix G. Prior 
to the start of the presentation of the scenario participants were required provide some 
demographic information and to identify their willingness to report to work in the event of a 
pneumonic plague incident (‘willing’, ‘not willing’ or ‘not sure’). 
 
Participants 
The participants were employees of organisations operating within the following sectors: 
energy (2 groups, n=13), finance (3 groups, n=19), Government (1 group, n=7) and health (2 
groups, n=14). Participants had an average age of 34 and the male/female breakdown was 
42% and 58% respectively. Participants with business continuity or crisis management roles 
were excluded.  
 
Scenario development and inject design 
The scenario used for the focus groups was a deliberate release of pneumonic plague at 
Victoria train station in central London. The scenario used in the focus groups was adapted 
(with the help of infectious disease modellers at Public Health England) from a scenario used in 
a Department of Health field exercise led by the Health Protection Agency’s Centre for 
Emergency Preparedness and Response in 2009 (‘Exercise Black Crocus’). It was also the same 
scenario used in a telephone survey study conducted by Rubin et al., which examined the 
perceptions and reactions of the public to the plague release.587 For more details about the 
modelling data used to develop the scenario see Appendix E.  
The scenario of a deliberate pneumonic plague release was selected for several reasons. 
Although CBR incidents are low-likelihood events, they have the potential to severely impact 
on UK national infrastructure, something that the UK Government’s National Risk Register 
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(NRR) acknowledges.588 However the NRR does not distinguish between the different types of 
CBR incidents. A biological incident was selected for the focus group scenario as it has the 
potential to cause widespread consequences affecting all sectors of national infrastructure; an 
initially relatively small initial incident such as the release of an infectious disease could affect 
the entire country. It was decided that a covert biological incident would be interesting to 
study as it could potentially cause delayed symptoms and could cause long-term issues with 
regards to staff absenteeism. The willingness of staff to report to work in the event of a covert 
infectious disease release could be lower than other incidents such as chemical or radiological 
incidents as employees may be concerned that colleagues could have been infected and not 
yet know it.  
Pneumonic plague was selected as the infectious disease used in the scenario due to the fact it 
is serious enough to potentially cause employees to be concerned about going to work (it is 
fatal if not treated) but could be effectively treated with antibiotics. Furthermore, in the web 
survey results discussed in Chapter 4, it was discovered that a pneumonic plague incident 
resulted in a very low percentage of employees being willing to work (24%). For a number of 
years the use of Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of plague, has been considered as a 
potential terrorist weapon, particularly in its aerosolised form. The methods needed to 
produce an aerosolised plague weapon have existed for many years; both the United States 
and Soviet Union’s biological weapons programmes were involved in developing the 
techniques.589 As a result, the scenario of an aerosolised plague attack has been used in past 
exercises and academic studies.590 591   
Focus group injects were developed to help set the scene of the deliberate pneumonic plague 
release and to help provide a sense of reality to participants by introducing new information 
over 3 stages (which represented 16 days of the scenario). The following three sections 
present a description of each stage of the scenario including the information given to 
participants. 
Stage 1: The first inject presented during Stage 1 was a televised news broadcast. This inject 
was developed for a Home Office funded study conducted by King’s College London and the 
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Health Protection Agency in 2007. The news report takes place on day 3 of the hypothetical 
scenario, 2 days after terrorists planted a pneumonic plague dispersal device in the rafters of 
London Victoria train station. The news reporters informed viewers that authorities had 
discovered the device in the rafters, that there had been 100 cases in Kent alone and that 
anybody who thought they were at the station at the time mentioned should report to a mass-
treatment centre. However, the main message given by the Health Protection Agency 
spokesperson was to carry on as usual.  
Stage 2: The second inject takes place on day 5 of the scenario. A news website article 
informed participants that were 5,959 confirmed cases in the affected region and 1,408 
deaths. In the article participants were given scientific information about the symptoms, 
incubation period, transmission and treatment of pneumonic plague. A key message of the 
article was that plague is fatal if not treated. Participants were again told to go to a mass-
treatment centre if they had been at the station or in close contact with someone showing 
symptoms, and if not then to carry on as normal.  
Stage 3: For the third and final stage, presented on day 16 of the scenario, participants were 
given a screenshot of a social media feed containing a number of posts. The first was a photo 
of someone being put into an ambulance and participants were asked to imagine the photo 
was showing the area outside their office building. Other posts contained opinions and 
concerns from other social media users (e.g. about the mass-treatment centres, the hospitals 
and schools). Participants were also told that the number of cases per day had significantly 
reduced by this point. Figure 5.1 provides a visual representation of the three stages of the 
scenario and the extent of the information provided at each stage is indicated. For full details 










Figure 5.1 Stages of the focus group scenario (images reproduced with permission of Public 











Focus group discussion guide 
The focus group discussion guide was designed to cover a number of topics related to 
employees’ thoughts and concerns about each inject, as well as their likely behaviour and 
expectations of their employer.  
After watching the news report (Inject 1), participants were prompted to discuss: (i) their first 
reactions to seeing the news report at home in the evening; (ii) anything they might do; (iii) 
any further information they would require; (iv) whether they would follow the advice; and (v) 
their thoughts or concerns about going to work the next day. For the groups that were 
conducted outside of London, participants were asked to imagine the incident had occurred at 
a train station near them. Participants were first asked to imagine that they had been at the 
station at the time of the release and asked what they might do in this scenario. Following this 
they were asked to imagine that they had not been at the station and what they might do in 
that scenario.  
After being presented with the news website article (Inject 2), participants were prompted to 
discuss: (i) their first reactions to reading the article; (ii) anything they might do; (iii) their 
thoughts about the messages in the article; (iv) any further information they would require; (v) 
their thoughts or concerns about going to work; (vi) what information and interventions they 
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would expect from their employer; and (vii) who they would want to hear the information 
from. 
Finally, after being presented with the social media inject (Inject 3), participants were 
prompted to discuss: (i) their first reactions to reading the social media posts; (ii) their general 
thoughts about using social media during an incident; (iii) their thoughts or concerns about 
going to work; and if still to be discussed at this point, (iv) the interventions and information 
they would expect from their employer during this type of incident. For full details of the focus 
group discussion guide see Appendix G.  
 
Analysis 
All focus groups were audio-recorded, transcribed and subsequently analysed using thematic 
analysis. This was the method of analysis used for the interview analysis in Chapter 3. The 
transcripts were read and examined a number of times and the text was annotated with 
comments. The transcripts were then coded, and these codes collated and combined in order 
to form over-arching themes and sub-themes.592  
Results 
 
Participants were required to provide written responses to a number of questions at the start 
of each focus group (prior to the presentation of the scenario injects or the start of any group 
discussions), including demographic questions and a question asking if they would be willing to 
report to work in the event of a deliberate release of pneumonic plague. Table 5.1 presents 
reported levels of willingness to work separated into the different sectors.  
 
Table 5.1 Percentage of participants willing to report to work in a pneumonic plague incident 
by sector  
Sector Percentage willing to report 
Energy (n=13) 23.1% 
Finance (n=19) 5.3% 
Government (n=7) 42.9% 
Health (n=14) 57.1% 
                                                          
592
 Braun and Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’. 
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Overall, participants revealed low levels of willingness to report to work in the event of a 
deliberate release of pneumonic plague. Clear variations in willingness were evident between 
sectors. For example, participants in the health groups reported the highest rates of 
willingness (57.1%) and the lowest rates were reported by employees from the financial 
services sector (5.3%). Qualitative analysis of the focus groups sheds some light on these 
reported trends.  
 
Qualitative analysis of the focus groups 
The following sections present the analysis of the focus group transcripts for each stage of the 
scenario, along with some examples of participants’ first written responses after being 
presented with each inject.  
 
Participants’ ‘first thoughts’ at each stage of the scenario: 
Stage 1: TV News Report (Day 3 of plague scenario): 
At the first stage of the focus groups participants viewed the television news report (Inject 1), 
that set the scene for the scenario. The quotes presented here are from the ‘first thoughts’ 
participants noted on a piece of paper before the group discussions began. They were asked 
what they would have been ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’ and what they ‘would do’ if they had seen this 
report on the news.  
Examples of participants’ written responses: 
The issue is worse than shown on news. The officials are quiet to stop panic. 
Concerned, people would panic. The fact that it is worldwide is very 
concerning. I would request to work from home, get tested and immunised. 
[Participant 6, Group 5 – Finance] 
 
Worried and anxious about my safety and alerting family and friends. 
[Participant 2, Group 4 – Finance] 
Stoical, the UK has suffered much worse. Unconcerned, as unlikely to have 
been affected. [Participant 3, Group 3 – Energy] 
 
Stay at home, not go back to work or allow boys to go to school. Watch out 
for symptoms and probably worry about the slightest cough. Log in to laptop 




Analysis of the written responses of participants revealed variation in their likely thoughts, 
feelings and actions. In general, the ‘first thoughts’ noted down by the majority of participants 
contained reference to the concern they would be feeling at this time and their need for more 
information. However, there were also participants in each group who did not reveal much 
concern or thought the situation was being over-hyped by the media.  
 
Stage 2: News Website Article (Day 5 of plague scenario):  
At the second stage of the focus groups participants were given a news website article (Inject 
2) to read, which contained information about the health effects of pneumonic plague and the 
current number of deaths (1,408).  
Examples of participants’ written responses: 
Get me out of London! How can I get back to Wales without the train? If I stay 
at home for 4 days then I could get my folks to come and pick me up. After 4 
days with no symptoms I should be ok. [Participant 1, Group 1 – Finance] 
 
These are large no's of cases and it is probably spreading now from infected 
people to others. They are being very clear about the seriousness of the 
situation. [Participant 3, Group 8 – Health]  
 
Shocked by number of deaths. Concern that it will rise further through 
contamination. Anger. [Participant 5, Group 2 – Energy] 
 
Not go to work. Work from own place even if management are adamant we 
come in! My health is more important than my job. [Participant 7, Group 7 – 
Health] 
As with Stage 1, the analysis of the participants’ written responses revealed variation in their 
thoughts, feelings and actions. Overall, participants’ ‘first thoughts’ after reading the article 
revealed a higher level of concern with more emotion revealed than in the first stage. 
Participants were more likely to reference their need to stay at home and had more specific 






Stage 3: Social Media Inject (Day 16 of plague scenario):  
In the final stage of the focus groups, participants were presented with a social media feed 
containing a series of posts from social media users.  
Examples of participants’ written responses: 
Less of a panic now. People are being treated and it seems there's more 
control of the scenario.[Participant 2, Group 4 – Finance]  
Still wary. Will there be repeated attacks? [Participant 1, Group 3 – Energy] 
 
Concern that this is carrying on. Feels closer to home now, personalising the 
cases. Seems to be affecting all areas within society. [Participant 7, Group 5 - 
Finance] 
 
Nothing - go to work, help out with the situation and carry on with your daily 
routine.  [Participant 6, Group 7 – Health] 
 
As with the previous two stages, the written responses of the participants at Stage 3 revealed 
variation in thoughts, feelings and actions. Overall, there was much less concern than had been 
evident in the first two stages. Participants were, in general, relieved that the situation was 
getting less serious and that they could now carry on as normal with less perceived risk to their 
health. However, there were still participants whose ‘first thoughts’ revealed some concerns 
and sometimes these concerns were not subsequently voiced during the group discussions.  
 
Findings of the group discussions 
The following section presents the findings of the analysis from the group verbal discussions 
during the focus groups. The analysis revealed 15 over-arching themes that are used to drive 
this discussion: 
1. General reactions 
2. Concerns 
3. Behavioural responses  
4. Information needs 
5. Information sources 
6. Perceptions of social media in general 
7. Reactions to the social media posts 
8. Knowledge/perceptions of a plague outbreak  
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9. Perceptions of the official/media response 
10. General thoughts about going to work 
11. Barriers to going to work 
12. Facilitators/motivating factors for going to work 
13. Expected response from organisation  
14. Methods of organisational communication 
15. Who/what would make employees believe it was safe to return 
Each of these over-arching themes will be discussed in turn with supporting evidence from the 
relevant stages of the focus groups.  
 
Theme 1: General reactions 
At the first stage of the focus groups, the majority of participants across all the groups spoke of 
their anxiety and fear upon viewing the television news report, and a range of reactions were 
observed  from being ‘worried’ and ‘stressed’ to feelings of ‘panic’ and ‘dread’.  An initial 
reaction for some participants was to leave London, for example as two employees of a 
financial services organisation discussed: 
[5] I’d want to move back to Ireland straight away. I’d be gone. [3] Yeah, I’d 
think the same, how can I get back to Wales without going on the train. 
[Group 1 - Finance] 
By contrast, some participants expressed being underwhelmed by the news report. They 
believed that the situation did not sound that serious and suggested that it was probably being 
blown out of all proportion: 
[1] I didn’t get that ‘oh my God I’m going to die’ [feeling]. I didn’t get that at 
all. I just thought ‘ok there has been an attack, some people are sick, no one’s 
died’. It didn’t say anybody had died yet, there was no mass panic on there, 
and the media does tend to over-hype things so I would think that was so 
subdued that it probably wasn’t that bad. [Group 1 – Finance] 
At the second stage of the focus groups, participants consistently across the groups described 
the situation as being more serious now than it was at Stage 1. They often described feelings 
of ‘anxiousness’, ‘worry’ and ‘concern’, as well as using words such as ‘horrific’, ‘freaked-out’ 
and ‘panicking’. The main cause of the increased concern was the number of cases and 
particularly the number of deaths. Many participants went on to calculate the death or fatality 
rate as a percentage or fraction of the total number of cases and noted that this was very high: 
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[6] Horrified at the amount of innocent people that have died, it’s a lot. The 
numbers… it’s a warzone. [Group 2 – Energy] 
[7] I think I would be very concerned about the proportion of deaths; it seems 
to be over a fifth of people that have died. And the fact it keeps saying it is 
fatal for those who do not receive treatment in time, makes it sound like it 
isn’t if you are old or frail, but if you don’t get the antibiotics you are going to 
die. [Group 5 – Finance] 
A small number of participants said they would be relatively calm if they had not experienced 
any symptoms. However the majority of participants expressed feeling more anxious after 
finding out that pneumonic plague was fatal for those who did not receive treatment.  
Overall, participants’ discussions during Stage 3 revealed a perception that the situation was 
becoming less serious now and that the response must have been successful: 
[2] The end is beginning to be in sight. It’s all slowing down a bit. [6] Not as 
concerned as I was. Seems to be running its course. [Group 2 - Energy] 
Certain posts on the social media feed caused some participants to worry or made others feel 
annoyed because they did not trust social media. There was an assumption in a few groups 
that the public must be under-informed to be asking questions on social media and this made 
some participants angry.  
 
Theme 2: Concerns 
Initially, participants in all groups spoke of their concerns that they may have been at the 
station themselves or that they may have been in contact with someone else who had. The risk 
to family and friends was a frequently mentioned concern. Some participants were worried for 
the safety of those they knew who may have been near the station or worried about the risk of 
themselves infecting their loved ones, as one participant described: 
[3] I think I’d be worried that there was still a chance that I could have it, 
because if I was on that train is there a chance I could still have symptoms? 
And should I stay away from my children because could I be giving it to them? 
[Group 2 – Energy] 
 Those with children were particularly worried about the risk to them, specifically with regards 
to them going to school. Similarly, some participants mentioned having elderly or vulnerable 
adults at home who they could also put in danger. Some of the groups expressed concern 
about having been at the office for the last three days, which may have resulted in contact 
 199 
 
with colleagues who had been through Victoria station on the release day. For example, one 
participant reminded another less concerned colleague of that issue: 
[3] I don’t think I would be stressed by it all. Being so far from it, with the 
family nowhere near it as well. [1] But you come here…where people from 
Victoria would have come. [Group 4 – Finance] 
Many groups spoke of their worry that there might be a secondary attack, that could either be 
a follow-up attack by the same people or a copycat attack and this was usually discussed in 
relation to using public transport to get to work.  
Concerns were generally heightened at Stage 2, with participants being more worried about 
getting ill and needing treatment. They were concerned that they may be ill already but not 
yet showing symptoms, as one participant explained:  
[7] And with the whole incubation period, but maybe I just don’t know about 
it yet because cases are still being confirmed? So, I’d be feeling very anxious 
and worried. [Group 5 – Finance]  
Frequently mentioned concerns were that there might be insufficient supplies of antibiotics for 
everyone who might need treatment and that the mass-treatment centres might already be at 
full capacity. Participants were increasingly concerned about their families and some said they 
would want to get antibiotics for their loved ones as soon as possible, even if they were not ill. 
They were also worried about having already passed the infection on to their families because 
they had been at home for the last few days and they might not have known that they had it 
themselves. The reluctance to use public transport was even more evident in Stage 2; however 
participants were now more worried about catching the plague from a fellow passenger than 
they were about a secondary attack, as one participant described: 
[2] …. I mean having a bomb on a train is one thing, but this is a bomb on 
every train potentially, if you’ve got a [fellow commuter] infected. And 
travelling in London at rush hour is dreadful. [Group 8 – Health] 
The risk of a secondary attack did still remain a concern for some participants who were 
concerned about a follow up attack because the perpetrators had not yet been caught. This 
concern was also evident amongst some participants during Stage 3 and in one group 
participants also mentioned still being concerned about catching the plague from fellow 
passengers, for example: 
[5] I wouldn’t want to use [public transport]… just because the cases that 
have arisen have resulted from public transport. So yeah, I wouldn’t be using 
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it.… [7] I guess you get copycat people, it could be done again. But I think I’d 
mainly be scared of catching it from someone. [Group 3 – Energy] 
Although there were fewer concerns discussed during the final stage of the focus groups, in 
two groups participants wondered if there were enough antibiotics for everyone and were still 
concerned about the mass-treatment centres being overrun by this point in the scenario.  
Participants also discussed the potential societal impacts of the incident in all of the groups. In 
general it was assumed that there would be widespread disruption caused by an event of this 
scale, with empty supermarkets, rioting and looting, transport disruption and ‘mass hysteria’ 
mentioned. For example, one participant in a finance group said:  
[7] Because I would imagine you would have mass hysteria. Supermarkets 
now would be completely empty. [Group 1 – Finance] 
 
Theme 3: Behavioural responses 
At the first stage of the scenario participants discussed the mass-treatment centres and the 
discussions revealed some scepticism and reluctance to follow the official advice and attend a 
centre. Although there were participants in most groups who said they would go, others were 
hesitant and said they would wait for more information or wait to see if they would start 
experiencing symptoms. The main reason for not wanting to attend a mass-treatment centre 
was that it would increase their chances of catching the plague if they did not have it already. 
When asked if they would attend a mass-treatment centre as per the advice in the news report 
participants answered: 
[7] Probably not actually. You’re probably more like to catch it there than 
anywhere else. [1] Well that’s true actually. [Group 2 – Energy] 
[7] I think I would probably be a bit sceptical about it, [because of] the number 
of people and whether you were more likely to come into contact with it, and 
you know, you’re sort of throwing yourself back out there again. [Group 3 – 
Energy]  
Across the groups participants spoke of their intention to contact others after finding out 
about the plague outbreak. This included calling friends and families to reassure or to check on 
them or calling colleagues who might have more information. A minority mentioned 
contacting their GPs either for advice or to try and get an appointment; however others 
disagreed with this idea.  
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Participants discussed the perceived dangers of using public transport, with some saying they 
would avoid major train stations for fear of another attack and others saying they would 
change their route to avoid Victoria station, as this participant explained: 
[1] Because of where I live I would probably still avoid Victoria station just to 
be on the safe side…I guess it wouldn’t be much extra effort for me to say get 
a tube to Vauxhall and walk the rest of the way. Another ten minutes on my 
journey, just to avoid Victoria, because there could be another device hidden 
there that’s going to go off. [Group 7 – Health] 
The only times participants spoke about wanting to use public transport were when they were 
discussing using it to leave London to go and stay elsewhere.  
A number of participants across all groups said that they intended to isolate themselves at 
home so that they did not catch the plague from other people outside the home. However, 
there was also a desire to get antibiotics somehow before they isolated themselves. Some 
participants said they would prefer to get the antibiotics delivered to their home (as they had 
during the swine flu pandemic).  
There was an increased desire a Stage 2, when compared to Stage 1, to ‘get checked out’ or to 
receive prophylaxis treatment. However, participants did not want to attend a mass-treatment 
centre and wanted antibiotics sent to their home. Again, participants wanted to source 
antibiotics as a preventative measure for themselves and their families, to take ‘just in case’, 
for example as one group discussed: 
5: Yes I...I as I said I would want them even if no one is symptomatic at this 
stage, I would want [my children] to have antibiotics as well, I would be 
worried not only for me to have the disease but to take it home. 3: But even 
when you’re fine? So you’re fine but you would give your child antibiotics? 5: 
Yes, by this stage and looking at the figures I would be worried. [Group 7 – 
Health] 
There was no difference in the desire to get antibiotics as a precautionary measure between 
the groups from the health sector and the other groups, even though it was acknowledged 
that it might be going against the advice of their employer.  
Participants often mentioned influencing the behaviour of their family members, either by 




[4] I certainly wouldn’t be sending them to school or nursery. [5] No. [4] It’d 
be rife there…. [4] I’d just want them to be enclosed as much as possible, 
they’re not going out to parks, they’re not going to soft play. [Group 2 – 
Energy] 
[7] Well one of [my children] works for [same employer] so he wouldn’t be 
coming in. And my daughter’s a teacher, so she wouldn’t be going anywhere 
near the little oiks. No they would stay away. I’d pull them all back to my 
house and stay there. [Group 1 – Finance] 
 [7]….if I didn’t think I had come into contact with it and I thought I could help 
then I would. But I wouldn’t let my husband, he would have to stay at home. 
Does that make sense? [Group 8 – Health] 
 There were parents who made the decision to keep their children off school only at Stage 2 of 
the scenario and who said they would have been fine to let their children go to school at Stage 
1.  
At Stage 3, fewer participants spoke about their behavioural responses, most likely because 
there was a perception things were getting back to normal. However one participant 
mentioned still avoiding public transport after 16 days, even when a vaccine was offered as an 
incentive: 
[7] I’d prefer them to give me the vaccine at home…I’d prefer not to travel on the 
train, if the trains were running. [Group 1 – Finance] 
In addition, two participants discussed how they would try to get antibiotics from an 
alternative location to the treatment centres or local NHS. For example, one suggested leaving 
London to go and visit a doctor: 
[1] We’ve got shortages here [points to inject], so there would be people 
migrating from that part to other parts. Rather than going to your local doctor 
you’d go out into the country. [Group 1 – Finance] 
 
Theme 4: Information needs 
Participants were asked if there was any information they still required after viewing the 
television news report. All groups discussed their need for more information as it was felt that 
the report was significantly lacking in specific details about pneumonic plague and practical 
information they could act on. For example: 
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[5] I’d want information on protection rather than cure, how can you protect 
yourself from catching it rather than about getting treatment if you actually 
have it. [2] Yeah exactly, how exactly is it transmitted and how do you stop 
that. [Group 1 - Finance] 
[7] And if there’s like an incubation period where you can say ok I’ll just stay in 
one room. Just other practical things so that people aren’t running out there if 
they’re infected. [Group 3 – Energy] 
In general, participants wanted information about what symptoms they should be looking out 
for, the duration of the incubation period and how easily plague was transmitted from person 
to person. Specifically participants wanted to know how they could protect themselves from 
catching it or avoid passing it on to significant others and whether or not it was possible to 
catch it from someone who was not yet showing symptoms. Participants also wanted to know 
about the effectiveness of antibiotics, whether or not antibiotics could protect an individual 
from catching the infection and if it was possible to catch the plague a second time after being 
treated. A few groups wanted to know what they should be doing and wanted more 
information about the mass-treatment centres. They also wanted to know if they should be 
going to their GP/A&E to get antibiotics and if they should be wearing masks. Other 
participants wondered if certain vulnerable groups were more susceptible to catching 
pneumonic plague or if they would experience more severe symptoms. A few groups 
expressed a need to find out how far the outbreak had spread so far, how many people were 
affected and the current location of the people who had caught it at the station.  
During Stage 2 of the scenario, many of the questions participants had in Stage 1 had been 
answered by the second inject, the news website article. However, participants still required 
more detailed information about how pneumonic plague was transmitted. For example, one 
participant wanted to know if it was safe to kiss people or to shake hands with them, and 
another queried whether plague would stay on people’s clothing. Other participants wanted to 
know if children were more susceptible to catching plague and if they would experience more 
severe symptoms. They also wondered if it was worse for people who did not have a good 
general level of health. There were still questions related to the use of antibiotics, as one 
participant queried: 
 [5]….can antibiotics prevent it as well as cure it? If you take the antibiotics 
does that give you some degree of resistance to it…. [Group 2 – Energy] 
Participants in a few groups also wanted to know about the course of the illness; for example, 
after developing symptoms how long would it be until people died. They also queried if they 
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could wait until they experienced symptoms before they went to a mass-treatment centre or if 
that would be leaving it too late.  
 
Theme 5: Information sources 
After viewing the news report on the television, participants were asked what sources they 
would use to get more detailed information. All groups mentioned using the internet for this; 
more specifically by typing ‘pneumonic plague’ into Google , searching Wikipedia and using 
news websites such as the BBC. Others would look at the NHS website and some said they 
would call NHS Direct. In the health sector groups the CDC website was also mentioned as a 
good source of information. Watching ‘24 hour rolling news’ and television news channels in 
general were discussed and one group suggested that local radio might be useful for local 
information. Two groups mentioned seeking out Government communications and that the 
Government may set up a new website containing information and updates about the 
situation.  
All groups reported a lack of trust in certain information or information sources and 
specifically, the lack of information in the television news broadcast made participants 
suspicious. Some participants felt that information was being withheld from them on purpose 
and that maybe the situation was more serious than reported, as one employee of an energy 
sector organisation explained: 
[2] They didn’t actually say how many casualties there were, they avoided it 
completely, it didn’t give rough estimates. So it might actually be more 
worrying than the [media] are leading you to believe because some of the 
facts are not there. [Group 2 – Energy] 
The BBC was mentioned as a trusted source, as was the NHS and Public Health England. 
However, some participants said they did not trust the doctor depicted in the report (named 
as Dr Ron Bowen from the Health Protection Agency) and did not feel confident in what he 
was saying. There was a perception among some groups that different news agencies may 
report differently. For example, the Daily Mail and Fox News were believed to cause panic as a 
result of the media’s perceived tendency to ‘over-hype’ stories. Social media was mentioned 
as a useful way to find out the opinions of the general population and also a way of checking 
on friends and family. However, there were also issues raised about the inaccuracy of social 
media as a source of information, with some participants reporting that it could be a source of 
‘hysteria’ and ‘panic’.  
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Theme 6: Perceptions of social media in general 
The general feeling of the majority of participants in the groups was that they did not trust 
social media. Firstly, participants thought that people can be prone to exaggeration when they 
are posting on social media. Secondly, they were concerned that people who simply do not 
know anything about a situation or topic will post something inaccurate. However, despite not 
trusting social media and thinking most of it was ‘rubbish’, there were a few participants in the 
groups who said that they would still look at it anyway. Particularly it was felt that it was useful 
to look at it during fast moving emergencies because you can see photos from people at the 
scene or see the general trends of public opinion. One participant said they knew it was not to 
be trusted but that it would be hard not to be affected by it: 
[7] I do think as well that although you know it isn’t to be trusted, it’s quite 
hard to look at all of that and be like ‘meh, these people must be over-
reacting’. I think it almost personalises some of the cases, you start to think 
‘oh this is affecting people’, and assuming that you might know some of the 
people if it’s on your social media feed. So that might start to breed a bit of 
concern even if it is hysteria and scaremongering. [Group 5 – Finance] 
Some participants said they were more likely to trust a social media post if it was posted by 
someone they knew on their friends’ list than if it was by complete strangers. However, it 
should be noted that often ‘friends’ on a social media friends’ list are not close acquaintances. 
One participant commented that they would be inclined to believe things that their friends 
posted because although they might not trust the media’s portrayal of a situation, it would be 
different if it was someone they knew posting about their own personal experiences.  
 
Theme 7: Reactions to the social media posts 
Despite the majority of participants indicating they did not trust social media and that most of 
the posts were just ‘panic mongering’ and by ‘idiots’, there were a number of participants who 
appeared to be affected by the posts in the inject presented during Stage 3. These participants 
noted that they would be likely to use social media during a real incident. 
The first post in the social media inject was a photo depicting what participants were asked to 
imagine was the outside of their office. In front of the building was a man being put into an 
ambulance and the post stated that he had been ‘coughing everywhere’. A small number of 
participants were affected by this, saying they would be worried about it if it was at their 
organisation or if a friend posted it: 
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[4] I think there would be a lot of people posting stuff on social media, 
including pictures, I expect there would be a load of pictures. I would probably 
be inclined to believe it, especially if my friends posted a picture of someone at 
work. I think that’s when it starts to become real doesn’t it. [Group 8 – Health] 
 One participant said it might make her worried that it was happening all over again and 
another said: 
[5] If they’re trying to get us all to come back into work, then it’s not the best 
advert for it. [Group 8 – Health] 
A different participant commented that they would be angry that someone had gone to work 
with symptoms and another said that if the photo was genuine it would mean nobody would 
come into the office after seeing it: 
[2] But if this first post was actually at work, I don’t think there would be 
anybody in the building after that. Because there’s no way that the company 
is going to say ‘yeah don’t worry about that, come on in anyway’. Unless 
there was a massive doctors’ surgery set up where they had vaccines or 
antibiotics ready for people to come in. [Group 1 – Finance]  
In contrast, other participants questioned whether the photo was genuine and suggested it 
might not even be from that day or it could be someone having a heart attack. A few 
participants said they would want confirmation from their organisation if this had genuinely 
happened and one participant said their employer would want to respond to the photo to 
reassure staff that their risk had not increased. 
 The social media inject also contained a post in which a user was complaining that people 
were not getting treated. After reading this, one participant queried why people were not 
getting treated as this was irresponsible. Furthermore, the post from a parent wondering 
whether it was safe to send her child back to school reinforced doubt in one participant:  
[4] Well I think the concern is about these people who are still unsure about 
when it’s safe to do things like go back to school. So you’d probably be 
wondering about when it is safe to go back to work. [Group 4 – Finance]  
Other participants were influenced by the post about mass-treatment centres being high-risk 
areas. When discussing the possibility of their employer providing vaccinations on site, two 
participants said: 
[2] Especially if you don’t have to go to that treatment centre that sounds like 
everybody’s coughing and spluttering everywhere. [1] Germ pool, isn’t it. 
[Group 2 – Energy] 
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There was also a comment from one participant that although they were able to think 
rationally about it all during a hypothetical scenario, in a real incident they would be more 
likely to be influenced by social media.  
 
Theme 8: Knowledge/perceptions of a plague outbreak 
Participants in all groups reported low levels of knowledge about pneumonic plague. However, 
some participants from health organisations in groups 7 and 8 had slightly higher levels of 
knowledge about infectious diseases in general. For example, in group 7 there was a discussion 
about whether colleagues who had been at the station would have been infectious in the last 
three days or whether they had to be showing symptoms to be infectious: 
[3] I don’t know for pneumonic plague, but I mean usually after exposure 
you’re not necessarily infectious. I don’t know if you have to be symptomatic 
to be infectious. [5] I would have thought yes, but sometimes you don’t. [3] 
But I know for measles you don’t have to be. You can give other people 
measles before you get itchy. [2] 14 days isn’t it, incubation for measles? 
[Group 7 - Health] 
Due to the low levels of knowledge about pneumonic plague specifically, participants in all 
groups discussed their previous experiences of influenza pandemics, particularly swine flu. 
Some participants assumed this pneumonic plague outbreak was going to be similar to a flu 
pandemic. For example some participants believed that elderly people would react more 
severely to the disease: 
[4] I would probably be more concerned for elderly family members and 
neighbours, who are more likely to react more severely to it. [Group 6 – 
Government] 
Other participants misunderstood the news report, that said that the plague was spread by 
coughing and sneezing and assumed that it was a mild illness with flu-like symptoms. They then 
filled in the gaps in the information with their own knowledge and perceptions, for example: 
[1]It does seem odd that you’ve got a terrorist attack and yet your symptoms 
are fairly mild, coughing and sneezing. [5] Well they are trying to figure out 
how serious it is. If it’s just coughing and whatever then it’s not such a big 
deal. [4] I thought it just said it was spread by coughing and sneezing, which is 
why I said there wasn’t much information about how the symptoms 
developed. I mean plague might start off like that but it certainly doesn’t stay 
like that. [Group 4 – Finance] 
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There were misconceptions about some of the scientific details of a pneumonic plague 
outbreak, for example that no individuals would have an incubation period of longer than 4 
days. Furthermore, one participant from a health sector organisation was convinced that 
people with good immune systems would not be at risk of catching it: 
[2] If you have a good immune system, then even if you come into contact 
with the person who’s infected then you will not get the disease. But we 
should look whether they have any vulnerable adults or children living with 
the families, are they being affected at all? So if you have a good immune 
system then you can get through it without getting plague.  [Group 7 – 
Health] 
Most participants appeared to assume that after receiving prophylaxis treatment they would 
no longer be at risk of catching plague again for a second time.  
A further assumption raised in two group discussions was that the outbreak would only affect 
London and would not spread as far as the countryside after five days: 
[3] Again with where we live it’s out in the sticks, so it’s unlikely the school 
would be closed, and the teachers all live locally, it’s a very small school. 
[Moderator] So you are assuming this has stayed in London?  [3] Yes. [Group 
4 – Finance].  
 
Theme 9: Perceptions of the official/media response 
There was a general lack of trust evident across all the group discussions with regards to the 
official advice to ‘carry on as normal’ featured in the television news broadcast. Participants 
often felt that there was a motive or agenda to the Government wanting the public to carry on 
as normal and others did not trust the HPA spokesperson featured in the news report: 
[6] But it didn’t sound to me like it was under control. I didn’t trust the guy 
from the HPA saying you should carry on as normal. It would be nice to be 
able to carry on as normal and I understand you have to give the impression 
of things not affecting you, but surely practically…. [7] That’s what I’m 
saying… I’m surprised that would come from someone like that. Someone 
from the Government or the police would be saying carry on as normal, not 
someone from a health authority. [6] Yeah that seems strange. [Group 1 – 
Finance] 
[7] [The media’s] approach would be ‘everyone’s going to die blah blah blah’ 
and you need to give it a balanced view. That is propaganda almost, saying 
calm down don’t worry about it. The cynic in me would say that they’re not 
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telling you the whole truth. [5] Yeah who would you trust, what can you trust? 
[Group 1 – Finance] 
Despite the official message encouraging them to carry on as normal, many participants said 
they would not be doing this following the broadcast. One group discussed the fact that the 
official advice during bad weather is to only travel if you have to, therefore it was felt that the 
Government were downplaying the plague outbreak too much which would cause suspicion. In 
contrast, some participants wondered if the media were overhyping the situation and that it 
would turn out to be not that serious. One group discussed their views on this: 
[1] I don’t have a lot of faith in the media and the Government to tell us 
exactly what’s going on. [3] I agree. [4] Well they don’t want to cause panic 
do they. [1] They don’t want to cause panic. [3] But they do also over-
dramatise. [Group 4 – Finance] 
Furthermore, some participants reported feeling reassured by the fact the reporter was not 
wearing PPE standing next to Victoria station and by how calm Dr Ron Bowen appeared. 
Others suggested that the response of the authorities suggested they were expecting the 
situation to get worse: 
[1] You know, if they’re setting [treatment centres] up on MOD land they must 
be expecting it to overspill from the hospitals. [Group 4 – Finance] 
The report mentioned that there were ‘100 people in Kent alone’ who had pneumonic plague, 
which was often misunderstood to be 100 cases in total and did not seem that serious to some 
participants.  
Although participants were happy to receive more information during the second stage of the 
scenario, some participants recognised that people’s behaviour before the full information is 
released could have serious consequences, as one explained to the rest of the group: 
[1] You know what we’re like, we all procrastinate until it’s too late. You…. in 
the first report before anybody died…you were all talking about ‘well as long 
as my family haven’t got it then I’ll just carry on like normal and think it’s 
going to be fine, let’s just wait and see what happens’. How do you know 1400 
people didn’t say ‘let’s see what happens?’ [Group 4 – Finance]  
Participants across several groups were still annoyed at the advice to carry on as normal, 
particularly as the situation was perceived to be more serious than at Stage 1, and this was 
seen as irresponsible: 
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[3] I’m actually a bit annoyed at the advice to carry on as normal because you 
think that’s just spreading the disease potentially, so why are they giving us 
this advice? [Group 2 – Energy] 
The message in the news website article of ‘it’s fatal for those who do not receive treatment in 
time’ shocked participants; however, it was also seen as useful information because it would 
encourage people to seek treatment.  
 
Theme 10: General thoughts about going to work 
There were mixed views among participants about whether or not they would go to work the 
day after seeing the televised news broadcast. Some participants said they would go to work 
as the situation did not seem serious enough to warrant staying at home. Others reported that 
they would go to work because they did not feel at risk. For example, one participant said: 
[5] I wouldn’t be too worried, I take the bus and I don’t usually enter the train 
station. [Group 7 - Health] 
Other participants said they would go to work unless they were specifically told to stay at 
home and would contact their employer first to find out what they should be doing. In spite of 
this, the majority of participants across all groups displayed a reluctance to go to work, with 
many saying they would rather work from home. Some participants also said they would not 
go to work but that they would not be able to work from home either as their job was 
something that could not be done at home. A number of participants said that work would not 
be their priority after seeing that news report. Furthermore, the majority of groups failed to 
discuss the subject of whether or not they would go to work unless specifically prompted by 
the moderator. The subsequent discussions among participants revealed their personal risk 
assessments, weighing up whether or not it was safe enough for them to consider going to 
work. For example, as one health sector group discussed: 
[1] I would want to look at every journey and say what’s the risk, and is it 
worth me taking that risk…. [2] I think it depends on your own opinion of 
what’s important. There’s a line that you will draw yourself as to what you 
would and wouldn’t do for work. If in your own mind your employer’s asking 
you to do something, to come into work, and you felt there’s no way I’m going 
to do that because the risk is too great, and you wouldn’t do it, simple as that. 
[3] I would feel I would have to come into work for the first couple of days to 
help out. [Group 8 – Health] 
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However, the majority of participants did not seem to be facing a dilemma between their 
personal risk and their professional duty; the decision of whether or not they would go to work 
was quickly made and appeared instinctive. Very few participants changed their minds during 
the group discussions in Stage 1 or Stage 2. For example, as two employees of a Financial 
Services organisation discussed: 
[5] Work would be the last thing on my list. I wouldn’t log on, I wouldn’t check 
to see what they are asking for, I probably wouldn’t even care, because it’s a 
job at the end of the day, my life is at risk. I wouldn’t really care. [7] And that 
would be the approach for the vast majority of us I think. [Group 1 – Finance] 
 Although many participants justified their decisions not to go to work with the fact they could 
just work from home, at least a quarter of these participants said that they might have left 
something in the office that they needed to be able to work remotely, for example their 
laptop.  
During the second stage of the scenario there was an increased reluctance to work and the 
majority of participants said they would not go in to the office. However, there were a minority 
of participants (mostly in the government and health sector groups) who said they would 
report to work if they were asked to go in and were protected by their employer.  
Some participants expected that contractors might be needed in order to keep the 
infrastructure running and that there might be an expectation for them to report to work:  
[3] ….everything we’ve had so far is ‘carry on as normal’, so there could be 
potential, certainly for some of the contract employees, for their employers to 
have a slightly different view [on the issue of losing their jobs if they didn’t 
come in. [5] Ah, they would probably come in. [3] Yeah they would probably 
come in. I’m a contractor, but there would be certain companies, you know 
restaurant, IT, if the news information is that employees carry on as normal 
then the expectation for them would be to carry on as normal. [1] You would 
have to have the infrastructure working. [Group 4 – Finance] 
There were similar discussions around the expectations of critical workers to report to work 
and one group discussed whether or not they expected them to do this. Participants were 
also aware that providing a back-up site would not remove the risk in such a widespread 
incident. There was a dilemma indicated by some participants who felt that they may feel 
pressured to go in, but they might also be worried about the risk to themselves or others. 
One participant said that they might need to fight their corner in this sort of situation and 
insist on working from home.   
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In the final stage of the focus groups there was a general increase in willingness to go back to 
work, due to a perception that the situation was less serious now: 
[6] Not as concerned as I was. Seems to be running its course. [Group 2 – 
Energy] 
 However, some participants said that they would still be at home at this stage.  
[2] Personally for me it would be my own peace of mind, that would be the big 
thing keeping me at home. Until I felt confident enough in what was going on, 
and what the news reports were saying. So that would be my feeling, to stay 
at home. [Group 3 – Energy] 
There was still a general feeling across the groups that it was up to the individual employee 
whether or not they would go into work; they would want to know the organisation’s 
expectations but they also wanted them to take into account people’s personal circumstances.  
 
Theme 11: Barriers to going to work 
Overall, the main barriers revealed by participants were concern about the risk to their own 
health and concern about the risk to their significant others’ health. The concern for their own 
health was related to their fear of catching pneumonic plague from other commuters on their 
way to work and also catching it from colleagues, as one participant explained:  
[5] I’d think about obviously a lot of colleagues go into and out of that station, 
so in terms of going into the office, I’d be a bit uncertain about that. [Group 3 
– Energy] 
 There were also worries about a potential secondary attack on public transport or in the area 
near their workplace, which was seen as a reason not to go to work.   
Participants discussed the potential need to look after children or other family members if they 
were sick. Parents also mentioned wanting to keep their children off school, meaning they 
would have to stay at home to look after their children. For example, one participant 
commented: 
[4] I think I’d be more worried about my children. It wouldn’t necessarily be 
about me coming into work, it would be about putting my children into school, 
because I’ve got no idea where the other parents were the day before, the 
week before. So that would cause childcare issues, which could cause issues 
getting to work. [Group 2 – Energy]   
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Others assumed the schools would be closed in this sort of scenario so they would have no 
choice but to stay at home and not go to work. Several participants said that family would 
come first in a situation like this.  
Another barrier that came up in discussions was not having an important role in a crisis or just 
generally and it was also perceived by some that employers would not care about their normal 
work in this scenario. They thought it would be better to stay out the way as they would not be 
able to help, as one participant explained: 
[3] I would stay home mainly because I know where we work, that nobody 
would care about the policies I worked on for a few days, because everybody 
would be more interested in responding to this crisis. So therefore I wouldn’t 
feel like I could help at all so I would stay at home.… [Group 6 – Government]. 
There were more discussions about the barriers participants might face when deciding 
whether or not to go to work at Stage 2 than at Stage 1, which was indicative of the situation 
getting worse. The perception that the situation was serious was related to participants’ 
decisions not to go to work.  The main barriers continued to be related to a fear for themselves 
and a fear for others. Participants across a number of groups indicated that their health would 
come first before their job. Some participants described a personal risk assessment they would 
do, and if they felt the risk to their health was too great they would not go in.  
As with Stage 1, there were worries about using public transport to commute to and from 
work because of the risk of catching plague from other commuters. Some participants were 
increasingly concerned about infected passengers sneezing or coughing on them or that they 
might touch communal railings. They were also concerned about the sheer number of people 
they could be exposed to on their daily commute. The second most prominent barrier 
discussed was the concern about loved ones, and participants were mainly worried about 
catching something at work or during their commute and then going home and passing this on 
to their families, as one explained: 
[1] If work asked me to come in…because I’m adamantly against it, but it’s 
more for personal reasons. I know that if I caught anything and went home, 
my dad has a really low immune system and I don’t want to pass that on, that 
would just be terrible. So I would tell work, and I would be quite adamant 
about it, I would expect them to understand. [Group 6 – Government] 
There was also a concern that if they had elderly parents or grandparents then there might be 
a feeling that they should stay home and look after them, a decision that had a level of guilt 
associated with it. 
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Being sent to a back-up site or alternative office location was suggested as a possible option 
the organisation might put forward; however, participants across the groups said this would 
not affect their decision to come into work or not. The reasons were because it still involved 
going on public transport, sometimes further than their normal office, or the situation could be 
even worse in the alternative location. Similarly, some participants said they would not want 
to expose themselves to people from a different office or they thought people in the 
alternative office would not want them turning up there if they were coming from a higher risk 
area.  
Another barrier to coming into the office mentioned by quite a few groups was the fact that 
they could do their jobs at home (provided they had the equipment and connection), so when 
doing their personal risk assessment they decided it was not worth putting themselves at any 
risk by coming into the office when they could complete their work in isolation at home, as 
one participant mentioned: 
[3] I think I would contact other people in my team, because for most of us 
there’s no reason why we couldn’t carry on working from home. So I don’t 
think I’d come in. [Group 3 – Energy] 
Participants were also more likely to say they would not come into the office if they felt their 
role was not important in a crisis. Other participants said that they were not that important in 
the chain of command at their organisation so they would not go in, but that people higher up 
would probably be expected to go to work.  
 
Theme 12: Facilitators/motivating factors for going to work 
In addition to the potential barriers faced by employees, there were various motivating factors 
that may increase their willingness to report to work. After viewing the initial news report, one 
of the primary reasons participants across the groups felt they were happy to go to work was 
because they did not perceive the situation as serious enough to warrant staying at home: 
 [5] I think I would still go into work, it hasn’t spread massively yet … Because 
if they’ve already contained it, it was found within a couple of hours, yeah my 
train line doesn’t go through Victoria anyway so.… [Group 5 – Finance]  
A few participants (the majority from the Government and Health organisations) said they 
would go to work if they could do something to help with the response or recovery: 
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[1] Also if we were doing something that could help, we would feel obliged to 
come in and contribute to that. To be part of the solution rather than the 
problem. [Group 8 – Health] 
This was a trend seen across the other stages of the scenario, even once the situation had 
become much more serious. Some participants in the health groups discussed the fact that 
because their roles were related to public health and this was a public health crisis they would 
feel a duty to go to work. Amongst those who said they were willing to go to work, many 
wanted information about what the organisation would be doing to protect them and 
specifically access to medication or vaccination, as one participant explained:  
[7] Perhaps if they had something in place to make sure you were ok. Maybe if 
they tested you and treated you. Maybe some kind of monitoring system to 
make sure that you’re alright, then that could be like an incentive to go to 
work. [Group 8 – Health] 
 One participant in a health sector group said that they would come in in the early days of the 
response to do the lab work needed, but then once the important work had been done they 
would go home to look after their family. In general, participants in the Government and 
health groups displayed more willingness to work (if they could do something to help) than 
those in the finance and energy groups. 
During the second stage of the scenario, a few participants spoke about the need to do their 
job. This was either for financial reasons, because ‘life goes on’, or because they needed to be 
in the office to be able to do their jobs, for example: 
[2] The majority of us don’t have to come into the office to do our jobs. [4] It 
does help though. It does make things a lot easier.… [2] The work doesn’t 
stop, the work carries on. If you don’t do it today then it will be piled up for 
next week and the following week after. [Group 7 – Health] 
Similarly, a small number of participants mentioned considering the fact that there might be a 
financial impact on the business at that point. However, these participants were more likely to 
perceive the situation as less serious and the risk to their life as less severe.  
Participants across the groups consistently mentioned having access to antibiotics and 
discussed whether this was something their employer could provide. It was suggested by some 
that the office could become a treatment centre for employees to come in and get treated and 
that this would be an incentive to come in, particularly when people were reluctant to attend 
the mass-treatment centres or were worried about a shortage of NHS antibiotics, as discussed 
in one group: 
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[5] That would actually be an incentive to come into work instead of working 
from home, if they said we could cut you out of the public queue. [4] Yeah if 
they said you could get your antibiotics here. [1] If we could turn into a 
treatment centre for the staff, that would be ideal. [5] Yeah because then 
you’d just.… [1] You’d come to work and get treated as well, you’d be double 
secure. [Group 4 - Finance]  
In the Health sector groups, participants also mentioned that their employer could provide 
diagnostic testing (if it were possible for plague) to tell people whether they had the plague 
already, and that this would reassure people that others they were working with did not pose 
a risk. Participants across all the groups wanted their organisation to introduce preventative 
measures in the workplace to reduce the risk of the infection spreading between staff 
members. Interventions mentioned were: PPE, hand gels, encouraging hand washing and 
facemasks. Some participants also mentioned that they would be more likely to come into 
work if they were provided with accommodation so that they did not have to go home in the 
evenings and risk infecting their families, for example: 
[7] If things were really that bad I don’t think I would want to go home to 
spread it to my family, I would probably want a little room at work to stay 
over in, if you were really critical. I would want to stay here rather than risk 
spreading it. [Group 8 – Health] 
Not having to use public transport was also given as a potential motivating factor for going into 
the office. Similarly, the organisation providing assistance with transport or advice on the 
precautions they could take was considered a motivating factor. If asked to go to a back-up site 
or alternative location then some participants wanted reassurance that it was safe for them to 
go and information about what interventions were being provided at this new location. 
Several participants across the groups said they would want to be provided information on the 
number of cases in the teams because if they knew nobody at their usual location had the 
disease they would feel reassured enough to go in. One participant suggested that people 
could report into a central database to say if they had been infected or if they had been in 
contact with anyone who had, and this information could be shared in an anonymised form.  
 
Theme 13: Expected response from organisation  
The analysis revealed that employees had a number of expectations of their employer in the 
event of a pneumonic plague outbreak. The majority of participants across the groups 
assumed their employer would be in contact with them almost immediately if it were a serious 
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incident. They also expected regular updates throughout the incident with specific advice and 
guidance, which was seen as useful, as one participant commented: 
[4] .…the more you know, the more you are going to be willing to come to 
work and the more you are going to be willing to commute and move around. 
So I think it’s really important for the employer to give as much information as 
soon as possible. [Group 8 – Health] 
There was a need for clear, concise information about exactly what to do with regards to 
working from home and also reassurance. Participants expected their organisation to be taking 
this very seriously because it was a terrorist attack but also because of the number of deaths 
revealed at the second stage. There were mixed views among participants about what they 
thought their organisation would be saying to them in this scenario, with some expecting a 
‘carry on as normal unless you are ill’ message. However, the majority of participants believed 
their organisation would tell their employees to work from home unless they were considered 
‘business critical’ staff. This was only different in the groups from the health sector who 
believed they would be asked to come in to help with the response.  
There were discussions about what the organisation would do if an individual said they did not 
want to come in because they were worried about the situation. Some participants thought 
the organisation or individual line managers would be unsympathetic, whereas others said 
they did not think the organisation could or would do anything in that situation, as it was their 
personal choice whether or not to come in: 
[3] But they can’t say nobody come to work, they physically can’t say that. 
Just as they equally can’t say yeah you’ve all got to come to work. They can 
only guide in what you want to do, in this sort of situation. They can’t tell you 
what to do. [4] No. [3] They can only give you guidance, and it’s your choice at 
the end of the day whether you follow that guidance or whether you say no 
I’m staying at home. [Group 4 – Finance]  
Participants across the groups wanted information from their employer about the 
organisation’s long-term recovery plan or the plan for a situation where things could get 
worse. They wanted to know how the organisation was going to continue to provide its 
services and if there was a plan to get people back to work. Some participants said they 
expected their organisation had prepared for this type of incident and also would have a 
contingency plan if critical workers were not willing to go into the office. For those that might 
have left their laptops in the office, one participant made a suggestion: 
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[7] I don’t think anybody would come in to get anything, if push came to 
shove it could be couriered out to you so you could still work. [Group 1 – 
Finance] 
There was a view in many of the groups that their employer would be in a position to provide 
antibiotics or vaccinations to their staff and there were discussions surrounding whether 
critical workers would get these first. As previously mentioned, some participants thought that 
the organisation would set up a treatment centre in the office or a treatment stand at an 
alternative location where members of staff could go and get antibiotics. However, some 
participants wanted these to be delivered to their houses so they did not have to put 
themselves at risk by going outside. Participants’ expectations were sometimes related to past 
experience of flu vaccinations or their employer purchasing antivirals: 
[5] I would think that [organisation’s name] would actually have sorted 
something out. Because as permanent employees we have healthcare, we 
have health cover on our benefits, so I hope they would’ve sorted something 
out so that we could go there instead of going to the public NHS. [4] They 
could give antibiotics. [5] Yeah something like that. [1] They did flu shots. [5] 
So maybe someone coming round the building and giving us the equivalent of 
a flu shot or something. [Group 4 – Finance]   
Furthermore, one group discussed how their employer probably already had quantities of 
antibiotics in storage for use in a scenario like this one.  
[2] A bank I think could get [antibiotics]. [7] I think you’ll find they’ve probably 
already got them. [3] Maybe they’ve already got them yeah. [Group 1 – 
Finance] 
At the final stage of the scenario much of the discussion was related to what an employer 
would do if the staff members had pneumonic plague. There was a general assumption across 
the groups that if an employee came into the office showing symptoms of plague that they 
would be sent home. Some participants were unsure about how exactly this would happen, 
but were sure it would. One participant thought it was likely that peer pressure would force 
the sick employee home before the organisation had them removed and, similarly, another 
participant said they would still be wary that colleagues could have pneumonic plague: 
[7] You would definitely be on edge of anyone coughing anywhere near you in 




Participants in a few groups said they would want to know what procedures their employer 
had in place to deal with staff members who were sick, for example contact-tracing, 
quarantining individuals or sending them for treatment. 
 
Theme 14: Methods of organisational communication 
Participants were asked how their organisation would communicate with them during this 
type of incident. Most groups mentioned expecting emails or texts from their employer or 
having a staff information telephone line they could call to see if they were expected to come 
to work. Most expected a mass-broadcast of information at this stage rather than targeted 
communication: 
[1] There would be an email but it would also have phone numbers in it as well. 
There’s a business continuity line and all sorts of things like that so that would 
have all the latest updates on what to do, and who to go to, and where to go to 
find more information. [Group 3 – Energy] 
[2] I would expect probably a text alert or an email at least. [Group 5 – Finance]  
In the Government group, the participants said they would expect an email telling them what 
was expected of them or for information to be put on the staff intranet. However, they also 
acknowledged that they might not have their laptops with them and were unsure if their 
employer had their personal contact details to be able to contact them in this sort of situation, 
as one employee explained: 
[4] Yeah I’d just go on the gov.uk website, and I’d call the line, we’ve been 
given a number of emergencies. But yeah I think in terms of email, I don’t 
think they’ve got my personal email and always keep my laptop at work and 
don’t have a work Blackberry, so they wouldn’t be able to contact me directly, 
I think I would have to look for the information. [Group 6 – Government] 
 
Theme 15: Who/what would make employees believe it was safe to return 
If a message was sent to staff telling them it was safe to return to the office, then participants 
across the groups expected to hear this from a range of sources. Some expected it to come 
from the CEO, others a group wide text, some wanted to hear it from someone senior and 
then also someone in their team that they knew personally (i.e. their line manager). If a line 
manager was the person telling them it was safe to go to work then participants said they 
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wanted to see how this message had been passed down from the CEO, as two groups 
discussed: 
[4] I would want to hear from someone fairly senior. But then I would also 
want to hear it from someone in our team, because you’d think if they are too 
senior then they might be saying official lines that are maybe not so accurate. 
So I would also want someone who was low down enough that you know they 
wouldn’t lie to you. I’d want both. [7] If the person who told me I needed to 
come to work was my line manager, and it was because they had been told 
through a chain of command, and if I could see the chain of command and I 
could understand how that had been passed through, and knew the message I 
was receiving was an accurate one… then yeah I would want to hear it from 
my line manager. [Group 6 – Government].  
[6] I don’t mind how it’s transmitted, but I want it to have credibility. So it 
needs to come from the top, even if it’s transmitted by my boss, I need to 
know it’s not him deciding, that it’s come from a higher level. [Group 1 – 
Finance] 
It was important to some participants that the person who told them it was safe to go to work 
was someone they knew. This was because this individual would have to tell them which 
specific tasks would be working on if they did go in, so they could judge the importance of 
these tasks and if it was worth the risk of them travelling into the office. Although some 
participants said they would want to see managers in the office before they went in, others 
said this would not affect their decision. Participants in one of the energy groups and both 
health groups suggested that they would be relatively trusting of what their organisation 
would tell them because they believed their employers to be very safety conscious, as one 
Energy group discussed: 
[7] ….in terms of my employer I would be reasonably trusting of what they 
told me in this case. [3] I think they would be unlikely to put out a message 
saying you must come into work. It would be quite the opposite. They’re quite 
risk averse. [2] Yeah. [1] Yeah. [3] They’re more likely to say stay at home 
because you don’t want to infect the entire workforce. [Group 2 – Energy] 
If they were told go into the office, participants often wanted to be given specific reasons for 
this and for the organisation to explain how they were putting their safety first, as one 
employee explained: 
[7] And if they did want us to come into work, that they gave us really good 
reasons, and throughout the whole process were putting our safety first. If at 
any point I felt that they were asking me to come in and didn’t have a 
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particularly good reason, and weren’t necessarily putting my safety first then I 
would definitely not come in.[Group 6 – Government]  
Some other participants said they would question the motivation of an organisation that asked 
its employees to go to work during such a serious incident and would wonder whether they 
were putting business above the safety of staff. Participants in one group discussed how 
annoyed they would be with a ‘come to work if you think you can’ message and felt that this 
was irresponsible. There was a general requirement for a good communication system to 
make sure staff have up-to-date information on which to base their decision and one 
participant said that the more confident they felt in the system the more likely they would be 
to come in.  
Discussion 
 
This focus group study has revealed that employees are likely to be reluctant to report to work 
in the event of a deliberate release of pneumonic plague due to a variety of potential barriers. 
However, several motivating factors that could encourage staff to report to work were also 
identified. At Stage 1 of the scenario there were mixed views about going to work, usually 
related to the perceived seriousness of the situation. The willingness of employees to go to 
work then reduced at Stage 2, when the full gravity of the situation was revealed and the 
number of confirmed cases and deaths was in the thousands. During Stage 3, participants’ 
willingness to report to work increased when the numbers of cases had reduced and the 
situation was perceived to be more under control.  
Across all focus groups, participants described the fear and anxiety they would feel during a 
pneumonic plague release. It is unsurprising that participants experienced fear during this 
scenario as past research into public risk perception has discussed the incidents the public fear 
most as ones that are unfamiliar, have serious consequences, have delayed effects, are 
uncontrollable and cause feelings of ‘dread’.593 594 595 A deliberate pneumonic plague release 
would score highly on all these qualitative attributes. The fear amongst participants was 
evident even before the information in the scenario revealed that the disease was fatal if not 
treated, and then increased significantly once that fact was known. This finding is similar to 
that of Glik et al., who reported that in their focus groups, after the first presentation of the 
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botulism scenario, a range of emotional responses were voiced by participants such as fear, 
anxiety and distress.596  When the scenario worsened and the participants were given more 
information, it was reported that their fear appeared to intensify and the information was 
deemed inadequate.  
This perception of a lack of information was also evident in this focus group study, particularly 
at Stage 1 where the lack of information caused significant levels of distrust among 
participants and led to them questioning the potential reasons (or ‘agenda’) for the 
Government withholding information. Rogers et al. recommend that when not yet in 
possession of all the facts, it is better for authorities to communicate that they do not have all 
the information and to say ‘I don’t know’, than to provide false reassurances.597 Organisations 
should therefore send out a holding statement in the event of a serious incident. The 
statement should say that an incident has occurred, that the organisation does not have all the 
facts at this time, however the response protocol of the organisation has been initiated and an 
update will be sent to employees as soon as more information is known.  
Past research has examined the potential behavioural responses of the public in the event of 
serious incidents such as those with a CBRN element. A study by Glik et al. reported findings 
from a series of focus groups examining public reactions to a hypothetical terrorist attack using 
botulinum toxin and discovered that the majority of participants said they would stock up on 
supplies such as food, water, and first aid supplies.598 This is a finding supported by the present 
focus group study, with some participants saying they would go to the supermarket to get food 
or that they would try to purchase protective masks. Glik et al. note that the implication of this 
behavioural response was that the participants in their study were preparing to stay in their 
homes by stocking up on these supplies. However, it is also conceivable that the participants 
were simply concerned about supplies running out, which is a possibility given the fact that 
some participants in the present study mentioned that they expected empty shelves in 
supermarkets due to ‘panic buying’ and also the potential for looting to take place.  Other 
participants in Glik et al.’s study said they would try to find a way to leave the area. Many said 
they would seek up-to-date information and others said they would contact family members 
to make sure they were safe. These are also findings supported by the present study, in which 
finding out information using the internet or contacting friends and family to check on their 
safety were top priorities immediately after hearing about the incident.  
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One of the most prominent concerns as the situation developed was for the health of the 
participants’ friends and families - their significant others. Participants often mentioned their 
need to make contact with their significant others, either to find out if they were safe and well 
or to reassure them with regards to their own state of health. Some also mentioned 
influencing the behaviour of other family members by encouraging them not to go to work or 
by keeping them away from school/nursery. Others mentioned staying at home to look after 
sick relatives or not going to work due to the risk of catching the plague themselves and going 
home and infecting their families. These findings provide support for Killian’s theory of ‘role 
conflict’ in disaster.599 Killian suggested that during a disaster, individuals would be faced with 
a conflict between their role in their family and their role in an organisation. Killian noted that 
in a disaster situation this conflict could be resolved in favour of loyalty to the family. This 
would explain the frequently discussed opinion in these focus groups that family would come 
before a job.  
The present study’s findings regarding the potential influence of significant others are also 
supported by previous research with healthcare workers, such as one study comparing nurses’ 
needs and concerns with hospital disaster plans following Hurricane Floyd in Florida.600 The 
most prominent concerns reported by nurses were family safety, pet care and personal safety 
while at work, followed by provision of basic needs such as food, water, sleep, shelter and rest. 
The fact that family safety came before the provision of food and water in people’s mind 
shows what a significant influence it is likely to be.  Furthermore, a focus group study of 
healthcare workers in the UK conducted by Ives et al. revealed that childcare could either be a 
barrier to ability or willingness.601  The authors discussed the idea that some employees might 
not be able to go to work during an influenza pandemic as they have to look after their 
children when there is no other childcare, whereas others might not be willing to go to work 
because they would choose to look after their children themselves rather than rely on others 
to do so for them. This is also more likely to be the case if their children were ill as a result of 
the incident as parents could decide they would feel too guilty if they went to work and left 
their sick child at home being looked after by others, and therefore would be unwilling to go to 
work.   
Due to these results, it is recommended that employers take into account this potential 
influence on their employees’ decisions regarding reporting to work. They may also need to 
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allow employees time during their working days to contact their significant others and let 
them know they are safe, or to enquire about the health of their children. If they cannot do 
this then they may not be able to focus on their work. Organisations could also consider 
implementing more flexible working from home arrangements during a serious incident and 
allow staff to work from home whilst taking care of sick family members. For infectious disease 
outbreaks it might be necessary to provide accommodation for essential staff who are 
required to come into the office, so that they do not have to worry about going home after 
work and spreading the infection to their children.  
The perceived importance of an employee’s role in the response of the organisation is 
something that the present study has revealed to be an influential factor on their willingness 
to report to work in the event of a deliberate release of pneumonic plague. This is a finding 
supported by previous research such as Balicer et al., who reported that a significant predictor 
of hospital workers’ willingness to respond to a radiological event was the perceived high 
impact of their individual response.602 Similarly, Goodhue et al. reported that the most 
significant factor predicting the willingness of paediatric nurse practitioners to respond in a 
disaster was having a specified role in the workplace disaster plan.603  In the present study’s 
focus groups, several employees in the health and Government groups expressed a sense of 
duty. Some participants, particularly in the health groups, discussed the fact that they would 
be expected to come to work during a public health incident; something that was not 
discussed in the finance and energy groups (with the exception of one participant). This is a 
finding supported by Ives et al.’s focus group study of healthcare workers, which reported that 
participants discussed a sense of professional obligation to work during difficult or even 
dangerous situations.604 The researchers noted that this was especially prominent amongst 
doctors and less so amongst nurses and ancillary staff. Therefore, the specific role of an 
employee is likely have an influence on willingness as well as the sector.  
Ives et al. also found that participants often spoke of a ‘duty to help’, and that this was 
sometimes because they perceived themselves to have specific skills making them more useful 
than others, meaning they would  have a special responsibility where others might not.605  
These findings may provide some explanation for the results of the written questions given to 
participants at the beginning of the focus groups which revealed that the percentage of 
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employees willing to report to work in the event of a deliberate release of pneumonic plague 
varied by sector; with 57% of health sector employees, 43% of Government employees, 23% of 
energy employees and just 5% of financial services employees reporting being willing to work. 
Therefore, it is possible that perceived importance of an individual’s role, or the role their 
organisation has in the response, may be mediating factors on the influence of national 
infrastructure sector on employees’ willingness to report to work during an extreme event.  
The findings of this study also provide some support for Witte’s Extended Parallel Process 
Model (EPPM), a model which previous academic researchers have found to be useful in 
understanding how healthcare providers’ perceptions of threat and efficacy may influence 
their willingness to work during an influenza pandemic.606 607 608 609 The model suggests that 
when individuals perceive a threat they assess the ‘perceived severity’, which is their belief 
about the seriousness of the threat and the ‘perceived susceptibility’, which is their belief 
about their own chances of experiencing the threat.610  The efficacy part of the model is 
separated into ‘perceived response efficacy’, which is the individual’s belief as to whether the 
response can prevent the threat, and ‘perceived self-efficacy’, which is their belief in their own 
ability to perform the recommended response. The present study revealed that threat 
perception has an influence over employees’ willingness to work, as those employees who did 
not think that the pneumonic plague scenario was a very serious incident or who thought that 
they were not susceptible to it (for example if they did not use public transport to get to work) 
were more likely to be willing to report to work. With regards to response efficacy, those 
employees who felt that antibiotics were going to protect them from catching the plague or 
would successfully treat them and who thought that their employer could keep them safe 
were more willing to work.  
The influence of the self-efficacy component of the original EPPM was less obvious, as 
participants were often unsure where and how they would get antibiotics (from the NHS or 
their employer). However, none of the participants reported that they would be unable to take 
the medication if they were able to get hold of it. As in the web survey findings (reported in 
Chapter 3), a feature of efficacy not included in the original model but that was a clear finding 
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of the present study and of Barnett et al., was that employees’ perceived importance of their 
role either in response or recovery, and the feeling that they would come to work if they could 
do something to help, was an influence on their willingness to work.611 Similarly, Balicer et al. 
surveyed local public health workers in the US and their willingness to work during a pandemic 
and found that the most influential factor on their willingness was their perception of the 
importance of their role in the agency’s overall response.612   
An efficacy finding which is unique to the present study is that there was evidence amongst 
employees in the health and Government groups that their organisation needed to continue to 
function in order to help the country respond to and recover from this incident. This 
perception among employees who work in the health and Government sectors, that there 
were wider implications to staff reporting to work in terms of keeping the country running, is a 
new feature of the efficacy variable in the EPPM and as such warrants further investigation in 
future research studies (other suggestions for future research studies are presented in Chapter 
6). 
It was interesting to note that this acknowledgement of being part of national infrastructure 
and part of the country’s response to the outbreak was not evident at all in the finance groups. 
During these groups was no evidence of a perception that their organisations needed to 
continue to function so that the country’s financial transactions continued. The issue was 
raised in the energy groups, with regards to the need to ‘keep the lights on’; however this was 
discussed in relation to the requirement for other essential/critical members of staff to be at 
work, and did not appear to be an influence on their own willingness to report. Therefore, it is 
possible that this perception that the recovery of their organisation is important for the UK as 
a whole varies by sector and potentially, by role. As such, employees who work for national 
infrastructure organisations that would not be as visible in the response to a public health 
event may need to be told the importance of their organisation continuing to function during a 
serious incident, and how they as individuals can contribute to that by going to work.  
One of the key topics of discussion in the present study’s focus groups was the provision of 
information. This was related to both the information that would be required from the 
Government or public health organisations and the information and advice that would be 
expected from people’s employers. Specifically, accurate scientific health information 
containing facts and figures was required, containing details about symptoms, modes of 
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transmission, the effectiveness of medical treatment and the numbers of cases in specific 
regions. This is a finding supported by Wray and Jupka who conducted focus groups with the 
public to assess their information needs during a hypothetical plague attack.613 The study 
found that that the public wanted answers to very specific questions such as: how to detect 
exposure; how to seek treatment; the nature of the threat; and what protective steps they 
could take to prevent transmission. It is vital, therefore, that communication in an infectious 
disease outbreak contains very specific information and is published as soon as possible in 
order for the public to take the recommended protective actions and help prevent the onward 
transmission of the disease. This type of information is likely to be provided by Government 
public health officials.  
With regards to information from their employer, staff in the present study wanted advice 
about whether they should go to work or stay at home and information about how exactly 
their employer would be protecting them if they did go to work. As previously mentioned, 
information that was deemed to be inadequate was a significant concern for participants and 
this led to them turning to Google, 24 hour news channels or to social media in order to fill in 
the gaps. Additionally, the ‘carry on as normal’ message caused some individuals to question 
the agenda of the Government and made others angry. Rogers, Amlôt and Rubin’s focus group 
study revealed that the provision of information increased the intention of the public to 
comply with official advice and also increased the perceived credibility of the messages given 
out by authorities for a hypothetical terrorist attack involving a radiological dispersal device.614 
The authors also note, however, that simple reassurance may not increase compliance with 
official guidance. Therefore, it is vital that both the Government and employers provide as 
much information as possible and do not simply rely on reassurance or ‘keep calm and carry 
on’ type statements. In terms of who people will want to hear this information from, the 
present study revealed that employees wanted to hear from health experts, both internal and 
external to their organisations. This is a finding that does not solely apply to biological 
incidents, with one study reporting that the public wanted to receive information during a VX 
incident from content experts on chemical attacks or from a well-respected public figure.615  
A further finding of this focus group study is that participants’ lack of knowledge about 
pneumonic plague, misperceptions of the response or misconceptions related to the 
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information they received, led to inaccurate assumptions about the seriousness of the 
situation. During a real incident these inaccurate assumptions due to ineffective risk 
communication have the potential to lead to an over-response or an under-response on the 
part of employees, which could have serious consequences for the management of the 
incident.616 These misperceptions could also have an impact on employees’ decisions about 
reporting to work. For example, if employees perceive the incident to be less serious than it is, 
they may report to work and not take the recommended protective actions and thus risk 
further spreading an infection. If they perceive the incident to be more serious than it actually 
is they may refuse to report to work and organisations and UK national infrastructure may be 
severely impacted unnecessarily.  
For the pneumonic plague scenario used in this study, some participants were underwhelmed 
by the media report due to the fact they had not witnessed any ‘mass panic’; the spokesperson 
seemed very calm, no deaths had been reported, and the journalist was not wearing any PPE. 
These misperceptions led to some participants believing that the situation was being over-
hyped due to media scaremongering and as such they would not change their behaviour or go 
to a mass-treatment centre. These findings of a potential under-response caused by 
misperceptions are supported by Pearce et al., who in their study of public responses to a 
hypothetical RED incident, found that participants were falsely reassured by the response of 
the authorities because they believed they would be quarantined or there would be a larger 
police cordon area if there was really a risk of radiation.617 This assumption caused them to 
believe it was a ‘scare story’, which led to the majority of participants commenting that they 
would not change their behaviour.  
In contrast, some participants in the present study thought that because the media report was 
‘very calm’ and the Government advice was to ‘carry on as normal’, it therefore meant that the 
situation was in fact more serious than the report was suggesting. They believed that the 
Government wanted the public to carry on as normal simply because they did not want to 
cause widespread panic. These results show the importance of using effective risk 
communication to provide accurate information of the true seriousness of the situation, and to 
explain the reasons for any potential inconsistencies between the public’s perception of an 
incident and the actual response. This could help avoid a situation in which the under- or over-
response of the public causes unnecessary consequences, both for the incident response and 
for the recovery of organisations. Furthermore, Wray and Jupka, in their study of public 
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information needs to a hypothetical plague attack, recommend that government messages 
should reflect full disclosure and openness.618  
In addition to accurate communication, the provision of medication during an infectious 
disease outbreak (or other such incident requiring treatment or vaccination) was an 
intervention deemed to be important by many of the participants in the present study. A 
number of previous academic studies have found that being provided with vaccination, 
medication and/or protective equipment was associated with increased willingness to work 
rates.619 620 621 622 623 In one study this was defined as ‘preferential access to antiviral 
medication’, which when offered resulted in an increase in willingness to work scores.624  
Interestingly, in the present study this preferential access was something mentioned by 
participants as important and was often something that was expected. For example, some 
participants spoke of getting medication ahead of ‘the NHS queue’ through their company’s 
private medical insurance, and the health sector groups discussed the idea that they were 
essential workers and so could potentially get medication ahead of the public if they were 
required to come to work to help with the response. This study has been the first to reveal the 
extent of employees’ expectations of their employers’ medical response. Employers, therefore, 
need to be aware that their employees may expect medication, particularly if the organisation 
has provided flu vaccinations in the past. They should also be aware that this intervention that 
has the potential to increase the willingness of staff to come to work during a serious incident. 
In light of these findings, it is recommended that organisations consider the health 
interventions they could provide (e.g. treatment or vaccination), ensuring that these processes 
sit alongside current NHS or occupational health policies. More discussion about the possibility 
of providing medical interventions to employees can be found in Chapter 6.  
Lastly, this focus group study has revealed potential barriers to the willingness and ability of 
employees to make use of business continuity interventions provided by their employers. For 
example, staff may not be able to work from home in the event of a serious incident because 
they might have left their remote access technology in the office the previous day. 
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Furthermore, due to the perceived risk of catching pneumonic plague on public transport, 
those participants who had left their laptops or remote access tokens in the office were 
unwilling to travel to the office to collect them. These findings are not only unique to this 
study, but they also provide evidence of an issue that could cause significant disruption to 
businesses that would need their employees to be able to continue working from home during 
a denial of access event. Therefore, it is vital that organisations include this issue in their 
contingency plans. As mentioned by one participant, employers could look into the possibility 
of using a courier service to deliver the necessary equipment to employees at their homes. 
Similarly, although (as discussed in Chapter 3) organisations may provide an alternative 
location for employees to work, such as a backup office, participants in this study revealed 
they may not be willing to travel to these alternative sites. Therefore, in addition to developing 
interventions that focus on facilitating the ability of staff to report to work, organisations 
should consider situations where staff may be unwilling to use these. More discussion of these 
recommendations can be found in Chapter 6.  
 
Methodological limitations  
One possible limitation of the present study was that the sample was an opportunistic sample 
and the participants were recruited through gatekeepers at their organisations. It is possible 
that a certain type of individual, perhaps those who are more willing and helpful in nature, or 
conversely, those who wanted to avoid doing their normal work, would want to participate in 
a focus group. It is, therefore, possible that the views and experiences of these participants are 
not representative of the population of employees that were the focus of this study. Another 
potential limitation to focus group research is that participants might not all get a chance to 
speak during the session. However, in the present study participants were encouraged to 
provide their initial views individually on response sheets, and the focus group moderator 
encouraged all participants to respond by asking them individually for further comment or by 
asking them if they agreed or disagreed with other participants’ opinion.  
As with any research involving self-report data there is always a risk that participants are not 
being honest and in this study this could have occurred because people were participating 
alongside their colleagues. However, to help minimise this problem participants’ line managers 
were not present in the same group as their employees and participants for each group were 
drawn from a range of departments within the organisations. Participants were also told that 
anything they said during the group would be confidential and their employer would not be 
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told. It is likely that these steps successfully created a ‘safe environment’ within which 
participants could express their views, as at least one person in each group was very vocal 
about the fact that they would definitely not be going to work, which encouraged others to 
voice their opinions, either agreeing or disagreeing with that decision. A related limitation to 
using focus groups is that opinions can be polarised during group discussion by the presence of 
strong opinions in the group. However, in addition to the moderator managing the group 
discussion, a way of helping to avoid this problem was by getting the participants to write 
down their first thoughts prior to the group discussion, making them less likely to vocalise a 
different view to the one they had just written down. Where participants did change their 
views because of others’ opinions, this provides important evidence of the effect that group 
discussions can have on attitudes, something that can also occur in real life.  
Conclusions 
 
The present study has been the first of its kind to conduct focus groups with employees of 
different national infrastructure sectors in order to assess staff reactions to a CBRN incident. It 
has also been the first of its kind to assess the influence of a social media inject on employee 
concerns and likely behaviour. The research study has gained important insights into 
employees’ likely concerns, behavioural intentions, information needs and expectations of 
their employer during a serious incident such as a pneumonic plague release, which may also 
apply to any major public health event.  
Overall the findings have revealed that employees are likely to be concerned about the risk to 
their health and the health of their significant others by going to work in the event of an 
infectious disease outbreak, particularly one that has the potential to be fatal. These concerns 
could influence their behavioural responses and may result in them refusing to report to work. 
The study has also revealed that in the event of a serious incident such as a deliberate release 
of an infectious disease, employees would expect a great deal from their employer in terms of 
accurate scientific information and practical advice and also in terms of medication and 
hygiene interventions. The study has also revealed that ensuring employees feel that they are 
doing something to help and that they are part of the overall response of a national 




This study has highlighted the need for organisations to take into account likely staff concerns 
and needs during an incident involving a CBRN risk such as contagion or contamination, as well 
as employees’ expectations of their employer such as communication or medical 
interventions. Organisations should include the issues identified in this study in their business 
continuity planning but should also take time to speak to their own members of staff to discuss 
their specific needs.  
The findings from these focus groups, along with the findings of the web survey (Chapter 4) 
and systematic literature review (Chapter 2), have been compared to the assumptions of 
resilience professionals revealed in the interview study (Chapter 3) and these discussions are 
presented in the final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6). The findings from the present study 
have also contributed to the development of a series of recommendations for employers of 
potential strategies that could promote resilience in their workforce and prevent absenteeism 




















Extreme events such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and infectious disease outbreaks 
have the potential to cause serious disruption to national infrastructure organisations in the 
UK. The failure of staff to report to work can seriously undermine the ability of the 
organisations, and the UK as a whole, to respond to, and recover from serious incidents. CBRN 
incidents create unique challenges in light of their potential to cause widespread and long-
term disruption. This is especially true when a contagious element or contamination is 
involved. A significant amount of research has examined public reactions to CBRN terrorist 
attacks.625 626 627 628 However, less is known about the likely responses of employees to these 
types of incidents. Although research examining the willingness and ability of healthcare 
workers to report to work during an extreme event has been conducted, little is known about 
employee levels of willingness and ability to report to work across for employees of other 
sectors of national infrastructure. As a result, the research presented in this thesis has 
provided much needed evidence regarding the likely concerns, behavioural responses and 
information needs of employees of national infrastructure organisations in the UK during CBRN 
terrorist attacks. It has also compared the assumptions of resilience professionals with the 
likely responses of staff, whilst examining the expectations staff have of their employer during 
a crisis. These findings have been used to inform the understanding of, and at times, challenge 
the academic framing of behavioural responses to extreme events. These findings have also 
been used to develop a series of practical recommendations for national infrastructure 
organisations. Organisational recommendations are as follows:  
1. Plan for high-impact, low-probability scenarios such as CBRN terrorist attacks. 
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2. Do not assume that all staff who are able to report to work during a serious incident 
(such as a CBRN terrorist attack) will also be willing to do so. 
3. Take time to find out what concerns staff may have during extreme events and identify 
any barriers they may face. Include staff needs and likely behaviour in exercises and 
planning.   
4. Understand the influence of an employee’s ‘significant others’ on their behavioural 
responses during an extreme event and develop strategies that are inclusive of both 
the employee and their family. 
5. Communicate with staff the importance of their role during an incident. Communicate 
with staff the importance of the organisation to national infrastructure.  
6. Develop interventions that focus on facilitating the ability of staff to report to work, 
but also consider situations where staff may be unwilling to use these.   
7. Facilitate organisational identification. 
8. Consider appropriate information sources for staff during an incident and advise staff 
on the use of these. This includes consideration of who is the best person at the 
organisation to communicate with staff.  
9. Provide accurate, scientific information to staff that emphasises the organisation’s 
focus on health and safety and how they are protecting their staff. 
10. Provide interventions to facilitate the willingness of staff to report to work, particularly 
medical treatment.  
11. Focus on practical support and facilitating natural social cohesion, rather than relying 
on unsupported psychological interventions. 
These recommendations, along with their links to academic theory, will be covered in greater 
detail later in this chapter. Before doing so, an overview of the aims and methodology will be 
presented.  
Overview of the Research 
 
The overarching aims of this thesis were to: 
 Identify the assumptions that business continuity managers and business continuity 
plans make about employees’ likely behaviour during, and in the aftermath of, a 
serious incident, including those involving CBRN hazards. This aim was achieved 
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through the analysis of 21 semi-structured interviews conducted with resilience 
professionals of national infrastructure organisations. 
 Assess the willingness and ability of employees to report to work in the event of a 
range of hypothetical incidents, including CBRN terrorist attacks. This aim was 
achieved primarily through the use of a web survey with 321 employees of any 
industry.  
 Examine the barriers and facilitators (both practical and psychological) that could 
influence employees’ decisions about whether or not to report to work, along with 
identifying employee information needs and expectations of their employers’ response 
during the incident. These aims were achieved through the web survey and a series of 
eight scenario-based focus groups with employees of national infrastructure 
organisations.  
In addition to the primary data collection activities, the relevant psychological theories were 
examined in order to ground the research in established academic theory (Chapter 1) and a 
systematic literature review identified 65 relevant peer-reviewed academic research papers 
(Chapter 2).  
The three studies (interviews, survey and focus groups) were analysed separately and a full 
description of the findings, and detailed discussions of the implications of those findings, can 
be found in the relevant chapters. This final chapter will synthesise the empirical findings from 
all the studies in order to form the overall research conclusions. These conclusions take the 
form of a series of practical recommendations for organisations. These recommendations have 
been informed by the findings of the primary data collection (Chapters 3-5), the systematic 
review of previous peer-reviewed literature (Chapter 2) and grounded in the relevant 
academic theories presented in Chapter 1. Therefore, each recommendation is discussed 
alongside links to the supporting evidence and theoretical frameworks.  
Unique Contributions to Knowledge 
 
The findings of this research have provided a number of unique contributions to our 
understanding of likely employee responses to extreme events, capable of:  
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(i) Challenging the assumptions made by resilience professionals from UK national 
infrastructure organisations about the likely behaviour and practical/psychological 
needs of staff during high-impact, low-likelihood events, such as CBRN terrorist attacks. 
(ii) Informing the existing literature concerning the organisational, psychological and 
demographic factors that predict the willingness of staff to report to work during a 
range of hypothetical scenarios. 
(iii) Demonstrating the importance of an organisation’s practical interventions and 
communication strategies for motivating staff to return to work in the event of a 
serious incident. 
The research has been the first to apply several theories to the topic of staff willingness to work 
during extreme events. Specifically, the author drew upon risk perception theory, risk 
communication theory, role conflict theory, organisational identification and job satisfaction. It 
is also the first study to apply the EPPM framework to employees other than healthcare 
workers and by using additional scenarios to pandemic, such as incidents involving CBRN 
hazards. These theories have been used to inform the recommendations for organisations 
presented in the next section.  
The systematic literature review (Chapter 2) was the first literature review to include non-
healthcare workers and identified many more studies (65 peer-reviewed research articles) 
than the previous two reviews (which reviewed 8 studies and 27 studies).629 630 The review 
confirmed the findings of previous reviews that a range of factors could potentially influence 
an employee’s decision about whether or not to work in the event of an extreme event. 
Several gaps in the research literature were identified, including: (i) the need to apply the 
concept of willingness to work to sectors of national infrastructure other than health; (ii) the 
need to apply academic theory to the concept; and (iii) the need to compare the likely 
behaviour of staff of national infrastructure organisations to the assumptions of the decision-
makers, the business continuity managers. 
The interview study presented in Chapter 3 was the first of its kind and as such all the findings 
of the study are novel. The outcomes of the interviews indicate that resilience professionals 
are making various assumptions about the likely behaviour of their staff and are in general 
focusing more on the ability of their staff to report to work, than the willingness of their staff. 
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Resilience professionals at national infrastructure organisations differ in their opinions of 
whether or not it is an employer’s responsibility to help or encourage its staff to report to 
work. Further, the interview study found that national infrastructure organisations do not 
generally include staff concerns in their exercises, nor do they invite staff from different levels 
of the organisation to participate in exercises in order to raise awareness of the organisation’s 
response, or to discover their likely concerns and barriers to reporting to work.  
A further unique finding of the interview study was that resilience professionals of national 
infrastructure organisations generally do not communicate to staff the importance of their role 
in an incident, nor do they communicate the fact that the organisation is part of UK national 
infrastructure. Finally, this study has been the first to examine the perceptions of resilience 
professionals with regards to what information their staff would want to receive from their 
employer during an extreme event and who would be the most trusted communicator of that 
information. The findings revealed a lack of knowledge about the content of the information 
staff would require during an incident, and assumptions were made about who staff would be 
most likely to trust in an incident.  
The employee web survey presented in Chapter 4 examined a number of unique predictors of 
willingness to work for a range of different scenarios, using a sample which was not solely 
employees of the health sector or essential workers. Measures from organisational psychology 
such as organisational identification and job satisfaction were applied to the topic for the first 
time. Similarly, the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) was used to examine the 
willingness to work of non-healthcare workers for incidents other than pandemic influenza.631 
This confirmed the findings of previous research in a novel study sample.632 The findings 
revealed new associations between a number of predictor variables (e.g. organisational 
identification, job satisfaction and business continuity roles) and the willingness of employees 
to report to work for a range of hypothetical scenarios, as well as confirming the findings of 
previous research (e.g. the association between perceptions of health and safety and self- and 
response-efficacy and willingness to work).  Furthermore, the web survey findings have 
provided support for a modified version of the EPPM. Specifically the results have confirmed 
that staff perceptions related to efficacy (i.e. the importance of their role and the role of their 
organisation) have a stronger influence on their willingness to report to work during a serious 
incident than their threat perceptions.  
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A further unique contribution to the existing literature was the focus groups study. It was the 
first to use focus groups with employees of different national infrastructure sectors to 
investigate staff reactions to a CBRN terrorist attack. It has also been the first to assess the 
influence of a social media inject on employee concerns and likely behaviour during an 
incident. The study has revealed important insights into employees’ likely concerns, 
behavioural intentions, information needs and expectations of their employer during a serious 
incident such as a pneumonic plague release. These findings support the findings of previous 
research in this area. Employees are likely to be concerned about the risk to their health and 
their families’ health by going to work in the event of an infectious disease outbreak. This will 
be particularly apparent for diseases that have the potential to be fatal with human-to-human 
transmission. Consequently, these concerns could result in staff refusing to report to work.  
The focus group study found that employees would expect a great deal from their employer 
during an extreme event in terms of accurate scientific information and practical advice. They 
would also expect numerous interventions, including those of a medical nature. This is the first 
time that these findings have been reported outside of the health sector. The study has also 
revealed a key finding that could be very useful for national infrastructure organisations: 
ensuring staff feel that they have an important role, and that they understand the wider 
implications of their organisation’s recovery for UK national infrastructure, could encourage 
them to report to work in the event of a serious incident. This finding provides further support 
for the EPPM and is consistent with the findings of previous research.633  These potential links 
between the findings of this research and previous academic studies and theoretical 
frameworks are revisited in greater detail throughout the rest of this chapter.  
Key Novel Findings: 
 Staff willingness to work in the event of a serious incident does not appear to be a 
front of mind concern for the majority of the resilience professionals involved in this 
research. 
 Resilience professionals have different opinions about whether or not to prepare for 
high-impact, low-probability events such as CBRN terrorist attacks. 
 Staff concerns are not often included in business continuity exercises and only a small 
minority of resilience professionals had spoken to staff about their likely behaviour or 
concerns, or included staff without a specific business continuity management role in 
their exercises.  
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 Some key national infrastructure organisations would provide psychological 
interventions to employees in the aftermath of a serious incident, usually in the form 
of trauma counselling, and based on the advice of their private healthcare provider. 
 Resilience professionals make various assumptions about the behaviour of their staff 
during a serious incident; for example, that they will report to work if they are able to, 
and, with regards to communicating with staff, what and who staff will trust.  
 Staff willingness to work is potentially associated with factors such as organisational 
identification, job satisfaction, having a business continuity role, receiving business 
continuity training and believing that their organisation continuing to function would 
make a big difference to keeping the country running.  
 Employees from a variety of sectors wish to receive medical treatment at their 
organisation in the event of a bioterrorist attack and this is considered a motivating 
factor for reporting to work.  
 Even if staff have access to flexible working arrangements (remote access technology 
and alternative work locations) it does not mean they would be able and willing to 
make use of them.  
 Some staff will use social media in an incident and be affected by what they see on it, 
even though they may acknowledge it is not a trusted source of information.  
Key Recommendations for Organisations 
 
This section presents a series of recommendations for national infrastructure organisations 
based on the findings of this thesis. These recommendations are discussed in relation to the 
results of the primary data collection of this PhD research, supported by the findings of past 
academic studies and grounded in psychological theory. They are grouped by whether they are 
strategies that should: i) be put in place before an incident; ii) be put in place before an 
incident but may also need to be emphasised/adjusted during an incident; or iii)  take place 






Recommendations for strategies that should be put in place BEFORE an incident:  
 
Recommendation 1: Plan for high-impact, low-probability scenarios such as CBRN terrorist 
attacks. 
Although considered low-probability events, CBRN terrorist attacks could cause significant loss 
of life and also widespread disruption due to the complicated nature of recovery.634 However, 
this research has revealed that many resilience professionals from national infrastructure 
organisations are reluctant to plan for these types of incidents. Some interviewees mentioned 
only planning for CBRN incidents when they directly affected their own infrastructure (i.e. 
when the supply of a water company is deliberately contaminated). Due to a general 
preference for impact-based planning over scenario planning, a number of interviewees 
discussed the fact they would not be concerned what the cause of an incident was, caring only 
about the impacts on the business.  
The findings of this research, however, have revealed that the type of incident could play a 
significant role in staff behavioural responses during an extreme event. Specifically, the web 
survey revealed that employees are likely to be less willing to report to work during an incident 
involving a CBRN hazard, than one without. This conclusion is supported by findings of the 
systematic literature review (Chapter 2), which revealed that healthcare workers were less 
willing to report to work for incidents involving the threat of contamination or a contagious 
element, than one without. For example,  Adams and Berry found that healthcare personnel in 
the US were most willing to report to work in the event of an explosion (93.0%) or a winter 
weather event (92.8%) and least willing to report to work during a SARS outbreak (74.6%) or a 
radiologic event (69.1%).635 This provides support for risk perception theory, specifically that 
less familiar, more complex incidents (in terms of the hazards involved) such as CBRN terrorism 
are potentially more fear-inducing than natural disasters or explosions.636 637  
In light of these findings it is recommended that organisations treat CBRN incidents differently 
to conventional or natural incidents in their planning. They should consider the potential for 
their staff to react differently to CBRN terrorist attacks, due the increased concerns related to 
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these unfamiliar incidents. Specifically, employees are likely to be concerned about threat to 
their health, as well as being concerned that they could infect or contaminate their significant 
others. Therefore, it is recommended that organisations use CBRN scenarios in their business 
continuity exercises. In particular, they should use scenarios involving a contagious or 
contamination element that could last longer than a week or two and affect multiple areas of 
the UK at the same time. It would also be useful to consider scenarios where there is no actual 
risk, but the public inaccurately perceive a risk to their health. For example, in the aftermath of 
a dirty bomb incident, radiation levels may be below the official safe levels; however staff 
could still be concerned about suffering negative health consequences as a result of travelling 
through the area affected by the original incident. Using these types of scenarios in exercises, 
involving staff from all levels of an organisation, will allow organisations to design and test 
interventions targeted at reducing employees’ concerns about the health risks of reporting to 
work. 
 
Recommendation 2: Do not assume that all staff who are able to report to work during a 
serious incident (such as a CBRN terrorist attack) will also be willing to do so. 
The findings of the interview study revealed that many organisations assumed that their staff 
will report to work during an extreme event, such as a CBRN incident. Often this assumption 
was based on conventional wisdom, or experience of their staff reporting to work during a past 
incident that was less serious or not a CBRN event (i.e. during swine flu or the 7/7 London 
bombings). However, the web survey and focus group studies found that not all staff who are 
able to go to work during an extreme event will necessarily be willing to do so. For example, in 
the web survey, although 41% of employees said they would be able to go to work during an 
incident involving a deliberate release of smallpox, only 29% said they would be willing to go to 
work. This finding is supported by previous academic research identified in the systematic 
literature review (Chapter 2). For example, a US study of essential workers including hospital 
staff, police and fire officers found that although 80% reported they would be able to report to 
work in a pandemic, only 65% said they would be willing to do so.638 Related to this, 
organisations need to factor into their planning the potential for their staff to be experiencing 
functionally-impairing mental health symptoms in the aftermath of an incident. These 
symptoms of distress and anxiety may prevent some staff from being able or willing to report 
                                                          
638
 Gershon et al., ‘Factors Associated with the Ability and Willingness of Essential Workers’. 
 242 
 
to work. It could also mean that the staff who do decide to report to work may be unable to 
function once they get there.  
The implications of these findings are that organisations may be caught out during a CBRN 
incident if they have not planned for significant numbers of staff to be absent, or not 
functioning, and due to this, their ability to recover from the incident could be seriously 
undermined.  
In addition to the possibility that business continuity managers are basing their expectations of 
staff on conventional wisdom, it is also possible that their beliefs are due to differing 
perceptions of risk. Past research has discussed the idea that experts and the public assess risk 
in different ways. Whereas the public base their risk perceptions on feelings or ‘affect’, experts 
analyse the risks in the world around them using logic, reason and scientific deliberation.639 
These contrasting methods for assessing risk could also provide an explanation for the web 
survey finding that individuals with a business continuity role were significantly more likely to 
report being willing to work during an extreme event than those without such a role. It is 
possible, therefore, that business continuity managers are making assumptions about staff 
behaviour based on their own perceptions of risk. This could potentially lead to rates of 
absenteeism being underestimated in business continuity planning. 
During the UK financial sector market-wide exercise in 2006, participant organisations 
reported no significant problems with 25% of their staff absent during a pandemic, but noted 
that this would change if the rate increased much more.640 The present survey study revealed 
that organisations should prepare for staff absenteeism rates higher than 25%, particularly for 
CBRN incidents. During the 2009 UK financial sector market-wide exercise, absenteeism rates 
from 25% to around 70% were tested for a two day severe weather scenario.641 Although most 
organisations coped well, it was noted that they were relying on remote working capability, 
cross-training and bringing in staff from other areas of the business. In light of the findings of 
the present study, it would appear these organisations are making a potentially inaccurate 
assumption that other staff would be willing to report to work to cover the absent employees’ 
work. Therefore, it is vital that in addition to planning for how absent employees’ work would 
be completed by other staff members, organisations should also focus on developing 
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strategies that will facilitate the willingness and ability of absent employees to return to work. 
It is unhelpful to assume that an individual who is absent from work cannot be motivated to 
return.  
 
Recommendation 3: Take time to find out what concerns staff may have during extreme 
events and identify any barriers they may face. Include staff needs and likely behaviour in 
exercises and planning.   
Staff are likely to have a range of concerns and needs during an extreme event. The results of 
the interview study suggest that many national infrastructure organisations in the UK do not 
currently include staff concerns in their planning or exercises. The findings also revealed that, 
in general, organisations do not allow employees who are below executive level or do not have 
a specific crisis management role to participate in exercises. The implication of this is that 
assumptions are made on behalf of the majority of staff about their likely responses during 
extreme events. The findings of this research have revealed that, during an extreme event, 
staff are likely to be faced by numerous practical and psychological barriers to reporting to 
work. For example, in the focus groups employees discussed a range of concerns they would 
have about reporting to work in the event of a deliberate release of pneumonic plague. These 
concerns were primarily related to the risk to their health and the health of their significant 
others. Similarly, the web survey revealed that staff thought they would face a number of 
barriers to reporting to work, such as transport problems, lack of knowledge about the 
incident, stress/anxiety and childcare responsibilities. However, it should be noted that the 
sample contained a low number of respondents with children, and, as such, the results about 
childcare should be generalised with caution and the issue needs to be researched in greater 
detail. Nonetheless, the survey findings provide evidence of the variety of different barriers 
that could influence an employee’s willingness and ability to report to work during an extreme 
event.  
Similarly, the findings of the systematic literature review (Chapter 2) revealed that the barriers 
found in the present research have also been identified in previous academic studies. For 
example, Qureshi et al. found that the most frequently cited reasons for healthcare workers 
being unwilling or unable to report to work during a catastrophic incident were: fear and 
concern for self and family; transportation issues; and childcare.642 The interview study 
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(Chapter 3) revealed that although organisations had often considered interventions related to 
employees’ ability to report to work (i.e. transport and childcare), they were less likely to have 
considered strategies to increase their willingness (i.e. related to their concerns for their health 
or their families’ health). In light of this, it is recommended that organisations take time to find 
out the potential concerns of their staff for specific scenarios, particularly ones more complex 
and long-lasting in terms of the health impact, such as CBRN terrorist attacks.  
One way of finding out this information from staff would be to invite staff from all levels of an 
organisation to participate in exercises. In these exercises staff could be asked about their 
likely behavioural responses, concerns and information needs during an extreme event. This 
staff involvement could also take the form of staff discussion/focus groups, with specific 
scenarios used to ground the discussions in a sense of reality. Once organisations are aware of 
the likely responses, concerns and needs of their staff, they can then design exercises that 
stress test the recovery of the organisation against situations in which staff are unwilling or 
unable to report to work. Furthermore, it could also be useful to include an HR representative 
in the exercises, as they are likely to have a greater understanding of the policies and 
procedures that specifically affect staff during a crisis, such as absence policies.  
It is important for organisations to consider the costs and benefits of including non-BCM staff 
in exercises. The costs of such activities are going to be dependent on the size of the 
organisation and the type of exercise being conducted. However, little is known about the 
relative effectiveness of different types of exercises, i.e. table top, command-post or field, and 
whether the scenario materials or injects affect perceptions of reality or learning. There is 
some evidence to suggest that disaster drills can be effective at increasing hospital employees’ 
familiarity with disaster procedures, identifying potential problems and giving staff the 
opportunity to put into practice lessons learned during real disaster response.643 Disaster drills 
and simulations have also been shown to be useful in community preparedness for 
earthquakes.644 Therefore it is possible that including staff in well-designed exercises could be 
of benefit to both the organisation and its staff. However, more research needs to take place 
to confirm whether this holds true with staff from organisations in sectors other than 
healthcare and to ascertain whether less-costly alternatives to field or live play exercises, such 
as table top exercises or simulations, can be as effective a training tool.  
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Recommendations for strategies that should be put in place BEFORE an incident, but may also 
need to be emphasised or adjusted DURING an incident:  
 
Recommendation 4: Understand the influence of an employee’s significant others on their 
behavioural responses during an extreme event and develop strategies that are inclusive of 
both the employee and their family.  
The interview study revealed that although many resilience professionals had considered that 
an employee’s ability to go to work during an extreme event could be influenced by their 
significant others, fewer resilience professionals had considered this issue in terms of 
willingness to go to work. Furthermore, only a minority of resilience professionals said their 
organisation might be able to provide childcare. Others clearly stated that it was not the 
organisation’s responsibility to help with this. However, the survey and focus group studies 
revealed that the issues surrounding the significant others of staff members cannot be 
ignored. The web survey study found that concern for significant others’ health or safety was a 
frequently cited barrier to reporting to work during a serious incident. Similarly, although not 
many focus group participants had children, the ones that did mentioned keeping them off 
school/nursery. In addition, some participants mentioned that they might influence other 
adults such as spouses and adult children to stay away from work. Many participants were 
concerned about going to work and catching plague and then going home and infecting their 
families, particularly children or elderly relatives with weakened immune systems.  
These findings provide support for Killian’s theory of ‘role conflict’, which relates to the 
potential conflict individuals might have during a disaster between their loyalty to their family 
and the loyalty to their organisation.645 This thesis supports the view that employees will be 
more likely to resolve this conflict in favour of their families, particularly during an incident in 
which an employee may perceive that they are increasing the threat to their significant others’ 
health by reporting to work. They may accept that there is a risk to their own health by 
reporting to work, but they may not accept that they could also be putting their loved ones at 
risk by doing this. This source of stress has also been discussed in relation to the professional 
obligations of healthcare workers; for example, when healthcare workers are faced with a 
situation in which caring for a patient with an infectious disease could potentially put their 
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own health at risk, and subsequently the health of their families. This stress can be caused by 
feelings of guilt about whether they should be risking their families’ health for the 
profession.646 Similarly, one study revealed that when student nurses were asked whether they 
would be prepared to work with victims who could transmit disease, their responses were 
influenced by whether their families would receive protection (prophylactic antibiotics) or 
vaccine.647 
It is recommended that organisations develop interventions that take into account the 
significant others of employees, both in terms of their influence on employees’ willingness and 
ability to work. It could be useful to provide temporary accommodation for essential staff so 
that they do not have to go home at the end of each day. Furthermore, organisations could 
allow staff to work from home to care for sick relatives; keeping in mind that an employee who 
is in the office worrying about those at home is unlikely to be very productive. If an 
organisation does require staff to be in the office, then it is important to allow staff to keep in 
contact with their significant others, to prevent their concerns from distracting them. Finally, 
several past studies have reported the unavailability of childcare as a potential barrier to 
employees returning to work after an incident.648 649 650 Therefore, it is recommended that 
organisations review their policies on childcare, either in terms of providing access to childcare 
in or near the workplace or allowing employees to work from home when there is no available 
childcare alternative. Although in this instance this recommendation is related to business 
continuity, it is also good practice for organisations to understand how employees’ significant 
others influence their behaviour on a day-to-day basis.  
 
Recommendation 5: Communicate with staff the importance of their role during an incident. 
Communicate with staff the importance of the organisation to national infrastructure.  
The results of the research presented in this thesis have revealed the importance of ensuring 
staff are aware of their role during an incident and in particular, that they believe their role to 
be important. Staff should be informed that they work for a national infrastructure 
organisation and the importance of their organisation continuing to function during an 
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extreme event. In the interview study (Chapter 3), however, few resilience professionals 
mentioned that they communicated to staff the importance of their role, nor that the 
organisation was part of national infrastructure. Of the interviewees who did tell staff they 
were part of national infrastructure, this was limited to essential or critical staff.   
The findings of the studies with employees presented in this thesis have suggested that 
organisations may need to rethink their approach. For example, in the web survey it was 
discovered that an individual’s role, or perception of their role, has a significant influence on 
their willingness to report to work in the event of a number of serious incidents. More 
specifically, those individuals who perceived that going to work during a serious incident would 
make a big difference to the organisation they worked for, were significantly more likely to 
report being willing to go to work. Similarly, those who perceived that their organisation 
continuing to function in a serious incident would make a big difference to keeping the country 
running, were significantly more likely to report being willing to go to work. These findings are 
also supported by past academic research examining the willingness of healthcare workers to 
report to work during an extreme event. For example, Balicer et al. concluded that the most 
influential factor associated with local public health workers’ willingness to work during an 
influenza pandemic was their perception of the importance of their role in the agency’s overall 
response.651 Similarly, Goodhue et al. reported that the most significant factor predicting the 
willingness of paediatric nurse practitioners to respond was having a specified role in the 
workplace disaster plan.652  
The findings also provide support for the EPPM, a model that was tested in the web survey 
(Chapter 4).653 The EPPM is a threat and efficacy based model that is useful for understanding 
the behavioural responses of employees during extreme events.654 This is the first time an 
academic study has applied the EPPM to the willingness of employees other than healthcare 
workers to report to work during extreme events. However, as noted in previous chapters, this 
was a modified version of the EPPM to make it more applicable to the present study 
population. In this research the efficacy variable was related to the perceived importance of 
the participants’ response to their organisation and the perceived importance of their 
organisation to keeping the country running. The analysis revealed that for the present study 
sample, perceived efficacy in terms of perceived importance of role/organisation had a 
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stronger association with willingness to work than perceived threat. This is a useful finding for 
organisations, as prior to an incident it will be more difficult to reduce perceived threat; this is 
often a task more suited to public health officials. However, organisations can focus on 
strengthening employees’ beliefs that they as individuals are important, that the recovery of 
their organisation is important and that their organisation is able to respond to the incident 
effectively.   
In the focus groups (Chapter 5) employees from the Government and health sectors 
recognised that their organisations needed to continue to function in order to help the country 
respond to and recover from an incident. This finding adds further support to the new feature 
of the efficacy variable in the EPPM uniquely developed for this research: employees need to 
be aware of the wider implications of their organisation’s recovery. It was interesting to note 
that this acknowledgement of being part of national infrastructure and part of the country’s 
response to the outbreak was not evident at all in the finance groups. In these groups there 
was no acknowledgement that their organisations needed to continue to function in order for 
the UK’s financial transactions to continue. Similarly, out of all the sectors included in the focus 
groups, participants from the financial sector groups were the least willing to report to work 
during the scenario; just 5% reported that they would be willing.  
In light of these findings it is recommended that all staff are made to feel important in the 
recovery of the business during a serious incident. This does not mean that all staff need to be 
told they have a role in the incident response, but they should understand that continuing with 
their normal day-to-day tasks will make a big difference to the recovery of the organisation. 
They should also be informed if there are wider implications of the organisation’s recovery. For 
example, an energy company needs to return to normal functioning in order to keep providing 
power to the hospitals. This is especially relevant in national infrastructure organisations that 
need to keep functioning in order to keep the country running, but organisations that do not 
operate in a sector of national infrastructure can also suffer serious consequences if they were 
to stop functioning. For example, they might lose the ability to continue to pay their staff. All 
of this can be communicated to staff during an incident; however, it is really something that 
staff need to believe before an incident occurs. Organisations could include this information in 
their induction programmes and business continuity training or awareness activities, as well as 
ensuring this is something that managers regularly communicate to their staff. Overall, the 
findings of the present study have shown just how important the perception of efficacy (self 
and organisational) is in the willingness of staff to report to work during an extreme event.  
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Recommendation 6: Develop interventions that focus on facilitating the ability of staff to 
report to work, but also consider situations where staff may be unwilling to use these.   
This research has revealed that national infrastructure organisations have considered the 
potential barriers to employees’ ability to report to work. They have also developed 
interventions to facilitate the ability of their staff to continue to work during an extreme event. 
For example, many organisations could provide transport (taxis, coaches etc.), remote access 
technology and back-up sites. However, there were assumptions being made about the 
willingness of their staff to make use of these interventions. For example, there was a lack of 
acknowledgement that staff may refuse to use the transport provided, that staff may refuse to 
go to a back-up site, or that they may have left their remote access technology in the office. All 
of which were discovered as potential issues during the web survey and focus groups. 
It is recommended that organisations do continue to include transport interventions as part of 
their business continuity planning. This is because, in addition to the present web survey study, 
a number of previous studies have also found that transportation problems are a barrier to 
employees’ ability to report to work.655 656 657 However, situations where staff refuse to use 
transport should also be considered. Organisations may need to provide private transport such 
as individual taxis, rather than coaches, as travelling with a large number of people in a 
confined space may be perceived as a significant risk by staff during an infectious disease 
outbreak. This private transport may also be needed in order to transport essential staff to 
back-up sites when the risk of travelling on public transport is judged as unacceptable. With 
regards to remote access technology, it is vital that organisations communicate the need for 
this equipment to be taken home every day or provide equipment to essential staff that they 
can keep at home. It may also be wise to have a contingency plan in place for those staff who 
have left their laptops in the office, possibly in the form of a courier service to send equipment 
out to employees’ homes.   
 
Recommendation 7: Facilitate organisational identification.  
The findings of the present study have shown that organisational identification is associated 
with the willingness of employees to report to work during an extreme event. Organisational 
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Identification is a construct with its roots in Social Identity Theory.658 Ashforth and Mael 
defined it as the experience of perceived oneness with a group.659 One of the key features of 
organisational identification is when an individual experiences the success and failures of an 
organisation as if they were their own.660 When this occurs they become part of an ‘ingroup’ 
with shared values, norms and goals.661 The findings of the web survey revealed that those 
employees who identified more strongly with their organisation, due in part to their shared 
experience of the organisations’ successes and failures, were more likely to report being 
willing to report to work during an extreme event.  
Interestingly, only one resilience professional interviewed recognised the importance of this 
topic, mentioning his own idea that the promotion of shared values and goals within the 
organisation was the reason staff would report to work during an extreme event.  It is 
recommended that all national infrastructure organisations take steps to foster their 
employees’ sense of identification with the organisation, through the promotion of shared 
values and goals. This is something that should be embedded in an organisation’s culture and 
something that could be implemented through the employee induction process, or as part of 
general staff training. Although not specifically focusing on organisational identification, 
previous research has identified relevant themes. For example, Gershon et al. reported that a 
measure of organisational trust/shared values was associated with essential workers’ 
willingness to work in a serious pandemic event.662 Similarly, a qualitative study by Ives et al. 
found that healthcare workers were motivated by a sense of ‘confederate loyalty’, and that 
barriers to their willingness to report to work included a lack of trust in, and goodwill towards, 
the NHS, and a feeling that employers do not take the needs of staff seriously.663 Organisations 
require loyal staff during an extreme event, whose goodwill towards their employer will 
motivate them to report to work.  
In addition to developing shared values and goals, organisational leaders, particularly ones that 
are going to be providing staff with information and instruction during an incident, should be 
viewed as ‘prototypical ingroup members’.664 This means they should be representative of the 
organisation as a whole and display the shared values and goals of the organisation. If they are 
seen as prototypical ingroup members then it is more likely they will be able to strengthen 
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organisational identification in an organisation. Research has found that prototypical ingroup 
leaders, or leaders who promote collective interests associated with a shared ingroup identity, 
are more likely to have the support of their staff.665 666 By extension, this could also mean that 
staff are more likely to trust them and follow their advice during an incident. It is, therefore, 
recommended that the leaders at an organisation, from the CEO down to line managers, 
receive training on how to promote the shared identity of the organisation, by ensuring that 
their behaviour and communication epitomises the organisation’s shared values and goals. 
They should also ensure they communicate with staff using language such as ‘us’ and ‘we’ 
instead of ‘you’ in order to facilitate the perception that they belong to the same group.667  
Organisations could also consider ways they could appoint prototypical ingroup members to 
key crisis management roles. They could include an interview or assessment as part of their 
selection process and train the reviewers on the qualities and values that should be present in 
a prototypical leader.668 Considering the potential influence that organisational identification 
can have on the willingness of employees to report to work during an extreme event, it is vital 
that national infrastructure organisations develop strategies to promote a sense of shared 
identity amongst their staff from day one. Further, due to the fact that organisational 
identification has previously been linked to other positive workplace behaviours such as 
productivity, promoting a sense of organisational identification in its employees is something 
that organisations should include as part of their overall business strategy. 
 
Recommendation 8: Consider appropriate information sources for staff during an incident 
and advise staff on the use of these. This includes consideration of who is the best person at 
the organisation to communicate with staff.  
Communication methods were comprehensive and well-tested by the organisations included 
in the research; however few resilience professionals had considered which person at an 
organisation should communicate with staff and who staff would trust the most. For the 
interviewees who had considered these issues, their assumptions were usually based on 
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conventional wisdom. In the focus groups, it was revealed that employees would want to get 
their information from a variety of sources, including health experts. These health experts can 
either be internal to an organisation (e.g. the organisation’s Chief Medical Officer) or external 
(an individual from Public Health England). For non-health related information, such as 
whether they should come to work and information about their organisation’s response and 
long-term recovery plan, staff wanted to hear from someone at the top, such as the CEO. 
However, some participants then wanted this information to be filtered down through 
someone they knew personally, usually their line manager. It is therefore recommended that 
organisations base their communication strategies on these findings.  
It is also important that business continuity planning is based on academic evidence. For 
example, Pearce et al., in their focus group study of public reactions to a hypothetical RED 
terrorist incident, found that the participants were generally sceptical of the media due to 
perceived scaremongering in the past, but were generally trusting of a non-governmental 
scientist.669 Similarly, Pearce et al., in their survey study examining public risk communication 
following a chemical spill found that the extent to which the public trusted the authorities 
giving the advice directly influenced their intention to comply with the recommendation to 
shelter in place.670 It is therefore vital that organisations use a trusted figure to communicate 
information to its employees. Those employees in the present study’s focus groups who 
wanted information from their line managers, believed their line managers would be less likely 
to lie to them because they knew them personally. It is important to understand that different 
people will trust different sources of information, and as such, organisations should use more 
than one person to communicate messages to staff during a crisis. In light of this, it is 
recommended that organisations use staff members such as the CEO, the chief medical officer 
and also line managers to communicate information to employees, particularly when the 
message is something they need to believe in order to come to work, for example that the risk 
to their health by coming into the office is sufficiently low.   
With regards to social media, although some resilience professionals were reluctant to include 
it in their planning, the focus group study revealed that some staff will use social media as a 
key source of information. Even though the majority of participants said they did not trust 
social media because information was often false or exaggerated, many would still use it to 
look at general trends. The analysis also revealed that some participants’ concerns and 
behavioural responses were influenced by what they read in the social media inject. 
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Consequently, it is recommended that business continuity professionals review their social 
media policies and, in particular, communicate to staff the trusted sources of information on 
social media. For example, they could direct them towards the official social media accounts of 
Public Health England, central Government or the Police. They could also help staff to 
understand how using social media in a certain way could result in inaccurate information. For 
example, if individuals search for details about an incident using a ‘hash tag’ they may be 
presented with false information, rumours, or fake photographs from other public users. This 
is knowledge that would be useful to staff on a day-to-day basis and not simply during an 
incident.  Lastly, organisations could potentially instruct staff to use social media as a way of 
checking on the status of their friends and families during an incident, and as an efficient way 
of communicating to others that they are safe. This could reduce the potential for them to be 
distracted whilst at work if they have been unable to contact their loved ones using traditional 
communication methods.  
 
Recommendation 9: Provide accurate, scientific information to staff that emphasises the 
organisation’s focus on health and safety and how they are protecting their staff. 
In the event of a CBRN terrorist attack or other public health emergency, employees will 
expect accurate, scientific information from their employers. The results of the focus group 
study revealed that employees will expect some form of communication from their employers 
almost immediately after an incident. It is therefore important for employers to send out a 
holding statement to their staff in the immediate aftermath of an incident. If key information is 
not known at that early stage, then it is important to acknowledge that fact and to say that 
more information will be sent as soon as it is known. Similarly, organisations should not 
withhold information from their own staff, as this may lead to them not being viewed as a 
trusted source of information in the future. Rogers and Pearce have suggested that some of 
the distrust the public have in the authorities is possibly a result of information being withheld 
from the public during past incidents.671 This may have occurred because authorities designed 
their risk communication materials based on an assumption that the public would panic if they 
knew the full extent of the situation, an assumption that we now know is largely unfounded.  
Therefore, it is recommended that organisations provide accurate, scientific/technical 
information to staff regarding the potential risks of an incident. The focus group analysis 
revealed that staff want to base their personal risk assessments on this information.  
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It is vital that employers provide their staff with accurate information concerning the risks they 
could face by going to work, keeping in mind that without the facts, employees could be under 
or overestimating the risks to their health and that of their significant others. This is 
particularly likely during unfamiliar incidents such as CBRN terrorist attacks, due to individuals 
basing their risk perceptions on their feelings about similar risks.672 Risk perceptions formed as 
a result of these generalisations are likely to be inaccurate. Due to the need to get accurate, 
technical information to staff as quickly as possible during an incident, it is recommended that 
organisations test their possible communication messages with staff prior to an incident in 
order to get feedback. It is also recommended that resilience managers seek out the relevant 
factsheets and information sources in advance, so that they have these to hand when an 
incident does occur. Organisations should also form relationships with well-respected subject 
experts, who they could contact during an incident to provide technical information and 
guidance to their staff.  
It was also revealed in the present research that staff wanted information about their 
organisation’s long-term recovery plan and what specific actions their employer was taking to 
protect their health and safety. Similarly, those survey respondents who believed that health 
and safety was a high priority with management where they work were more willing to report 
to work during an extreme event. Therefore, organisations need to communicate specific 
details about how they are protecting their staff during an incident, for example what 
interventions are in place and how these will reduce the risks to staff. In addition, 
organisations should embed a focus on health and safety into their day-to-day culture, by 
using conspicuous health and safety interventions and regularly communicating health and 
safety information, particularly as it relates to responses to major incidents. Past research 
provides further support to these recommendations. For example, Irvin et al. reported that for 
those healthcare workers unsure about their intentions to report to work in an avian influenza 
pandemic, the most important facilitating factor was their confidence that the hospital could 
protect them.673 Bar-Dayan et al. discovered that healthcare workers’ willingness to risk ones’ 
life for a patient during an A/H1N1 pandemic in Israel was significantly lower for those with 
less trust in workplace preparedness and in the effectiveness of safety measures.674 Therefore, 
it is important that staff believe their organisation is capable of protecting their health and 
safety prior to an incident and this message should also be reinforced during the incident.  
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Recommendations for DURING or in the AFTERMATH an incident:  
 
Recommendation 10: Provide interventions to facilitate the willingness of staff to report to 
work, particularly medical treatment.  
The scenario-based employee focus groups revealed that staff would expect a variety of 
interventions during a pneumonic plague outbreak, most frequently related to medical 
treatment. Participants expected their organisation to provide medication, often in their 
workplace or delivered to their home, as well as other interventions such as diagnostic testing, 
vaccinations, PPE and hand gels. These types of interventions made staff more willing to report 
to work. It was found that staff may not want to go to the official treatment centres due to the 
perceived increased risk associated with these locations. Due to this, staff in the focus groups 
said they would be more willing to go to work if they felt they were ‘jumping the NHS queues’, 
or avoiding the crowds, in order to get medical treatment. However, the study also revealed 
that although some resilience professionals said they would think about providing medication, 
they were often unsure about the practical and ethical issues with doing this. Previous 
literature examining the willingness of healthcare workers to report to work during extreme 
events has also found evidence that providing medication can increase employees’ willingness 
to work.675 676 677 In one study this was defined as ‘preferential access to antiviral medication’, 
which when offered to employees, resulted in an increase in willingness to work scores. 678  
Another study found that being offered the treatment on site was important to staff; being 
offered the treatment at a remote site reduced the willingness rate by nearly half.679 
It is recommended therefore that organisations consider whether they could, and whether 
they should, provide medical treatment to employees. However, they should also consider the 
numerous ethical and practical issues involved. It is also important to remember that just 
because staff want a specific medical treatment does not mean it is the right option for them. 
For example, staff may wish to receive antibiotics as a treatment, but we must all consider the 
long-term implications of overprescribing antibiotics on antibiotic resistance and the resulting 
serious risks to the future health of the world’s population.  Organisations should take advice 
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from public health officials, such as those at Public Health England, as to whether a treatment 
option is advisable and not solely rely on their private healthcare providers who may have 
financial reasons for their recommendations. If, however, treatment is deemed appropriate, 
organisations should consider where they could prescribe this medication, on site being 
preferable. They should also exercise for scenarios in which the medication is in short supply. 
In these situations they would need to consider if they should only supply medication to 
essential workers and also consider the message that this policy would be sending to the rest 
of the workforce. Furthermore, they should decide what they would do if the official 
recommendation is to prescribe medication, but it is not cost effective for the organisation. It 
will be important to communicate clearly the justification for not providing medication, 
particularly if the organisation has provided this in the past for other situations (e.g. flu 
vaccinations). If there are scientific reasons for not supplying the medication to staff, for 
example if it is not known to be effective, if it could result in more resistant strains of bacteria, 
or has side effects, then these reasons should be communicated clearly to staff. This is 
important in light of the present study’s findings that staff will expect medication from their 
employer during an infectious disease outbreak. Furthermore, research has shown that 
providing vaccination, medication or protective equipment to an employee’s family is also 
something that could increase their willingness to work.680 681 682 Therefore, organisations 
should also consider whether this is an option that could be written into their business 
continuity plans.  
However, it is vital that any medical treatment or services provided to an individual by an 
organisation are communicated to that individual’s general practitioner, to avoid any potential 
duplicate or contradictory treatment. Conversely, private healthcare providers or occupational 
health departments would require access to an individual’s medical records to ensure there 
are no potential interactions with other medications they may be taking. This process is 
already routinely followed for patients who receive both private and NHS medical care; 
however it can be a slow process and would need to be improved. In the event of an incident 
requiring a widescale public health response, there is the potential for both occupational 
health services and private healthcare providers to assist in the response and therefore 
facilitate the recovery of UK national infrastructure organisations, as well as relieving some of 
the pressure from a potentially overstretched NHS. However, it is vital that these services are 
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designed to sit alongside current NHS policies and that they adhere to the relevant legislation, 
and, most importantly, are part of a coordinated response.  
 
Recommendation 11: Focus on practical support and facilitating natural social cohesion, 
rather than relying on unsupported psychological interventions. 
The interview study revealed that although a number of interviewees mentioned that they 
would provide psychological interventions in the aftermath of an incident, there was no 
discussion concerning what type of intervention would be most appropriate. Furthermore, of 
the interviewees who said they could provide a psychological intervention, most said they 
would be advised by a third party organisation (usually their private healthcare provider) what 
type of psychological intervention to use, which was usually a form of ‘trauma counselling’. 
There is no doubt that CBRN terrorist attacks have the potential to cause widespread 
psychological consequences. However it is important to understand that not everyone 
involved in a traumatic incident will go on to develop a psychological disorder such as 
depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).683 684 Nonetheless, the symptoms of stress 
and negative emotions experienced by some employees as a result of the incident could 
impact on their ability to return to normal functioning. For example, as a result of the Anthrax 
attacks in 2001 in the US, Capitol Hill staff workers experienced concentration difficulties, an 
inability to focus on work and avoidance of related information.685  Therefore, it is important 
to acknowledge the psychological impact of an incident on the employees of an organisation. 
However, it is not advisable to implement blanket ‘trauma counselling’ or conduct ‘single 
session-psychological debriefing’ with all individuals involved in an incident.22 Providing these 
types of interventions to all staff at an organisation does not have any recognised benefit and 
potentially could do more harm than good. It could make individuals believe they should be 
experiencing psychological symptoms or force them relive an incident unnecessarily.  
Therefore, it is recommended that organisations help staff to understand that feeling stressed 
or anxious in the aftermath of a serious incident is normal. In the immediate aftermath it is 
important to focus on meeting the practical needs of staff when providing care, but also make 
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sure access to psychological interventions are in place and conspicuous for those who need to 
use them. Organisations could consider implementing peer-support programs in which 
volunteer staff members are trained in skills such as psychological first aid. However, as much 
of the existing research focuses on high-risk organisations such as the police and military, more 
research is needed to assess the effectiveness and feasibility of introducing these peer-support 
programs in organisations that are not considered high-risk.686 687 
In light of the finding that many resilience professionals would be advised by a third party 
organisation (e.g. their private healthcare provider) about what type of intervention to use, it 
is recommended that organisations seek independent expert advice. Organisations should, 
where possible, not base their decisions on the advice of a third party that could benefit 
financially from the recommendation to provide specific interventions. If advice from an 
independent organisation is not available, then resilience professionals should make use of 
available research and base their decisions on peer-reviewed research evidence.  
Following on from this recommendation, it is important that organisations consider the issue 
of ‘presenteeism’ in the workplace. The term presenteeism is used to describe a situation 
whereby an individual may report to work when they are either physically or psychologically 
unwell, something that may have a negative impact on productivity.688 689 It is important that 
that line managers are taught to communicate to their teams the importance of not attending 
the workplace if unfit, either physically or psychologically. They should also tell their 
employees that there will not be any negative consequences on their employment if they are 
absent and what the impacts might be if they do choose to attend work whilst unwell; for 
example that they might spread a virus to their colleagues or that they could lengthen their 
own recovery time by coming back to work too soon. Organisations should also make sure that 
the appropriate HR policies are in place and communicated to employees so they are aware 
they can take a sick day without fearing they may lose their job. The leaders within an 
organisation should also set a good example by not coming to work if they are visibly unwell as 
this can reinforce an unhelpful culture of presenteeism. This is not only something that should 
happen in the event of a serious incident, but something that should be embedded into an 
organisation’s day-to-day culture. Finally, line managers should be taught how to spot 
presenteeism within their teams. They should focus on communicating with their staff and 
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being sympathetic to their feelings and concerns; this is all part of building meaningful 
relationships within teams. Managers’ training should emphasise that although physical 
symptoms might be easy to spot, it will be more difficult to notice team members who are 
suffering from symptoms of psychological distress or disorder. Again, this is not solely related 
to business continuity and should be considered part of good general management.  
Strengths and Limitations of the Research 
 
This research has many strengths, one of which is its mixed methods design. Mixed methods 
research combines qualitative and quantitative data collection, drawing from the strengths of 
both, and at the same time minimising the weaknesses.690 Two or more data collection 
methods can be used to obtain a more accurate view of the phenomenon being studied – a 
concept known as triangulation.691 When there is convergence between the findings of 
separate studies this allows researchers to be more confident in their conclusions. Although 
the interview study was somewhat separate in its focus on organisational responses, the 
survey and focus group studies were both designed to examine staff responses.  By conducting 
a web survey followed by scenario-based focus groups, the researcher was able to move 
between broad, more general knowledge and deeper, richer insights, in order to capture a 
more accurate representation of reality.692 It should also be pointed out that just because it is 
not possible to directly compare the results of the three studies, this does not mean that they 
cannot be combined with care in order to form conclusions and to support recommendations. 
However, although there are clear benefits to using different methods to examine the same 
topic, this does not mean the individual studies’ limitations can be ignored. 
A further strength of the research is that the design of each study was informed by the findings 
of the preceding studies. The findings of the systematic literature review revealed a variety of 
influences on the ability and willingness of employees to report to work during extreme 
events; these factors were then included as part of the interviews with resilience professionals, 
contrasted with findings of the web survey and confirmed by the results of the scenario-based 
focus group studies. The scenario of the focus group study was selected due to the findings of 
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the web survey revealing pneumonic plague had one of the lowest rates of willingness to work 
amongst survey respondents. Pneumonic plague was also selected as the terrorist agent due 
the systematic literature review revealing more barriers and facilitators and more long-term 
issues, related to infectious disease outbreaks (concerns about catching an infection, risk to 
families’ health, medication, vaccination etc.) than conventional or more short-term incidents. 
The decision to use a social media inject in the focus groups was a direct result of the resilience 
professionals in the interview study revealing mixed views about the use of social media during 
an incident.  
The biggest strength of this research is its ability to produce unique findings that can be 
applied in the real world, to increase the likelihood of national infrastructure organisations 
recovering from disruption in a timely manner.  
The research also had some limitations that need to be acknowledged here. The specific 
limitations related to the individual studies are described in more detail in the relevant 
chapters. More generally, the studies used opportunistic sampling methods and, as such, were 
not always demographically or geographically representative of the UK population. The survey 
study only included a relatively small sample for a quantitative study (n=321); however the 
sample of interviewees (n=21) and the sample of focus group participants (n=53) were 
considered of a sufficient size for qualitative research. It is also possible that people who are 
generally more helpful in other aspects of their lives were more likely to fill in the survey or 
volunteer for the focus groups. These more helpful people might be more willing to help 
during emergencies and, therefore, the willingness rates could have been overestimated. 
Another potential sample bias could have occurred due to the fact that employees with 
operational or business critical roles may have been less likely to volunteer to participate in the 
web survey or focus groups, due to the essential nature of their day-to-day roles.  
As with all data collection methods that make use of self-report, it is hard to verify the 
authenticity of the data. It is also possible that participants’ responses were influenced by a 
social desirability bias and group polarisation. However, steps were taken to help prevent 
these potential methodological issues (e.g. the use of the ‘first thoughts’ written responses in 
the focus groups) and the low levels of willingness reported in the survey and focus groups 
studies indicate that participants were not strongly influenced by social desirability bias.  
A final issue to be considered is that willingness rates reported in this study may not translate 
into actual rates of attendance during the incidents, due to sample biases or other details 
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specific to the scenario. For example, absenteeism rates are likely to be higher in a pneumonic 
plague incident during which there are enough antibiotic doses for the whole population, than 
for a situation when they are in short supply. This however does not mean the willingness 
rates are not useful; they still present an interesting comparison of likely employee responses 
to different types of incidents and should therefore be considered as a relative measure rather 
than an absolute measure. It is important for organisations to consider which types of 
incidents might be more fear-inducing than others for staff and thus may result in higher rates 
of absenteeism. 
Ideas for Future Research 
 
In light of the findings of the present research, some ideas for future research are suggested 
here.  
A larger, more demographically and geographically representative study is needed to test 
some of the findings of the interview study more widely, perhaps in the form of focus groups 
or a web survey. It would also be useful to interview business continuity managers at 
organisations that have experienced disruption caused by the same incident in order to 
provide a direct comparison, preferably in the immediate aftermath of the incident so that it is 
fresh in the interviewees’ minds. 
Furthermore, there is a need to replicate the web survey with a larger, more representative 
sample to test some of the findings more widely. Alternatively, a survey study comparing staff 
from a small number of different organisations would be useful to allow more details about 
the organisation and individual roles to be included. It would be invaluable to collect survey 
data in the aftermath of a real incident to see if the predictor variables reported in the present 
study also have a role to play in actual rates of attendance. For such a study it would be useful 
(although potentially not practical) to have collected data on the psychological measures such 
as organisational identification prior to the incident occurring.  
The focus group study findings have suggested possible differences in willingness to work 
between staff of different sectors; however this needs to be tested on a larger scale to see if 
the differences are statistically significant. It would also be useful to compare the willingness 
to report to work of ‘critical’ or ‘essential’ workers with those who are not, either through a 
survey or focus groups.  
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This study has revealed new and interesting findings regarding the influence of social media 
content on employee reactions and, as such, this is something that warrants further research. 
It would be useful to compare different forms of social media or manipulate the message 
content and measure employees’ reactions to these using quantitative measures. The focus 
groups made use of just one scenario; therefore, it would be interesting to directly compare 
employee reactions to different scenarios (such as chemical or radiological incidents), as well 
as comparing deliberate terrorist incidents to accidental ones.  
Lastly, this research examined the influence of risk communication on willingness to work, as 
well as discussing which individuals at an organisation should be used to communicate 
information to staff. To extend these findings, it is recommended that future research 
examines the affect that different leadership styles might have on staff willingness to report to 
work in the aftermath of a serious incident, as well as looking at the specific content of the 
messages that leaders present to staff.  
Conclusions 
 
Prior to this study there was a need for empirical research examining the likely responses of 
staff from all sectors of national infrastructure during an extreme event such as a CBRN 
terrorist attack. There was also a need to compare the assumptions of national infrastructure 
organisations with the likely behaviour of staff in the event of a CBRN terrorist attack. This 
research has provided much needed empirical evidence to address these gaps in knowledge. 
The results have been used to formulate a series of recommendations that organisations can 
implement as part of their BCM programmes. These practical interventions are aimed at 
increasing likelihood that staff will report to work in the event of a CBRN terrorist attack or 
other public health emergency.  
The findings of this research have revealed that not all staff will be willing to go to work during 
an extreme event. In the case of some CBRN incidents, less than a quarter of staff reported 
they would be willing to go work. The interview study discovered that many resilience 
professionals assumed their staff would be willing to report to work during an extreme event. 
It also found that organisations had not placed sufficient emphasis on facilitating staff 
willingness to return to work during a crisis. This is a serious issue considering that the web 
survey and focus groups revealed staff will face a variety of barriers and expect a great deal 
from their employer during an extreme event. At present, national infrastructure 
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organisations’ plans will not meet the expectations of their staff and address their numerous 
practical, psychological and communications needs in the event of a CBRN terrorist attack. 
However, this research has revealed a variety of factors that could facilitate employees’ timely 
return to work. In light of these findings, it is vital that national infrastructure organisations 
review their business continuity planning, putting more emphasis on the human factor of their 
organisation’s recovery and develop strategies to motivate their staff to return to work.  
Some of the recommendations for organisations developed from the findings of this research 
are to be included in an upcoming industry publication. The report entitled ‘Willing and Able: 
Building a Crisis Resilient Workforce’ is due to be published by Deloitte in early 2015.  
The dissemination of this research could have a significant impact on the ways in which 
organisations prepare for and respond to high-impact, low-likelihood events by: 
(i) Challenging and changing resilience professionals’ understanding and expectations of 
likely staff responses to high-impact, low-likelihood events. 
(ii) Highlighting the importance of including likely responses and needs of staff during an 
extreme event in business continuity planning and processes. 
(iii) Informing business continuity management in UK national infrastructure organisations 
by recommending strategies that could be used to motivate staff to return to work.   
This research has used theories of risk perception and risk communication, alongside 
theoretical frameworks from health psychology and social psychology to investigate 
organisational and employee responses to high-impact, low-likelihood events such as CBRN 
terrorist attacks. A number of these theories have been applied to the topic of staff willingness 
and ability to report to work during an extreme event for the first time. The findings presented 
in this thesis have addressed a number of significant knowledge gaps in the original research 
and have highlighted the importance of including staff responses in the business continuity 
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Appendix A: Systematic literature review table 
Table A1 Methods and key willingness findings of all articles included in systematic literature 
review 







in U.S.  
Multiple incidents 
 
Willingness rates: Explosion (93.0%); winter 
weather (92.8%); influenza pandemic 
(85.1%); chemical event (80.9%); 
tornado/flooding (80.4%); smallpox epidemic 
(79.4%); SARS outbreak (74.6%); radiologic 
event (69.1%). Commonly expressed barriers 
to reporting to work were; concern for 
self/others, responsibility for spouse with 
healthcare needs/disability, effect of disaster 
on self/others, childcare responsibilities and 







Bioterrorism 80% willing to continue caring for patients in 
the event of an outbreak of an unknown but 
potentially deadly illness. 40% willing to put 
self at risk of contracting a deadly illness to 
save others’ lives. 33% would care for infected 
smallpox patients even if unvaccinated.  










53.8% of employees likely to report to work. 
Likelihood of reporting to work was 
significantly higher for clinical than technical 
and support staff.  






in U.S.  
Influenza 
pandemic 
Willingness to respond was 82.5% if required 
and 72% if asked but not required. Significant 
predictors of willingness were: belief that 
pandemic is likely and of its severe 
consequences; level of perceived knowledge of 
pandemic events; perceived importance of 
one’s role in the hospital’s overall response; 
perceived safety; perceived ability to perform 
one’s duties; and others. Study used Extended 
Parallel Process Model.  






in U.S.  
Radiological event 
(RDD) 
Willingness to respond was 50% if required 
and 39% if asked but not required. 27.9% of 
the hospital employees with a perception of 
low efficacy declared willingness to respond to 
a severe RDD event. Significant predictors of 
willingness were: perceived high impact of 
ones’ response; perceived safety; perceived 
confidence about getting to work safely; 








A/H1N1 Pandemic 84% of HCWs who read a scientific article 
about A/H1N1 flu were willing to risk their 
lives for a patient compared to 73% who had 
not read an article. 82% of HCWs who were 
acquainted with Ministry of Health regulations 
were willing compared to 69% who were not.  
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A/H1N1 Pandemic Willingness to risk one’s life for a patient 
significantly lower in females, younger 
employees (18-24), administrative staff, those 
with a non-academic education, those with 
less knowledge about safety measures, those 
with less trust in colleagues, in workplace 
preparedness and in the effectiveness of safety 
measures.  







the U.S.  
Pandemic 
influenza 
92% were willing to respond if required and 
86% were willing to respond if asked but not 
required. Study used Extended Parallel 
Process Model (EPPM). Those employees with 
a perception of high threat and high efficacy 
were more likely to be willing to respond than 
those fitting a ‘low threat/low efficacy’ EPPM 
profile. 












93% would be willing to report to work, if 
required, and 88% would be willing to report 
to work if asked, but not required. If there was 
a possibility for disease transmission to family 
members, the willingness-to-report rate was 
48%. Study used Extended Parallel Process 
Model. Confidence in personal safety at work 
and a high threat/high efficacy (“concerned 
and confident”) EPPM profile distinguished 
those who were more likely to voluntarily 
report to duty. 








Multiple incidents  Willingness rates: Pandemic influenza 
(91.0%); weather-related (92.7%); dirty bomb 
(74.3); deliberate anthrax (80.3%). Rural 
respondents had higher rates of willingness 
than urban respondents. Willingness rates 
















Willingness to respond decreased with the 
progression of the pandemic and when the job 
required face-to-face contact with people who 
could be infected. During the early pandemic, 
92.3% were very/somewhat likely to report 
if performing low-risk jobs duties and 66.4% 
were very/somewhat likely to report during 
the early pandemic if required to perform 
high-risk job duties. 







in U.S.  
Man-made/ 
natural disaster 
Of the 672 employees who completed the 
willingness questions, 47% were willing to 
respond in the event of either a man-made or 
natural disaster. Being male and not being 
married/living with partner were more likely 
to be willing to respond.  Physicians were the 














76% reported that they would continue to 
report to work when the incidence of infection 
in HCWs was twice that of the general 
population. Females were more likely to 
report discontinuation of work compared to 
males; however, the strength of this 
association substantially reduced when 












Willingness rates: Chemical (78.1%); 
biological (84.4%); radiological (75.0%). 
There was a positive association between 
willingness to participate in CBR incidents and 
postgraduate qualification in emergency 
nursing For chemical incidents, there were 
weak positive correlations between training 
adequacy and both willingness to participate, 
but this did not apply to biological or 
radiological incidents. Study had small sample.   






in U.S.  
Bioterrorism The majority of respondents were willing to 
respond to both a high-risk (HR) event and a 
low-risk (LR) event within their local 
community (81.7 and 82.8% respectively). 
These rates reduced for events that were 
regional (64.4% and 68.8% respectively), 
statewide (53.6% and 35.8% respectively), 
and nationwide (48.2% and 47.0% 
respectively).  









Factors with the greatest potential impact on 
likelihood of working were ‘illness to children’ 
(13% likely to work) and illness to partner 
(23% likely to work). Females were 
significantly less likely to work during a 
pandemic than males, part time workers less 
likely than full time workers and those with 
caring responsibilities less likely than those 
without. Those who lived alone or who shared 
with friends were more likely to report to 
work than those who lived in households with 
children. Females were significantly less likely 
than males to work if children were ill.  









Those respondents who agreed that all 
healthcare workers have a duty to work were 
significantly more likely to report that they 
would work than those who disagreed. Those 
who agreed that doctors and nurses have a 
duty to the sick were over four times more 
likely to work than those who disagreed. 
Those agreeing that their main responsibility 
was to themselves and their family were 
significantly less likely to work than those who 














21% of critical care HCWs reported that they 
were either unsure about whether they would 
come to work during a pandemic or were 
unlikely to do so. No differences were found 
between HCWs in their likelihood of reporting 
to work, based on job title, hospital affiliation, 
or the respondent’s degree of confidence in 










Rift Valley Fever 
Virus 
(bioterrorism) 
Four groups were studied: Medical first 
responders, their spouses/partners, 
journalists and others (residents). Most 
participants in all groups indicated they would 
remain on the job throughout the crisis. After 
the disease was identified, and recognized as 
bioterrorism, 95% of responders, 71% of 
media and 65% of residents said they would 
continue working, and 78% of spouses said 
they would want their first responder partners 












Willingness to report to work: Snowstorm 
(84.1%); smallpox (64.8%); chemical attack 
(74.3%); explosions( 87.7%); landfill fire 
(87.5%); dirty bomb (73.6%). ‘Sense of 
responsibility’ (83.3%), ‘ability to provide 
care’ (77.3%) and ‘code of ethics’ (69.9%) 
most frequently selected reasons by those 







in Germany  
Influenza 
pandemic 
52% disagreed that it would be professional 
acceptable for healthcare professionals (HCP) 
to abandon their workplace during a pandemic 
to protect themselves and family. 
Disagreement was higher for physicians 
(65%) than administrators (32%). 77% 
disagreed that HCP should lose their jobs for 














Single most significant barriers to employees 
were: Concern for safety of family (25.03%); 
personal safety concern (18.03%); and 
dependent childcare needs at home (16.17%). 
Mitigation strategies including preferential 
access to antiviral medication and PPE for 
employee and immediate family resulted in an 
increase in willingness to work scores.  









Majority of home healthcare workers (51%) 
reported that they would not provide care for 
a client who was in quarantine because of 
exposure to a serious infectious disease (e.g. 
anthrax, avian flu).  









43% would be willing to take care of their 
current patients, but this reduced to 27% for 
new patients who were infected. Most 
common barrier to willingness was fear for 
self and family’s safety. Facilitators for 
willingness were being given a vaccine, being 
confident a mask would protect them and if 




Reference Method Scenario(s) Key willingness findings 
Gershon et al. 
(2009b) 






in U.S.  
Influenza 
pandemic 
Willingness to report to duty during a 
pandemic increased from 63% at the pre-test 
stage (before the pandemic preparedness 
training, which involved an educational 
intervention and a skill-based drill with 
respiratory PPE) to 66% at the post-test stage 
(after the pandemic preparedness training). 
Training was effecting at increasing pandemic 
knowledge and behavioural intentions with 
respect to use of respiratory PPE and seasonal 
influenza vaccination.  













65% willing to report to work compared to 
80% able to report to work. Group most able 
and willing to report to work was department 
of health workers (59%) and least able and 
willing were the corrections workers (37%). 
Organisational trust/shared values, two or 
more workplace pandemic preparedness 
elements, less concern that a pandemic might 
occur within the next 5-10 years and 
pandemic influenza training were all 
significantly associated with willingness to 
work.  








in U.S.  
Multiple incidents Willingness rates: Disaster in general 
(26.75%); biological event (25.88%); terrorist 
attack (26.71%). Fewer than 10% of PNPs felt 
‘definitely prepared’ for either a disaster in 
general or natural disaster and were willing to 
respond. PNPs who felt definitely prepared for 
a disaster in general were 4.2 times more 
likely to be willing to respond than were PNPs 
who did not feel prepared. Significant 
predictors of responding included being male, 
having military experience, and disaster 
training. The most significant factor was 
having a specified role in the workplace 








Bioterrorism Nurses’ intention to respond was higher in 
scenarios where the infection risk was lower. 
Overall intention to respond scores were 
positively related to bioterrorism knowledge 
and having had previous emergency and 
disaster experience. Being less likely to 
respond was associated with having 







Bioterrorism When asked how willing they would be to care 
for infected smallpox patients if they 
themselves were unvaccinated, 47.5% 
answered ‘not at all’. When asked how willing 
they would be to care for a patient infected 
with communicable respiratory infection, such 
as SARS or pneumonic plague, 20.2% 
answered ‘not at all’  
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Reference Method Scenario(s) Key willingness findings 










More than 75% of physicians were willing to 
be contacted on an urgent basis in the event of 
a public health emergency and to help 
according to their capacity. 21% said they 
would not be willing to be contacted. Out of 
those who were willing, 94% said they would 
assist in immunisation clinics and 84% in 
antibiotic clinics.  







Multiple incidents Willingness rates: Weather related event 
(78%); influenza pandemic (67%); 
bioterrorism event (52%). Willingness did not 
differ by clinical status or professional 
classification. Rural respondents were more 
likely to be willing than urban respondents 
during a weather related or bioterrorism 
event. Factors associated with willingness in 
all three scenarios were: perceived confidence 
in own skills, likelihood of being asked to 
respond and family preparedness.  






in U.S.  
Avian influenza 
pandemic 
50% reported being willing to work if patients 
with avian flu were being treated at the 
hospital. Doctors were more likely to be 
willing than nurses or clerical/other 
associates. For those who answered ‘maybe’ 
and also answered the questions about 
incentives, the most important factor was their 
confidence that the hospital could protect 
them (83%).  













HCWs tended to feel motivated by a sense of 
obligation to work through an influenza 
pandemic, and this was evident across all job 
categories. This was separated by the 
researchers into ‘a professional ethic’, ‘a duty 
to help’ and ‘a work ethic and confederate 
loyalty.’ Barriers to willingness to report to 
work included: prioritising the wellbeing of 
family members; lack of trust in, and goodwill 
towards, the NHS; a lack of information about 
the risks and what is expected of them during 
the crisis; fear of litigation; and the feeling that 
employers do not take the needs of staff 
seriously.  







Multiple incidents Willingness rates for being asked to report but 
not required: Natural disaster 96%; pandemic 
influenza 93.7%; radiological event 83.3%. 
When asked their level of agreement to the 
statement ‘I would be willing to respond 
regardless of severity’ the rates reduced to: 
Natural disaster 92.5%; pandemic influenza 
87.8%; radiological event 74.6%.  








Bioterrorism 73.8% expressed willingness to provide 
assistance to the state of Hawaii in the event of 
a bioterrorist attack. 9.2% indicated they were 




Reference Method Scenario(s) Key willingness findings 








Bioterrorism 74% of responding physicians expressed 
willingness to provide assistance to the state 
of Hawaii’s bioterrorism response and control 
efforts; 13% indicated that they were able to 
effectively respond to a bioterrorism attack.  
74% of nurses expressed willingness to 
provide assistance to the response; 11% 
indicated that they were able to respond 
effectively to a bioterrorist attack.  






SARS Descriptive statistics indicated that the 
respondents were neutral in their intention to 
care for SARS patients. Study used theory of 
planned behaviour. Factors found to have a 
significant relationship with intention to care 
for SARS patients were: attitude towards 
SARS-patient care, subjective norm (perceived 
dis-/approval of significant others), and 
perceived behavioural control.  





SARS Survey was completed after the SARS 
outbreak. 42.7% of nurses had a positive 
intention to provide care to SARS patients and 
25.4% would volunteer to care for a SARS 
patients. Factors predicting intention to care 
for SARS patients were self-efficacy 
(confidence in their ability to care for SARS 
patients), attitude towards caring for SARS 
patients, years working at the hospital, and 
receiving resources from the hospital. Study 










Bioterrorism 86.5% said they would report to work if a 
chemical nerve agent was suspected in the city 
(61% definitely report, 25.5% possibly 
report). 90% of staff would report to work if a 
smallpox patient were admitted to the 
hospital, however only 6% would report if 







s in U.S.  
Smallpox If no vaccine was available and paramedics 
had no protective gear then 4% said they 
‘probably’ would remain on duty and none 
‘definitely’ would remain on duty, this 
increased to 44% definitely and 39% probably 
if protective gear was available and if it was 
guaranteed that a vaccine would be available 
within 4 days. Being younger, male, not 
married and having no children under the age 
of 18 were associated with greater likelihood 
of remaining on duty. Study had small sample.  
 292 
 
Reference Method Scenario(s) Key willingness findings 
Martin (2011) Survey of 
735 nurses 
in U.S.  
Influenza 
pandemic 
90.1% were willing to work during pandemic 
flu and 83% felt knowledgeable enough to 
safely care for pandemic flu patients. When 
offered full PPE (gloves, gown, N-95 mask) 
92.5% were willing to care for pandemic flu 
patients, but this reduced to 53.9% when a 
gown was not available. When only a surgical 
mask was available 14.2% would be willing to 
provide care. Providing both antiviral 
medication and vaccine to nurse and their 
family resulted in the highest willingness to 












13% would not attend work if there was a 
single case of avian influenza admitted to the 
hospital. Of the rest, 25% would not work until 
specific antiviral preventative measures were 
provided. If there were multiple admissions of 
human influenza, indicating a pandemic, 36% 
of staff would not report to work. Of the rest, a 
further 17% would not work without antiviral 
preventative measures. For 70-80% of staff 
the main reasons for not working were 
concerns for their own health and concerns for 
their family’s health. Most important 
incentives to work were full preventative 
measures for staff and provision of alternative 








in U.S.  
Multiple incidents Willingness to work additional hours for 
victims of: an airplane crash 98%; a 
radioactive bomb 85.3%; biologic agent 54%. 
Men were significantly more likely to respond 
in an incident involving a biologic agent than 
women. Disability coverage, increased pay and 
increased compensation time were the 
incentives found to be most influential on an 
employee’s willingness to respond.   
Mortelmans 





Avian influenza 82.3% reported being willing to care for 
pandemic patients if necessary, however this 
reduced to 41.2% when the patients were 
children. Only 18.9% considered themselves 
to be sufficiently educated regarding H5N1.  
Ogedegbe et 





in U.S.  
Disaster 93% willing to report for duty in the event of a 
disaster and understood why they might be 
required to work overtime. Most common 
personal responsibilities endorsed as barriers 
were ‘caring for children’ and ‘pets’. Significant 
predictors of willingness were being in an 
older age group, and having eldercare 
obligations. Years of service and job type were 
not related to willingness.  







Multiple incidents Willingness rates: Snow storm 80%; mass 
casualty incident 86%; environmental disaster 
84%; chemical event 68%; smallpox epidemic 
61%; radiological event 57%; SARS outbreak 
47%. Correlates of being less willing to report 
to work for most events: Being female; having 
childcare and eldercare obligations.  
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Reference Method Scenario(s) Key willingness findings 









83.3% would present to work if a patient in 
their ward/department had an influenza-like 
illness. 79% would present to work if a 
colleague had contracted pandemic influenza. 
60.6% would present to work if a family 
member had an influenza-like illness. 81.2% 
would not present to work if they themselves 
had influenza symptoms, and 53.4% would 
still not even if there was a severe staff 
shortage.  









86% indicated that they would report to work 
if a patient in their ward/department had an 
influenza-like illness. 81% would report if a 
colleague had contracted influenza. 71% 
would present if a family member had an 
influenza-like illness. 62% would report to 
work if there was a staff shortage and they 
themselves had symptoms of influenza. 74% 
accepted the risk of getting pandemic 
influenza as part of their job, but 85% of 
doctors and 86% of nurses were afraid of 









Avian influenza 60.7% disagreed with the statement that it 
was ethical for healthcare workers to abandon 
their workplace during a pandemic in order to 
protect themselves and their families (24.9% 
agreed), however 64.5% agreed that 
healthcare workers should be allowed to 
decide whether they report to work during a 
pandemic. 21% said they would not volunteer 
even if they were provided with the following: 
hazard pay; PPE and training; specialized 
infectious disease training; life/disability 
insurance coverage for family; additional 
support for personal/family needs; and being 
the first to receive antiviral drugs and a 
vaccine if one became available.  












42% were willing to report to their duties, 
however this increased to 86% if safety 
measures were provided. Most willing to 
report to work were males, personnel with 
headquarter duty of hospital site managers 
and parents of children over 14yrs old.  










The GPs in the study said they would continue 
to work during a pandemic and that declining 
to work would be unethical. GPs had a strong 
personal work ethic and had a sense of 
responsibility for their patients’ welfare. 55 
out of the 60 GPs said they would stop 
working if PPE were unavailable, due to 
concerns for their own welfare and also the 
welfare of their dependents if they were to die. 
If public health authorities recommended that 
essential services receive prophylactic 
antivirals then most GPs would take them and 
would also want them for their families.  
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Reference Method Scenario(s) Key willingness findings 














avian influenza.)  
The way paramedics perceived risk was 
directly influenced by the type of incident and 
the potential for it to impact on their family. 
Concerns about threats to health and 
wellbeing of self, colleagues and family were 
frequently mentioned. Paramedics also 
reported their desire to fulfill their 
professional responsibilities. Majority of 
participants willing to report to work during 
conventional disasters; however willingness 
decreased for situations non-conventional and 
less visible. Perception of risk increased (and 
willingness decreased) the longer a disaster 
situation lasted for. Some paramedics said 
they would self-impose quarantine if they 
were required to work during a health related 














Overall responsibility in the organization 
affected attitudes to returning to work the 
most, and having dependents had less effect 
than the researchers expected. Staff who were 
not perceived to be as important were more 
likely to show a preference towards home 
responsibilities, or to feel they would be in the 
way and would be better to stay away. Study 








Multiple incidents Willingness rates: Influenza pandemic 89%; 
severe earthquake 88%. Most frequently 
reported barriers for influenza pandemic were 
fear or concern for their family, fear or 
concern for themselves and personal health 
problems. For earthquake scenario most 
frequently cited barriers were transportation 
problems and fear or concern for family and 
self. For those respondents with children 
under 18 living at home, childcare obligations 
were a frequently cited barrier to reporting to 
work in both scenarios.  







in U.S.  
Bioterrorism Before the nature of the incident was known 
(scenario described vague presentations that 
would typical of an influenza-like illness 
outbreak) less than 80% would report to 
work. When healthcare workers fell ill that 
rate reduced to 55%. Once the agent was 
identified there was a significant decrease in 
willingness to respond. When the agent was 
identified as being transmissible and there 
were only experimental treatments available 
the response rate was less than 40%.  






Avian influenza 81.6% would not consider a job change or 
resigning even if they were required to take 
care of patients with the infection, even 
though 69.4%  reported being afraid of falling 
ill with the infection. 72.7% accepted a 
personal risk of avian influenza infection in 
the course of their work and 84% were 
prepared to take care of patients infected with 
the virus.  
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Reference Method Scenario(s) Key willingness findings 









in Australia  
Influenza 
pandemic 
56.3 reported that they would be willing to 
work during pandemic conditions. 75% would 
be prepared to wear PPE and 47.5% would be 
willing to change role. One third would refuse 
to work with a colleague exposed to a known 
case of pandemic human influenza and one 
quarter would refuse to work with a colleague 
exposed to suspected influenza. Increased 
willingness was associated with high 
confidence in employer and perceived 
adequate education/training on infectious 
disease generally. NB: Data was collected in 
2006.  





Avian influenza 58.7% of nurses thought that if an outbreak of 
avian flu occurred (with human to human 
transmission) their hospital would not have 
sufficient infection control measures. 56.9% 
indicated they were willing to care for patients 







in U.S.  
Radiological 
emergency 
Baseline knowledge, clinical competence and 
perception of personal safety were all 
positively associated with willingness to 
respond. Perception of personal safety was the 
primary determinant.  









Avian influenza 71.9% accepted the risk to their health from 
their occupation and the risk of falling ill with 
avian influenza, but 25.5% felt they should not 
be looking after avian influenza patients. 15% 
would consider resigning. 63.5% felt that 
people would avoid them during a pandemic 
and 54.1% felt that people would avoid their 
families.  











Avian influenza 82.5% accepted the risk to their health from 
their occupation and falling ill with avian 
influenza. 11.8% would consider stopping 
work. 69.9% felt that people would avoid them 
during a pandemic and 54.1% felt that people 
would avoid their families.  









76.9% reporting that they were not willing to 
take care of patients during H1N1 influenza 
pandemic. The reasons for being unwilling 
were: psychological stress (55%) and fear of 
being infected (29.2%). 74.5% wanted more 
training and professional education regarding 
how to deal with H1N1 influenza. 









67.9% said they were likely to volunteer if 
they were healthy and able. This is increased 
to 77.4% if they were provided with protective 
garments. 55.6% said they would volunteer if 
compensated and 50% said they would 
volunteer if conscripted by the government.  
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90% of students were not willing to work with 
contagious clients if transmission to family 
was possible and there was no prophylactic 
help to their family. Willingness rates 
increased when prophylactic vaccine or 

























Appendix B: Interview schedule 
 
Introduction to interview 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview. In this study we are interested in 
exploring business continuity after disruption, specifically after Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear or explosive incidents (CBRNe). There are no right or wrong answers to 
these questions. We do not expect you to be experts about these incidents. We are simply 
interested in your views and your likely reactions to these types of events. 
Before we start, do you have any questions? 
Do you mind if I record this interview? As noted on the information sheet, the audio recording 
will be destroyed after the interview is transcribed, and any quotes used in the report or future 
publications will be completely anonymous. You are free to leave this interview whenever you 
wish.  
 
Questions and Prompts 
 
Can I ask you to tell me a little bit about you role? 
How does your organisation plan for disruption (scenario planning or impact-based planning) 
Can you list some of the other types of incidents that you exercise for?  
How important do you think it is for your organisation to keep functioning during an incident? I 
mean in terms of keeping the country running. Why is it so important? 
Thinking about the average employee of this organisation, how much involvement do they 
have in the business continuity planning?  
Were you involved in the creation of your organisation's Business Continuity Plan? 
 - If yes, what was/is your role? 
What types of incidents does your organisation's Business Continuity Plan include?  
What types of incident do you think your organisation is not prepared for?  
- What would happen to the organisation if this kind of incident occurred? (The 
business and the individual employees) 
- What additional incidents do you think the organisation should prepare for? Why? 
Do you plan for CBRN incidents? How? 
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Can you tell me a bit about any incidents that have occurred and how your organisation 
responded to them? E.g. Swine flu, July 7th, September 11th, Fire, Flooding, Snow.  
How do you include staff concerns in business continuity planning? 
How do you expect your staff to react to an extreme event? To a CBRN incident? Would they 
come to work?  
Have you considered situations where staff might be unwilling to report to work? How would 
you deal with that? Have you experienced any unwilling staff in the past?  
What do you think might prevent staff from reporting to work? 
How would the organisation help staff to report to work? Practical interventions? Medication? 
Do you have any psychological interventions in place? 
Can you tell me a bit about how you communicate with staff during an incident?  
Who would communicate with staff during an incident? Who would tell staff it was safe to 
come to work? 
Do you have any thoughts or experience related to the use of social media during an incident? 
 
Do you have any other comments or points you think are relevant to this discussion? Do you 
have any questions for me?  
 
Thank you for taking part in this interview. If you do think of any questions or comments for 












Appendix C: Full list of survey questions and recoding information 
We are conducting an online survey as part of a PhD project which takes about 15-20 minutes to 
complete. The aim of the research is to examine the likely behaviour of employees during times of 
disruption, particularly in the event of a high impact extreme event (including incidents with a CBRN - 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive - or other hazardous materials element). 
 
We’d like you to fill in this survey if you are over 18 and currently working in the UK.  
 
Before we go on, there are some points we would like to make sure you are aware of: 
 We would like to assure you that all of the information we collect will be kept in the strictest 
confidence and used for research purposes only. It will not be possible to identify any individual 
in the reporting of the results.  
 We may share the findings from this survey with other research teams who are interested in 
this topic. If we do this, no individual will be identifiable from the data. Anonymised results may 
also be published in academic journals, practitioner publications and books.  
 Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw from it at any time 
without giving a reason up until the point of submission. Submission of a completed survey 
implies consent to participate.  
 As participation is anonymous it will not be possible for us to withdraw your data once you 
have submitted your questionnaire.  
 Data collected in this survey will be treated in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
Finally, if you would like to speak to someone about this survey, in the first instance you should contact 
the lead researcher Lorna Riddle (lorna.riddle@phe.gov.uk) or the research supervisors Dr. Brooke 
Rogers (brooke.rogers@kcl.ac.uk) and Dr. Richard Amlôt (richard.amlot@phe.gov.uk). 
1.  Please indicate that you have read the information on this page and are happy to take part in this 
study: 
 Yes – I consent to taking part in this study 
 No – I do not consent to taking part in this study 
2. Are you currently over 18 AND in paid employment in the UK? 
 Yes 
 No 
3. Are you currently registered as a full time student? 
 Yes 
 No 
4. How many hours a week do you work on average? 
5. What is your specific role/profession and in which industry? Please describe what you do as best you 
can. For example: Personal assistant in a retail organisation; bank branch manager; teacher; shop 
assistant; project manager for an IT firm; fundraiser for a charity; waitress etc.  
6. Does the organisation you work for operate in any of the following sectors of national infrastructure? 
(You can select more than one if applicable) 
 Communications (e.g. landline/mobile telephone networks and internet) 
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 Emergency services 
 Energy 






 It does not operate in any of these sectors 
 Don’t know 
7. Is the organisation you work for in the public or private sector? 
 Public sector 
 Private sector 
 Both public and private sector 
 Not-for-profit sector 
 Not sure 
 Other, please specify 
8. Roughly how many people are employed by the organisation you work for? 
 1 – I am the only employee 
 More than 1 but less than 10 
 More than 10 but less than 100 
 More than 100 but less than 1000 
 More than 1000 
 I don’t know 
9. Where in the UK is the location of your usual workplace? 
 East Midlands 
 East of England 
 Greater London 
 North East England 
 North West England 
 South East England 
 South West England 
 West Midlands 
 Yorkshire and the Humber 
 Scotland 
 Wales 
 Northern Ireland 
10. Which of these methods of transport do you usually use to get to your usual place of work? Please 
select all methods that you use. 











 I do not travel to get to work 
 Other, please specify 
11. How long does it take you to get to work on an average day? 
 I have no commute because I usually work from home 
 Up to 30 minutes 
 30 minutes to 1 hour 
 1 to 2 hours 
 Over 2 hours 
 Other, please specify  





 Other, please specify  
13. How many people at work report directly to you? 
14. How long have you worked for your present employer? 
15. Ideally how long do you plan to stay working for your current organisation? (Please choose the 
option that best applies to you? 
 I have given in my notice 
 Less than a year 
 More than 1 year but less than 5 years 
 More than 5 years but less than 10 years 
 More than 10 years 
 Until I retire 
16. Are you self-employed and/or do you own your own business? 
 Yes 
 No 
17. Have you ever had a resilience/business continuity/crisis management/emergency planning or 
related role? 
 Yes – my current role 
 Yes – a previous role 
 No – never 
 If unsure, please provide details of role here: 
18. Have you ever received any business continuity or crisis management training? 
 Yes – at a current organisation  
 Yes - at a previous organisation 
 No – never 
 If unsure, please provide details of training here: 
19. Are you well informed about the business continuity arrangements/plans at the organisation where 
you currently work? i.e. the plans for how an organisation would return to normal after disruption 
 Yes - I am fully informed 
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 Yes - but I only know some details 
 I am aware they exist but I don’t know any details 
 No – I don’t know if the organisation has any business continuity arrangements/plans  
 No – the organisation does not have any business continuity arrangements/plans 
20. Thinking about the organisation you currently work for, please indicate your level of agreement to 
the following statements: [Likert scale: 1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree]  
 All in all I am satisfied with my job 
 In general, I don’t like my job 
21. Thinking about the organisation you currently work for, please indicate your level of agreement to 
the following statements: [Likert scale: 1 = Strongly agree, 5 = Strongly disagree]  
 When someone criticises the organisation I work for, it feels like a personal insult 
 I am very interested in what others think about the organisation I work for 
 When I talk about the organisation I work for, I usually say ‘we’ rather than ‘they’ 
 This organisation’s successes are my successes 
 When someone praises the organisation I work for, it feels like a personal compliment 
 If a story in the media criticised the organisation I work for, I would feel embarrassed 





 N/A – I don’t have a supervisor/manager 
23. How often are you involved in conflicts with colleagues at work? 




 N/A  - I work alone 





25. Are you aware of any workplace bulling? (where you currently work) 
 Yes  
 No 
26. Please indicate your level of agreement to following statements: [Likert scale: 1 = Strongly agree, 9 = 
Strongly disagree]  
 The health and safety of staff is a high priority with management where I work 
 I believe management where I work would put the continuation of business above my 
personal safety in the event of a serious incident 
27. How secure do you feel in your job? (By secure it means not worrying about losing your job) 
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 Very secure 
 Secure 
 Insecure 
 Very insecure 
28. If for whatever reason you were to lose your current job, how easy do you think it would be for you 
to get another job? 
 Very easy 
 Fairly easy 
 Neither easy nor difficult/not sure 
 Fairly difficult 
 Very difficult 
29. How likely do you think it is that the following incidents will occur in an area close to your usual 
place of work? [Likert scale: 1 = Extremely likely to occur, 9 = Extremely unlikely to occur] [Order of 
incidents was randomised for each respondent] 
 Pandemic flu (new virus strain) 
 Bomb/explosive device 
 Nuclear incident 
 Severe snow 
 Deliberate release of smallpox virus 
 Severe flooding 
 Dirty bomb (bomb that contains radioactive material) 
 Chemical warfare agent release 
 Accidental chemical spill or leak 
 Deliberate release of pneumonic plague 
30. If the following incidents were to occur in an area close to your place of work, how likely would they 
be to cause severe public health consequences? [Likert scale: 1 = Extremely likely, 9 = Extremely 
unlikely]  [Incidents same as Q29] 
31. If the following incidents were to occur in an area close to your place of work, how likely would they 
be to put your own health at risk? Likert scale: 1 = Extremely likely, 9 = Extremely unlikely]  [Incidents 
same as Q29] 
32. Which of these factors do you think could potentially prevent you from reporting to your usual place 
of work in the event of a serious incident? (i.e. in such incidents as the ones listed in the previous 
section) Please select as many as apply.  
 Childcare responsibilities 
 Eldercare responsibilities 
 Transport problems 
 If I had a lack of knowledge about the specific incident 
 Fear for my own health or safety 
 Fear for my significant others’ health or safety 
 Stress/anxiety 
 I don’t care about my job that much 
 Not sure 
 I volunteer at another organisation 
 Other, please specify 
33. Which of these factors do you think could potentially motivate you to report to your usual place of 
work in the event of a serious incident? (i.e. in such incidents as the ones listed in the previous section) 
Please select as many as apply. 
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 Because it is my duty to report to work 
 Because my colleagues would report to work, therefore so should I 
 Because my colleagues might not report to work, therefore I should 
 Because I get paid to go to work 
 Because I would want to carry on as normal 
 Because I would want to be around colleagues for support 
 Because I would be concerned about losing my job if I didn’t report to work 
 If I was provided with an extra financial incentive  
 If I felt I had enough knowledge about the incident 
 If my organisation kept me up to date with frequent communication 
 Not sure 
 Other, please specify 
34. Please indicate your level of agreement to the following statements: [Likert scale: 1 = Strongly agree, 
9 = Strongly disagree]  
 If I can continue to work in the event of a serious incident it will make a big difference to 
the organisation I work for 
 If my organisation can continue to function in the event of a serious incident it will make a 
big difference to keeping the country running 
35. Thinking about the organisation you currently work for, please indicate your level of agreement to 
the following statements: [Likert scale: 1 = Strongly agree, 5 = Strongly disagree]  
 I believe my organisation has taken steps to find out what might prevent staff from 
reporting to work during a serious incident 
 During a serious incident my organisation wouldn’t be interested in why I wasn’t willing to 
come to work, only that I wasn’t at work 
36 – 37. For the next set of questions we would like you to imagine that the incident has occurred in (or 
is affecting) an area close to your usual place of work. For each incident please indicate your ability and 
willingness to report to your usual place of work. By 'ability' to report to work, we mean whether you 
are capable of getting to work and performing your duties. By 'willingness' to report to work, we mean 
whether you voluntarily intend to report to work. [Incidents same as Q29] 
Please select one response from each section: 
 Able 
 Not able 
 Not sure 
AND 
 Willing 
 Not willing 
 Not sure 
38. If your normal workplace was inaccessible, would you be able to work from home? i.e. is your job 
something you can do from home and be reasonably productive? For example, a taxi driver could not 
work from home if the taxi or roads were inaccessible. 
 Yes - I could work from home 
 Yes - I could work from home, but only for a few days 
 No - my job is not something I could do from home 
 I don’t know 
 Other, please explain 
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39. Thinking about a situation where your normal workplace was inaccessible, please answer the 
following questions. (Please answer N/A if your job means you cannot work from home) [Options: Yes; 
No; Not sure; N/A] 
 Would you be willing to work from home if your normal workplace was inaccessible? 
 Would you have all the equipment/resources you needed to be able to work from home? 
 Would it have been necessary for you to have brought some equipment (e.g. laptop, 
remote access token) home with you the previous day? 
 If you require a remote access token and/or laptop to connect from home, do you take this 
equipment home with you each day or keep it at home? (please answer N/A if you would 
not need to use this equipment to work from home) 
 Would you only be able to work from home if you had a working internet connection 
and/or phone? 
40. In the last 12 months, approximately how many times have you worked from home? (Please select 
the option that best applies to you) 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Once every 2 weeks 
 Once a month 
 On 5 or less separate occasions 
 Never (but I could have if I’d needed/wanted to) 
 Never (my job is not something I can do from home) 
 Never (my organisation does not allow working from home) 
 Other, please specify 
41. Age: 
42. Gender: 
43. Number of children under the age of 18: 
44. Number of children under the age of 5: 
45. Household composition:  
 I live alone 
 I live with my spouse/partner 
 I live with my children (who are under the age of 18) 
 I live with my children (who are 18 or older) 
 I live my parents or extended family 
 I live with others (not relations) 
 Other, please specify 
46. Are you currently expecting a baby? 
 Yes – I am pregnant 
 Yes – I am a father to an unborn baby 
 No 
47. Do you have elderly family members or family members with disabilities who rely on you for care? 
 Yes 
 No 




 Vocational qualifications (=NVQ1+2) 
 A-Level or equivalent (=NVQ3) 
 Bachelor Degree or equivalent (=NVQ4) 
 Masters/PhD or equivalent  
 No formal qualifications 
 Other 
49. What is your current salary? 
 Up to £10,000 
 Over £10,000 but less than £20,000 
 Over £20,000 but less than £30,000 
 Over £30,000 but less than £50,000 
 Over £50,000 but less than £75,000 
 Over £75,000 
 Prefer not to say 
50. In general, how would you rate your overall health? 
 Excellent 




51. Do you have any chronic (long-standing) illness, disability or infirmity?  
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
52. Please indicate how often the following apply to you: [Likert scale: 1=Very often, 5 = Not at all] 
 How often do you do dangerous things for fun? 
 How often do you do exciting things, even if they are dangerous? 
53. Please indicate how true the following statements are for you: [Not true at all; Rarely true; 
Sometimes true; Often true; True nearly all of the time] 
 I am able to adapt to change 
 I tend to bounce back after illness or hardship 
54. Would you say that filling in this survey has made you feel at all upset? Note: If you answer yes, 
please feel free to contact the lead researcher (contact details on the next page)  




Age was recoded into ‘18-24’, ‘25-43’, ’35-44’, ‘45-54’ or ‘55+’;  Education was recoded into ‘GCSE/A 
Level or equivalent’, ‘Bachelor degree or equivalent’ or ‘Masters/PhD or equivalent’ and those who 
selected ‘other’ and whose written response could not be grouped into one of the categories were 
counted as missing data; Salary was recoded into ‘Up to £30k’, ‘More than £30k but less than £50k’ and 
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‘£50k or more’, ‘prefer not to say’ was coded as missing data; Location of work was recoded into 
‘London’ or ‘Not London’; Children under 18 was recoded into ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Direct reports was recoded 
into ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; Business Continuity role was recoded into ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; Business Continuity training 
was recoded into ‘Yes’ or ‘No’; General ability to work from Home was recoded into ‘Able to work from 
home’ and Not able to work from home’; Job security was recoded into ‘Insecure’ and ‘Secure’; Ease of 
finding a new job was recoded into ‘Easy’ or ‘Difficult’, with the ‘neither/not sure’ category removed; for 
the working climate questions about their supervisor/manager considering their views, being involved in 
conflicts at work and feeling uneasy about going to work, responses were recoded into 
‘Often/Sometimes’ and ‘Rarely/Never’, with the ‘N/A’ responses removed. The question about health 
was removed from the final odds ratio analysis due to a very low number of responses in two of the five 
categories (‘Fair’ and ‘Poor’) for which it was decided it was not appropriate to recode and include these 
in the remaining three groups (‘Excellent’, ‘Very Good’ and ‘Good’) as they are too qualitatively 
different. The results from the separate ‘threat’ and ‘efficacy’ items of the modified EPPM were 
summed to create the final ‘threat’ and ‘efficacy’ values. These were then dichotomised at the median 
to create low and high categories as per the method of Barnett et al.
693
  Low ‘threat’ or ‘efficacy’ were 
calculated as less than or equal to the median, and high ‘threat’ or ‘efficacy’ were calculated as greater 
than the median. Each survey respondent was then put into one of the four EPPM categories: Low 
Threat Low Efficacy (LTLE), Low Threat High Efficacy (LTHE), High Threat Low Efficacy (HTLE) and High 
Threat High Efficacy (HTHE).  
The outcome variable ‘willingness to report to work’ was dichotomised into those who said they would 
be ‘willing’ to report to work and those who said they were ‘not willing’ or ‘not sure’. The predictor 
variable ‘ability to report to work’ for each incident was dichotomised the same way as the outcome 
variable into ‘able’ to report to work and perform their duties and those who said they were ‘not able’ 
or ‘not sure’. This dichotomisation was employed in a similar way to the method of analysis employed 
by Qureshi et al., in their study of the correlates of the ability and willingness of healthcare workers to 
report to duty during catastrophic disasters; however for the present study only ‘willingness’ to work 









                                                          
693
 Barnett et al., ‘Assessment of Local Public Health Workers’ Willingness to Respond to Pandemic 
Influenza’. 
694
 Qureshi et al., ‘Health Care Workers’ Ability’. 
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Appendix D: Supplementary survey response tables 
 
Table D1 Participants willing to work for each incident 
Scenario Number of participants willing to go to 
work/total sample (%) 
Bomb/explosive device 166/312 (53.2) 
Chemical warfare agent release  70/312 (22.4) 
Accidental chemical spill or leak 177/312 (56.7) 
Pandemic flu (new strain) 173/312 (55.4) 
Deliberate release of the smallpox virus 91/312 (29.2) 
Dirty bomb 69/312 (22.1) 
Severe flooding 258/312 (82.7) 
Deliberate release of pneumonic plague 75/312 (24.0) 
Severe snow 276/312 (88.5) 
Nuclear incident 76/312 (24.4) 
 
Table D2 Participants able to work for each incident 
Scenario Number of participants able to go to 
work/total sample (%) 
Bomb/explosive device 129/312 (41.3) 
Chemical warfare agent release  96/312 (30.8) 
Accidental chemical spill or leak 156/312 (50.0) 
Pandemic flu (new strain) 196/312 (62.8) 
Deliberate release of the smallpox virus 128/312 (41.0) 
Dirty bomb 84/312 (26.9) 
Severe flooding 116/312 (37.2) 
Deliberate release of pneumonic plague 124/312 (39.7) 
Severe snow 141/312 (45.2) 
Nuclear incident 82/312 (26.3) 
 
Table D3 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of a 
bomb/explosive device  
Demographic 
Variable 
No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   2.528 0.112 
Male 156 (50) 91 (58.3)   
Female 156 (50) 77 (49.4)   
Age:   10.361 0.035 
18-24 23 (7.4) 7 (30.4)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 70 (50.7)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 32 (53.3)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 35 (62.5)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 24 (68.6)   
Children under 18:   1.422 0.233 
Yes 86 (27.6) 51 (59.3)   
No 226 (72.4) 117 (51.8)   
Education:   3.810 0.149 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 24 (42.9)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 76 (58.0)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 66 (55.9)   
Health:   9.285 0.054 (but 2 cells 
had less than 5 with 
no Fisher reported) 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 41 (51.9)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 86 (59.7)   





No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Fair 14 (4.5) 10 (71.4)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   1.633 0.201 
London 146 (46.8) 73 (50)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 95 (57.2)   
Salary:   3.667 0.160 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 45 (45.9)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 62 (55.4)   
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 54 (59.3)   
 
Table D4 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of a 
chemical warfare agent release 
Demographic Variable No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   0.663 0.415 
Male 156 (50) 32 (20.5)   
Female 156 (50) 38 (24.4)   
Age:   3.776 0.437 
18-24 23 (7.4) 2 (8.7)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 30 (21.7)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 14 (23.3)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 16 (28.6)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 8 (22.9)   
Children under 18:     
Yes 86 (27.6) 22 (25.6) 0.675 0.249 
No 226 (72.4) 48 (21.2)   
Education:   1.243 0.537 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 10 (17.9)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 33 (25.2)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 26 (22.0)   
Health:   5.868 0.209 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 21 (26.6)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 37 (25.7)   
Good 74 (23.7) 10 (13.5)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 2 (14.3)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   2.451 0.117 
London 146 (46.8) 27 (18.5)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 43 (25.9)   
Salary:   2.228 0.319 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 18 (18.4)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 30 (26.8)   










Table D5 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of 
an accidental chemical spill or leak 
Demographic Variable No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   2.207 0.137 
Male 156 (50) 82 (52.6)   
Female 156 (50) 95 (60.9)   
Age:   5.967 0.202 
18-24 23 (7.4) 13 (56.5)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 77 (55.8)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 28 (46.7)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 34 (60.7)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 25 (71.4)   
Children under 18:   0.508 0.476 
Yes 86 (27.6) 46 (53.5)   
No 226 (72.4) 131 (58.0)   
Education:   2.899 0.235 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 30 (53.6)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 82 (62.6)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 62 (52.5)   
Health:   5.037 0.283 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 47 (59.5)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 87 (60.4)   
Good 74 (23.7) 35 (47.3)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 8 (57.1)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   3.213 0.073 
London 146 (46.8) 75 (51.4)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 102 (61.4)   
Salary:   1.279 0.528 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 60 (61.2)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 60 (53.6)   
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 51 (56.0)   
 
Table D6 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of 
pandemic flu (new strain) 
Demographic Variable No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   3.750 0.53 
Male 156 (50) 78 (50)   
Female 156 (50) 95 (60.9)   
Age:   7.438 0.114 
18-24 23 (7.4) 11 (47.8)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 71 (51.4)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 31 (51.7)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 34 (60.7)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 26 (74.3)   
Children under 18:   0.469 0.494 
Yes 86 (27.6) 45 (52.3)   
No 226 (72.4) 128 (56.6)   
Education:   5.225 0.073 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 30 (53.6)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 82 (62.6)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 57 (48.3)   
Health:   7.030 0.134 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 47 (59.5)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 86 (59.7)   
 311 
 
Demographic Variable No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Good 74 (23.7) 35 (47.3)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 5 (35.7)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   4.179  0.041 
London 146 (46.8) 72 (49.3)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 101 (60.8)   
Salary:   0.128 0.938 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 54 (55.1)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 64 (57.1)   
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 50 (54.9)   
Self employed/own 
business: 
  0.083 0.773 
Yes 17 (5.4) 10 (58.8)   
No 295 (94.6) 163 (55.3)   
 
Table D7 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of a 
deliberate release of the smallpox virus  
Demographic 
Variable 
No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   0.16 0.901 
Male 156 (50) 45 (28.8)   
Female 156 (50) 46 (29.5)   
Age:   3.419 0.490 
18-24 23 (7.4) 6 (26.1)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 35 (25.4)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 17 (28.3)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 21 (37.5)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 12 (34.3)   
Children under 18:   0.065 0.798 
Yes 86 (27.6) 26 (30.2)   
No 226 (72.4) 65 (28.8)   
Education:   2.090 0.352 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 17 (30.4)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 43 (32.8)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 29 (24.6)   
Health:   7.224 0.125* 3 cells have 
expected count less 
than 5.  
Excellent 79 (25.3) 23 (29.1)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 50 (34.7)   
Good 74 (23.7) 17 (23.0)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 1 (7.1)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   1.942 0.163 
London 146 (46.8) 37 (25.3)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 54 (32.5)   
Salary:   0.211 0.900 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 27 (27.6)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 34 (30.4)   











No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   0.19 0.891 
Male 156 (50) 35 (22.4)   
Female 156 (50) 34 (21.8)   
Age:   5.964 0.202 
18-24 23 (7.4) 3 (13)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 25 (18.1)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 14 (23.3)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 18 (32.1)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 9 (25.7)   
Children under 18:   2.312 0.128 
Yes 86 (27.6) 24 (27.9)   
No 226 (72.4) 45 (19.9)   
Education:   3.821 0.148 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 9 (16.1)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 36 (27.5)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 23 (19.5)   
Health:   4.917 0.296* 3 cells have 
expected count less 
than 5 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 21 (26.6)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 35 (24.3)   
Good 74 (23.7) 12 (16.2)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 1 (7.1)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   6.448 0.011 
London 146 (46.8) 23 (15.8)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 46 (27.7)   
Salary:   1.781 0.411 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 17 (17.3)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 27 (24.1)   
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 22 (24.2)   
 
Table D9 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of 
severe flooding  
Demographic 
Variable 
No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   0.000 1.000 
Male 156 (50) 129 (82.7)   
Female 156 (50) 129 (82.7)   
Age:   4.891 0.299 
18-24 23 (7.4) 20 (87.0)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 109 (79.0)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 48 (80.0)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 51 (91.1)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 30 (85.7)   
Children under 18:   0.88 0.767 
Yes 86 (27.6) 72 (83.7)   
No 226 (72.4) 186 (82.3)   
Education:   1.123 0.570 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 44 (78.6)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 111 (84.7)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 99 (83.9)   





No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
expected count less 
than 5 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 68 (86.1)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 120 (83.3)   
Good 74 (23.7) 58 (78.4)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 11 (78.6)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 1 (0.4)   
Work location:   0.671 0.413 
London 146 (46.8) 118 (80.8)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 140 (84.3)   
Salary:   5.342 0.069 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 82 (83.7)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 86 (76.8)   
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 81 (89.0)   
 
Table D10 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of 
a deliberate release of pneumonic plague  
Demographic 
Variable 
No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   0.18 0.895 
Male 156 (50) 37 (23.7)   
Female 156 (50) 38 (24.4)   
Age:   4.809 0.307 
18-24 23 (7.4) 3 (13.0)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 28 (20.3)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 17 (28.3)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 17 (30.4)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 10 (28.6)   
Children under 18:   2.495 0.114 
Yes 86 (27.6) 26 (30.2)   
No 226 (72.4) 49 (21.7)   
Education:   0.798 0.671 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 11 (19.6)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 33 (25.2)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 30 (25.4)   
Health:   5.561* 3 cells have 
expected count less 
than 5 
0.234 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 22 (27.8)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 39 (27.1)   
Good 74 (23.7) 13 (17.6)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 1 (7.1)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   3.550 0.060 
London 146 (46.8) 28 (19.2)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 47 (28.3)   
Salary:   1.433 0.488 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 19 (19.4)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 29 (25.9)   










No (%) of participants No (%) willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   8.039 0.005 
Male 156 (50) 146 (93.6)   
Female 156 (50) 130 (83.3)   
Age:   1.560* 2 cells have 
expected count less 
than 5 
0.816 
18-24 23 (7.4) 20 (87.0)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 122 (88.4)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 52 (86.7)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 52 (92.9)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 30 (85.7)   
Children under 18:   0.582 0.446 
Yes 86 (27.6) 78 (90.7)   
No 226 (72.4) 198 (87.6)   
Education:   5.000 0.082 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 45 (80.4)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 119 (90.8)   
Masters/PhD or 
equivalent 
118 (38.7) 107 (90.7)   
Health:   3.007* 3 cells have 
expected count less 
than 5 
0.557 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 72 (91.1)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 129 (89.6)   
Good 74 (23.7) 63 (85.1)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 11 (78.6)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 1 (100)   
Work location:   1.866 0.172 
London 146 (46.8) 133 (91.1)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 143 (86.1)   
Salary:   0.560 0.756 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 85 (86.7)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 98 (87.5)   
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 82 (90.1)   
 
Table D12 Associations between demographic variables and willingness to work in the event of 
a nuclear incident  
Demographic 
Variable 
No (%) of 
participants 
No (%)willing to go 
to work 
X² p 
Gender:   0.070 0.792 
Male 156 (50) 39 (25.0)   
Female 156 (50) 37 (23.7)   
Age:   4.080 0.395 
18-24 23 (7.4) 3 (13.0)   
25-34 138 (44.2) 31 (22.5)   
35-44 60 (19.2) 14 (23.3)   
45-54 56 (17.9) 18 (32.1)   
55+ 35 (11.2) 10 (28.6)   
Children under 18:   0.811 0.368 
Yes 86 (27.6) 24 (27.9)   
No 226 (72.4) 52 (23.0)   
Education:   2.534 0.282 
GCSE/A Level or 
equivalent 
56 (18.4) 11 (19.6)   
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 38 (29.0)   





No (%) of 
participants 




Health:   4.237* 3 cells have 
expected count less 
than 5 
0.375 
Excellent 79 (25.3) 23 (29.1)   
Very good 144 (46.2) 38 (26.4)   
Good 74 (23.7) 13 (17.6)   
Fair 14 (4.5) 2 (14.3)   
Poor 1 (0.3) 0 (0)   
Work location:   7.797 0.005 
London 146 (46.8) 25 (17.1)   
Not London 166 (53.2) 51 (30.7)   
Salary:   1.113 0.573 
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 21 (21.4)   
More than £30k less 
than £50k 
112 (37.2) 31 (27.7)   
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 22 (24.2)   
 
Table D13 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of a bomb/explosive device (odds ratios adjusted for age)   
Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
Gender:      
Male 156 (50) 91 (58.3) 0.241  1.315  (0.832-
2.077) 
Female 156 (50) 77 (49.4)   Ref 
Age:      
18-24 23 (7.4) 7 (30.4) 0.006 0.201 (0.064-
0.627) 
 
25-34 138 (44.2) 70 (50.7) 0.062 0.472 (0.215-
1.037) 
 
35-44 60 (19.2) 32 (53.3) 0.148 0.524 (0.218-
1.257) 
 
45-54 56 (17.9) 35 (62.5) 0.556 0.764 (0.312-
1.870) 
 
55+ 35 (11.2) 24 (68.6)  Ref  
Work location:      
London 146 (46.8) 73 (50) 0.589  0.878 (0.549-
1.406) 
Not London 166 (53.2) 95 (57.2)   Ref 
Salary:      
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 45 (45.9) 0.295  0.716 (0.384-
1.337) 
More than £30k less than 
£50k 
112 (37.2) 62 (55.4) 0.815  0.934 (0.536-
1.658) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 54 (59.3)   Ref 
Children under 18:      
Yes 86 (27.6) 51 (59.3) 0.559  0.1.187 (0.669-
2.107) 
No 226 (72.4) 117 (51.8)   Ref 
Education:      
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 24 (42.9) 0.028  0.460 (0.230-
0.922) 
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 76 (58.0) 0.936  1.022 (0.606-
1.721) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 66 (55.9)   Ref 
Direct reports:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 81 (60.9) 0.141  1.427 (0.889-
2.292) 
No 179 (57.4) 87 (48.6)   Ref 
Business continuity role:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 88 (66.2) 0.002  2.175 (1.345-
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Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 








No 179 (57.4) 80 (44.7)   Ref 
Business continuity 
training: 
     
Yes 156 (50.0) 102 (65.4) 0.000  2.352 (1.469-
3.767) 
No 156 (50.0) 66 (42.3)   Ref 
General ability to work 
from home: 
     
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 137 (52.7) 0.691  0.879 (0.465-
1.661) 
Not able to work from 
home 
49 (15.9) 29 (59.2)   Ref 
Job security:      
Insecure 61 (19.6) 30 (49.2) 0.377  0.771 (0.433-
1.373) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 138 (55.0)   Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:      
Easy 132 (42.3) 73 (55.3) 0.243  1.422 (0.780-
2.665) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 56 (54.4) 0.464  1.262 (0.677-
2.350) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 39 (50.6)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often does your 
supervisor or manager 
consider your views? 
     
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 154 (55.0) 0.050  2.296 (0.999-
5.281) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 10 (37.0)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often are you involved in 
conflicts at work? 
     
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 41 (60.3) 0.586  1.170 (0.665-
2.059) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 127 (52.0)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often do you feel uneasy 
about going to work? 
     
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 52 (52.0) 0.647  0.892 (0.548-
1.453) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 116 (54.7)   Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
     
Yes 77 (24.7) 44 (57.1) 0.986  0.995 (0.581-
1.703) 
No 235 (75.3) 124 (52.8)   Ref 
Ability to go to work 
(incident specific) 
     
Not Able 183 (58.7) 69 (37.7) 0.000  0.189 (0.113-
0.316) 








Table D14 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of a chemical warfare agent release 
Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Gender:     
Male 156 (50) 32 (20.5) 0.416 0.801 (0.470-1.366) 
Female 156 (50) 38 (24.4)  Ref 
Age:     
18-24 23 (7.4) 2 (8.7) 0.178 0.178 (0.62-1.676) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 30 (21.7) 0.887 0.887 (0.386-2.275) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 14 (23.3) 0.958 0.958 (0.382-2.765) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 16 (28.6) 0.548 0.548 (0.507-3.594) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 8 (22.9)  Ref 
Work location:     
London 146 (46.8) 27 (18.5) 0.119 0.649 (0.377-1.117) 
Not London 166 (53.2) 43 (25.9)  Ref 
Salary:     
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 18 (18.4) 0.664 0.853 (0.415-1.750) 
More than £30k less than £50k 112 (37.2) 30 (26.8) 0.329 1.386 (0.719-2.672) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 19 (20.9)  Ref 
Children under 18:     
Yes 86 (27.6) 22 (25.6) 0.412 1.275 (0.714-2.276) 
No 226 (72.4) 48 (21.2)  Ref 
Education:     
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 10 (17.9) 0.526  0.769 (0.342-1.730) 
Bachelor degree or equivalent 131 (43.0) 33 (25.2) 0.559 1.192 (0.662-2.144) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 26 (22.0)  Ref 
Direct reports:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 35 (26.3) 0.158 1.469 (0.861-2.507) 
No 179 (57.4) 35 (19.6)  Ref 
Business continuity role:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 36 (27.1) 0.092 1.583 (0.927-2.701) 
No 179 (57.4) 34 (19.0)  Ref 
Business continuity training:     
Yes 156 (50.0) 42 (26.9) 0.059 1.684 (0.981-2.892) 
No 156 (50.0) 28 (17.9)  Ref 
General ability to work from 
home: 
    
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 54 (20.8) 0.132 0.594 (0.302-1.1170) 
Not able to work from home 49 (15.9) 15 (30.6)  Ref 
Job security:     
Insecure 61 (19.6) 9 (14.8) 0.113 0.539 (0.251-1.157) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 61 (24.3)  Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:     
Easy 132 (42.3) 31 (23.5) 0.416 0.767 (0.406-1.452) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 17 (16.5) 0.054 0.494 (0.241-1.013) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 22 (28.7)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
does your supervisor or 
manager consider your 
views? 
    
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 64 (22.9) 0.170 2.370 (0.691-8.128) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 3 (11.1)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
are you involved in conflicts 
at work? 
    
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 17 (25.0) 0.567 1.201 (0.641-2.250) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 53 (21.7)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
do you feel uneasy about 
going to work? 
    
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 22 (22.0 0.899 0.964 (0.544-1.708) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 48 (22.6)  Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
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Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
bullying? 
Yes 77 (24.7) 24 (31.2) 0.036 1.861 (1.042-3.323) 
No 235 (75.3) 46 (19.6)  Ref 
Ability to go to work (incident 
specific) 
    
Not Able 216 (69.2) 35 (16.2) 0.000 0.337 (0.194-0.585) 
Able 96 (30.8) 36 (36.5)  Ref 
 
Table D15 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of an accidental chemical spill or leak 
Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Gender:     
Male 156 (50) 82 (52.6) 0.138 0.712 (0.454-1.115) 
Female 156 (50) 95 (60.9)  Ref 
Age:     
18-24 23 (7.4) 13 (56.5) 0.245 0.520 (0.173-1.567) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 77 (55.8) 0.097 0.505 (0.225-1.131) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 28 (46.7) 0.021 0.350 (0.143-0.854) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 34 (60.7) 0.299 0.618 (0.249-1.533) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 25 (71.4)  Ref 
Work location:     
London 146 (46.8) 75 (51.4) 0.074 0.663 (0.422-1.040) 
Not London 166 (53.2) 102 (61.4)  Ref 
Salary:     
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 60 (61.2) 0.470 1.238 (0.693-2.212) 
More than £30k less than £50k 112 (37.2) 60 (53.6) 0.725 0.905 (0.519-1.578) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 51 (56.0)  Ref 
Children under 18:     
Yes 86 (27.6) 46 (53.5) 0.476 0.834 (0.506-1.374) 
No 226 (72.4) 131 (58.0)  Ref 
Education:     
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 30 (53.6) 0.899 1.042 (0.551-1.971) 
Bachelor degree or equivalent 131 (43.0) 82 (62.6) 0.109 1.512 (0.912-2.506) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 62 (52.5)  Ref 
Direct reports:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 79 (59.4) 0.412 1.209 (0.768-1.905) 
No 179 (57.4) 98 (54.7)  Ref 
Business continuity role:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 86 (64.7) 0.015 1.769 (1.116-2.805) 
No 179 (57.4) 91 (50.8)  Ref 
Business continuity training:     
Yes 156 (50.0) 101 (64.7) 0.004 1.933 (1.227-3.045) 
No 156 (50.0) 76 (48.7)  Ref 
General ability to work from 
home: 
    
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 147 (56.5) 0.938 0.976 (0.527-1.808) 
Not able to work from home 49 (15.9) 28 (57.1)  Ref 
Job security:     
Insecure 61 (19.6) 29 (47.5) 0.108 0.631 (0.360-1.106) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 148 (59.0)  Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:     
Easy 132 (42.3) 84 (63.6) 0.851  1.057 (0.591-1.891) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 45 (43.7) 0.014 0.469 (0.256-0.857) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 48 (62.3)   
Working climate: How often 
does your supervisor or 
manager consider your 
views? 
    
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 161 (57.5) 0.099 1.968 (0.881-4.395) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 11 (40.7)  Ref 
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Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Working climate: How often 
are you involved in conflicts 
at work? 
    
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 38 (55.9) 0.873 0.957 (0.557-1.645) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 139 (57.0)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
do you feel uneasy about 
going to work? 
    
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 52 (52.0) 0.247 0.754 (0.467-1.216) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 125 (59.0)  Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
    
Yes 77 (24.7) 48 (62.3) 0.253 1.360 (0.802-2.305) 
No 235 (75.3) 129 (54.9)  Ref 
Ability to go to work (incident 
specific) 
    
Not Able 156 (50.0) 60 (38.5) 0.000 0.208 (0.128-0.338) 
Able 156 (50.0) 117 (75.0)  Ref 
 
Table D16 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of pandemic flu (new strain) (odds ratios adjusted for location)  
Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
Gender:      
Male 156 (50) 78 (50) 0.069  0.640 (0.407-
1.007) 
Female 156 (50) 95 (60.9)   Ref 
Age:      
18-24 23 (7.4) 11 (47.8) 0.076  0.359 (0.116-
1.112) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 71 (51.4) 0.037  0.408 (0.176-
0.948) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 31 (51.7) 0.057  0.408 (0.162-
1.028) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 34 (60.7) 0.195  0.541 (0.213-
1.371) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 26 (74.3)   Ref 
Work location:      
London 146 (46.8) 72 (49.3) 0.041 0.626 (0.399-
0.982) 
 
Not London 166 (53.2) 101 (60.8)  Ref  
Salary:      
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 54 (55.1) 0.711  0.894 (0.496-
1.613) 
More than £30k less than 
£50k 
112 (37.2) 64 (57.1) 0.889  1.041 (0.593-
1.828) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 50 (54.9)   Ref 
Children under 18:      
Yes 86 (27.6) 45 (52.3) 0.414  0.618 (0.394-
0.971) 
No 226 (72.4) 128 (56.6)   Ref 
Education:      
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 30 (53.6) 0.680  1.145 (0.601-
2.2184) 
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 82 (62.6) 0.032  1.747 (1.049-
2.907) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 57 (48.3)   Ref 
Direct reports:      




Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
No 179 (57.4) 93 (52.0)   Ref 
Business continuity role:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 87 (65.4) 0.005  1.961 (1.231-
3.126) 
No 179 (57.4) 86 (48.0)   Ref 
Business continuity 
training: 
     
Yes 156 (50.0) 104 (66.7) 0.000  2.557 (1.609-
4.062) 
No 156 (50.0) 69 (44.2)   Ref 
General ability to work 
from home: 
     
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 145 (55.8) 0.629  1.168 (0.622-
2.190) 
Not able to work from 
home 
49 (15.9) 27 (55.1)   Ref 
Job security:      
Insecure 61 (19.6) 23 (37.7) 0.002  0.396 (0.221-
0.708) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 150 (59.8)   Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:      
Easy 132 (42.3) 75 (56.8) 0.839  0.942 (0.529-
1.678) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 52 (50.5) 0.236  0.695 (0.381-
1.268) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 46 (59.7)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often does your 
supervisor or manager 
consider your views? 
     
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 160 (57.1) 0.011  2.982 (1.278-
6.957) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 9 (33.3)    
Working climate: How 
often are you involved in 
conflicts at work? 
     
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 41 (60.3) 0.392  1.272 (0.733-
2.207) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 132 (54.1)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often do you feel uneasy 
about going to work? 
     
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 48 (48.0) 0.087  0.657 (0.406-
1.064) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 125 (59.0)   Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
     
Yes 77 (24.7) 47 (61.0) 0.350  0.640 (0.407-
1.006) 
No 235 (75.3) 126 (53.6)   Ref 
Ability to go to work 
(incident specific) 
     
Not Able 116 (37.2) 43 (37.1) 0.000  0.308 (0.190-
0.499) 







Table D17 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of a deliberate release of the smallpox virus 
Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Gender:     
Male 156 (50) 45 (28.8) 0.901 0.969 (0.595-1.580) 
Female 156 (50) 46 (29.5)  Ref 
Age:     
18-24 23 (7.4) 6 (26.1) 0.510 0.676 (0.211-2.165) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 35 (25.4) 0.291 0.651 (0.294-1.444) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 17 (28.3) 0.544 0.758 (0.309-1.856) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 21 (37.5) 0.756 1.150 (0.476-2.781) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 12 (34.3)  Ref 
Work location:     
London 146 (46.8) 37 (25.3) 0.164 0.704 (0.429-1.154) 
Not London 166 (53.2) 54 (32.5)  Ref 
Salary:     
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 27 (27.6) 0.747 0.901 (0.479-1.695) 
More than £30k less than £50k 112 (37.2) 34 (30.4) 0.915 1.033 (0.565-1.890) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 27 (29.7)  Ref 
Children under 18:     
Yes 86 (27.6) 26 (30.2) 0.798 1.073 (0.624-1.847) 
No 226 (72.4) 65 (28.8)  Ref 
Education:     
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 17 (30.4) 0.420 1.338 (0.660-2.718) 
Bachelor degree or equivalent 131 (43.0) 43 (32.8) 0.153 1.500 (0.860-2.614) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 29 (24.6)  Ref 
Direct reports:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 43 (32.3) 0.290 1.304 (0.798-2.131) 
No 179 (57.4) 48 (26.8)  Ref 
Business continuity role:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 46 (34.6) 0.070 1.574 (0.963-2.574) 
No 179 (57.4) 45 (25.1)  Ref 
Business continuity training:     
Yes 156 (50.0) 54 (34.6) 0.035 1.703 (1.038-2.793) 
No 156 (50.0) 37 (23.7)  Ref 
General ability to work from 
home: 
    
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 74 (28.5) 0.554 0.821 (0.426-1.580) 
Not able to work from home 49 (15.9) 16 (32.7)  Ref 
Job security:     
Insecure 61 (19.6) 12 (19.7) 0.072 0.533 (0.269-1.058) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 79 (31.5)  Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:     
Easy 132 (42.3) 41 (31.1) 0.987 0.995 (0.542-1.826) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 26 (25.2) 0.380 0.746 (0.387-1.437) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 24 (31.2)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
does your supervisor or 
manager consider your 
views? 
    
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 84 (30.0) 0.106 2.464 (0.827-7.345) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 4 (14.8)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
are you involved in conflicts 
at work? 
    
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 24 (35.3) 0.210 1.441 (0.814-2.551) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 67 (27.5)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
do you feel uneasy about 
going to work? 
    
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 26 (26.0) 0.399 0.795 (0.466-1.355) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 65 (30.7)  Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
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Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
bullying? 
Yes 77 (24.7) 26 (33.8) 0.307 1.333 (0.768-2.316) 
No 235 (75.3) 65 (27.7)  Ref 
Ability to go to work (incident 
specific) 
    
Not Able 184 (59.0) 43 (23.4) 0.007 0.508 (0.310-0.833) 
Able 128 (41.0) 48 (37.5)  Ref 
 
Table D18 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of a dirty bomb (odds ratios adjusted for location) 
Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
Gender:      
Male 156 (50) 35 (22.4) 0.762  1.087 (0.633-
1.869) 
Female 156 (50) 34 (21.8)   Ref 
Age:      
18-24 23 (7.4) 3 (13) 0.401  0.537 (0.126-
2.291) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 25 (18.1) 0.568  0.771 (0.315-
1.884) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 14 (23.3) 0.923  1.050 (0.392-
2.811) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 18 (32.1) 0.483  1.405 (0.544-
3.628) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 9 (25.7)   Ref 
Work location:      
London 146 (46.8) 23 (15.8) 0.012 0.488 (0.279-
0.854) 
 
Not London 166 (53.2) 46 (27.7)  Ref  
Salary:      
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 17 (17.3) 0.086  0.525 (0.251-
1.095) 
More than £30k less than 
£50k 
112 (37.2) 27 (24.1) 0.766  0.905 (0.467-
1.752) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 22 (24.2)   Ref 
Children under 18:      
Yes 86 (27.6) 24 (27.9) 0.171  0.667 (0.374-
1.191) 
No 226 (72.4) 45 (19.9)   Ref 
Education:      
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 9 (16.1) 0.417  0.701 (0.297-
1.654) 
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 36 (27.5) 0.185  1.503 (0.822-
2.747) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 23 (19.5)   Ref 
Direct reports:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 37 (27.8) 0.028  1.843 (1.067-
3.183) 
No 179 (57.4) 32 (17.9)   Ref 
Business continuity role:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 39 (29.3) 0.019  1.931 (1.116-
3.339) 
No 179 (57.4) 30 (16.8)   Ref 
Business continuity 
training: 
     
Yes 156 (50.0) 43 (27.6) 0.020  1.929 (1.108-
3.358) 
No 156 (50.0) 26 (16.7)   Ref 
General ability to work 
from home: 
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Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 54 (20.8) 0.453  0.764 (0.378-
1.544) 
Not able to work from 
home 
49 (15.9) 14 (28.6)   Ref 
Job security:      
Insecure 61 (19.6) 10 (16.4) 0.206  0.618 (0.294-
1.303) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 59 (23.5)   Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:      
Easy 132 (42.3) 32 (24.2) 0.835  1.073 (0.552-
2.086) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 18 (17.5) 0.261  0.657 (0.315-
1.367) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 19 (24.7)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often does your 
supervisor or manager 
consider your views? 
     
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 65 (23.2) 0.050  4.378 (1.001-
19.158) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 2 (7.4)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often are you involved in 
conflicts at work? 
     
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 18 (26.5) 0.362  1.339 (0.715-
2.508) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 51 (20.9)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often do you feel uneasy 
about going to work? 
     
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 17 (17.0) 0.172  0.652 (0.353-
1.205) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 52 (24.5)   Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
     
Yes 77 (24.7) 22 (28.6) 0.191  1.489 (0.820-
2.704) 
No 235 (75.3) 47 (20.0)   Ref 
Ability to go to work 
(incident specific) 
     
Not Able 228 (73.1) 40 (17.5) 0.004  0.436 (0.246--
0773) 
Able 84 (26.9) 29 (34.5)   Ref 
 
Table D19 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of severe flooding 
Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Gender:     
Male 156 (50) 129 (82.7) 1.000 1.000 (0.445-1.798) 
Female 156 (50) 129 (82.7)  Ref 
Age:     
18-24 23 (7.4) 20 (87.0) 0.893 1.111 (0.238-5.178 
25-34 138 (44.2) 109 (79.0) 0.374 0.626 (0.223-1.757) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 48 (80.0) 0.485 0.667 (0.214-2.082) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 51 (91.1) 0.430 1.700 (0.455-6.358) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 30 (85.7)  Ref 
Work location:     
London 146 (46.8) 118 (80.8) 0.413 0.783 (0.435-1.408) 
Not London 166 (53.2) 140 (84.3)  Ref 
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Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Salary:     
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 82 (83.7) 0.290 0.633 (0.271-1.477) 
More than £30k less than £50k 112 (37.2) 86 (76.8) 0.026 0.408 (0.185-0.900) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 81 (89.0)  Ref 
Children under 18:     
Yes 86 (27.6) 72 (83.7) 0.767 1.106 (0.568-2.154) 
No 226 (72.4) 186 (82.3)  Ref 
Education:     
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 44 (78.6) 0.392 0.704 (0.315-1.574) 
Bachelor degree or equivalent 131 (43.0) 111 (84.7) 0.856 1.065 (0.538-2.111) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 99 (83.9)  Ref 
Direct reports:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 113 (85.0) 0.362 1.325 (0.724-2.425) 
No 179 (57.4) 145 (81.0)  Ref 
Business continuity role:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 114 (85.7) 0.226 1.458 (0.792-2.684) 
No 179 (57.4) 144 (80.4)  Ref 
Business continuity training:     
Yes 156 (50.0) 134 (85.9) 0.136 1.572 (0.867-2.850) 
No 156 (50.0) 124 (79.5)  Ref 
General ability to work from 
home: 
    
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 211 (81.2) 0.151 0.489 (0.184-1.298) 
Not able to work from home 49 (15.9) 44 (89.8)  Ref 
Job security:     
Insecure 61 (19.6) 46 (75.4) 0.097 0.564 (0.287-1.109) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 212 (84.5)  Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:     
Easy 132 (42.3) 109 (82.6) 0.549 1.243 (0.611-2.531) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 88 (85.4) 0.277 1.539 (0.708-3.345) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 61 (79.2)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
are you involved in conflicts 
at work? 
    
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 57 (83.8) 0.780 1.109 (0.537-2.288) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 201 (82.4)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
do you feel uneasy about 
going to work? 
    
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 77 (77.0) 0.070 0.573 (0.314-1.047) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 181 (85.4)  Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
    
Yes 77 (24.7) 60 (77.9) 0.204 0.660 (0.347-1.254) 
No 235 (75.3) 198 (84.3)  Ref 
Ability to go to work (incident 
specific) 
    
Not Able 196 (62.8) 146 (74.5) 0.000 0.104 (0.037-0.297) 
Able 116 (37.2) 112 (96.6)  Ref 
 
Table D20 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of a deliberate release of pneumonic plague 
Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Gender:     
Male 156 (50) 37 (23.7) 0.895 0.966 (0.574-1.623) 
Female 156 (50) 38 (24.4)  Ref 
Age:     
18-24 23 (7.4) 3 (13.0) 0.175 0.375 (0.091-1.548) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 28 (20.3) 0.293 0.636 (0.274-1.478) 
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Predictor Variable No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
35-44 60 (19.2) 17 (28.3) 0.980 0.988 (0.392-2.489) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 17 (30.4) 0.856 1.090 (0.431-2.758) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 10 (28.6)  Ref 
Work location:     
London 146 (46.8) 28 (19.2) 0.061 0.601 (0.353-1.023) 
Not London 166 (53.2) 47 (28.3)  Ref 
Salary:     
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 19 (19.4) 0.332 0.711 (0.357-1.416) 
More than £30k less than £50k 112 (37.2) 29 (25.9) 0.920 1.033 (0.548-1.948) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 23 (25.3)  Ref 
Children under 18:   0.116 1.565 (0.895-2.736) 
Yes 86 (27.6) 26 (30.2)  Ref 
No 226 (72.4) 49 (21.7)   
Education:     
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 11 (19.6) 0.402 0.717 (0.329-1.562) 
Bachelor degree or equivalent 131 (43.0) 33 (25.2) 0.966 0.988 (0.557-1.750) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 30 (25.4)  Ref 
Direct reports:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 38 (28.6) 0.107 1.535 (0.911-2.587) 
No 179 (57.4) 37 (20.7)  Ref 
Business continuity role:     
Yes 133 (42.6) 41 (30.8) 0.016 1.901 (1.125-3.211) 
No 179 (57.4) 34 (19.0)  Ref 
Business continuity training:     
Yes 156 (50.0) 47 (30.1) 0.013 1.971 (1.157-3.359) 
No 156 (50.0) 28 (17.9)  Ref 
General ability to work from 
home: 
    
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 59 (22.7) 0.236 0.665 (0.339-1.305) 
Not able to work from home 49 (15.9) 15 (30.6)  Ref 
Job security:     
Insecure 61 (19.6) 10 (16.4) 0.123 0.561 (0.269-1.169) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 65 (25.9)  Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:     
Easy 132 (42.3) 34 (25.8) 0.658 0.867 (0.462-1.628) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 19 (18.4) 0.111 0.565 (0.280-1.141) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 22 (28.6)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
does your supervisor or 
manager consider your 
views? 
    
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 68 (24.3) 0.274 1.844 (0.616-5.521) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 4 (14.8)  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
are you involved in conflicts 
at work? 
    
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 22 (32.4) 0.072 1.724 (0.953-3.116) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 53 (21.7 )  Ref 
Working climate: How often 
do you feel uneasy about 
going to work? 
    
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 23 (23.0) 0.768 0.919 (0.524-1.611) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 52 (24.5)  Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
    
Yes 77 (24.7) 23 (29.9) 0.169  1.499 (0.842-2.669) 
No 235 (75.3) 52 (22.1)    
Ability to go to work (incident 
specific) 
    
Not Able 188 (60.3) 34 (18.1) 0.003 0.447 (0.264-0.757) 




Table D21 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of severe snow (odds ratios adjusted for gender)  
Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
Gender:      
Male 156 (50) 146 (93.6) 0.006 2.920 (1.357-
6.285) 
 
Female 156 (50) 130 (83.3)  Ref  
Age:      
18-24 23 (7.4) 20 (87.0) 0.608  1.509 (0.313-
7.264) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 122 (88.4) 0.483  1.485 (0.492-
4.484) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 52 (86.7) 0.824  1.150 (0.337-
3.920) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 52 (92.9) 0.239  2.332 (0.569-
9.551) 
55+ 35 (11.2) 30 (85.7)   Ref 
Work location:      
London 146 (46.8) 133 (91.1) 0.231  1.561 (0.753-
3.236) 
Not London 166 (53.2) 143 (86.1)   Ref 
Salary:      
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 85 (86.7) 0.944  0.967 (0.380-
2.462) 
More than £30k less than 
£50k 
112 (37.2) 98 (87.5) 0.706  0.841 (0.342-
2.071) 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 82 (90.1)   Ref 
Children under 18:      
Yes 86 (27.6) 78 (90.7) 0.770  1.135 (0.486-
2.653) 
No 226 (72.4) 198 (87.6)   Ref 
Education:      
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 45 (80.4) 0.129  0.487 (0.193-
1.233) 
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 119 (90.8) 0.619  1.250 (0.519-
3.011) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 107 (90.7)   Ref 
Direct reports:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 119 (89.5) 0.804  1.096 (0.532-
2.257) 
No 179 (57.4) 157 (87.7)   Ref 
Business continuity role:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 119 (89.5) 0.719  1.141 (0.555-
2.347) 
No 179 (57.4) 157 (87.7)   Ref 
Business continuity 
training: 
     
Yes 156 (50.0) 140 (89.7) 0.593  1.213 (0.597-
2.463) 
No 156 (50.0) 136 (87.2)   Ref 
General ability to work 
from home: 
     
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 230 (88.5) 0.951  1.030 (0.399-
2.658) 
Not able to work from 
home 
49 (15.9) 43 (87.8)   Ref 
Job security:      
Insecure 61 (19.6) 54 (88.5) 0.690  1.199 (0.491-
2.931) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 222 (88.4)   Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:      
Easy 132 (42.3) 117 (88.6) 0.210  1.671 (0.749-
3.727) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 96 (93.2) 0.031  2.922 (1.105-
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Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 








Difficult 77 (24.7) 63 (81.8)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often does your 
supervisor or manager 
consider your views? 
     
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 250 (89.3) 0.085  2.415 (0.885-
6.590) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 21 (77.8)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often are you involved in 
conflicts at work? 
     
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 60 (88.2) 0.766  0.879 (0.375-
2.059) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 216 (88.5)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often do you feel uneasy 
about going to work? 
     
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 85 (85.0) 0.280  0.672 (0.327-
1.382) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 191 (90.1)   Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
     
Yes 77 (24.7) 62 (80.5) 0.058  0.489 (0.234-
1.024) 
No 235 (75.3) 214 (91.1)   Ref 
Ability to go to work 
(incident specific) 
     
Not Able 171 (54.8) 140 (81.9) 0.000  0.161 (0.060-
0.428) 
Able 141 (45.2) 136 (96.5)   Ref 
 
Table D22 Odds ratios for demographic and categorical variables predicting willingness to work 
in the event of a nuclear incident (odds ratios adjusted for location)  
Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
Gender:      
Male 156 (50) 39 (25.0) 0.653  1.128 (0.667-
1.907) 
Female 156 (50) 37 (23.7)   Ref 
Age:      
18-24 23 (7.4) 3 (13.0) 0.312  0.476 (0.113-
2.006) 
25-34 138 (44.2) 31 (22.5) 0.804  0.897 (0.380-
2.115) 
35-44 60 (19.2) 14 (23.3) 0.878  0.927 (0.353-
2.437) 
45-54 56 (17.9) 18 (32.1) 0.678  1.218 (0.480-
3.089 
55+ 35 (11.2) 10 (28.6)   Ref 
Work location:      
London 146 (46.8) 25 (17.1) 0.006 0.466 (0.271-
0.801) 
 
Not London 166 (53.2) 51 (30.7)  Ref  
Salary:      
Up to £30k 98 (32.6) 21 (21.4) 0.285  0.681 (0.336-
1.379) 
More than £30k less than 
£50k 




Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
£50k or more 91 (30.2) 22 (24.2)   Ref 
Children under 18:      
Yes 86 (27.6) 24 (27.9) 0.462  1.239 (0.700-
2.195) 
No 226 (72.4) 52 (23.0)   Ref 
Education:      
GCSE/A Level or equivalent 56 (18.4) 11 (19.6) 0.506  0.761 (0.341-
1.701) 
Bachelor degree or 
equivalent 
131 (43.0) 38 (29.0) 0.277  1.384 (0.771-
2.483) 
Masters/PhD or equivalent 118 (38.7) 26 (22.0)   Ref 
Direct reports:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 40 (30.1) 0.032  1.785 (1.051-
3.030) 
No 179 (57.4) 36 (20.1)   Ref 
Business continuity role:      
Yes 133 (42.6) 44 (33.1) 0.006  2.127 (1.248-
3.623) 
No 179 (57.4) 32 (17.9)   Ref 
Business continuity 
training: 
     
Yes 156 (50.0) 49 (31.4) 0.004  2.234 (1.298-
3.843) 
No 156 (50.0) 27 (17.3)   Ref 
General ability to work 
from home: 
     
Able to work from home 260 (84.1) 62 (23.8) 0.923  1.036 (0.508-
2.112) 
Not able to work from 
home 
49 (15.9) 13 (26.5)   Ref 
Job security:      
Insecure 61 (19.6) 13 (21.3) 0.488  0.785 (0.396-
1.556) 
Secure 251 (80.4) 63 (25.1)   Ref 
Ease of getting a new job:      
Easy 132 (42.3) 33 (25.0) 0.946  0.978 (0.511-
1.872) 
Neither/Not sure 103 (33.0) 22 (21.4) 0.391  0.737 (0.367-
1.480) 
Difficult 77 (24.7) 21 (27.3)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often does your 
supervisor or manager 
consider your views? 
     
Often/Sometimes 280 (91.2) 71 (25.4) 0.068  3.175 (0.917-
10.988) 
Rarely/Never 27 (8.8) 3 (11.1)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often are you involved in 
conflicts at work? 
     
Often/Sometimes 68 (21.8) 20 (29.4) 0.305  1.375 (0.748-
2.529) 
Rarely/Never 244 (78.2) 56 (23.0)   Ref 
Working climate: How 
often do you feel uneasy 
about going to work? 
     
Often/Sometimes  100 (32.1) 23 (23.0) 0.821  0.936 (0.531-
1.652) 
Rarely/Never 212 (67.9) 53 (25.0)   Ref 
Working climate: Are you 
aware of any workplace 
bullying? 
     
Yes 77 (24.7) 24 (31.2) 0.188  1.477 (0.826-
2.641) 
No 235 (75.3) 52 (22.1)   Ref 
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Predictor Variable No of participants 
(%) 
No (%) willing 
to work 
p Unadjusted odds 




ratio (95% CI) 
for willingness 
to work 
Ability to go to work 
(incident specific) 
     
Not Able 230 (73.7) 40 (17.4) 0.000  0.301 (0.171—
0.529) 
Able 82 (26.3) 36 (43.9)   Ref 
 
Table D23 Reliability of predictor scales 
Predictor scales Cronbach’s alpha 
Organisational Identification 0.848 (good) 
Job satisfaction 0.847 (good) 
Resilience 0.709 (good) 
Sensation seeking 0.871 (good) 
 
Table D24 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
bomb/explosive device (odds ratios adjusted for age) 
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants  
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.001 1.627 (1.216-2.177) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.018 1.229 (1.036-1.459) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.021 1.123 (1.018-1.240) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.173 (1.075-1.280) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.001 0.803 (0.702-0.919) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.032 1.108 (1.009-1.218) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.240 0.871 (0.691-1.097) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.087 1.355 (0.957-1.920) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
4.37 (2.33), 312 0.262 1.058 (0.959-1.168) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
7.65 (1.91 ), 312 0.015 0.849 (0.745-0.968) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
7.01 (2.28), 312 0.013 0.873 (0.785-0.972) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  




Table D25 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
chemical warfare agent release 
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No  of 
participants 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.001 1.817 (1.279-2.582) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.214 1.141 (0.927-1.405) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.000 1.359 (1.178-1.569) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.291 (1.150-1.451) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.115 0.874 (0.739-1.033) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.490 1.040 (0.931-1.162) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.929 0.988 (0.758-1.287) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.378  1.203 (0.798-1.815) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
2.64 (1.99), 312 0.238 1.080 (0.950-1.228) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
8.15 (1.53), 312 0.002 0.779 (0.666-0.910) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
7.54 (2.13), 312 0.211 0.928 (0.825-1.043) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  
Years 7.50 (8.45), 312 0.043 1.030 (1.001-1.060) 
 
Table D26 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of an 
accidental chemical spill or leak 
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.014 1.420 (1.075-1.877) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.038 1.192 (1.010-1.406) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.004 1.153 (1.046-1.271) 
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Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.164 (1.070-1.267) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.018 0.858 (0.755-0.975) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.552 1.028 (0.938-1.126) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.027 0.774 (0.616-0.972) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.111 1.320 (0.938-1.856) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
3.80 (2.24), 312 0.030 1.121 (1.011-1.242) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
7.00 (1.99), 312 0.159 0.920 (0.820-1.033) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
6.61 (2.28), 312 0.004 0.858 (0.773-0.952) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  
Years 7.50 (8.45), 312 0.402 1.012 (0.985-1.039) 
 
Table D27 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of 
pandemic flu (new strain) (odds ratios adjusted for location)  
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.004 1.526 (1.148-2.029) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.001 1.322 (1.114-1.569) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.000 1.229 (1.111-1.360) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.254 (1.146-1.371) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.004 0.825 (0.724-0.940) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.015 1.122 (1.023-1.231) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.999 1.000 (0.799-1.251) 
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Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
personality) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.009 1.597 (1.126-2.266) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
4.88 (2.37), 312 
 
0.021 1.120 (1.017-1.234) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
7.77 (1.53), 312 0.154 0.897 (0.773-1.041) 
 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
7.30 (1.95), 312 0.016 0.858 (0.757-0.972) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  
Years 7.50 (8.45), 312 0.136 1.022 (0.993-1.051) 
 
Table D28 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
deliberate release of the smallpox virus 
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.128 1.265 (0.935-1.710) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.027 1.251 (1.026-1.526) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.000 1.237 (1.100-1.392) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.229 (1.112-1.358) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.503 0.953 (0.828-1.097) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.658 1.023 (0.925-1.131) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.784 0.967 (0.759-1.232) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.947 1.013 (0.700-1.464) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
2.33 (1.84), 312 
 
0.318 0.931 (0.808-1.072) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
8.00 (1.71), 312 0.002 0.802 (0.700-0.920) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
7.33 (2.311), 312 0.000 0.826 (0.747-0.914) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  




Table D29 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
dirty bomb (odds ratios adjusted for location)  
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.017 1.514 (1.076-2.128) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.006 1.393 (1.101-1.763) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.000 1.336 (1.158-1.543) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.270 (1.128-1.428) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.136 0.882 (0.749-1.040) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.481 1.041 (0.931-1.164) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.904  0.984 (0.751-1.288) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.757 1.066 (0.710-1.601) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
2.74 (1.82), 312 0.161 1.097 (0.964-1.250) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
8.24 (1.57), 312 0.102 0.879 (0.753-1.026) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
7.61 (2.19), 312 0.151 0.920 (0.820-1.031) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  
Years 7.50 (8.45), 312 0.007 1.041 (1.011-1.071) 
 
Table D30 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of 
severe flooding 
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted Odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.005 1.678 (1.170-2.406) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.001 1.394 (1.144-1.699) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.000 1.259 (1.113-1.423) 
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Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted Odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.019 1.138 (1.021-1.267) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.006 0.815 (0.705-0.943) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.802 1.015 (0.902-1.143) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.708 0.972 (0.840-1.126) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.029 1.272 (1.025-1.577) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
4.39 (2.51), 312 0.258 1.072 (0.951-1.208) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
5.74 (2.35), 312 0.037 0.867 (0.759-0.991) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
4.37 (2.43), 312 0.156 0.917 (0.813-1.034) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  
Years 7.50 (8.45), 312 0.919 0.998 (0.964-1.033) 
 
Table D31 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
deliberate release of pneumonic plague 
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.018 1.490 (1.072-2.072) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.090 1.198 (0.972-1.475) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.000 1.275 (1.119-1.453) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.318 (1.174-1.479) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.278 0.918 (0.786-1.072) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.740 1.018 (0.915-1.133) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.596 0.933 (0.721-1.207) 
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Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
personality) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.730  1.072 (0.722-1.591) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
2.27 (1.82), 312 0.830 0.984 (0.852-1.138) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
8.08 (1.58), 312 0.005 0.807 (0.694-0.937) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
7.49 (2.15), 312 0.012 0.867 (0.776-0.969) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  
Years 7.50 (8.45), 312 0.012 1.037 (1.008-1.067) 
 
 
Table D32 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of 
severe snow (odds ratios adjusted for gender)  
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.062 2.944 (1.362-6.361) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.078 1.233 (0.977-1.556) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.034 1.168 (1.012-1.348) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.270 1.075 (0.946-1.222) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.001 0.764 (0.649-0.900) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.172 1.101 (0.959-1.263) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.706 1.070 (0.752-1.522) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.029 1.736 (1.057-2.851) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
5.95 (2.23), 312 0.352 1.076 (0.922-1.255) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
4.64 (2.40), 312 0.246 0.916 (0.789-1.063) 
Likelihood of incident 1-9 (higher number = more 3.89 (2.48), 312 0.085 0.885 (0.770-1.017) 
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Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants 
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  
Years 7.50 (8.45), 312 0.251 0.977 (0.939-1.017) 
 
Table D33 Odds ratios for continuous variables predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
nuclear incident (odds ratios adjusted for location)  
Predictor Variable Scale range or unit of 
measurement 
Mean (SD), No of 
participants  
p Adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for 
willingness to work 
Organisational 
Identification 
1-5 (higher number = 
identifies more with 
organisation) 
3.38 (0.83), 312 0.011 1.537 (1.103-2.140) 
Job satisfaction 1-7 (higher number = more 
satisfied with job) 
5.29 (1.37), 312 0.004 1.391 (1.110-1.743) 
Belief that going to work 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to the 
organisation 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief role is important) 
6.08 (2.35), 312 0.000 1.375 (1.193-1.584) 
Belief that organisation 
continuing to function 
during a serious incident 
will make a big 
difference to keeping 
country running 
1-9 (higher number = more 
belief recovery of 
organisation is important) 
5.65 (2.72), 312 0.000 1.275 (1.138-1.429) 
Belief that health and 
safety of staff is priority 
with management 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief health and safety is 
important to employer) 
2.74 (1.80) 312 0.015 0.806 (0.678-0.959) 
Belief that organisation 
would put continuation 
of business above 
personal safety 
1-9 (lower number = more 
belief that organisation 
would put continuation of 
business above personal 
safety) 
6.46 (2.45), 312 0.093 1.101 (0.984-1.232) 
Sensation seeking 1-5 (lower number = more 
sensation seeking 
personality) 
3.57 (1.01), 312 0.954 1.008 (0.776-1.309) 
Resilience 1-5 (higher number = more 
resilient) 
4.12 (0.66), 312 0.157 1.342 (0.893-2.016) 
Likelihood of incident 
occurring in an area 
close to their place of 
work 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to occur) 
2.09 (1.73), 312 0.703 1.029 (0.890-1.189) 
Likelihood of incident 
causing severe public 
health consequences if it 
did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to cause severe public 
health consequences if it did 
occur 
8.25 (1.60), 312 0.009 0.822 (0.709-0.952) 
Likelihood of incident 
putting own health at 
risk if it did occur 
1-9 (higher number = more 
likely to put own health at 
risk if it did occur 
7.69 (2.17), 312 0.060 0.898 (0.804-1.004) 
Length of time spent 
working for organisation  








Table D34 Odds ratios for EPPM predicting willingness to work in the event of a bomb/explosive 
incident (odds ratios adjusted for age)  
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Adjusted odds ratio (95% 
CI) for willingness to 
work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
90 (28.8) 45 (50.0) 0.056 0.530 (0.276-1.016) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
79 (25.3) 49 (62.0) 0.526 0.802 (0.406-1.585) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
72 (23.1) 28 (38.9) 0.006 0.378 (0.189-0.754) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
71 (22.8) 46 (64.8)  Ref 
 
Table D35 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
chemical warfare agent release 
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
95 (30.4) 14 (14.7) 0.016 0.398 (0.188-0.842) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
73 (23.4) 26 (35.6) 0.588 1.209 (0.608-2.404) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
67 (21.5) 6 (9.0) 0.003 0.229 (0.087-0.607) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
77 (24.7) 24 (34.3)  Ref 
 
Table D36 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of an 
accidental chemical spill or leak  
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
116 (37.2) 61 (52.6) 0.006 0.389 (0.197-0.766) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
85 (27.2) 49 (57.6) 0.033 0.461 (0.227-0.938) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
46 (14.7) 19 (41.3) 0.000 0.230 (0.101-0.523) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
65 (20.8) 48 (73.8)  Ref 
 
Table D37 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of 
pandemic flu (new strain) (odds ratios adjusted for location)  
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Adjusted odds ratio (95% 
CI) for willingness to 
work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
93 (29.8) 41 (44.1) 0.000 0.245 (0.121-0.497) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
80 (25.6) 50 (62.5) 0.040 0.466 (0.225-0.965) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
69 (22.1) 28 (40.6) 0.000 0.180 (0.084-3.84) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 





Table D38 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
deliberate release of the smallpox virus 
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
106 (34.0) 25 (23.6) 0.223 0.650 (0.325-1.300) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
85 (27.2) 39 (45.9) 0.125 1.701 (0.863-3.352) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
56 (17.9) 6 (10.7) 0.006 0.250 (0.092-0.678) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
65 (20.8) 21 (32.3)  Ref 
 
Table D39 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of a dirty 
bomb (odds ratios adjusted for location) 
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Adjusted odds ratio (95% 
CI) for willingness to 
work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
111 (35.6) 15 (13.5) 0.000 0.233 (0.107-0.506) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
96 (30.8) 27 (28.1) 0.076 0.522 (0.255-1.070) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
51 (16.3) 5 (9.8) 0.001 0.161 (0.055-0.473) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
54 (17.3) 22 (40.7)  Ref 
 
Table D40 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of severe 
flooding  
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
95 (30.4) 73 (76.8) 0.147 0.539 (0.234-1.243) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
76 (24.4) 71 (93.4) 0.266 2.227 (0.717-6.912) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
67 (21.5) 50 (74.6) 0.088 0.467 (0.195-1.120) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
74 (23.7) 64 (86.5)  Ref 
 
Table D41 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
deliberate release of pneumonic plague  
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) for willingness 
to work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
106 (34.0) 19 (17.9) 0.041 0.459 (0.217-0.970) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
93 (29.8) 33 (35.5) 0.831 1.079 (0.535-2.179) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
56 (17.9) 4 (7.1) 0.002 0.159 (0.050-0.507) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 





Table D42 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of severe 
snow (odds ratios adjusted for gender) 
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Adjusted odds ratio (95% 
CI) for willingness to 
work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
88 (28.2) 75 (85.2) 0.294  0.588 (0.217-1.587) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
72 (23.1) 67 (93.1) 0.646 1.325 (0.399-4.404) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
74 (23.7) 63 (85.1) 0.297 0.583 (0.211-1.608) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
78 (25.0) 71 (91.0)  Ref 
 
Table D43 Odds ratios for EPPM categories predicting willingness to work in the event of a 
nuclear incident (odds ratios adjusted for location)  
EPPM Categories No of participants (%) No (%) willing to 
work 
p Adjusted odds ratio (95% 
CI) for willingness to 
work 
Low Threat Low Efficacy 
(LTLE) 
113 (36.2) 18 (15.9) 0.005 0.358 (0.173-0.737) 
Low Threat High Efficacy 
(LTHT) 
86 (27.2) 32 (37.2) 0.861 1.062 (0.540-2.092) 
High Threat Low Efficacy 
(HTLT) 
49 (15.7) 3 (6.1) 0.001 0.123 (0.34-0.442) 
High Threat High Efficacy 
(HTHT) 
64 (20.5) 23 (35.9)  Ref 
 
Table D44 Responses to survey item 19: Are you well informed about the business continuity 
arrangements/plans at the organisation where you currently work? 
Response options Response percentage 
Yes – I am fully informed 25.6 
Yes – But I only know some details 26.6 
I am aware they exist but don’t know any details 26.3 
No – I don’t know if the organisation has any business continuity 
arrangements/plans 
19.9 




Table D45 Responses to survey item 35a: I believe my organisation has taken steps to find out 
what might prevent staff from reporting to work during a serious incident (Likert Scale: 1 = 
strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree) 












Table D46 Responses to survey item 35b: During a serious incident my organisation wouldn’t be 
interested in why I wasn’t willing to come to work, only that I wasn’t at work (Likert Scale: 1 = 
strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree) 





































Appendix E: Focus group modelling data 
Table E1 Pneumonic plague scenario modelling data 
 
NB: Data includes successful intervention by public health authorities. However, after day 4 it 
is assumed that 10% of the total number of infected people did not go to the treatment centre 






























0 0.000 0.000 - - 0 - - - 
1 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.000 128 0 128 0 
2 0.157 0.142 0.002 0.002 1,269 15 1,397 15 
3 0.416 0.260 0.030 0.029 2,316 256 3,713 272 
4 0.652 0.236 0.139 0.109 2,106 969 5,819 1,241 
5 0.810 0.158 0.326 0.187 141 167 5,959 1,408 
6 0.900 0.090 0.532 0.205 80 183 6,040 1,591 
7 0.948 0.049 0.703 0.171 43 153 5,955 1,744 
8 0.974 0.025 0.824 0.120 22 107 6,106 1,852 
9 0.986 0.013 0.900 0.076 11 68 6,117 1,920 
10 0.993 0.007 0.945 0.045 6 40 6,123 1,960 
11 0.996 0.003 0.970 0.025 3 22 6,126 1,982 
12 0.998 0.002 0.984 0.014 2 12 6,128 1,995 
13 0.999 0.001 0.991 0.007 1 7 6,128 2,001 
14 0.999 0.000 0.995 0.004 0 4 6,129 2,005 
15 1.000 0.000 0.997 0.002 0 2 6,129 2,007 
16 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.001 0 1 6,129 2,008 
17 1.000 0.000 0.999 0.001 0 1 6,129 2,008 
18 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0 0 6,129 2,009 
19 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0 0 6,129 2,009 
20 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0 0 6,129 2,009 
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Appendix F: Focus group injects  
(Images and content reproduced with permission of Public Health England ©2015)  
Inject 1: Mock News Broadcast Script 
 
John Anchor, (voicing over intro shot): ‘Our top story: Found - the terrorist device used to bring Plague to 
the UK – hidden in the rafters of a busy train station. 
(Back to shot of anchor in news studio) 
John Anchor: Good evening. Tonight police are at the start of a major investigation following the 
discovery of the device terrorists used to deliver their deadly attack on train travellers earlier this week. 
After numbers of people being admitted to hospitals with suspected Plague soared, investigators were 
yesterday able to narrow down what it was that connected them - a journey in rush hour on a busy 
commuter train from Victoria station. 
Then, last night came the breakthrough investigators were hoping for. Police officers discovered the device 
in the rafters of the station following a finger-tip search of the building and track. 
Now the site of the attack has been identified – a busy mainline station - fears are growing for the numbers 
of people who will have been affected. 
Our reporter Hazel Westwood is outside Victoria station this evening. Hazel, what’s the latest? 
(OB of Hazel Westwood outside train station) 
Hazel Westwood: Well, as you can see, the train station is now a crime scene which officers are scouring 
to gather as much evidence as they can before the station re-opens. 
Health officials insist that the station poses no threat to public health and will be safe to open to the public 
once police officers have finished here. 
John Anchor: Do we know how the terrorists were able to access the station and plant such a deadly 
device? 
Hazel Westwood: At this moment in time, no John, we don’t and police are keeping pretty tight-lipped 
about their theories at this stage. What we can say though, is that the transport infrastructure in the USA 
has come under similar attack in recent months so we could be looking at a well-practised model. 
What is also very clear is that the effect of this attack has been devastating to the South East and 
increasingly further a-field, with more than 100 people in Kent alone with chest and respiratory symptoms 
and hospitals struggling to cope. 
John Anchor: What are the doctors saying about the casualties? How many people are expected to be 
affected? 
Hazel Westwood: Earlier today I managed to speak to Dr Bowen, from the Health Protection Agency’s 
Centre for Emergency Protection and Response, who said that emergency plans were being initiated and 
implemented in the South East, to deal with what is an escalating public health emergency. 
(Shot to clip of Hazel’s interview with Dr Bowen) 
Hazel Westwood: Thanks for speaking to us, Dr. Bowen. First of all, can you tell me whether or not all 
those at the station have been traced? 
Dr Bowen: We’re requesting that anyone who was at the station 2 hours either side of the estimated 
release time, which we think is approximately 5pm, go to one of the mass treatment centres that are being 
set-up in sport facilities and M.o.D. sites. A list of these sites is available from NHS Direct. People going to 
these centres will be assessed and given antibiotic treatment to make sure that they do not contract the 
disease. Contact tracing of those who had contact with infected individuals is continuing. Otherwise the 
advice to the public is to carry on as normal – if they have concerns they should call NHS Direct or visit 
their GP. 
Hazel Westwood: What’s the significance of the contact tracing – can people catch Plague by being in 
contact with someone who caught the disease at the station? 
Dr. Bowen: Yes it is a possibility and one we’re concerned about which is why it is a vital part of our 
response to this situation. 
Hazel Westwood: But with so many people having passed through that station during the rush hour when 
the disease was released, is contact tracing enough – will you also be recommending for example, that 
travel is restricted and public gatherings cancelled? 
Dr Bowen: No, the advice is to carry on as usual. 
Hazel Westwood: Is this advice, in part, based on the fact that hospitals are already under enormous 
pressure from this crisis, with Intensive Care Departments particularly struggling? If mass treatment 
centres have been established, you must be anticipating that considerable numbers of people will require 
treatment? 
Dr. Bowen: I can’t comment on hospital capacities but NHS organisations have emergency plans which 
are being activated. The mass treatment centres are a way forward which provides a targeted response to 
a specific emergency, which this quite clearly is. 















































Appendix G: Focus group discussion guide 
Stage 1: TV NEWS REPORT 
1) First reactions - Written responses: 
 
First reactions to hearing the report: 
– What you might be ‘thinking’ 
– What you might be ‘feeling’ 
– Anything you might ‘do’ 
 
2) Discussion - General: 
 
- What you might be thinking and feeling  
- What if you had been at the station – does anybody go through Victoria station? 
- What if you hadn’t been near the station 
- What concerns might you have about themselves 
- Thoughts about family/significant others  
- Any possible protective actions likely to be considered  
- What further information do you want and where would you look for it 
 
Prompts:   
Would you attend a treatment centre if you were at the station either side of 5pm? 
Would you carry on as normal? 
Would you contact GP/NHS Direct for advice if concerned? 
 
3) Discussion - Organisation focused: 
 
- What are you thinking about going to work tomorrow or the next day 
- What information do you think you would get from their employer 
- What information would you want to get from your employer 
- Who at your organisation would they want to hear from – who would you trust to tell you it’s 
safe to come into work – is there anyone you wouldn’t trust 
- Thoughts about commuting 
- Thoughts about colleagues 
- Precautions you might take in light of the report 
 
Prompts: 
What barriers might prevent you from being able/willing to report to work? 





Stage 2: NEWS WEBSITE ARTICLE 
1) First reactions: Written responses: 
 
First reactions to reading the article: 
– What you might be ‘thinking’ 
– What you might be ‘feeling’ 
– Anything you might ‘do’ 
 
2) Discussion - General: 
 
- What you might be thinking and feeling 
- What concerns you have 
- Any possible actions likely to be considered 
- What further information do you want (what questions would you have) and where would you 
look for it 
- Thoughts about family/significant others  
 
Prompts:   
Would you attend a treatment centre if you thought you’d been in contact with someone who was at 
the station at that time, or someone who was later confirmed as having plague? 
Would you carry on as normal? 
Would you contact GP/NHS Direct for advice if concerned? 
 
3) Discussion - Organisation focused: 
 
- What are you thinking about going to work tomorrow or the next day 
- What information do you think you would get from their employer 
- What information would you want to get from your employer 
- Who at your organisation would they want to hear from – who would you trust to tell you it’s 
safe to come into work – is there anyone you wouldn’t trust 
- Thoughts about commuting 
- Thoughts about colleagues (what if there was a confirmed case in the office) 
- Precautions you might take in light of the report 
 
Prompts: 
What barriers might prevent you from being able/willing to report to work? 





Stage 3: SOCIAL MEDIA POST 
1) First reactions: Written responses 
 
First reactions to seeing the social media post: 
– What you might be ‘thinking’ 
– What you might be ‘feeling’ 
– Anything you might ‘do’ 
 
2) Discussion - General: 
 
- What you might be thinking and feeling 
- What concerns you might have 
- Any possible actions likely to be considered 
- What further information do you want and where would you look for it 
- Thoughts about family/significant others 
- Any thoughts about the authenticity of the post 
- Any concerns about the timeline – 2 weeks later  
 
3) Discussion - Organisation focused: 
 
- What are you thinking about going to work 
- What if there was a confirmed case in the office or the office next door as in the post 
- What information would you expect to get from your employer via social media 
- What information would you want to get from your employer via social media 
- Who at your organisation would they want to hear from – who would you trust to tell you it’s 
safe to come into work 
- Thoughts about commuting 
- Thoughts about colleagues 
- Precautions you might take in light of the social media post 
 
Prompts: 
What barriers might prevent you from being able/willing to report to work? 
What might help your ability/willingness to report to work? 
 
 
 
